Alexander Nnadi V. The State (2016)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.
This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Imo State, Owerri Division dated 13th day of May, 2013.
The Appellant and seven other accused persons were convicted on two counts charge of conspiracy and murder by C.M.I Egole J.
The Appellant was charged alongside eight accused persons for the offences of conspiracy and murder contrary to Section 516A and 319 of the Criminal Code Cap. 30 Vol. 11 Laws of Eastern Nigeria 1963 as (amended) applicable to Imo State of Nigeria.
The case of the prosecution in relation to the Appellant is that he was one of those that the PW1 mentioned as the killer of the deceased, his late father – Nze Dominic Duru.
The Appellant who was the 3rd accused gave evidence as DW1 and pleaded alibi.
First, that on 313105 he left his business premises as a butcher to his residence and later that he went to the market.
The prosecution called eight (8) witnesses to prove its case against the Appellant and the other eight (8) accused persons.
?The learned trial Judge placed reliance on the evidence of the only
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eyewitness to the incident PW1 and the pathologist PW4 to convict the Appellant even though two other pathologists testified in defence.
Dissatisfied with the decision of 13/5/2013, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal containing fifteen (15) grounds of appeal on 30th day of July 2013.
The relevant briefs and processes for this appeal are as follows:
(a) Amended Appellant’s brief of argument dated 5/2/2015, filed on 23/2/2015 and deemed filed on 26/2/2015 – Settled by D. C. Denwigwe SAN.
(b) Amended Respondent’s brief of argument dated and filed on 11/3/2015 – Settled by C. Anyaoha Esq.
Asst. Chief State Counsel, Imo State,
(c) Appellant’s Reply brief of argument dated 8/6/2015 and filed on 10/6/2015 – Settled by O. O. Okonkwo Esq.
(d) Corrigendum to Amended Appellant’s Brief of argument filed on 21/4/2016 – Settled by O. O. Okonkwo Esq.
(e) List of Additional Authorities filed on 21/4/2016 ? Settled by D. C. Denwigwe Esq. SAN.
?Learned Counsel for the Appellant nominated two (2) issues for determination as follows.
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the medical evidence as the
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cause of death of the deceased as stated by the DW7 – Dr. Egejuru and the DW8 – Dr. Onoyona but accepted and convicted the Appellant on the evidence of the PW4 – Dr. Gogo Abite? (Grounds 5, 6, 7 and 14)
2. Whether on the totality of the evidence on the printed record the learned trial Judge was right in convicting the Appellant of the offence of conspiracy and murder of the deceased? (Ground 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15).
Learned Counsel for the Respondent on the other hand nominated three (3) issues for determination. They are:
1. Whether on the totality of evidence adduced, the trial Judge was right in holding that the prosecution proved its case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt,
2. Whether the defence of alibi raised by the Appellant availed him on the facts and circumstances of this case.
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the medical evidence as to the cause of death of the deceased as stated by the DW7 – Dr. Egejuru and the DW8 – Dr. Onoyana but accepted and convicted the Appellant on the evidence of the PW4 – Dr, Gogo Abite?
?On issue One, Learned Counsel for the Appellant
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submitted that Dr. Egejuru was assigned by the police as the PW7 to conduct the autopsy on the deceased. That he conducted the autopsy and produced his report which was admitted as Exhibit ?D4?.
Appellant’s Counsel referred to page 402 of the record, where the trial Court held that:-
“After due consideration of the evidence of the PW1 and PW4, I came to the conclusion that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had died and also proved a homicidal cause of death.”
Counsel argued that from this portion of the judgment, it can no longer be said that the conviction of the Appellant is not based on medical evidence as to cause of death. It was the PW4 who in his medical report – Exhibit “P7? introduced “Homicidal injury” as the cause of death. That the trial Court accepted and relied on that evidence.
He submitted that the line of precedents which decide that medical evidence as to cause of death is not always required do not apply to this case.
He submitted that the conviction of the Appellant is based on the evidence of PW1, PW4 and PW7. He went ahead to treat what he termed contradictions,
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inconsistencies and impossibility in the evidence of PW1 to PW3, PW4, vis-a-vis DW7, and DW8 and PW7.
In relation to issue One, Appellant’s Counsel submitted on the PW4 vis-?-vis the DW7 and DW8 as follows. That at the behest of the family of the deceased the PW4 Dr. Gogo Abite was procured to conduct another autopsy on the remains of the deceased foufteen (14) months after the death. That the consequence of this can be found in the medical report of PW4, that he found “a poorly preserved adult male consisting of dry skin and bones.”
In effect, said Counsel, his post mortem examination was conducted on ?a poorly preserved adult male consisting of dry skin and bones.” He performed the autopsy on 23rd May 2006 when the police officer CPL Charles Amaefule and Inspector Oninia identified the corpse to him (page 167). Those police Officers, said Counsel were not listed as witnesses in the proof of evidence and they never testified at the trial. He submitted that on the same page, 17 PW4 noted that “it was not the first autopsy on the body of the deceased” and “it was after performing the autopsy that he had to check “other things? i.e.
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“confirmatory observation? That, he never explained what he meant by “other things” or “confirmatory observation?.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted that on this poorly preserved “body consisting of dry skin and bones” the PW4 was yet able to see “some mark of violence on the body” and that the skull was fractured on the left side of the frontal part” measuring 1.5c.m, and there was “reactions” round the fracture ?a brown reactive before the fracture which led him to believe “that it happened before death”. That on this same poorly preserved body consisting of ?dry skin and bones” the PW4 was yet able to notice “a penetrating injury on the left side of the neck measuring 1c.m which has reactions around – a brown stuck reactive” which made him believe that it happened before death.
He also saw “a laceration on the left groin which measured 3c.m in length” which had reaction against the wound which led him to believe that it happened before death. He concluded that “these were the only useful findings”(pages 167 to 168).
?On “reaction” it was submitted that the PW4 testified that usually a microscope is required to see it but
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the record does not show that he used a microscope.
