Nursing and Midwifery Council of Nigeria V. Esther Bose Adesina (2016)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court sitting at Asaba,?Coram Judice: Buba, J. in Suit No. FHC/ASB/CS/47/2009: MRS ESTHER BOSE ADESINA vs. NURSING & MIDWIFERY COUNCIL OF NIGERIA delivered on 5th day of August 2010. The facts of this case are simple and straightforward.
The Respondent herein, who was the Applicant at the Lower Court, is a Nurse and Midwife. She qualified as a Nurse in the name of KEHINDE YEKINI. She was duly licensed as a Nurse by the Appellant. Subsequently, the Respondent furthered her studies and qualified as a Midwife. At the time she qualified as a Midwife she now bore the names ESTHER BOSE ADESINA. The Appellant duly licensed her as a Midwife in the said name of ESTHER BOSE ADESINA. The change in the Respondent?s name was occasioned as a result of her marriage and having become a Christian. The Respondent duly gave the Appellant notice of the change of name and also paid the fees for change of name. Subsequently, the Appellant duly renewed the Respondent?s licence to practice as Nurse/Midwife in the name of ESTHER BOSE
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ADESINA. Upon the expiration of the renewal of this licence, the Appellant refused to grant the Respondent a further licence in the said names but granted a renewal for the Respondent as a Nurse only in the name of KEHINDE ADESINA. The Respondent demanded for an explanation for the refusal to renew her licence as a Nurse/Midwife in the name of ESTHER BOSE ADESINA and in reply the Appellant,inter alia, stated that according to its policies on change of name, an individual can only change her maiden name but not the first or middles names since it does not change first or middle names in its records. Nonplussed by the reason advanced for the refusal to renew her licence as a Nurse/Midwife, the Respondent instituted proceedings at the Federal High Court for a review of the said decision wherein she claimed the following reliefs:
?1. An order declaring the decision of the Respondent by which it refused the Appellant a person who has satisfied the requirements for registration both as a nurse and mid-wife, and who had previously been registered, licence or renewal of licence to practise as both nurse/midwife as arbitrary, unfair and a violation of her
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constitutional right to freedom from discrimination.
2. An order setting aside the decision of the Respondent made on the 13th day of March, 2008 whereby it decided that the Appellant cannot be licensed to practise as both nurse/mid-wife because she had effected change in both her first and middle names and that its policy does not allow such changes, on the ground that its reasons are extraneous and contrary to the purport and intendment of the statute establishing it.
3. An order directing the Respondent to license the Appellant to practise as both nurse and mid-wife having been registered as such and having not been shown to be of bad character forthwith.?
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The action was contested on affidavit evidence filed by the parties and the written addresses filed and exchanged by counsel for the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Lower Court entered judgment in favour of the Respondent. The said judgment is at pages 108-131 of the Records. The Appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment lodged an appeal against the same on 3rd November 2010. The notice of appeal is at pages 132-134 of the Records. The Records of Appeal having been
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compiled and transmitted the parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument.
The Appellant?s Brief of Argument was filed on 20th December 2010, while the Respondent?s Brief was filed on 5th February 2013; pursuant to the order for extension of time to file the same granted by the Court on 23rd January 2013.
The Appellant distilled two issues as arising for determination, namely:
?1. Is the Appellant entitled under its enabling powers to issue guidelines for the registration of names of Nurses and Midwives and amendment of any portion thereof.
2. Has the fundamental human rights of the Appellant been breached by the mere refusal of the Appellant to effect a change in its own registers to accommodate her whimsical change of her entire names.?
The Respondent equally formulated two issues as arising for determination as follows:
?1. Whether the power granted to the Appellant to make rules or guidelines is such as could enable it make the kind of rules that would infringe on the constitutional rights of the Respondent.
2. Whether the fundamental right of the Appellant to freedom from discrimination
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has been breached in the application of the Appellant?s policy in the instant case.?
At the hearing of the appeal, Adeleke O. Agbola, Esq., learned counsel for the Appellant adopted and relied on the submissions in the Appellant?s Brief and he urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Lower Court. In the same vein, E.A. Egbedi, Esq., of counsel for the Respondent adopted and relied on the submissions in the Respondent?s Brief in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Lower Court.
