Bayo-Philip Morayo V. Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba – Akoko & Ors (2016)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the decision of the Federal High Court sitting at Akure, Ondo State delivered on the 13th day of March, 2014 against the appellant, who was the applicant thereat.
The respondents were the respondents to the application at the trial Court.
At the trial, Federal High Court, Akure Judicial Division in Suit No. FHC/AK/CS/3/2013 the applicant’s case was that she was enrolled at the 1st respondent in 2008 to undertake a Post Graduate Diploma Program in Public Administration. She paid all the necessary fees. She took lectures at the 1st respondent’s campus at Iju, Ita – Ogbolu along Ikire Road, Akure North and wrote her 1st semester examinations—
Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant filed a notice of appeal dated 12th of June, 2014 and upon seven (7) grounds.
Before proceeding, it is pertinent to reproduce wholesale, the prayers sought in the applicant/appellants’ motion on notice for the reliefs under the Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Rules and pursuant her Fundamental Rights Guaranteed Under
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Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Article 7 of African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Laws, of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Were as follows:-
A. A declaration that the appellant is entitled to be heard by the respondent in the determination of her civil rights and obligation as a student of the 1st respondent in exercise of her fundamental rights guaranteed under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Articles 7 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
B. A declaration that the failure, omission neglect of the respondents to hear the applicant before determining her civil rights and obligations as a student of the 1st respondent is a flagrant violation of her fundamental rights guaranteed under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and is therefore unconstitutional null and
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void and of no effect whatsoever.
C. A declaration that all decisions taken by the respondents, their agents servants or privies in the determination of the civil rights and obligation of the applicant a student of the 1st respondent without the opportunity of a fair and adequate hearing constitutes a flagrant violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and is therefore unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
D. AN ORDER setting aside invalidating, nullifying, canceling, all decisions taken by the respondents without recourse to her right to fair hearing.
E. AN ORDER forthwith re-instating the applicant as a bonafide student of the 1st respondent for refusing to comply with the applicants constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing.
F. A PERPERTUAL INJUNCTION restraining the respondent, their servants, agents or privies from implementing, executing, further executing or giving effect to
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any decisions that may have been taken by the respondents in the hearing or from further violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights.
G. The sum of ONE HUNDRED MILLION NAIRA (N100, 000.000) as damages being special, aggravated, punitive and general damages against the respondents, jointly and severally, for their violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights.
H. AN APOLOGY from the respondents to the applicant to be published and circulated in three national news papers namely, the Punch, the Guardians and the Nigerian Tribune for their violation of the applicants fundamental rights.
I. SUCH FURTHER OR OTHER ORDERS as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
The applicant’s motion on notice was supported by a 19 paragraph affidavit duly deposed to by the applicant to which exhibits ‘A-O’ were attached to the application was a statement setting out the grounds upon which the reliefs of the applicant were sought. There was also a written address attached and dated 14/01/2013.
The respondents filed a 16 paragraph counter – affidavit dated 31-01-2013 deposed to by the 5th respondent in opposition
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to the applicant’s motion and also attached exhibits marked “AAU1 ? AAU2” respectively. A written address dated 28 – 01 – 2013 was also filed in support of the affidavit.
The applicant in response filed a 21 paragraph further affidavit to which was attached exhibits “E – H” and a written address dated 19/02/2013.
Prior to the hearing of the applicant’s motion the respondents filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 18th March, 2013 challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit as constituted and urging the Court to strike out same for the following grounds:
a. That the applicant?s cause of action arose on 2/11/2011 sequel to her expulsion from the 1st and 6th respondents as per exhibit C attached to the applicant’s affidavit in support of her motion dated 14/01/2013.
b. That the main plank of the applicant’s case was that of her expulsion from the 6th respondent.
c. That the applicant had asked the Court for an order setting aside the said expulsion and an order re- restating her as a student of the 1st respondent as per reliefs D & E of her motion dated 14/01/2013 respectively.
d. That the
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applicant ought to have commenced the action under the Ondo State High Court (Civil Procedure Rules), 2012 by taking out a writ of summons against the respondents and not under the Fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure (FREP) Rules as was constituted.
e. That whether or not there was a breach of the applicant’s right to fair hearing by the respondents in the determination of her right as a student of the 1st and 6th respondents, that the claim was ancillary to the main claim i.e the applicants expulsion from the 1st and 6th respondents.