Appellant’s Counsel continued that the same witness testified on page 168 that ?Around the wounds there were surgical incisions? and “that it had been opened before” “There was long incision version on the neck wound. There was also long incision across the groin wound”. On page 169, he concluded he would not examine the internal organs “because they were decomposed already after one year of death?. He then concluded that the cause of death was “due to multiple injuries on the body —–”.
Appellant’s Counsel offered us the dictionary meanings of “lacerated” and “wound” and suggested that the words convey interchangeable meanings. He submitted that under cross-examination on page 171, the PW4 testified that ?I saw the scalp of the deceased. I did not record any injury on the scalp of the deceased?. But, that contrary to the PW4, the PW1 testified on oath under cross-examination on page 133 that “I saw wounds on my father?s face because blood was gushing out from his face?. The PW4 never saw any wound on the face of the deceased.
?Counsel submitted that
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the medical evidence and report of PW4 cannot be accurate if the PW1 saw bleeding “wounds” on the face of the deceased but the PW4 did not see any wound on that face.
According to Counsel, it is important to note the evidence of the PW4 that he received information from the police about what happened to the deceased before the autopsy. He was told that various weapons were used on the deceased. The natural meaning of this, said Counsel, is that his report was pre-medicated. Also, that on that same page 171, the PW4 testified that “perhaps” a depth of a punctured wounds determine whether it is “homicidal” or suicidal. In his medical report Exhibit “P7″the PW4 said Counsel reported the cause of death is “due to multiple homicidal injuries caused by blunt object to the head and penetrating injuries to the neck and groin?.
Counsel submitted that what this means is that the PW4 did not observe any multiple injuries inflicted through hitting the deceased all over the body with a stick. The PW1 did not state the size or nature of the stick which he claimed he saw the 2nd accused strike the deceased all over the body with. (pages 126 and 133). That the
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PW1 was unable to “observe” exactly what part of the deceased the 7th and 4th accused held (page 133).
However, that in Exhibit “P7? the PW4 drew the judicial conclusion which the trial Court followed on page 402 that the deceased died of a purposeful knowingly and reckless act of the accused persons.
He submitted that whether or not an injury is homicidal is within the province of the Court to decide based on the evaluation and application of admissible evidence on record. It is not within the province of an unbiased pathologist to conclude for the Court that the deceased died of multiple homicidal injuries “homicidal” having been defined in the 7th Edition of Oxford Advanced learners Dictionary as “the crime of killing somebody deliberately?.
He submitted that Exhibit P7 shows that the PW4 relied on pictures which he referred to as pix. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 for his conclusions. These pictures, said Counsel were never demonstrated in open Court and to the accused persons. He referred to the cases ofAwuse V. Odili (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.952) 416 at 467 ? 468, Nwole V. Iwuagwu (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt.952) 543 at 571; Duruminiya V.
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C.O.P. (1961) NNLR 70.
He submitted that the DW7 did not need to demonstrate Exhibit “D7” after the Court had ruled that it speaks for itself. On the evidence of DW7 and DW8, Appellant’s Counsel alluded to problems with free flow of the defence as demonstrated from pages 256 to 257 of the record when the defence Counsel Mr. Nworka wanted to ask question of thing that happened regarding the mortuary and when he (Nworka) asked for adjournment which was refused.
That in the cross-examination which followed immediately on page 258, Counsel submitted that DW7 testified that ‘he was given an order to perform the autopsy?. He also testified that the Medical and Dental Council was investigating the matter because the deceased family petitioned and the Council had to act and they are still on it.
Counsel submitted that the Court never asked for the report of that body of experts seeing the fundamental conflict between the evidence of the two pathologists on the cause of death of the deceased. That while the PW4 reported the cause of death to be “multiple homicidal injury —” in his Exhibit P7. The DW7 in his own report Exhibit “D4″ reported the
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cause of death to be ‘Acute cardio respiratory failure due to cerebral oedoma with tonsiler herniation consequent upon wide-spread intravascular blood cloths”.
He submitted that DW7 issued his autopsy report on 26/3/2005 after conducting the autopsy on 24/3/2005 – about three week after the death of the deceased. The report shows ex facie that ‘Arinze Duru (son)’ of the deceased identified the body of the deceased to the DW7, that fact said Counsel, was never challenged during cross-examination of the DW7.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted further that the cross-examination of the DW7 on pages 257 to 258 reveals that not even one question was put to him to challenge his report and evidence as to the cause of death of the deceased. That evidence, said Counsel, never took the prosecution unawares because they listed the DW7 and his report Exhibit “D4” ab initio in the proof of evidence which they served on the accused persons. This, according to Counsel should therefore be a proper case when the failure to challenge the evidence through cross-examination amounts to admission of the evidence.
On this, counsel referred to the cases of Oforlete V. The
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State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt.681) 415 at 436; Gaji v. Paye (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt.823) 583 at 605; Waziri v. The State (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt.496) 689 at 727; Okoro v. The State (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt.1290) 351 at 373.
He argued that it is not the place of the Court to prefer the evidence of the PW4 without the record reflecting the jurisdiction for doing so, particularly after the prosecution has accepted the evidence of DW7 who they listed as a prosecution witness in the proof of evidence. That the unchallenged evidence of DW7 on the cause of death at least raised a reasonable doubt which required clarification and explanation through further and better medical evidence, the burden being on the prosecution. He referred to the cases of Ebeinwe V. The State (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1246) 402 at 414; Aboyede V. The State (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 445) 270.
He submitted that to make matters worse, the DW8 – Dr. A. Onoyona gave evidence which supports the evidence of DW7 against the evidence of the PW4. He submitted that the only challenge of the evidence of the DW8 occurred on page 264 when it was put to him that he was not there when the autopsy was performed on 23rd May, 2006
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precisely at 4.30 p.m. He responded that the date was 25th May, 2006. He confirmed also that he was physically there at the time the autopsy was performed. He also testified that the performance of autopsy is not special preserve for the pathologist.