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The facts of this matter and the issues involved therein are not convoluted. In fact the Lower Court was cognisant of this and duly stated at page 128 of the Records that the issue is simple and narrow. It is effulgent that the decision of the Lower Court is informed by its having concluded that the action of the Appellant in failing to renew the licence of the Respondent because she had changed all her names is discriminatory and infringed her fundamental right to freedom from discrimination. It is therefore from the con of this ratio decidendi of the Lower Court that I will consider the
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submissions of learned counsel and resolve this appeal.
The issue number one distilled by the parties, though differently worded, and which deals with the power of the Appellant to make Rules or Guidelines does not seem to be germane in view of the holding that the action, taken by the Appellant pursuant to the Rules or Guidelines is unconstitutional. So whether the Appellant has the power to make the Rules or Guidelines is peripheral to the substance of the decision which is that the action taken is unconstitutional. In this wise therefore, it seems to me that the respective issue number two distilled by the parties which interrogates whether the refusal to renew the Respondent?s licence breached her fundamental rights is apposite. It is settled law that a Court of law has a duty to examine the facts of a case properly and take issues that will resolve the matter before it once and for all: See ENEKWE vs. IMB (NIG) LTD (2007) 1 CMLR 117 at 136.
Equally trite is that in order to conduce to clarity for the proper determination of an appeal, the issues for determination have to be concise and ad rem: MUSA SHA (JNR) vs. DA RAP KWAN (2005) 5 SCNJ 101 at 127.
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In this regard therefore, it is on the basis of the issue number two as distilled by the Appellant which issue is precise and goes to the pith of the ratio decidendi of the Lower Court that I will consider the submissions of counsel and resolve this appeal.
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
Has the fundamental human rights of the Appellant [sic](Respondent) been breached by the mere refusal of the Appellant to effect a change in its own registers to accommodate her whimsical change of her entire names.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT?S COUNSEL
The Appellant contends that the holding of the Lower Court that the power of the Appellant under Section 6(5) of the Nursing and Midwifery (Registration, etc.) Act Cap. N143 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 remains puny vis–vis Sections of the Constitution on freedom from discrimination is a misapprehension of the provisions against discrimination as enshrined in the Constitution. Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution was referred to and it was submitted that the question whether a particular law, regulation or governmental policy is discriminatory against a particular person is basically
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a question of fact and the person alleging discrimination must show that he has been singled out by the policy which is not generally applicable to other citizens of Nigeria. It was posited that the Respondent was not discriminated against because the guideline was applicable to all Nigerians who seek to register as a Nurse and/or Midwife and that the prohibition against wholesome abandonment of previous names is applicable to both male and female, even though a female is allowed to change her surname if it occurs as a result of marriage. It was argued that for a charge of discrimination to be sustained, the Respondent ought to have showed that the policy targets her or a particular group to which she belongs. The definition of Discrimination quoted in Akande: Introduction to the Constitution of Nigeria, Sweet & Maxwell (1982) 39 was referred to.
It is the further submission of the Appellant that the bearing of a particular name is not a fundamental right and that since names are used for purposes of identification, it is in the public interest that names of a person are known with a degree of certainty. It was stated that the Rules and Regulations of
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the Appellant restricting change of name is a rule reasonably necessary in a democratic society and that it is not discriminatory of the Respondent or indeed any other person as it has a universal application. The standards to apply in determining whether a rule or law is reasonably justifiable as laid down in OLAWOYIN vs. A-G NORTHERN NIGERIA (1960) NRNLR was referred to. It was then submitted that from the totality of the affidavit evidence, the Lower Court misdirected itself on the facts and the law when it held that the guidelines of the Appellant was discriminatory against the Respondent when there was no such evidence. The case of NWOKIDU vs. OKANU (2010) 1 SC (PT 1) 136 at 171 was relied upon.