The respondents also filed a written address dated 18 – 03 -2013 in support of the preliminary objection.
In response to the preliminary objection the applicant filed a written address dated 29/04/2013. In further response, the respondents filed a written address dated 26/01/2014 as a reply on point of law to the applicant?s written address dated 29/04/2013.
In accordance with the rules of Court on Enforcement of Fundamental Rights, to wit: Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, the trial Court consider the preliminary objection along with the substantive application. Thus, the
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Court adopted the procedure of first determining the preliminary objection before delving into the merits or substance of the case.
The trial Court held in favour of the respondents, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain in the applicant?s application and thereby struck out the substantive suit.
The appellant filed his appellant?s brief of argument on 21/4/16, whilst the respondents on their part filed their respondents? brief of argument on 23/3/16 but out of time; however, by leave of this Court granted on 3 – 3 – 16, the said brief was regularized following an order extending time to so file and a deeming order in respect thereof.
The appellant also filed an appellant’s reply brief of argument on 23 – 3 – 16. The parties, by their learned counsel adopted their respective brief and urged that the appeal be allowed or dismissed as applicable to respective parties. Now to the issues framed.
On his part, the appellant formulated four (4) issues for determination to wit.
1. Whether the appellant’s suit was not covered by Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution to confer jurisdiction on trial Court,
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and whether the appellant’s claims are ancillary to the issue of her expulsion. (Ground 4)
2. Whether the respondents preliminary objection did not amount to an abuse of Court process and if so. Whether the learned trial Court was right to have entertained and upheld same.
3. Whether the appellant’s case before the trial Court complied with the fundamental rights (Enforcement Rules and Section 17(10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law 2007? (Grounds 3,7).
4. Whether the trial Court has jurisdiction over the appellant’s suit, being a case of enforcement of the appellant’s fundamental human rights? (Grounds 1, 5 and 6).
On their part, the respondents formulated the following issues for determination; namely:
1. Whether the lower Court was right in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the applicant’s suit as the same was not properly constituted, commenced by the proper procedure and at the appropriate Court.
2. Whether the respondents’ preliminary objection on point of law was an abuse of Court process and if so, whether the trial Court was right to entertain and uphold same.
The appellant’s issues are specific
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on the components of all the sub issues raised and argued at the trial and are also covered by and distilled from the Grounds of appeal. On the other hand the respondents’ issues are encompassing and all embracing but to the same effect in determining whether the action at the trial Court was competently brought and whether the Court had no jurisdiction as held.
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I would prefer to adopt the issues formulated by the appellant for the determination of this appeal, as after all it is his appeal and the settlement of all the nitty-gritty issues posed, in my view, would, settle the dispute with finality; appellant, reproduced the reliefs claimed in his application for the enforcement of his fundamental rights; id est:-
A. A DECLARATION that the applicant is entitled to be heard by the respondent in the determination of her civil rights and obligations as a student of the 1st respondent, in exercise of her fundamental rights guaranteed under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
B.
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A DECLARATION that the failure, omission, neglect of the respondents to hear the applicant before determining her civil rights and obligations as a student of the 1st respondent constitutes a flagrant violation of her fundamental rights guaranteed under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and is therefore unconstitutional, null void and of no effect whatsoever.
c. A DECLARATION that all decisions taken by the respondents, their agents, servants or privies in the determination of the civil rights and obligations of the applicant as a student of the 1st respondent without the opportunity of a fair and adequate hearing constitutes a flagrant violation of the applicant fundamental human rights guaranteed under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and is therefore unconstitutional, null and of no effect
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whatsoever.
D. AN ORDER setting aside, invalidating, nullifying, canceling all decisions taken by the respondents in the determination of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations as a student of the 1st respondent without recourse to her right to fair hearing.
E. AN ORDER forthwith reinstating the applicant as a bonafide student of the 1st respondent for refusing to comply with the applicant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing.
F. A PERPERTUAL INJUNCTION restraining the respondents, their servants, agents or privies from implementing, further implementing, executing, further executing or giving effect to any decision that may have been taken by the respondents in the determination of her civil rights and obligations without recourse to her right to fair hearing or from further violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights.
