Home » Nigerian Cases » Supreme Court » Muhammadu Buhari V. Chief Olusegun A. Obasanjo (2006) LLJR-SC

Muhammadu Buhari V. Chief Olusegun A. Obasanjo (2006) LLJR-SC

Muhammadu Buhari V. Chief Olusegun A. Obasanjo (2006)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

M.L UWAIS, CJN

The Presidential Elections was held on the 19th day of April 2003 to fill the offices of the President and the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The election, which was conducted nation-wide by the 3rd Respondent/Cross Appellant, was contested by candidates from 20 political parties. The 1st Appellant/Cross Respondent together with another candidate (now deceased) contested the election as candidates of the 2nd Appellant/Cross-Respondent – All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) while the 1st and 2nd Respondents/Cross-Appellants contested as candidates of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The 1st and 2nd Respondents/Cross-Appellants were returned by the 5th Respondent/Cross-Appellant as duly elected President and Vice-President, of the Federal Republic of Nigeria respectively.

The 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents felt aggrieved and, therefore, as petitioners, brought a petition, before the Court of Appeal, on the 20th day of May, 2003, challenging the declaration of the 1st and 2nd Respondents/Cross-Appellants as President and Vice-President respectively and joining the 4th and 5th Respondents/ Cross-Appellants, as well as the 3rd and 6th to 268th Respondents/Respondents as provided by section 133(2) of the Electoral Act, 2002.

In their petition, which was amended twice, the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents, pleaded in paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof, as follows:-

“4. “And your petitioners state that the candidates and their scores as arbitrarily assigned to each candidate and declared by the National Returning Officer for the Presidential election are as follows:

The 1st Respondent who together with the 2nd Respondent were sponsored by the Peoples Demo-cratic Party was returned as elected.

“The petitioners shall contend that the figures ascribed to each of the candidates in the result above pleaded were the product of deliberate wrong entries made by the 3rd Respondent’s Agents or representatives at the wards, Local Government Areas and State collation centers. The declared result of the Presidential election held on the 19th April, 2003 is hereby pleaded.”

The relief’s sought in the last Amended Petition are:-

“(a) An order of the court, that the election is invalid for reasons of non-compliance with substantial sections of the Electoral Act 2002.

(b) An order of the court that the election is invalid for reason of corrupt practices.

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(c) An order of the court that at the time of the election the 1st Respondent was not qualified to contest.”

The trial of the petition, which lasted about 15 months, began before the Court of Appeal (Abdullahi, PCA, Mahmud Mohammed, J.C.A. (as he then was) Nsofor and Tabai, JJ.C.A.) on the 25th day of September, 2003, ended on the 20th day of December, 2004. The Court having heard the 139 witnesses called by the 1st and 2nd petitioners (1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Appellants), the 100 witnesses called by the 1st and 2nd respondents (1st and 2nd Respondents/Appellants) and the 116 witnesses called by the 3rd and 6th to 268th Respondents (3rd and 6th to 268th Respondents/ Cross-Respondents). Being altogether to 355 witnesses.

In the leading judgment of the Court of Appeal, delivered by Tabai, J.C.A., (with Nsofor J.C.A. dissenting,) the Court held as follows:-

“I have considered the evidence in support of the allegations in each of the 14 States which elections (sic) were questioned. And in the exercise I have cancelled the election in Ogun State, some Local Government Areas, Wards and Units. The question is the effect (sic) of this annulment on the election in the country. For the determinations (sic) of this question I refer to the provisions of Section 134(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Section 134(2) of the Constitution provides:-

‘A candidate for an election to the office of President shall be deemed to have been elected where, there being more than two candidates for the election –

(a) he has the highest number of votes cast at the election; and

(b) he has not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election on each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.’

This provision appears clear to me. Where a candidate wins the highest number of votes cast in at least two-thirds of the 36 States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, he is deemed to be elected………. I do not appreciate any ambiguity in the provision and even if there was one, this Court is bound to adopt a construction which is just, reasonable and sensible. (See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, Chapter 10). In my view, it would lead to absurdity and manifest injustice to nullify the election for the entire nation because of the nullification of the election of one State, some Local Government Areas, Wards and units. Such a devastating result could hardly have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.

