Tijani Ikotun V. Oba Samson Oyekanmi & Anor (2008)
LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report
C.M. CHUKWUMA-ENEH, J.S.C.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division (lower court) dated 28/11/1996. The lower court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the trial court in the penultimate paragraph to the end of its judgment at page 107 of the record it held as follows:
“I think quite clearly suit HIL/5/72 is conclusive proof that the respondent was neither the owner of the land in dispute, nor in possession of it or a tenant. In the Circumstances, I am satisfied that by virtue of the judgment in exhibit ‘D’ the respondent was estopped from opening the matter again and instituting the present action in the lower court for exhibit D is a judgment in rem. The fact that the claims are the same as the claims in the present case is noteworthy …”
The plaintiff, (that is, respondent) in the lower court being dissatisfied with the decision has appealed to the court as per the original notice of appeal dated 13/1/97 and filed on 21/1/97. By an application, the court has granted the plaintiff/appellant on 16/6/2004 leave to file a fresh notice of appeal containing two grounds of appeal. The parties have filed and exchanged their briefs of argument. The appellant has also filed a reply brief of argument. The appellant has also raised in his own brief one issue for determination which has been adopted by the defendants/respondents. It reads as follows:
“Whether the lower court was right in holding that the trial court considered exhibits B and D for the purpose of res judicata only”
The plaintiff’s claims in the trial court as per the amended writ of summons dated 11/10/90 at page 20 of the record of appeal read as follows:
“1. Declaration that the plaintiff is the person in possession of the farmland situate lying and being at ERINRO via IPERINDO in the Atakunmosa Local Government of Oyo State which farmland is bounded as follows:
On the first side by ERINRO Stream;
On the second side by Oni River:
On the third side by Alaposo stream;
On the fourth side by Obembe farmland:
The annual rental value of the land is N1,000.00.
(2) Declaration that the defendant cannot interfere with the plaintiffs enjoyment of the farmland or the enjoyment of any person claiming through the plaintiff.
(3) Injunction restraining the defendants, his servants, agents and/or privies from interfering with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of the farmland or threatening harassing or embarrassing the plaintiff’s tenants or any person claiming through the plaintiff any portion of the said farmland”.
The parties, I must observe, have filed and exchanged their respective pleadings. I shall come back to them later on in this judgment.
The plaintiff/appellant’s case in the trial court as per the record is that, Owa Obokun of Ijesha land had granted the farmland in dispute to the plaintiff’s father who died in 1928 and he had put rent paying customary tenants on the farmland. The plaintiff pleaded the judgments in suits Nos. HIL/9A/71, Ikotun v. Adu and HIL/5/72: Agunlejika v. Ikotun and also appeal No. CA/1/112/70 that is, the decision on appeal against the judgment in exhibit B to buttress his case against the defendants.
The defendants/respondents’ case on the other hand is that the 2nd defendant/respondent’s father was in possession of the farmland in dispute granted to him by Obokun of Ijeshaland and that the same devolved to them that is, defendants/respondents. The defendants/respondents are contended in paragraph 14 of the statement of defence that the doctrine of res judicata by, virtue of the judgments in suits Nos. HIL/5/72 and CA/1/112/74 operates against the plaintiff, in other words it prevents indeed estoppes him from reopening the issues of title, customary tenancy or possession of the land in dispute by instituting the instant suit on the same issues which otherwise were the necessary ingredients in the cause of action proved and conclusively decided in the said judgments as per exhibits B and D.
Both parties and their witnesses have adduced oral testimonies in the trial court to support their cases as per their respective pleadings. In a considered judgment, the trial court found for the plaintiff/appellant. In the words of the trial court, in its judgment at page 38 LL 9-26 it found as follows:
“1st respondent later testified but he had not legal defence to the plaintiffs claim. Exhibits A, B and D which he relied upon did not avail him. The res judicata which was pleaded on his behalf was not legally open to him as he was not a party to the three exhibits mentioned above.
Before I deal with the defence of 2nd defendant, let me state at this juncture that the main claim of the plaintiff is to be declared as the person in possession of the land in dispute i.e. the farmland situated at ERINRO via Iperindo.