The Appellant contended that the Lower Court dismissed the assertions in Paragraphs 6, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Counter Affidavit as well as the proof on page 50 of the Record showing that each registered person has a small column and unbridled change of name will make the Register unwieldly and unmanageable. It was maintained that every profession has a way of protecting itself from quackery, and that one way of preventing quackery is to maintain a
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stronghold on the Register of its members. The Court was conclusively urged to hold that the Guidelines of the Appellant do not in any way discriminate against the Respondent and should therefore be upheld.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT?S COUNSEL
The quiddity of the Respondent?s submission is that the Lower Court fully comprehended the constitutional provisions against discrimination and fully grasped the same in reaching its decision. It was stated that the question whether a particular law, regulation or policy is discriminatory against a person is both an issue of fact and law. That the Respondent?s affidavit clearly showed how she was deprived from practising as a Midwife. Section 38 of the 1999 Constitution which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion was referred to and it was maintained that the Appellant?s policy was discriminatory. It was asserted that the Respondent proved and demonstrated that her right to practice her profession was impaired by the policy because she changed her name.
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It was submitted that names are not only meant to identify and that where reasons advanced for change of names
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are religious and marital, the names are interwoven with the fundamental rights to practice religion of her choice and not to be discriminated against on that account. It was consequently contended that the Appellant?s policy on change of names is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The Respondent maintained that she discharged the burden of proof of discrimination and that the issue of quackery did not arise on the facts because there was never any question as to the identity of the Respondent as the person who had the Nursing and Midwifery qualifications upon which she was registered, especially as her photographs were embossed on her certificates. It was maintained that the Respondent changed her name because of marriage and Christian faith. In conclusion the Respondent submitted that the practical implementation of the Guidelines as contained in the Appellant?s policy causes an infraction of the right of the Respondent to freedom from discrimination and that the Constitution does not condone or tolerate discrimination. The case of ANZAKU vs. GOVERNOR, NASSARAWA STATE (2006) ALL FWLR (PT 303) 308 at 341 was cited in support.
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RESOLUTION
In the exordial, I redacted the simple and straightforward facts of this matter. In finding that the Respondent was entitled to judgment the Lower Court reasoned as follows on page 129 of the Records:
?It is my considered opinion, a Nigerian and indeed any person entitled to change his name not only for marital purposes but also for religious purposes especially in a country like Nigeria both male and female can change their name for instance a Christian, Abraham can chose [sic]to be Ibrahim, a muslim or vice versa if the interpretation or decision of the Respondent is to be conceded to then there would be a discrimination that only females can change but their maiden name, but not their whole names. There is no Law that says a female cannot change all her names. To that extent, I hold that the appeal has merit and this Court is prepared to strike down that provision of the guideline as being unconstitutional.
The power of the Respondent as submitted by its Counsel under Section 6(5) of the Act remains puny vis–vis Sections of the Constitution of freedom from discrimination.?
Now, facts are sacred and
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facts are the fountainhead of the law. What are the facts on the basis of which the Respondent changed her names and do those facts in any way pertain to the constitutional guarantees on the fundamental rights of an individual? Weturn to the affidavit evidence. In Paragraphs 3-12, 15 and 16 of the supporting affidavit the Respondent deposed as follows:
?3. That having passed prescribed examination as contemplated by the provisions of the Nursing and Mid-wifery (Registration e.t.c) Act, Cap. 332 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 now Cap. N143 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, I am qualified to be registered as nurse/midwife.
4. That my maiden name is Kehinde Yekini.
5. That at the time I sat for my nursing examinations, I was bearing the name Kehinde Yekini. A photocopy of my Certificate of Registration by the Respondent dated 27th July, 1990 is attached hereto and marked Exhibit ?A?
6. That it was after my registration as a nurse, being a Christian coupled with the fact of my marriage that I changed my name by dropping Kehinde and my maiden surname Yekini and commenced bearing of the name Mrs. Esther
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Bose Adesina as my marital name. A photocopy of the advert of the change of name as contained in the Wednesday January 30, 1991 edition of the Herald Newspapers is attached hereto and marked Exhibit ?B?.
7. That attached hereto is a photocopy of the notification of my registration as a mid-wife by the Respondent. It is marked as Exhibit ?C?.
8. That I paid fees for change of name. The photocopy of the receipt for change of name is attached hereto and marked Exhibit ?C1?.
9. That also attached hereto is a photocopy of the licence granted to me by the Respondent by which I was clearly designated as Nurse/Mid-wife. It is marked Exhibit ?C2?.