It is my conclusion therefore that the cancellation of the election in Ogun State and the other smaller components does not substantially affect the election of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

In the event, this petition fails and same is dismissed with costs which I assess at N5,000 in favour of each set of Respondents.”

The notice of appeal to this Court, filed by the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents, contains 41 grounds of appeal and the following 7 reliefs which are being sought:-

“(a) To allow the Appeal.

(b) To set aside the majority judgment of the Lower Court (sic) dismissing the petition.

(c) To uphold the dissenting judgment of Nsofor, JCA.

(d) To allow the petition on all the grounds and consequentially disqualify the 1st and 2nd Respondents under section 129 of the Electoral Act (2002).

(e) To order the 3rd Respondent to conduct a fresh election within one month from the date of judgment in this Appeal.

(f) In the event of disqualifying the 1st and 2nd Respondents either under Ground 9(c) of the petition and/or consequentially under section 129 of the electoral Act, to order the 3rd Respondent to conduct a fresh election between the remaining candidates in the election.

(g) In the event that the appeal succeeds, with or without the disqua-lification of the 1st and 2nd Respon-dents, to order that the President of the Senate acts as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria during the period between the judgment and the fresh election.”

The 1st and 2nd Respondents/Cross-Appellants and the 4th and 5th Respondents/Cross-Appellants, with our leave, have both cross-appealed. However, I shall delay consideration of the cross-appeals till I determine the appeal by the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents Chief Mike Ahamba, Senior Advocate of Nigeria, in the Amended Brief of Argument filed on their behalf, has formulated 18 issues for determination to cover the 41 grounds of appeal filed. They read as follows:-

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“ISSUE NO. 1

Whether the Court of Appeal properly interpreted Sections 135(1) and 67(3) of the Electoral Act 2002 (Grounds 5, 7 and 25).

ISSUE NO. 2

Whether the Court of Appeal properly interpreted and applied the presumption of regularity under Section 150(1) of the Evidence Act in the judgment (Grounds 3, 13 and 30).

ISSUE NO. 3

Whether the failure of the Court of Appeal to nullify the Presidential Election of 19th April, 2003 after holding the 3rd respondent damnable and lacking in neutrality and impartiality for failing to produce election results was proper in law (Ground 1).

ISSUE NO. 4

Whether the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that non-compliance with Section 67(3) of the Electoral Act was not proved is sustainable considering the express provisions of the Section, the pleadings of the parties and the totality of evidence on record on the point (Grounds 8 and 9).

See also  Ndokwu Mberekpe V. Udom Adikes & Anor (1962) LLJR-SC

ISSUE NO. 5

Whether the Court of Appeal’s failure to invalidate the Presidential election after holding that Section 18 of the Electoral Act 2002 was not complied with was proper (Ground 4).

ISSUE NO. 6

Whether the Court of Appeal’s failure to invalidate the Presidential election after finding that Section 40(1) of the Electoral Act, 2002 was breached in the conduct of the election was proper (Ground 10).

ISSUE NO. 7

Whether the Court of Appeal was not in error by failing to invalidate the Presidential election considering the specific and uncontroverted evidence of bias or likelihood of it in the 1NEC, and Resident Electoral Commi-ssioners in twelve States of the Federation (Grounds 11,12 and 17).

ISSUE NO. 8

Whether the failure of the Court of Appeal to apply Section 149(d) of the Evidence Act against 3rd Respondent for failing to produce the letter of protest in Cross-River State for which Notice to produce had been given was proper in law (Ground 14).

ISSUE NO. 9

Whether the Court of Appeal’s non-application of the provisions of Section 129 of Electoral Act 2002 against the 1st and 2nd Respondents was proper after the pleadings, evidence on record and the findings of the Court on intimidation and violence,. (Grounds 23 and 34).

ISSUE NO. 10

Whether the exclusion in the majority judgment of the properly admitted evidence of malpractices proffered in several Local Government Areas on the ground that such Local Government Areas were not specifically pleaded was proper in law (Grounds 2 and 37).

ISSUE NO. 11

Whether, on the balance of probability, the Presidential election should not have been invalidated (Grounds 24, 31, 32 and 33).

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ISSUE NO. 12

Whether there was no evidence proffered on Imo State that can substantially affect the election (Ground 36).