2nd defendant relied heavily on exhibits A, B and D and res judicata as his defence. In exhibit A which is a direct action of ownership of the land in dispute against the plaintiff, 2nd defendant lost his claim on appeal.
In my view, exhibits B and D do not help the 2nd defendant’s defence, He is not a relation of Oba Agunlejika who was the plaintiff in the case. He is also not a party in the case.
I would like to state categorically at this Juncture that the defence of res judicata is not open to the 2nd defendant.”
The defendants/respondents as I indicated above appealed the decision to the court below. I have also averted to the judgment of the court below which allowed the appeal and from which decision the plaintiff/appellant has now appealed to this court.
I now come back to the issues for determination vis-a-vis the arguments of the parties as per their respective briefs of argument filed in this matter.
The appellant in his main brief of argument has posited that exhibit B, that is, the judgment in suit No. HIL/1/5/72 and exhibit D that is, the appeal the judgment on appeal against the decision in exhibit B as pleaded in paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 of the (amended) statement of claim at page 22 of the record cannot be relied on by the defendants/respondents as a shield, when the respondents were not parties to the suits as per exhibits B and D and the claims thereof as per the said exhibits are not the same and there is evidence on the record and even moreso as found by the trial court as per the abstract of its judgment above that the respondents are not parties to exhibits B and D and are total strangers to the claims and issues decided therein. And so, these decisions as judgment in exhibits B and D, they submit, cannot constitute conclusive proof as against the instant parties and their privies in the instant proceedings in regard to the facts directly in issue therein and actually decided in the said previous suit as per exhibits B and D and particularly vis-a-vis the issues on whether the plaintiff/appellant has been in possession of the farmland in dispute under customary tenancy. He has relied on section 54 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 112, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 and the case Iyaji v. Eyigebe (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 523 to contend that once judgment of a court is final it is conclusive proof in subsequent proceeding between the same parties or the privies of the matter actually decided. It is in this respect that the appellant has challenged the lower court’s finding in regard to the legal effect of exhibit B and D and I quote as per page 103 LL 25-10 of the record thus:
“I am therefore in full agreement that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have considered exhibits B and D for the purpose of res judicata only …”
Some couple of pages further from the above abstract in the record at p. 107 LL 24-31 to be precise, the lower court again held:
“In the circumstances, I am satisfied that by virtue of judgment in exhibit ‘D’ the respondent was estopped from opening the matter again and instituting the present action in the lower court for exhibit “D” is a judgment in rem. The fact that the claims are the same as the claims in the present case is not worthy. ”
The appellant has denounced vehemently the above holding by the lower court and has contended, if I may repeat, to the effect that neither the claim as per exhibits B and D nor the parties named therein are the same and has further relied on Ezeanya v. Okeke (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 388) 142 at 161 per Iguh JSC, Balogun v. Adejobi (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) 131 at 149, D-G; Faleye v. Otapo (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 381) 1; and Odutola v. Oderinde and Ors. (2004) 6 SCNJ 161; (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 574 to further contend that the appellant cannot therefore be said to be relitigating issues directly in issue as per the cause of action as conclusively decided in the judgments as per exhibits B and D and so he cannot be estopped by the said judgments. And even moreso that exhibit D is not a judgment in rem but in personam.
It is particulary submitted that the lower court has completely misapprehended hence it has misconceived the appellant’s case as validly put in the trial court’s finding at page 38 LL 18-26 of the record which for case of reference I quote as follows:
“2nd defendant relied heavily on exhibits A, B and D and res judicata as his defence. In exhibit A which is a direct action of ownership of the land in dispute against the plaintiff 2nd defendant lost his claim on appeal.
In my view exhibits B & D do not help the 2nd defendant’s defence. He is not a relation of Oba Agunlejika who was the plaintiff in the case. He is also not a party in the case. I would like to state categorically at this juncture that the defence of res judicata is not open to the 2nd defendant”. (Italics mine for emphasis)
It is against the backdrop that the appellant has submitted that the trial court has in its decision considered exhibits B and D for the purposes of res judicata only.