Counsel submitted that the seeming contradiction in the evidence of DW8 on the date of the autopsy was cleared and explained under re-examination on page 268 to confirm that the second autopsy by the PW4 was conducted on 25/5/2006.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge never found as a fact or held that the DW8 did not observe the 2nd autopsy by the PW4. That he had other reasons for stigmatizing and rejecting the evidence of the DW7 the reasons were (i) that he was bribed to falsify his autopsy report and (ii) that the defence did not explain the “jargons” in the medical report. For the DW8 the reasons were (i) that he was “lured” to give the evidence and that (ii) he is not a pathologist.
Counsel submitted that those conclusions by the trial Court are perverse. They are not valid conclusions from the printed evidence on record. He referred to the cases of Omogodo V. The State
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(1981) 5 NSCC Vol. 12 page 119 at 130; Osuoha v. The State (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt.1219) 364 and Ebeinwe V. The State (Supra) that the decision and findings by the Court must be justified by evidence on record.
After a long analysis of the evidence of PW7 vis-a-vis DW7, Appellant’s Counsel summarized the flaws in the finding and decision as follows.
1. No witness on record ever testified that Dr. Onyejiaka “bribed” the DW7.
2. No witness on record testified that he saw the DW7 receive bribe from Dr. Onyejiaka for any purpose at all. The evidence of the PW7 that one Dr. Onyejiaka and one of the referred sponsor of killers of his father went and paid the money to Egbejuru and Co. is hearsay evidence which is statutorily inadmissible. See. Section 37 and 38 of the Evidence Act. See Doma V. INEC (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt.1317) 303 at 328 – 329; A. Njoku V. The State (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 55S at 568; Odogwu V. The State (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt.1373) 80 at 104.
3. The con in which that hearsay evidence was given is that when he refused to pay the doctors for the autopsy Dr. Onyejiaka went and paid. The PW7 never testified that the payment was a bribe to
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falsify the autopsy report.
4. The evidence of the PW7 is that the autopsy was carried out by “doctors”. So for the DW7 to falsify it there must be in existence the original autopsy report issued by “the doctors” and the falsified report.
See Obinwune v. Tabansi-Okoye (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt.981) 104 at 110 and 111; Hashidu V. Goje (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.843) 352 at 386.
5. No witness on record testified that the autopsy report was falsified in favour of the accused persons.
6. Dr. Egejuru was never confronted with any allegation that he was bribed to falsify any report. He could not have denied that he was not confronted with through cross-examination on the contents of his autopsy report.
7. The finding imputed a criminal offence against the DW7 for which he was never afforded any opportunity to defend himself and the prosecution bore the burden to prove such an allegation beyond reasonable doubt.
See Egolum V. Obasanjo (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt.611) 355 at 397.
8. That finding violated the Appellant’s fundamental right to a fair hearing. That finding and decision are
perverse. See Egolum v. Obasanjo (supra); Okafor v. AG. Anambra state
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(1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.200) 659 at 678 and U.T.B v. Ozoemena (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt.1022) 448 at 471.
Those perverse finding and decision according to Counsel are the reasons why the trial Court preferred, accepted and acted on the evidence of the PW4 and Exhibit “P7? thus: “Which was based on the eye witness account of the PW1,’
Appellant’s Counsel submitted further that the trial Court dismissed the evidence of DW8 summary on page 420 of the record on the basis that (a) he was “hired” by the defence to observe the 2nd autopsy, (b) He was on his own? (c) He was “not invited? (d) He had big qualifications but he was not a pathologist (e) He was a “mere observer” and “his report went to the defence” and has nothing to do with the proceedings in this case and his view cannot compare with let alone override the authority of PW4 “His evidence counted for nothing?.
Counsel submitted that these pronouncements have no evidential or legal support from the printed record. They are perverse. That the reasons for this submission are as follows.
(i) No evidence on record supports the conclusions
that DW8 was hired.
(ii) The
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invitation of the DW8 for the accused persons by the defence counsel to observe the autopsy is an exercise of the accused person’s right of representation at the autopsy proceedings which affects their rights to life and liberty. The denial of that right is a denial of their rights to a fair hearing,
Even the PW7 recognized and asserted that right when he insisted that his own pathologist must be present at the autopsy.
(iii) His qualifications were never challenged see again Gaji V. Paye (supra) and it is his fundamental right to be so qualified. He was never challenged on his training or experience on autopsy examination.
Furthermore, no law precludes him from observing or from his observations supporting the defence.
The disqualification of his evidence because it supports the accused person is a manifestation of bias against the accused person on the part of the trial Court.
See Okoduwa V. The State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.76) 333 at 354.
He further submitted that the least that can be said by way of summary from the printed record on this issue are as follows:
(a) The prosecution based its case on the medical evidence of the
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PW4 – Dr. Gogo Abite and the Court also based the conviction of the Appellant on that evidence of the PW4. (Page 419 to 421). He referred to the decision of the supreme court in Gabriel V. The State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) 457 at 467 – 468 Per Nnaemeka-Agu JSC to the effect that once the prosecution sets out to rely on medical evidence it is no longer open to them to go back on it and argue that inference of cause of death could be drawn from other circumstances.
(b) The trial Court fully recognized that there was conflicting evidence on record between the evidence of the PW4 on one side and the DW7 and DW8 on the other on the cause of death of the deceased.
(c) Further evidence was needed to resolve that conflict and the resolution could have been drawn from the result of the proceedings of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Tribunal which was already investigating the matter on the petition of PW7.
That was not done,
(d) The trial Court did not allow the DW7 to explain his report on Exhibit D4 because the Court held that Exhibit ‘D4’ speaks for itself. Being bound by that decision it was wrong for the Court to turn later in its judgment
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to rely on the failure to explain the report as reason to reject the evidence of the DW7 whose evidence in chief the same Court abruptly stopped on no prompting from the prosecution. That act of the Court denied the Appellant a fair hearing which is guaranteed by Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
(e) Seeing the conflicting medical evidence on record the trial Court tagged the DW7 with “bribery by Dr. Onyejiaka to falsify his autopsy report”, No witness on record testified that Dr. Onyejiaka bribed the DW7. That imputation of ‘bribe’ originated from the trial Court suo motu. The evidence of the PW7 about Dr. Onyejiaka is hearsay evidence which is statutorily inadmissible. The imputation of “bribe” on Dr. Onyejiaka and DW7 is an imputation of crime which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
See Adun v. Odunde (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt.847) 643 at 668.