ISSUE NO. 13

Whether the Court of Appeal was not in error by discountenancing a substantial volume of evidence in some States on the ground of a perceived non-joinder of necessary parties (Grounds 18 and 28).

ISSUE NO. 14

Whether on the balance of probability the election in each of Adamawa, Kaduna, Enugu, Kogi, Taraba, Ebonyi, Benue, Cross River, Edo, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Imo States should not have been severally invalidated (Grounds 15, 16, 19. 20, 21, 22, 27, 29, 35, 40 and 41).

ISSUE NO. 15

Whether the Court of Appeal was not in error by upholding the Presidential election of 19/4/03 after invalidating the election of one state (Ogun) considering the provisions of Section 134(1) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ground 6)

ISSUE NO. 16

Whether the 1st and 2nd Respon-dents’ Reply is a competent process in the proceeding (Ground 39).

ISSUE NO. 17

Whether the 1st Respondent was qualified to contest the Presidential election under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ground 38).

ISSUE NO. 18

Whether the Court of Appeal did not misdirect itself on the number of States of the Federation upon which the Petitioner proffered evidence and, if it did, whether the misdirection did not occasion a miscarriage of justice (Ground 26).”

For his part, Chief Afe Babalola, Senior Advocate of Nigeria, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents/Cross-Appellants, puts forward, in their Amended Brief of Argument, 11 issues for determination, thus:-

“(1) Whether or not the statement of the court below, “that INEC’s failure to produce the Presidential Election Results which it was summoned to produce amounts to a negation of INEC’s claim to neutrality is of any moment and capable of denying the election the presumption of regularity to lead to nullifying the Presidential election herein? Grounds 1, 13 (Appellants, Issues 2 & 3).

(2) Whether or not the court below was not right in its decision to discoun-tenance and or expunge from record all evidence led by the petitioners in that case that were not pleaded? Ground 2 (Appellants’ Issue 10).

(3) Whether or not the Presidential Election of 19/4/03 was not conducted in substantial compliance with the provisions of Electoral Act, 2002 particularly Sections 18, 40(1), 17(2), 19, required for the validation of the election? Grounds 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 30, 31, 32, 33 (Appellants’ Issues 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 11 & 15).

(4) Whether or not the appellants proved their allegation of failure to certify the election materials as required by S. 67(3) of the Electoral Act, 2002 and if so whether any such failure is capable of rendering the election void? Grounds 7, 8, 9 & 25 (Appellants’ Issue No. 1 & 4).

(5) Whether or not the appellants pleaded and proved their allegations of malpractice, irregularities in the conduct of the election in Cross-River State, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Adamawa, Lagos, Rivers, Bayelsa, Taraba, Enugu, Ebonyi, Benue, Imo, Edo, Kogi States to substantially affect the election in those States? Grounds 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 29, 35, 36, 37, 40 and 41 (Appellants’ Issue 8, 12 & 14).

(6) Whether or not the court below was not right in discountenancing evidence adduced against presiding Officers that were not joined as parties to the petition? Grounds 18, 28 (Appellants’ Issue 13).

(7) Whether or not the findings of the court below that violence and destruction of properties attended the election in some places were substantial and sufficiently linked to the 1st and 2nd Respondents to invalidate their election? Grounds 23, 34 (Appellants’ Issue 9).

(8) Whether or not the nullification of the Presidential Election in Ogun State and few other Local Governments, Wards and Polling units in the Federation was right and, if so, whether the said nullifications were substantial to warrant the nullification of the entire election? Ground 24 (Appellants’ Issue 11).

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(9) Whether or not the petitioner pleaded and proved any malpractice in any number of states to substantially affect the result of the election? Grounds 26 (Appellants’ Issue 18).

(10) Whether or not the 1st Respondent was disqualified from contesting the election on the false allegation that he had been elected twice into present office? – Ground 38 (Appellants’ Issue 17).

(11) Whether or not the reply filed by the Respondents in this case was not competent having regard to the provisions of Electoral Act? Ground 39 (Appellants’ Issue 16).”