If, I may digress, could it be said therefore, that the defendants/respondents by their averments in paragraphs 9, 10 and 14 of the statement of defence have pleaded issue estoppel and not res judicata. The answer I shall supply in due course. I think the whole essence of pleading exhibit A by the plaintiff/appellant is to show positively that the respondents are neither the owners nor customary tenants in possession of the farmland in dispute, the 2nd defendant/respondent having lost in that suit. Besides, whether exhibits B and D can on the issues decided therein constitute estoppel per rem judicatam against the plaintiff, the defendants not being parties to the said suit, I shall deal with later.
The appellant has attributed the total misapprehension of the appellant’s case in this regard to the lower court’s failure to give due effect to the meaning of the word “and” as used conjunctively in the con of the trial court’s finding that “the 2nd defendant relied heavily on exhibits B and D and res judicata as his defence” (Italics mine for emphasis). He denounced the lower court for not upholding the finding of the trial Court that exhibit B and D cannot constitute res judicata as they lack the intrinsic qualities that characterise this doctrine, that is, as to the sameness of parties, claims and issues in both the present and previous suits. To backup his stance in the argument, he has referred to and relied on the cases of A.C.B. Plc v. Losada (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt 405) 26; Ibekwe v. Maduka (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 392) 716; and Okulate v. Awosanya (2000) 1 SCNQR 149; (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530.
It is for the foregoing submissions that the appellant has urged the court to allow the appeal.
The respondents in their joint brief of argument have highlighted suits No.HIL/5/72 .and No. CA/1/112/74, that is, exhibits B and D as being germane in this appeal. They submit that the appellant in suit No. HIL/5/72, that is, exhibit B has at the trial court conceded title to the Obokun of Ijesha land and that the decision also found against the appellant’s assertion of being in possession of the land in dispute as a customary tenant. Exhibit D has confined the judgment as per exhibit B on appeal. They debunk the findings of the trial court to the extent that the case for res judicata has not been made out by the respondents as per exhibits B and D, because they are not parties nor relations of the plaintiff in the said suits. The respondents have also submitted that by exhibit B and D the appellant is estopped from contesting the issues of being in possession of the farmland in dispute as a customary tenant paying Ishakole to Obokun of Ijeshaland. The instant suit they contend is relitigating the issues directly and conclusively settled in the judgments as per exhibits B and D given as exhibits B and D are judgments in rem. And they have therefore submitted that the trial court is wrong to have considered exhibits B and D for the purposes of res judicata only as it should have gone further to uphold their case on the plea of issues estoppel by judgment. It is in this regard that they have further contended that the appellant’s submission on the word “and” as used by the trial court as per the abstract adverted to above as having a special effect in the con does not hold water as such construction is bound to lead to an absurd meaning of the word “and” in con of the said clause.
Furthermore, the respondents have referred and relied on the averments in paragraphs 9, 10, and 12 of the (amended) statement of claim and paragraphs 9, 10 and 14, of the statement of defence to underscore their contention that word “and” construed in con of the averments as per the pleadings is used conjunctively.
And finally, the court is urged to intervene to avert a miscarriage of justice otherwise arising from the misconception by the trial court of defendants/respondent’s case in resisting the appellant relitigating the issues of being in possession as customary tenant of the farmland in dispute which issue has been directly and conclusively settled in the judgments as per exhibits B and D. See Balogun v. Akanji (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 70) 301; and Anyabine v. Okolo (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt. 582) 444. The court is again urged to hold that the judgments as per exhibits B and D have conclusively decided that the appellant is not in possession of the farmland in dispute as a customary tenant, furthermore that these questions have been highly considered and decided by the lower court. The respondents have therefore asked the court to dismiss the appeal for want of merit.
This is an elaborate account of the submissions of the parties in this appeal as per the briefs and oral submissions in court.