The burden of proof is on he who asserted that crime.
The DW7 had no burden to disprove it but the trial Court placed the burden on him.
He referred to Egolum v. Obasanjo (supra); Onobruchere v. Esegine (1996) 1 NWLR (pt.19) 799 at 805;
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PHMB v. Ejitagha (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt.677) 154 at 160 – 161.
(a) The Appellant was denied the benefit of the reasonable doubts. Onubogu V. The State (supra)
(b) The reasons set out on the record for rejecting the evidence of the Dw7 and Dw8 are grossly soaked in miscarriage of justice including denial of fair hearing.
Appellant’s Counsel concluded on issue one that the power and indeed the duty of Appellate Court to intervene and interfere in this case has arisen because:
(i)The trial Court failed to draw the correct inferences from the proved and accepted facts on record, but wrongly assessed the probative values of some evidence on record, (ii) the decision of the trial Court on the defence witnesses is not based on observation of the witnesses but on matters which the Court of Appeal can verify from the printed record, (ii) the findings on the PW4 are not supported by admissible and credible evidence (iv) the findings are perverse so that the decisions arising from the perverse findings are unreasonable, unwarranted and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence and (v) it would be a travesty of justice to allow the findings to
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stand.
He referred to the cases of Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 130, 221 ? 223; Adaje v. The State (1979) 6 – 9 SC 18 at 30; MISR v. Ibrahim (1974) 5 SC 55 at 62.
He urged that the issue be decided in favour of the Appellant.
The reaction of the Respondent to Appellant’s issue one would be found in her treatment of Issue No. Two.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the sole purpose of a medical report in a case of murder, or manslaughter is nothing but to suggest or show cause of death. That for this reason, medical report is usually based upon expert opinion which at times may be right or wrong, the law therefore allows that it could be discountenanced.
He submitted that where the cause of death is obvious, medical evidence ceases to be of any practical or legal necessity in homicide cases where for example, death was instantaneous or nearly so. That medical evidence, though desirable in establishing cause of death is dispensable where there are facts which sufficiently show cause of death to the satisfaction of the Court.
On this, Counsel referred to the cases of Ogbu V. State (2007) All FWLR (Pt.361)
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1651 at 1674 (Per Ogbuagu JSC); Lori v. State (1998) 1 ACLR 267 at 279 and Alarape v. State (2001) LRCN 600 at 634.
Respondent’s Counsel submitted that in the instant case, the prosecution through the evidence of PW1 proved how the Appellant and the other accused persons with their different weapons injured the deceased which led to his death and he saw the deceased die.
That the Medical Report of PW4 relates cause of death to multiple injuries sustained by the deceased.
The evidence and Medical Report of DW7 Exhibit D4 shows cause of death as Acute Cardio respiratory failure consequent upon wide-spread intra vascular blood cloth. This, Counsel said still suggests that deceased had injuries that resulted to blood cloths inside blood vessels.
?Respondent’s Counsel referred to the evidence of PW8 at pages 202 – 210 of the record and submitted that there is sufficient evidence that shows that DW7 was out to cause mischief hence the family of the deceased objected to his conducting the autopsy. The question, said Counsel, is why is the DW7, a public officer so desperate in making sure he conducts the autopsy even when the deceased family
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objected to that. Also, that the state CID handling investigation connived with him and refused a second autopsy by an independent pathologist even against the order of the Federal High Court – Exhibit P12. And, that it is the totality of all these that the learned trial Judge considered in not relying on Exhibit D4.
Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the pertinent question is assuming without conceding that the learned trial Judge rejected the two medical reports would it had arrived at the same conclusion that the Appellant and the other accused persons murdered the deceased.
He concluded that this is a situation where medical report can be dispensed of and still arrive at the cause of death.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE.
In deciding Appellant’s Issue One, it is important to point out some factual misconceptions on the reasons why the learned trial Judge preferred the evidence and report of PW4 to the evidence and report of DW7 as to the cause of death of the deceased.
It is true that at page 419 of the record the learned trial Judge made some afflusions about the fact that “———- Dr. Egejuru as DW7 did not deny that he received
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bribe from Dr. Onyejiaka for the purpose of falsifying the autopsy report in favour of the accused persons who paid the money ——-?, the real reason for rejecting the evidence of Dr. Egejuru (DW7) and his report Exhibit D4 is that the report was not demonstrated. On this point the learned trial Judge at page 420 of the record relied on a quotation from the case of Bosah v. The State (1980) 1 NLR 204 page 229 that “The findings on the corpse and how those findings led to the conclusion as to the cause of death must be explained to the Court?.
Besides, in the circumstances of the case it is obvious from record that the circumstances in which DW7 produced his report is to say the least controversial. Clearly, as a matter of law the existence of relevant and credible evidence before the Court showing that the evidence of the expert is not or cannot be true will constitute a good reason for rejecting it.
See ELF (Nig.) Ltd V. Sillo (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt.350) 258.
?In relation to medical evidence, the situation in the instant case boils down to conflicting opinions of experts, that is between the evidence of PW4 and DW7. The law is that a
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trial Court faced with conflicting opinions of experts is at liberty to accept one and reject the other after evaluating both.
See Ozigbo V. Commissioner of Police (1976) 2 S.C 67; Shell Petroleum Development Corporation V Farah (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.382) 148.
In the scheme of things, the evidence of DW8 and his medical report was rightly declared as irrelevant by the learned trial Judge. This is because even though DW8 claimed to be an observer in relation to the autopsy performed by PW4, he was not requested or ordered to produce an independent autopsy report.
There is no gainsaying that in a criminal trial, the Court must be wary of admitting a report prepared by an expert not at the instance of the police but at the behest of the complainant. According to Edozie JCA in the case of Waziri V. State (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt. 496) 689 “Such an expert report must be taken with a pinch of salt.’