G. THE SUM OF ONE HUNDRED MILLION NAIRA ONLY (N100,000,000) AS DAMAGES being special, aggravated, punitive and general damages against the respondents, jointly and severally, for their violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights.
H. AN APOLOGY from the respondents to the applicant to be published
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and circulated in three national newspapers namely the Punch, the Guardian and the Nigerian Tribune for their violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights.
I. SUCH FURTHER OR OTHER ORDERS as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.”
Learned counsel therefore, submitted that the appellant’s right to fair hearing was infringed upon in the determination of her civil rights.
That, the 1st respondent decided on its own mind that there was a case of examination malpractice and misconduct against the appellant. That this was apparent from the so – called letters and invitations which never got to the appellant.
That a stage was therefore set for a decision to be taken in respect of these allegations. That it was immaterial that, that stage and allegations arose in the cause of studentship of the appellant as they could have arisen in other circumstances such as if she were a member of staff of the 1st respondent or indeed a contractor.
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That the appellant’s right of fair hearing is granted, imputed or accorded to her as a citizen of Nigeria and a human being, not as a student. That the learned trial judge was not
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right in holding that the right tied as it were on studentship was not available to the appellant.
That the appellant may choose not to go back to the respondent as a student but has a right to clear her name as a cheat, as the allegation was wicked and unfounded.
That, the issue of breach of fair hearing will be determined first before the issue of whether she can be re – instated as a student can follow. That the breach of fair hearing and breach of her fundamental right preceded and made the issue of studentship a concomitant subject.
Learned counsel argued that the stand of the trial Court was such as to show that the litigant cannot claim in respect of a violation of a fundamental right except he does so in relation to her expulsion as a student. Learned counsel argued that if, the expulsion came through a process which was marred by a breach of the appellant’s fundamental rights leading to a decision whether it is expulsion or not, such a decision is of course null and void and of no effect whatsoever. – Adio V. A. G. Oyo State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 163) @ 488.
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That the inquiry should be directed to whether there is a breach of a right
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and not what the status of the applicant is. That the status is immaterial to the question whether there has been a breach of the right. That the purpose of the fundamental rights enforcement regime should not be hamstrung with such narrow interpretation or application.
That the reliefs sought as reliefs A, B and C are declaratory reliefs for the enforcement of fundamental human rights to fair hearing. That is to enforce the applicant’s fundamental rights to fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations as a student of the 1st respondent.
That the other reliefs are consequential to the declaratory reliefs, which in any case would be considered and granted even if they were not specifically asked for, and if the declaratory reliefs succeed.
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That it was wrong of the trial judge to focus on the consequential reliefs and be describing them as ancillary, when his main duty was to decide whether there had been a breach of the appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing.
That the breach was the principal claim and enforcement of fundamental right and protection was claimed under the Constitution. That any of the reliefs of
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declaration claim can be the subject of prosecution of the application to conclusion.
That since any of the reliefs can be maintained, the Court had jurisdiction.
The learned counsel referred to Section 17(10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law, which provides thus.
“Nothing in this Section shall affect any power of a Court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the fundamental right of any aggrieved citizen as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”
That the above provisions are clear and unambiguous; they are unique statutory provisions recognizing and making resort to the enforcement of fundamental rights procedure an avenue where there is an alleged violation of the provisions of Section 17 of the University Law relating to discipline even in examination matters. That the University Law in issue was a unique Statute, that ought to have been given due consideration by the trial Court in this instance, supra.
That the said Statute has not been interpreted and this Court should so interpret it in favour of right of access to the Court to enforce a complainant’s fundamental right to fair hearing claim as
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made.
Learned counsel argued vehemently that even if the general rule were that a claim by a student against expulsion were to be by a writ of summons, the contention here is that in the face of a specific legislation making the exception and providing for the right to a resort to the procedure of enforcement of fundamental right, that provision was specific and should be interpreted as such and as derogating from the general rule and overriding such a rule.
The case of Schroder & Co. V. Major & Co. Ltd. (1989) 2 NWLR (pt. 101) SC 1 relied upon and contended that the cases of Egbuonu V. Borno Radio Corporation (1979) 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 29 at 40 – 41: WAEC V. Adeyanju (2008) 9 NWLR (pt. 1092) 270 at 295 – 296: Unical v. Ugochukwu (No. 10) 2007 NWLR (pt.338) Page 747 at 755 relied upon by the trial judge were distinguishable and inapplicable to the instant case where the claim was for reliefs in respect of breach of fundamental right to fair hearing and there was a specific conferment of jurisdiction in the trial Court by the Statute establishing the University (1st respondent).