I think that, against the background of the facts of this matter, the misconception of the parties cases as accentuated in the sale issue for determination raised in this matter has clearly portrayed want of proper appreciation of the distinction between issue estoppel and res judicata although both estoppels come under one head as estoppel by judgment with a clear objective to prevent a cause of action and issues as arising from the cause of action and directly decided in a previous suit from being reopened or relitigated in a subsequent litigation,the same parties or their privies. The issue must be relevant in the subsequent proceeding that is as in the instant suit. See:Osunrinde v. Ajamogun (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 246) 156. It is in this respect that judgments are said to be conclusive as to cause of action and issues directly arising and decided in the cause of action as between the parties or their privies.One crucial feature of estoppel by judgment is that it has to be specifically pleaded as otherwise it cannot be relied upon in court although it is not required to be pleaded in any form. See Ebba v. Ogodo (2000) 6 SC (Pt.1) 133; (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 387; Ukaegbu v. Ugoji (1991) NSE (Vol. 22) 298; (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 196) 127 and Chinwendu v. Mbamali (1980) 3 SC 21. As the judgments as per exhibits B and D are final decisions given by courts of competent jurisdiction, they are conclusive as to the cause of action and all the issues that are germane and decided in directly establishing the cause of action as between the parties or their privies. A party so affected by it is estopped as per rem judicatam from relitigating the matter all over again. The implication of the above assertion vis-a-vis the judgments as per exhibits B and D is that they are binding as to the cause of action and the issues in any subsequent proceedings in which the cause of action and the issues directly decided in the previous case are called to question as between the same parties or their privies. So that the party is estopped from bringing a fresh suit before any court on the same case and on the same issue already pronounced upon by the court in a previous case. See: Ladimeji v. Salami (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 548) 1; Igwego v. Ezeugo (1992) F 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 561, Dokubo v. Omoni (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 616) 647 and Oshodi v. Eyifunmi (2000)7 SC (Pt. 11) 145; (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298. On the other hand, issue of estoppel arises where an issue has been adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same issue has arisen in question in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties or their privies. See Ito v. Ekpe (2000) 2 SC 98; (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 650) 678: Ebba v. Ogodo (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 133; (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 387; Alakija v. Abdulai (1998) 6 NWLR (pt. 552) 1. There is however high authority that a party, relying on issue estoppel need not prove unlike res judicata that the res, the claims and the parties are the same in the pervious suit as in the subsequent proceedings. See: Ezewani v. Onwordi (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 33) 27.
Again, it is to be noted that if successfully invoked, the jurisdiction of the court is ousted. However, be it noted that a party as in the instant suit, is therefore prevented from proving any facts in contradiction to his earlier acts or declarations to the prejudice of the other party who has in reliance thereof has acted on it. It is in regard to the above that estoppel is a shield, and it is never a sword and so cannot be pleaded by the plaintiff; meaning in effect that it has no place in the plaintiff’s statement of claim but in the statement of defence; see Ukaegbu v. Ugoji (supra). See also Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 360 at 737; Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) I. In the instant case, both parties have pleaded the said judgments as per exhibits B and D as constituting estoppel by judgment. The trial court however has found the invocation of the principle of res judicata by the respondents as per exhibits B and D albeit to oust the jurisdiction of the court over this matter as a non-starter and so inapplicable; consequently, it has entered judgment for the plaintiff which judgment has been upturned by the lower court on appeal, hence the parties are here.
I shall come back to this question in a thrice as I have my misgivings on a closer scrutiny, of the averments as per the pleadings and evidence in this case whether the trial court and indeed the court below have misconceived in essence the defendants’ pleading of exhibits B and D as res judicata. However,for a successful plea of res judicata the law requires, I must emphasis, that the identities of the parties (or privies), the res, that is, the subject matter of the litigation and claim as well as the issues and the parties in both the present and previous actions have to be the same otherwise the plea is not tenable. See Ezeanya v. Okeke (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 388) 142 at 161 per Iguh JSC; Balogun v. Adejobi (supra); Faleye v. Otapo (supra) and Odutola v. Oderinde & Ors. (2004) supra.
Having outlined above the law and guiding principles on estoppel by judgment in relation to exhibits A, B and D, it must be noted that the Parties to this suit have pleaded these judgments in paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 of the (amended) statement of claim and paragraphs 8, 9 and 14 of the statement of defence as follows:
At page 22 of the record, the plaintiff has pleaded thus:
“9. The plaintiff avers that one Oyekanmi instituted an action against the plaintiff in the customary court Grade ‘A’ Ilesa “claiming ownership and title ship to the farmland which case went on Appeal to Ilesa High Court in suit HIL/9A/71; Ikotun v. Adu: and it went in favour of the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff avers that Owa Obokun Oba Peter Agunlejika II also brought an action against the plaintiff claiming:
(i) Declaration of title under native law and custom to a piece of parcel of farmland known and called Erinre situate, lying and being in Iferindo.