Speaking generally, a Judge is at liberty to form his own impressions about the testimony of experts who give evidence before him. He is not duty bound to give reasons for being more impressed with the evidence of one expert than he is with that of another expert.
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Indeed, a Court can reject unchallenged expert evidence. This is because evidence of an expert is generally an aspect of the entire evidence to be evaluated by the Court.
There is nothing in law or practice which can compel a trial Court to admit unreasonable and illogical evidence no matter the qualification of the expert who gave the evidence. This point is well illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Aladu V. State (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 563) 618. ? the Appellant made a confessional statement that he had shot the deceased with a gun loaded with gun powder and pellets. An expert witness stated that he found a round wound about 1/2 inch diameter between ribs, which resulted in acute internal bleeding and subsequent death of the deceased. However, he went on to state that the injury could be caused as a result of an application of a sharp edged instrument such as a sharp iron or knife, the trial Judge rejected the opinion of the medical expert and held.
“I do not accept PW1’s evidence that the round wound could be caused as a result of an application of a sharp edge instrument on the affected part of the body such as a sharp iron or knife
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in view of the statement of the accused, Round wound in my opinion is consistent with gunshot wound.”
?The Appellant’s Counsel in the Aladu’s case however insisted that since the PW1 was an expert and his evidence on the instrument with which the wound was inflicted was uncontradicted, the trial Judge ought to have believed that evidence.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the opinion of experts are admissible whenever the subject is one upon which competency to form an opinion can only be acquired by a course of special duty or experience. In the instant case however, PW1, the medical doctor called by the prosecution was less than candid in stating that a knife or a sharp iron could be used to inflict a round wound 1/2 inch in diameter.
In this respect, Nsofor JCA declared:
?It is my respectful view, most unreasonable and illogical that any jury faced with these facts would accept “hook line and sinker” the opinion of Dr. Ohieri that a knife could be used to inflict the round wound measuring 1/2 inch in diameter which he (PW1) observed on the deceased and ‘not a gunshot’. In my view the learned trial Judge qua jury
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was absolutely justified in rejecting that opinion of the PW1 on the point and forming his opinion based on the facts overwhelmingly in evidence before him. The criticisms made by the learned Judge, in my view are ‘abirato’ unwarranted and unprovoked”.
One important lesson from the Aladu?s case (supra) as it concerns the instant appeal is that the Court is even at liberty to reject unchallenged expert evidence if it finds such evidence, although unchallenged at the trial, illogical and unreasonable.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant in this case however relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case ofGabriel V. The State (1985) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) 457 at 467 – 468 (per Nnameka – Agu JSC) to the effect that once the prosecution sets out to rely on medical evidence it is no longer open to them to go back on it and argue that inference of cause of death could be drawn from other circumstances.
There are at least two points of distinction between the Supreme Court decision in Gabriel V. The State (Supra) and the instant case. The first is that the eye witness account of PW1 would have been sufficient to convict the Appellant without any
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medical evidence at all. The second is that the evidence and the medical report of PW4 were ordered by the police, it was relevant and it even supported the eye-witness account of PW1.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent was therefore right relying on the cases of Ogbu V. State (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 361) 1651 at 1674; Lori V. State (1998) 1 ACLR 267 at 279 and Alarape V. State (2001) LRCN 600 at 634 that where death was instantaneous or nearly so, medical evidence though desirable in establishing cause of death is dispensable where there are facts which sufficiently show cause of death to the satisfaction of the Court.
Also, that the learned Judge would have arrived at the same conclusion that the Appellant and the other accused persons murdered the deceased even if the learned trial Judge had rejected the two medical reports.
?Issue One is resolved against the Appellant.
ISSUE TWO
On Issue Two, Learned Counsel for the Appellant adopted his submissions on Issue One and added that where there is conflict in the evidence of a witness the Court cannot pick and choose which of the conflicting versions to believe and act on.
Also, that
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no witness is entitled to honour of credibility when he has two materially inconsistent evidence given on oath by him on record. Such a witness does not deserve to be described as truthful.
On these, he referred to the cases of Adun V. Osunde (supra); Onubogu V. The State (supra) and Ezemba V. Ibeneme (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.674) 61 at 74.
He highlighted the following as contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
(a) The impossibility that the PW2 prepared lunch and handed to the PW1 to take to the deceased and therefore whether the claim of that mission by the PW1 is evidentially probable and reliable.
(b) The accuracy of the PW1’s alleged observations and its reliability and credibility as basis for convicting the accused persons for murder.
(c) The reliability and credibility of the evidence of the PW7 as basis for the rejection of the evidence of DW7 and DW8. The PW7 made it clear that all he said about the death of his father are what his younger brother told him.
(d) The credibility of the evidence of the PW2 and PW3 and the reliability of the evidence of the PW4.
?Counsel submitted that the trial Court
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treated the PW1 as an eye witness and therefore relied on what the PW1 claimed to have observed at the alleged scene of crime as an unshaken eye witness “account of how the deceased died, who killed the deceased and when he died.” Evidence which seek to establish any of those points is therefore material evidence. Consequently, a contradiction which renders such evidence doubtful is a material contradiction. That material contradictions in the evidence of the PW1 will render the evidence of every other prosecution witness useless because the truth of his account provides the foundation for every other evidence for the prosecution.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted that it cannot be true that the PW1 received the lunch for the deceased at “up to 2.00pm” on 3/3/2005 from the PW2 to take to the deceased at the farm because when the 1st accused returned from the farm “after mid-day” on that same 3/3/2005 and met the PW2 “she was alone home” (Referred to Exhibit P5) which was admitted without objection which she made on 14/3/2005 – only eleven days after the death of the deceased. That her attempt to retract and resile from that statement during her
31
cross-examination amounts to her stating in Exhibit ‘P5’ that she was alone at home at the material time and then stating at the trial that she was not alone at that time.