10. That I also attached hereto photocopies of my qualifying certificates bearing my photographs. They are attached hereto and marked as Exhibits ?C3? and ?C4?.
11. That I am the same person as Kehinde Yekini.
12. That I was surprised when my current licence came without my designation as Nurse/Midwife. The current licence is attached hereto and marked Exhibit ?D?.
15. That after a series of correspondence
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between my solicitors and the Respondent?s Registrar, the Respondent through its Registrar by a letter dated 13th March, 2008 addressed to my solicitors conveyed their decision stating that the Respondent?s policies on change of name is that an individual can only change her maiden name and not first or middle names.
16. That it was also stated that there is no relationship between the names contained in my Nursing and Midwifery Certificates. A copy of the letter is attached hereto and marked Exhibit ?E?.
(See pages 58 ? 59 of the Records).
Lucent and instructive in the facts deposed to by the Respondent is Paragraph 6 of the affidavit where she deposed that her change of name was on account of becoming a Christian coupled with the fact of getting married.
In its Counter Affidavit, the Appellant presented the following facts in Paragraphs 5 ? 15, namely:
?5. That I have seen Paragraph 3 of the affidavit in support of the Motion and I am aware that the mere passing of an examination does not qualify one to be registered as a Nurse/Midwife but such person must also comply with all the guidelines
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issued from time to time by the Council including Exhibit ?A? aforesaid.
6. That to my knowledge, the Applicant registered with the YEKINI KEHINDE as a Nursing in May, 1990 with registration No. 66954. Certified copy of the extract from the Register for the updating and Re-licensing of the Council is attached herewith and marked Exhibit ?B?.
7. That by virtue of the Council?s policy, a married woman is allowed to drop her maiden surname and adopts her husband?s surname.
8. That it is not allowed for a person to drop all HIS/HER name and adopt new names that bears no nexus to the previously registered name.
9. That I have been advised by A.O. Agbola, Esq of Counsel and a Yorubaman and I verily believe him that the name ?KEHINDE? is not a fetish name but is given to a twin to specify that he/she came second to the his/her twin in chronological order.
10. That Midwifery is a separate course from Nursing and registration as a midwife is issued based on completion of the midwifery course.
11. That one Adesina Esther Bose was registered as a Midwife based on completion of her training.<br< p=””
</br<
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12. That Exhibit ?C2? was issued in error and has since lapsed.
13. That there is no Register of Names in Nigeria and uncontrolled change of names is liable to be abused.
14. That the Council?s policy on change of name is in the public interest to protect members of the public from quackery and misconduct.
15. That it would promote fraud and certificate racketeering if a person could be permitted to completely change his identity at any time he chooses.?
(See pages 34 ? 35 of the Records).
It is clear that even though the Appellant alluded to issues of quackery, misconduct, fraud and certificate racketeering, it never suggested that the certificates relied upon by the Respondent were a fraud or that the Respondent was a quack. This is more so as the Respondent had deposed that her certificates bear her photographs. The Appellant never challenged the deposition that her change of name was consequent upon becoming a Christian.
Section 38(1) of the 1999 Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It provides:
?38-(1) Every person shall be entitled to
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freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.?
Since it is pursuant to her constitutional right of freedom to change her religious belief that the Respondent became a Christian with the consequent change of name, I agree with the submission of the Respondent?s counsel in Paragraph 4.02.8 of the Respondent?s Brief that:
?Names are meant not only to identify. In Nigeria names are borne for a variety of reasons, some for ethnic, religious reasons as well as circumstances of birth. In the instant case where the reasons advanced for the change of the names are religious and marital, the names are interwoven with the fundamental rights to practice religion of her choice and not to be discriminated against on that account.?
Section 42 (1) of the 1999 Constitution guarantees the right to freedom from discrimination. It provides:
?42 (1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community,
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ethnicgroup, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person-
(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the government, to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinion are not made subject; or
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, any privilege or advantage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions.?