(ii) N400.00 damages for trespass; and
(iii) Injunction restraining the defendant, his servant and or agent from entering into it dealing in any way with the said farmland.
- The plaintiff pleads and will rely on the judgment in
(a) HIL/9A/71: lkotun v. Adu; and
(b) HIL/5/72: Agunlejika v. Ikotun
Pleaded in paragraphs (9) and (10) above.”
At pages 6 and 7 of the record, the defendants have pleaded as follows:
“8. The defendant was then presented with three court judgments in respect of the land in dispute between the plaintiff and late Oyekanmi Adu and the plaintiff against Oba Peter Agunlejika.
- The judgment are:
(a) HIL/94/71 Ikotun v. Adu
(b) HIL/5/72 Agunlejika v. Ikotun
(c) CIL/112/74 Yekini lkotun v. Oba Peter Agunlejika
- The defendant will contend at the trial that the doctrine of res judicata will operate against the plaintiff from raising the issue of title, tenancy or possession by virtue of the judgment in suits HIL/5/72 Oba Peter Agunlejika v. Yekini Ikotun CAW/112/74 Yekini lkotun v. Oba Peter Agunlejika.”
The foregoing averments are clear and unambiguous as well as the evidence tendered in support. I have here adverted to the distinction between estoppel and res judicata. When therefore a party as in the instant suit pleads judgments as estoppel, what he is saying in essence is that the court should take the judgment into consideration into considering the totality of his case before the court. See Ukaegbu v. Ugoji (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 196) 127. It is settled law that only a defendant or plaintiff in reply to a defendant’s pleading in defence to an issue raised therein can plead res judicata and if I may repeat, it operates not only against the party whom it affects but also ousts the jurisdiction of the court. The party affected cannot institute a fresh action before the court. These averment leave no one in any doubt that both parties to this suit have founded their cases on the judgments tendered as exhibits B and D as estoppels by judgment. In view of the foregoing, I digress to expatiate in some detail on a few common rules of pleading, that is to say, in so far as I have perceived them pertinent here, but not before observing that the characterisation of estoppel as a rule of evidence or substantive law (which on either side there is high authority) is neither here or there in my discussion of this matter. And so, in this regard I have not given any consideration as to whether estoppel is a cause of action or not. However, the two critical exhibits specifically pleaded by the parties in this regard in this suit – that is, exhibits B and D have been pleaded as facts relevant to facts in issue and not as res judicata as such, and I so hold. This finding has willy-nilly collapsed the appellant’s case.
More definitively, exhibit A is the judgment as per suit No. HIL/9A/71 in which, in sum, the 2nd respondent here has claimed title to the farmland in dispute, trespass and injunction against the appellant; the claim was dismissed. Exhibit B is the judgment in suit No. HIL/5/72: Oba Peter Agunlejika v. Ikotun (that is the appellant in the instant suit) wherein the plaintiff has claimed title to the farmland in dispute, trespass and injunction. The title to the farmland having been conceded by the appellant in the instant suit, the trial court rightly granted title to Oba Agunlejika and dismissed the claims for trespass and injunction; exhibit D on the other hand, is the judgment on appeal of the decision as per exhibit B. In dismissing the appeal as per exhibit D, the appellate court pronounced as to the effect that the defendant is neither a customary tenant to the plaintiff nor in possession of the land in dispute. These issues are the burning issue in the instant suit. This is so as the plaintiff in the instant suit as set forth herein is relitigating the issues of possession of the farmland in dispute as a customary tenant; this time against the defendants/respondents notwithstanding the conclusive findings that he is not in possession of the land in dispute as a customary tenant and the respondents have challenged this suit on that premise. The parties in any event are bound by their pleadings. See: Ogiamien v. Ogiamien (1967) NWLR 245 and N.I.P.C. Ltd. v. The Thomson Organisation (1969) NMLR 99. And it appears to me having scrutinized the averments of the plaintiff as per particularly paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 and of the (amended) Statement of claim and, as per paragraphs 8, 9: 10, 14 of the defendants’ statement of defence and I have come to the firm view that the facts that the parties have expressly and even moreso explicitly averted in their respective pleadings have clearly raised exhibits B and D as facts relevant to facts in issues and not res judicata simpliciter. After all, worthy of note is the submission that the parties are not the same in the claim as per,exhibits B and D and the instant case and so res judicata cannot avail them.