He submitted that this is an apt sample of the witness’s contradiction between her extra judicial statement (which she was duly confronted with under cross-examination) and her evidence during the trial. That if she was alone at that material time then the PW1 and PW3 cannot fit into the scene. That contradiction, Counsel said, is therefore on a very material point in the case. The prosecution never explained that contradiction. The Court cannot explain it for them. The benefit of doubt so created should have been resolved in favour of the Appellant but the trial Court never adverted to it let alone evaluate that evidence to give legal effect to it.
After referring to the case of Williams V. The State (1974 – 75) VOL. 9 NSCC 398 at 4O2. Learned Counsel for the Appellant refers to the definition of “mid-day” in the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 6th Edition as “12 O’clock” in the middle of the day the period around this time.”
?He submitted that the ordinary meaning of
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“after mid-day” to which the Appellant is entitled (by application of the foftisime contra preferentem rule) should be “after 12 o’clock”. That was the time when the PW2 was alone when the 1st accused returned from the farm she was with the 1st accused and Maduka Chukwu in whose company she went in search of the deceased.
The effect of this, said Counsel on the evidence of the PW1 that, she was at home with the PW2 up to 2.00pm on 3/3/2005 when she prepared lunch and gave to him to send to the deceased in the farm is that the PW2 lied on this material point and vice-versa.
The Court, Counsel said, cannot pick and choose between these two versions of the prosecution’s evidence.
He referred to the cases of Hashidu V. Goje (supra); Onubogu V. The State (supra); Ebeinwe V. The State (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1246) 402 at 414 and that the trial Court never advert to this material contradiction. The farm according to Counsel was more than five miles from the home of the PW1 to PW3. Also that in Exhibit Pl, which was made on 7/3/2005 the PW1 said that the six accused persons were all armed. But, that in his statement of 4/3/2005 he listed the 3rd, 8th, 9th as
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the only persons he saw armed with knife, hammer and rod. In that statement also he specifically mentioned that 7th accused Chifoani Okorie held the deceased by the mouth.
However, that in the cross-examination of PW1 at page 133, he changed gear to state that “because of the shock I had I could not observed exactly on what part of him they held”.
The effect of this evidence, according to Counsel is that the accuracy of the observation which the PW1 claimed he made at that crucial moment was diminished by “shock?. Counsel submitted that he observed more clearly on 4/3/2005 but on 30/1/2008 when he was cross-examined it occurred to him that he could not have an exact observation because of shock on 3/3/2005.
Also that in his cross examination on that same 30/1/2008 – page 133, he (PW1) testified that “three of them?. ?came after me with weapon?. But in his evidence in chief on page 126 he testified that ?I rushed to rescue him” but “10th and 8th accused came after me with their weapon” That whether it was “three” or “two” of the accused that he saw chase him with their weapon is a material fact about the accuracy
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of the observation which the PW1 claimed to have made.
Appellant’s Counsel furthered that on the same page 133, the PW1 testified that when he got to the farm land he “had the motorcycle?. That all along in his evidence in chief he testified that he had “the 6 years bicycle?. The means by which the PW1 went to that more than 5 miles away farm is a material fact to determine the time frame of events and also to determine if six kinsmen who were killing the deceased could persist after hearing the sound of an approaching motorcycle and also if the PW1 could hear. “The muffled cry of his father” in spite of the sound of the motorcycle. That from the account of the PW1 on page 126 the scene of the alleged murder was within a “tip-toe” distance from the path where he parked the 6 years bicycle.
?Counsel submitted that from the combined accounts of the PW1 and PW3 the PW2 was still at home and she had not had any encounter from the 1st accused when the PW1 returned from the farm after witnessing the murder of his father. Their evidence is also that it was not yet dark when he returned for example that PW1 went to the 1st accused before 6pm. That from
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the totality of the evidence, PW1 had returned from the farm and had gone to confront the 1st accused before the 1st accused came and took their mother PW2 to the farm to search for the deceased.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted further that the most crucial evidence of the PW3 which is on page 158 is that “my father’s corpse was found that same night in the bush inside the particular farmland where they went.” That the account of the PW1 is that he alone saw what happened. When he went to the police he was asked to come the next day. It was on the next day that they went with policemen and a photographer to remove the corpse. And, that still on page 158, the PW3 testified that ‘According to them they did not see my father at the farm” who then found the corpse in the bush that same night? Who were they who went to the particular farm land according to the PW3?
On conspiracy, Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the only reason why the accused persons were convicted of conspiracy is the speculation which the PW1 made on page 127 that when he told the 1st accused that he was going to report to Izombe Police Station that 1st accused discouraged “us” and
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said “we” should go to the house of the 3rd accused. That it was for this reason that he realized that 1st accused “was used to lure his father to the bush?. Counsel asked who were the “we” and “us” in this account of the PW1?.
He submitted that the evidence of PW1 on record all agree that the deceased had an existing voluntary agreement with the 1st accused – his half brother to go and fight the bees at the farm on that 3/3/2005. His dressing for that mission by the account of the PW2 confirms this point. The deceased, Counsel said was not lured to the farm. The Court cannot rely on that speculation of the PW1 to safely convict the accused persons of the offence of conspiracy to commit murder.
He referred to the case of Amadi & Ors V. The State (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt.314) 644 at 663.
He submitted that the record shows that the trial Court never adverted to these material contradictions. The record does not show how inspite of those contradictions the trial Court still believed and accepted the evidence on the PW1 as undisturbed and unshaken evidence to justify the acceptance of PW4 against the evidence of the DW7 and DW8.
?On this,
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Counsel referred again to the case of Ebeinwe V. The State (supra) and Abogede V. The State (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 448) 270.
He submitted that on page 128, the PW1 testified that policemen were released by the Izombe Police Station to go and take investigation of what happened. The outcome of that investigation is vital and material to this case. Those policemen are therefore vital witnesses. The failure by the police to call material and vital witnesses in this case was not explained. It is said Counsel, a fatal failure by the prosecution.