The critical question is whether the Lower Court was right in holding that the action of the Appellant in refusing to register or renew the licence of the Respondent based on the provisions of its Regulations on change of names is an act of discrimination against the Respondent. I iterate that the unchallenged and uncontroverted reason given by the Respondent for changing her names is
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because she got married and became a Christian. The Appellant does not make an issue as to the Respondent?s change of her maiden name consequent upon her marriage, indeed, the Appellant?s Regulations allows for that. The Appellant?s only grouse is with the change of the Respondent?s forenames occasioned by her Christian faith. The Appellant?s Policies and Procedures which is exhibited as Exhibit A to the Appellant?s Counter Affidavit is at pages 36 ? 49 of the Records. The relevant portion on change of name is at page 45 of the Records. It stipulates:
?CHANGE OF NAME
– Change of name is allowed to married women only and this applies to change in surname.
– Addition or change of other names is not acceptable
– Change of name for males is not acceptable.
– Only three consistent names in full will be acceptable for all NMCN records.?
The above stipulation states that ?Addition or change of other names is not acceptable?. This is the crux. The kernel therefore is; how would this provision rank in the light of the constitutional provisions where the addition or change of
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name is on account of a change in religion pursuant to the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of religion. We will find out in a trice.
The right to freedom of religion is one of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. Fundamental Rights are rights which stand above the ordinary laws of the land. They are in fact antecedent to the political society itself. Fundamental rights have been described as the minimum living standard for civilised humanity. The fundamental rights have been enshrined in the Constitution so that the rights could be inalienable and immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of the Constitution itself. See RANSOME-KUTI vs. A-G FEDERATION (1985) 7 NWLR (PT 6) 211 at 229 ? 231. So the right of the Respondent to change her religion with the attendant consequences inheres to her and is inalienable and immutable. A fundamental right is more significant than the rights under other statutes or laws as it goes to the root of the day to day existence of the citizen and corporate living of the citizens: ESSIEN vs. INYANG (2011) LPELR (4125) 1 at 24. The Courts are under a duty as provided by
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the Constitution to see that executive and administrative actions are in conformity with the fundamental rights of persons. See OBAYIUWANA vs. MINISTER OF FCT (2009) LPELR (8202) 1 at 26.
So the question to ask is whether the administrative action of the Appellant in refusing to register the Respondent in her changed names in the circumstances of this matter is in conformity with her fundamental rights. The answer to this poser is self-evident and does not require rocket science to decipher. It clearly is not in conformity with the adherence to the constitutional guarantee of freedom to change religious belief since, at the risk of being prolix, the Respondent?s change of name was consequent upon the change of her religion. The provision of the Appellant?s Policies and Procedures on change of name is clearly discriminatory.
I have already set out the of Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution which guarantees the right to freedom from discrimination.The Black?s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition defines discrimination on page 534, inter alia, as
?Differential treatment; esp; a failure to treat all persons equally when no
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reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.?
?I will now demonstrate how the Appellant?s Policies and Procedures on change of name is discriminatory. The enabling legislation setting up the Appellant is the Nursing and Midwifery (Registration, ETC) Act, Cap. N143 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The said enactment in Section 1(2) (b) gives the Appellant the general duty of establishing and maintaining a register of persons entitled to practise the profession of nursing and midwifery. The law continues in Section 6(2) & (3) to provide for the Registrar to prepare and maintain a register of all persons entitled in accordance with the provisions of the Act to be registered as nurses or midwives. It also stipulates for making of rules as to making applications for registration and the evidence in support of applications as well as notifying the Registrar of any change in registered particulars. Section 6(5) of the Act then confers on the Registrar the duty to correct entries incorrectly made in the Register, make alterations to the registered particulars of registered persons and to remove from the
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Register the name of any registered person who has ceased to be entitled to be registered. In order to properly conualise how the Policy is discriminatory it is pertinent to ascertain what entitles or qualifies a person to be registered.
Sections 8 and 9 of Cap. N143 are relevant in this regard. They provide:
?8. Registration of nurses
(1) Subject to any restriction upon registration otherwise imposed by this Act, the holder of-
(a) any qualification of a general nature specified in Part A of the Second Schedule to this Act.
[Second Schedule]
(b) any qualification of a specialised nature specified in Part B of the Second Schedule to this Act.
shall be entitled to registration as a nurse in the appropriate part of the general register maintained pursuant to Section 6(2) of this Act.