However, the view of the court below with regard to paragraphs 8, 9 and 14 of the defence and which has been challenged by the appellant is that, “it is clear that the purpose of exhibits B and D extended further than for that of res judicata and that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have considered exhibits B and D for that purpose of res judicata … only … ” In conclusion thereof, the lower court rightly in my view held at p. 106 LL 33-37 of the record as follows:
” …I am of the view that the suit HIL/5/72 confirmed on appeal the issue of ownership, tenancy and possession which had been resolved against the respondent and which I say can therefore not be reopened or relitigated again.”
And I uphold entirely this finding, being well grounded on the facts of this case. There would be an obvious failure of justice not to interfere with the judgment of the trial court in the circumstances.
The lower court rightly intervened.
I have no doubt in my mind that both parties to this suit having pleaded the judgment tendered as per exhibits B and D that effect should be given to the judgments in line with the provisions of section 55(1) of the Evidence Act, 1990; a fortiori, in situations as here where the estoppel by judgment has been specifically pleaded; therefore, the appellant’s contention on this issue as sustained by the trial court has ignored the fact that both parties here pleaded these judgment that is exhibits A, B and D and in my view as facts relevant to the facts in issue that is to say, the issues as to possession and tenancy of the land in dispute. I have referred to and relied on Ezewani v. Onwordi (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.33) 27 to support my reasoning that to rely on issue estoppel, a party is not required to prove that the subject matter, claims and parties are identical. I can therefore find nothing amiss in the defendants/respondents resisting the plaintiff/appellant’s claim here by pleading exhibits A, B and D; even though they are not parties to the said action. Although without deciding the point quite clearly on the facts of this matter, the plaintiff, Owa Obokun of Ijeshaland in suit No.HIL/5/72 as per exhibit B confirmed on appeal by exhibit D and the respondent in the instant case have privity of interest in respect of the land in dispute and so as privies of the said plaintiff, that is, Owa Obokun of Ijeshaland the defendants/respondents are capable of pleading estoppel per rem judicatam against the plaintiff/appellant if I may repeat on the facts of this case and they are capable in my humble view of sustaining the said plea. However, I say no more of this as counsel’s attention has not be drawn to the issue for their address.
However, the purpose of section 55(1) of the Evidence Act that is to say is to enable judgments relevant to facts in issue in an action to be so pleaded. Section 55(1) provides:
“(1) If a judgment is not pleaded by way of estoppel it is as between parties and privies deemed to be a relevant fact, whenever any matter, which was, or might have been, decided in the action in which it was given, is in issue, or is deemed to be relevant to the issue, in any subsequent proceedings.
(2) Such a judgment is conclusive proof of the facts which it decides, or might have decided, if the party who gives evidence of it had no opportunity of pleading it as an estoppel.”
I have made it clear here that the obvious purpose of the plaintiff/appellant pleading exhibit A is none other than to bring out the fact that the 2nd defendant/respondent lost his claims comprising of title, possession and tenancy of the land in dispute against the plaintiff/appellant. Exhibits B and D have been pleaded by the defendants/respondents simply to prevent the plaintiff/appellant here from reopening the issues of possession and customary tenancy of the land in dispute which the plaintiff/appellant here as defendant lost to Oba Obokun of Ijeshaland exhibit B and D, have pronounced conclusively therein that the plaintiff/appellant is neither in possession nor a customary tenant of the land in dispute. The fundamental principle for not allowing relitigation of a matter as in the instant one as being a subsequent proceeding of issues or matters.
SC.166/2001