On this, he referred to the cases of Oshodin V. The State (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt.726) 217 at 234; Imhanta V. Nigerian Army (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt.1053) 76 at 94; Afolalu V. The State (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt.1220) 584 at 610 ? 617; Ochiba V. State (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt 1277) 663 at 696; Omogodo V. State (supra).
He submitted that the evidence of PW1 is that he went to the house of the 1st accused and ?I did not report to him what I mw because I wanted to find out my father’s whereabout? That he went to him before 6p.m, the PW1 continued on page 132 to testify on oath that “my intention was to asked James (1st
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accused) the whereabout of my father who he, Susana Duru and Matheas Ohazuruike invited to meet them in the bush?.
This, said Counsel, is straight forward evidence which plainly shows that up to 6p.m the PW1 did not know the whereabout of his deceased father. He said it is not the natural and reasonable evidence of a witness who had already known the whereabout of his father.
He submitted that it does not accord with the natural course of human conduct for the PW1 a full adult male with university education to find his kinsmen and cousins in broad day light in a bush near a farm path killing his father and all he did was to (i) run away (ii) never raised alarm (iii) hid quietly in the bush (iv) waited quietly for his assailants to return to the scene of murder (v) he did not take the opportunity of the discontinuance of the chase after him to escape and seek help. (vi) he was able to know when the murderers finished killing his father and dumped his body between two trees (vii) the known murderers of his father conveniently left the scene (viii) he quietly returned to the scene (ix) he could not touch the body of his father to avoid finger
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print (x) he withdrew quietly and returned home to confide in his brother PW3 about the murder of his father (xi) they both stayed calm (xii) the PW1 proceeds to ask of the whereabout of his same father who he saw being killed and he saw dead while the PW3 proceeded after a long time to recharge his phone, and he did not name the killers of his father on the very first occasion when he went to the police station. That at page 135, he testified under cross-examination that “I cannot remember if I named the persons that night?.
Appellant?s Counsel submitted that the PW1 knew each of the accused persons in details by name before the event. That his statements Exhibit P1 and P2 and his evidence at the trial centered on, prior bitter land dispute between the father of the 3rd, 5th and 7th accused and his late father. That dispute, said Counsel should explain the motive for taking the opportunity of the death of the deceased to do in the accused persons.
Appellant’s Counsel referred again to the cases of Onuoha V. The State (Supra); Ezemba V. Ibeneme (Supra) and Nnajiofor V. Ukonu (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 36) 505 at 521 and submitted that the account
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of PW1 does not deserve credit and belief. That it is absolutely improbable.
He submitted further that the learned trial Judge summarily dismissed the evidence of the DW5 which is on pages 243 to 251. That the Court rejected his evidence because he did not make any statement to the police. That no one question was put to challenge the evidence of DW5 under cross-examination. That his case is therefore not of the class in which the trial Court is in a better state than the Court of Appeal to evaluate or to believe or disbelieve. The evidence was completely accepted by the prosecution.
On this, Counsel referred to the case of Okoro V. State (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt.1290) 351 at 373.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the DW5 was never challenged on any of his material evidence. That the trial Court on page 418 stigmatized the evidence of the DW5 as unbelievable) that DW5 did all he said yet made no statement to the police at Izombe, State CID and Zone 9 Umuahia. There is no other reason on record why the Court held that “He appeared to be a hired witness to try to confuse the Court.’
?He submitted that failure to make a statement to the police should not
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detract from the value of the evidence of a witness which is otherwise credible, relevant and material to the case. He referred to the case of Fawehinmi V. IGP (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt.767) 606 at 670, 671 and 672. That the trial Court never evaluated the evidence of DW5 which the prosecution never disputed. The prosecution never accused the DW5 of being a “hired” witness. The condemnation of the DWs went to the person of the witness and not to his evidence. The record does not show any act or conduct of the DW5 which warranted his condemnation.
As for the DW6, Counsel said, the prosecution never named any other person than him as the one who received the corpse of the deceased at the mortuary. He was never contradicted through cross-examination. The statement by the trial Court that he could not identify the photograph of the deceased is contrary to his evidence on record. The conclusion that the witnesses were bought is perverse.
He urged us to allow the appeal, quash the conviction and set aside the sentence of the Appellant.
The answers to Appellant’s Issue Two could be found in the treatment of the Respondent’s Issue One and Two.
?Learned counsel for
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the Respondent reiterated the ingredients of the offence of murder by reference to the cases of Igago V. State (2001) 2 ACLR page 108; Abirifon V. State (2009) All FWLR (Pt.471) 478 and Nwachukwu V. State (2002) All FWLR (Pt.123) 312 at 322 and submitted following the ingredients of proof as laid down in Igabele V. State (2006) All FWLR (Pt.311) 1797 at 1523 that in the instant case, the Respondent proved its case through the direct evidence of PW1 corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. That the PW1 was unequivocal in his statements and oral evidence in Court in identifying the Appellant to be among those who participated and actually murdered the deceased.
Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the identification of the Appellant was not only direct and precise but also made to the police in all the statements of PW1 and his oral evidence in Court, making the identification of compelling probability and therefore not in doubt.
He referred to the cases of Bozin V. State (1998) 1 ACLR page 2 at 11; Okasi V State (1998) ACLR 284 at 294.
He submitted that the unbiased and independent findings of the PW4 aptly corroborated the direct account of
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PW1 in proving the offence of murder. Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the alibi of the Appellant that he was in the market is not only dry and unfounded, but purely raised as an afterthought.
That the statements of the Appellant do not qualify as alibi as the Appellant never stated.
a. The name of the market.
b. The time he left for the market.
c. The time he returned.
d. Those who saw him in the market.
Thus, as the above details are lacking, the alibi purportedly set up by the Appellant lacked sufficient particulars and the police cannot investigate it, since to do so will be sending them on a wild goose chase.
He referred on the above to the cases of Ochemaje V. The State (2005) 36 NSCQR (Pt.2) 69; Udo Ebere & Ors V. The State 6 NSCQR 755 and submitted that the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the vague and unspecific alibi of the Appellant.