The 4th and 5th Respondents/Cross-Appellants have postulated, in their Amended Brief of Argument prepared by their counsel, Mr. Alfred Eghobamien, learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria, 2 issues for determination which raise the following questions:-

“1. Whether having regard to the evidence before the Court below, their Lordships were wrong is not nullifying the results of the Presidential Election of 19/4/2003 by reasons of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2002, irregularities and corrupt practices.

Whether the Court below was right in holding that the 1st Respondent was qualified to contest for the post of the Office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the 19/4/2003.”

Mr. E. O. Sofunde, learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria, counsel for the 3rd and 6th to 268th Respondents/Respondents, did not consider it necessary to amend the joint brief of argument, which he filed on behalf of all his clients, after the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents amended their brief of argument. He adopted, instead of raising issues of his own, the issues for determination formulated by the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Respondents in their original brief of argument. Happily, those issues are the same as those contained in the Amended brief of argument later filed by the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents as stated earlier above.

For the sake of clarity, I propose to consider as argued therein the issues formulated in the Amended Brief of Argument of the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents as I find them more comprehensive than the issues in the other briefs of argument.

See also  Alhaji Muhammadu Maigafu Dingyadi & Anor V Independent National Electoral Commission (2010) LLJR-SC

Issue No.1

Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents argued, in the Amended brief, that the Court of Appeal misinterpreted sections 67 subsection (3) and 135 subsection (1) of the Electoral Act, 2002, and that by its misconstruction of the provisions of the Act, the Court of Appeal placed on the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents the burden of proving a non-existent onus. This, he contends, affected the resolution of the issues that arose before the Court of Appeal. It is submitted that the Court could expound the provisions of a statute but it could not in so doing expand them because they lack the competence to do so on the authority of Tukur v Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Part 117) 517 at p. 547C. It is further canvassed that the duty of the Court of Appeal in interpreting a statutory provision is to give the unambiguous words of the statute effect in their natural and grammatical meaning, save where to do so would lead to absurdity. The cases of Aqua Ltd. v Ondo Sports Council (1988) 4 NWLR (Part 91)622 at p. 641E and Oviawe v I.R.P. (Nig.) Ltd (1999) 3 NWLR (Part 492) 126 at p. 139F were cited in support. It is submitted that when Tabai, J.C.A. found as follows:-

“It is clear both from section 67(3) of the Electoral Act (2002) and paragraph 13 of the petition that it was the Polling Agent who has the authority to certificate (sic) document. And although it is not categorically so stated in the provision, it appears to me that certification were to be done either at Ward Collection/Distribution Centre where materials were supposed to be handed over to the Presiding Officers. I came to that conclusion because from the evidence before the Court the Polling Agent carried out his functions only within the operational bases or areas of a Presiding Officer.”

the interpretation he gave to section 67(3) was speculative and that he failed to give effect to the words of the section. It is being urged that we should hold that the court below was in error and that we should reverse its finding by holding that the words “Polling Agent” in section 67(3) mean “Party Agent.”

With regard to section 135(1) of the Act, learned Senior Advocate refers to the following excerpt from the judgment of Tabai, J.C.A.:-

“It is my view from above provision therefore that unless there is some proof that the non-compliance with the provisions of section 18 of the Electoral Act substantially affected the result, the election shall not be liable to be invalidated.”

and submitted that the Court of Appeal did not interpret the express words of the provision but instead imported extra words upon which the court based its interpretation of the section. It is also submitted that the Court of Appeal in its interpretation of section 135(1) had omitted the words “did not” and thereby changed the meaning of the section by giving it a different construction. Reference is made to section 93(1) of the Electoral Act, 1963, which had similar wording as section 135(1) of the 2002 Act, and the case of Swem v Dzungwe. (1966) NMLR 297 at p. 303, which was cited to the Court of Appeal, is referred to. It is argued that the court refused to follow the decision in that case, which being a decision of this Court is binding on it and followed Amadi v Eke (2004) 14 NWLR (Part 891) 1, which is a decision of the Court of Appeal. Thus misdirecting itself.