(2) A registered nurse may apply for registration as a nurse tutor upon the ground that he has undergone requisite practical training in an institution where student nurses are trained and has completed a course for nurse tutors in an institution or university recognised for that purpose by the Council; and if the Council is
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satisfied as to his qualifications, the Council may direct registration accordingly.
(3) In the application of this section, a certificate or other document produced as evidence shall be deemed to be a valid certificate or document unless the contrary is proved.
9. Registration of midwives
(1) An applicant for registration shall, unless otherwise precluded by the Act, be entitled to registration as a midwife if she satisfies the Council that she is of good character, and ?
(a) is the holder of a certificate under Part B of the Second Schedule to this Act; or
[Second Schedule]
(b) is exempted from examination as the holder of a qualification granted outside Nigeria and for the time being accepted by the Council:
Provide that if the Council so requires, the applicant shall satisfy the Council that she has had sufficient practical experience as a midwife.
(2) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Council under this section may appeal to the High Court most convenient in terms of access to her, within one month after notice is given to her of the decision of the Council.?
?It seems to me that upon
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meeting the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 above, a person is entitled to be registered as a nurse and/or midwife. It accordingly becomes discriminatory and a differential treatment where a person who meets the requirements is denied registration because he has changed his names on account of his religious belief. I reiterate that there is no issue as to the fact that the Certificates relied upon by the Respondent, which bear her photograph, belong to her, notwithstanding the change in names. Accordingly it is not equal treatment of persons qualified to be registered since one person will be duly registered upon presentation of the qualifying certificate while another person will be denied registration upon presentation of the qualifying certificate because on account of his religious belief of having become a Christian, Muslim or indeed an animist, has changed his name due to his religion, which the Constitution gives him the freedom to change and guarantees him the freedom from discrimination on account thereof.
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The interosculation of what I have said thus far leads me to the syzygial alignment with the Lower Court that the provisions of the
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Appellant?s Policies and Procedures on change of name infringes on the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution and is accordingly unconstitutional. The Courts guard fundamental rights provisions very jealously. Therefore any law or action that is perpetrated against the provisions of the fundamental rights of any individual which is against the spirit of the Constitution would not be allowed to stand. The spirit of the Constitution must be upheld at all times, the fundamental rights of the citizen which are immutable and inalienable cannot be subsumed or swept aside by a side wind such as the Appellant?s Policies and Procedures on change of name. Any breach of the provisions of the fundamental rights provisions renders any act subsequent to that breach a nullity. See ONYEMEH vs. EGBUCHULAM (1996) LPELR (2739) 1 at 21, OKAFOR vs. A-G ANAMBRA (1991) LPELR (2414) 1 at 28 and TOLANI vs. KWARA STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (2009) LPELR (8375) 1 at 52-53.
There is a further matter I need to address. It is the submission of the Appellant in Paragraph 4.02.13 of the Appellant?s Brief. Hear the Appellant:
See also
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page 50 of the Record which shows that each registered person has a small column and unbridled change of name will make the register unwieldy and unmanageable.?
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The above submission is an assertion that it is out of its convenience to avoid the Register being unwieldy and unmanageable since the column on the Register for a registered person is small that the Appellant abhors change of names. This is not good enough. The Register is meant to properly enhance the practice of the profession of Nursing and Midwifery and I add that by the provision of Section 6(3) (d) of Cap. N143 fees are paid in respect of entry of names in the Register. So if the column for the particulars of a registered person is small, then the solution should be in making the column bigger and not in refusing registration to a qualified person in violent breach of the fundamental rights. The Register is meant for the professional nurses and midwives not the other way round. In any event, I have seen the Register which is at page 50 of the Records and the column therein is large enough to accommodate the Respondent?s new names of ESTHER BOSE ADESINA. Therefore the
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Appellant?s contention that if otherwise the Register will be unwieldy and unmanageable is an ignis fatuus.
It is now the appropriate time to wrap up this judgment. The issue for determination is resolved against the Appellant. The appeal is devoid of merit. It fails and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Federal High Court Asaba Judicial Division in Suit No. FHC/ASB/CS/47/2009 delivered on 5th August 2010 is hereby affirmed. There shall be costs of N100,000.00 in favour of the Respondent.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8763(CA)