He submitted further that it is settled law that where there is direct or positive evidence of participation in a crime by an accused person, the claim of alibi by the accused person who was seen and recognized while participating in the crime will not avail
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him. He referred to the cases of Odidika v. State (1977) 2 S.C. 21; Ikemson v. State (1998) 1 ACLR 85 at 88 and Njovens V. State (1973) 5 SC. 17 at 65 and submitted that the Appellant was clearly fixed at the scene of crime by the PW1 and that the direct, positive and unchallenged fixing of the Appellant to the scene of crime rebuts his alibi.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO.
Some of the notable points that were developed by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant in the treatment of issue two outside the purview of his treatment of issue one are what he termed (a) the accuracy of the PW1’s alleged observations and its reliability and credibility as basis for convicting the Appellant and other accused persons for murder. (b) the impossibility that the PW2 prepared lunch and handed to the PW1 to take to the deceased and therefore whether the claim of the mission by PW1 is evidentially probable and reliable.
In pursuance of these two related hypotheses, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant contrasted the evidence of PW1 that he took lunch for the deceased at “up to 2.00pm”on 3/3/2005 with the extra judicial statement of PW2 where she said that the 1st
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accused returned from the farm hoves (sic) hours after mid-day. Appellant’s Counsel considered the above possibilities as a material contradiction in between the evidence of PW1 and the extra judicial statement of PW2 – Exhibit P5 especially on the basis that PW2 could not have claimed to be alone after mid-day when the 1st accused came back from the farm.
There are two reasons why I would not regard the above pieces of evidence as contradictions nay material contradictions. The first is as suggested by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent that hoves (sic) hours after mid-day in African terminologies would indeed mean from mid-day to sun set. This is more so in the circumstance when the PW2 was not cross-examined on the matter. The second reason is that the above discrepancies as to time if any does not in any way affect and/or contradict the vivid and unchallenged eyewitness account of PW1 of how the Appellant and other accused persons killed his father.
?Learned Counsel for the Appellant also tried to point out inconsistencies between the statement of PW1 and his evidence in Court for example, that in Exhibit P1 which he made on 7/3/2005 that the
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six accused persons were all armed but that in the statement of 4/3/2005 only the 3rd, 8th and 9th accused persons were armed with knife, hammer and rod.
?Also, that in the statement while he specifically mentioned that the 7th accused Chifoani Okorie held the deceased by the mouth, but that on cross-examination at page 133, he testified that because of the shock he could not observe correctly on what part of the body they held. Again that at one point under cross-examination he said “three of them?. Came after him with weapons. But, that in his evidence-in-chief at page 126, he said “I rushed to rescue him but 10th and 8th accused came after me with their weapon?.
Appellant’s Counsel also pointed out inconsistencies between “had the motorcycle” and “the 6 years bicycle” in the evidence of PW1.
?With due respect to the Learned Counsel for the Appellant I do not consider any of the above pieces of evidence as contradictory. I am guided in this view by the position of the law that a piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what that other evidence states. Also, that a contradiction between two pieces of
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evidence goes to the essentiality of something being or not being at the same time. On the other hand, minor discrepancies depend rather on the person’s astuteness and capacity for observing meticulous details.
Contradictions which are not material as in the cases mentioned above goes to no issue.
Dagayya V. State (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt.980) 637; Uzoka V. FRN (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt.1177) 118, Akpan V. State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.182) 646; Gabriel V. State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) 457; Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509; Akpan v. State (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt.1106) 72.
Appellant’s Counsel also suggested that the evidence of the PW1 that he went to the 1st accused and that “I did not report to him what I saw because I wanted to find out my father’s where about” and that “my intention was to ask James the whereabout of my father who he, Susana Duru and Mathias Ohazuruike invited to meet them in the bush” shows that up to 6p.m, the PW1 did not know the where about of his deceased father. Again, with due respect to Appellant’s Counsel, the above pieces do not indicate that the PW1 did not know the whereabout of his deceased father up to 6.p.m on that fateful day.
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The reason for this is that the PW1 started that portion of his statement by saying “I did not report to him what I saw—“. This means that there was no denial of the knowledge of what he earlier saw in his attempt to play dummy to the 1st accused. The evidence was neither unnatural nor unreasonable in the circumstances on the whereabout of his deceased father.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant also raised issues about the stigmatization of the evidence of DW5 and the lack of acceptance of the evidence of DW6. In the case of the former, the reason was that he did not make statement to the police or did not tell the police that the deceased was stung to death by bees. And, for the latter, a mortician who could not recognize the photograph of the body he claimed to have received in the mortuary.
In all of these, it seems to me that the decisive factor is the fact as observed by the learned trial Judge that the eye-witness account of the PW1 was unshaken.
Indeed, as a matter of law, the evidence of a single witness, if believed as in the instant case can establish a criminal case even if it is a murder charge. Usufu V. State (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt.1020) 94;
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Effiong V. State (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt.562) 362; Garko V. State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.977) 524.
Finally, in the instant case, I do agree with the learned Counsel for the Respondent first that the Appellant’s defence of alibi was rightly rejected for lacking in particulars as the Appellant in the instant case only said he was in the market at that time without more.
A defence of alibi to be worthy of investigation must be precise and specific in terms of the place that the accused person was, the person or persons he was with and possibly what he was doing there at the material time.
See. Shehu V. State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt.1195) 112; Ochemaje V. State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt.1109) 57.
Secondly, and as it happened in the instant case, the defence of alibi crumbles the moment the prosecution gives superior evidence, that is, a more believable evidence than that of the accused, by fixing the accused person not only at the scene of crime, but also in the commission of crime. Dagayya V. State (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt.980) 637; Ikuepenikan V. State (2011) 1 NWLR (Pt.1229) 451 at 469.
Issue Two is resolved against the Appellant.
? Having resolved the two issues in
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this appeal against the Appellant the judgment, conviction and sentence of the Appellant as the 3rd accused person in Charge No.HOG/4C/2007 by C. M. I. Egole J. of the High Court of Imo State, Owerri Judicial Division on 13/5/2013 is hereby affirmed.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8764(CA)