In reply, Chief Afe Babalola argued, under his issue no.4, that the interpretation given to section

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67(3) of the Electoral Act, 2002 was correct, since it is settled law that where the wordings of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the court must give such wordings their natural meaning. He refers in support, to the case of A-G Bendel State v A-G. Federation (1982) 2 NCLR 1. He draws our attention to Exhibit O, which is page v of the Manual for Election Officials prepared by the 3rd Respondent/Respondent pursuant to section 149 of the Electoral Act, 2002, where the phrase “Polling Agent” is defined to mean “Any person(s) appointed by a political party to attend at a polling station to observe the conduct of the elections may become party agent(s) at a Collation Centre.” He urged upon us to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal that any reference to a polling agent cannot be extended beyond a person appointed by a political party to attend at a polling station.

Mr. Eghobamien, learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria, for the 4th and 5th Respondents/ Cross-Appellants argues that the provisions of section 67(3) must be read together with those of section 36(1) of the Electoral Act, 2002, which states “polling agents are to carry out their assignments at each of the polling, stations in the Local Government Area for which they have candidate(s)” when this is done, he says, it will be appre-ciated that what section 67(3) envisages is that the certification of election materials is to take place at polling station and not in the office of the 3rd Respondent/Cross-Appellant. He refers to the finding, by the Court to Appeal to the failure of the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents to produce evidence to prove that the necessary documents were not certified as pleaded in paragraph 13 of their petition. He then submitted that there is no ground for this Court to interfere with it, because it has not been shown that the finding is perverse for it to warrant any interference. He cited the cases of Ozokpo v Paul (1990) 2 NWLR (Part 153) 494 at p. 513A – B; Woluchem v Gudi (1981) 5 SC 31 and Fatoyinbo v Williams (1956) SCNLR 294, (1956) 1 FSC 87. He submitted on the authority of Amadi v Eke, (supra) at p. 10E – H that the non-certification is not fatal to the election results unless it can be shown that it substantially affected the result of the election.

In his reply, Mr. Sofunde, learned counsel for the 3rd and 6th – 268th Respondents/ Respondents, states in their brief of argument, that the thrust of the submissions of the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents is that certification of election materials ought to have started from the office of the 3rd Respondent/Respondent. He submits that the Court of Appeal was right when it stated, per Tabai J.C.A., that “certification (sic) were to be done either at the polling unit or at the ward collation/distribution centre where materials were supposed to be handed over to the Presiding Officers.” Learned counsel argues that this decision is supported by the provisions of section 67(3) of the Electoral Act, 2002, which prescribes for certification by polling agents and no other person. That the polling agents are persons whose political parties have, by notice in writing signed and addressed to the Electoral Officer of the Local Government Area, appointed them to attend at each polling station in the Local Government Area, appointed them to attend at each polling station in the Local Government Area for which they have candidates. That section 36(1) of the Electoral Act, 2002, requires that the notice sets out the names and addresses of the polling agents and that the notice must be given to the Electoral Officers before the date fixed for the election. He submits that it is only such persons that have the right to certify electoral materials under section 67(3) of the Act; and argues that by the combined reading of sections 67(3) and 36(1) of the Act, certification of the materials could have been done only at the polling booths. He submits that the phrase “shall certify the election materials from the office to the polling booths” in section 67(3) merely means that the materials coming from the office to the polling booth shall be certified. It does not state the place where the certification should be made, he contends; and submits that since polling agents are restricted to the polling booths, they can only certify the materials at the polling booths. Learned counsel refers to the argument by learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Appellants, the words that “Polling Agents” mean “Party Agent” and argues that the words “Polling Agent” have been defined in section 36(1) of the electoral Act, 2002 and cannot mean a “Party Agent.”

See also  Sani V. State (2020) LLJR-SC

Learned counsel, arguing on the provisions of section 135(1) of the Act, refers to the decision of this Court in the case of Swem v Dzungwe (supra) which he submits had been superseded by the later decisions of the Court in Awolowo v Shagari (1979) All N.L.R. (Reprint) 120 at pp. 167 – 170 and Ojukwu v Onwudinwe (1984) I SCNLR 247 at pp. 305D – 306D which support the findings made by the Court of Appeal. He canvassed that the alien expression imported into section 135(1), complained about by the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents, cannot be sustained in the light of the later authorities of this Court cited above. Learned Senior Advocate, submits that once non-compliance is established, the onus lies on the Respondent in an Election petition to establish that the non-compliance did not affect the results of the election. He said that the onus lies on the 1st and 2nd Appellants to establish that there was non-compliance and that such non-compliance did or could have affected the result of the election. It is submitted that it is only when this happens that the burden of proof would shift from the Petitioners to the Respondents to prove that the result was not affected.

Now the Electoral Act, 2002 provides in sections 36(1) and (3), 67(3) and 135(1) thereof, as follows:-

“36(1) All political parties may by notice in writing signed and addressed to the Electoral Officer of the Local Government Area appoint persons (in this Act referred to as “Polling Agents”) to attend at each polling station in the Local Government Area for which they have candidate(s), and the notice shall set out the names and addresses of the polling agents and be given to the Electoral Officer before the date fixed for the election.

…………………………………………………………….

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(3) Where in this Act, an act or thing is required or to be done by or in the presence of a Polling Agent, the non-attendance of the Polling Agent at the time and place appointed for the act or thing or refusal by the Polling Agent to do the act or thing shall not, if the act or thing is otherwise done properly, invalidate the act or thing.”

“67(3) The Polling Agents shall certify the election materials from the office to the polling booth.”

“135(1) An Election shall not be liable to be invalidated by reason of non compliance with the provisions of this Act if it appears to the Election Tribunal or Court that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of this Act and that the non compliance did not affect substantially the result of the election.”

In their Amended petition at the Court below, the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents, pleaded in paragraphs 13 and 13A thus:-

“13. In accordance with the Provisions of Section 67(3) of the Electoral Act 2002, the Polling Agents of contesting political parties were expected to certify all the election materials to be used at the election from the office to the polling station. But the 3rd Respondent and its representatives failed or neglected to apply this very important provision, which was enacted to ensure credibility of the electoral process. As a result of this failure, the Petitioners shall contend, it became impossible to monitor what materials actually and officially emanated from the offices of 3rd Respondent at the National, State or Local government points of distribution of election materials such as the ballot boxes, the ballot papers and result sheets for the polling stations (booths), wards, Local Government Area, State and National Collation Centers.

13A. The petitioners hereby plead and shall contend at the hearing that all such uncertified election materials were invalid for the election, and, by extension, the election itself was invalid, the same having been conducted with invalid materials.”

These averments were denied by the Respondents. Consequently, by the rules of procedure and evidence this places the burden of proving the facts on 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents. The Court of Appeal, per Tabai, C.A., in interpreting section 67(3) held that it was a polling agent that was to certify the election materials from the office to the polling booth. And that the certification was to take place at either the Ward Collection Centre or the Ward Distribution Centre.

It seems to me that the certification of the election materials is intended by S.67 (3) to take place at both the office and polling station. It is not difficult to know the office or the polling booth. If this is correct, then there cannot be a certification when the materials leave the office on its way to but has not reached the polling booth. It is not practically possible or convenient for the certification to take place after leaving the office but before reaching the polling booth. According to section 36(1) of the Electoral Act, 2002, the polling agents are to carry out their function at a polling booth. In my view, the Act simply mentions “office” and “polling booth.” It certainly does not mention “ward collection centre” or “ward distribution centre” as surmised by Tabai, JCA. However, the word “office” has been defined by The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition, to mean place for transacting business, room etc in which the clerks of an establishment work, counting-house, room in which any kind of administrative or clerical work is done. It therefore appears to me by the definition that a “ward distribution centre” and a “ward collection centre” could pass for an “office.” In that case, I do not think that it will be right to say, as argued by learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents, that the Court of Appeal misdirected itself in determining where the materials were to be certified.

In the light of the provisions of section 36(1), I do not think that a “polling agent,” even if appointed by a political party, should be interpreted to mean a “party agent,” as submitted by Chief Ahamba, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Cross-Respondents. The words “polling agents,” in section 67(3), even if not explained by section 36(1), cannot in their ordinary meaning be the same as “party agents.” In any event the words must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning since they are not ambiguous or vague. See Aqua Ltd v Ondo Sports Council (1986) 4 NWLR (Part 91) 622 at p.641, Ahmed v Kassim. 3 FSC 51 and Oviawe v I.R.P. (Nig.) Ltd (1999) 3 NWLR (Part 492) 126 at p.139.


SC.3/ 2005

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