That the Court cannot cry more than the bereaved by turning
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their law against them where they had agreed and by their law wanted suits undertaken under a particular procedure even in matters affecting students against them.
Learned counsel argued that where there is a right, there is a remedy; that a Court has a duty to provide a remedy even where none is prescribed in the Statute book. The cases of Damisa V. UBA Plc. (2005) 9 NWLR (pt. 931). CA 526 at 536 – 537 paraqraphs H -A, Ewhurdie V. W.L.G.C. (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 924), 334 (CA) at 360 were referred to.
The learned counsel further referred this Court to Order 16 Rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 and the cases of Dantata V. Mohammed (2000) 7 NWLR (pt.664) page 176 at 196 and Owodunmi v. Registered Trustee of CCC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675), page 315 at 355.
Reproducing the reliefs sought in the motion on notice dated 14th January, 2013, the learned counsel argued that on the strength of the ? aforesaid decisions cited the declaratory reliefs even alone are enough to sustain the case of the appellant; that the respondent’s preliminary objection lacked merit and ought to have been dismissed.
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That the respondent was out
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to frustrate the appellant from being heard in any Court of law at all.
ISSUE TWO:
“Whether the respondents’ preliminary objection did not amount to an abuse of Court process and if so, whether the trial Court was right to entertain and uphold same?”
It was argued that the trial judge was wrong to have entertained the objection as it was not brought in accordance or in compliance with Order 8 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 which mandates by its Rule 2 thereof thus:
“8 – 1 where the respondent is challenging the Court?s jurisdiction to hear the application he may apply to the Court for an order to strike out the suit or setting aside the proceedings.
2. The respondents’ notice of preliminary objection must be filed along with the counter affidavit to the main application”
Learned counsel submitted that the provision supra, relating to a notice of preliminary objection was mandatory; that is that, it must be filed contemporaneously with the counter affidavit to the main application.
That failure to so file on the same date, same time and together was fatal to the competence of such as
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objection. Atolagbe V. Anwuni (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 522) referred.
That to have filed the preliminary objection at all was an abuse of Court process as a counter affidavit had been filed, apparently to answer to the application on its merit. That it amounted to taking steps on the merit of the matter and the right of protest was thus extinguished. Akhiwu V. Principal Lotteries Officers. Mid Western State (1972) 1 ALL NLR (reprint) 233: (1972) 3 SC 183: and University of lfe V. Fawehinmi Contruction Co. Ltd. (1991) 7 NWLR (pt. 201) 26 @ 36 referred.
That the counter affidavit was responded to, before the notice of preliminary objection was filed. The learned counsel likened the respondents’ action/position to that of a litigant who filed an unconditional memorandum of appearance only to come later to complain that the suit was incompetent.
The counsel contends that this cannot be done, and upon the authority of Ariori v. Elemo (1983) 1 SCNLR 1 as he would have voluntarily surrendered or abandoned his right or benefit as being aware, he nontheless chose to abandone it or to jettison and compromise same.
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The learned counsel submitted that it was
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not correct as held by the trial judge that the objection bordered or related to jurisdiction and could be raised any time; that it has to be raised appropriately as provided by the Rules, as issues of locus standi; estoppel, statute of limitation all relate to jurisdiction but have to be raised in pleadings first; that the counter affidavit filed did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Court. That this argument did not border on technicality but goes to the respondent’s power to file and argue a preliminary objection; that the objection of the respondent was to the effect that the aggrieved applicant should come to Court vide a particular procedure of writ of summons; yet resisting the applicants mode of procedure in challenging the action of breach of fair hearing.
Counsel contends that one in breach cannot so complain against the other.
That purporting to dismiss a student upon no hearing at all and on a serious allegation of examination malpractice and driving such a student from access to a Court of law on account of alleged non-compliance with legal procedure must himself be diligent and not in default of complaint against another. That
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the log in their eyes be removed before the pointing of fingers. The other point, it is submitted, is the question of equity. That the same trial judge who refused to grant the applicant’s prayers for the reason of non-compliance with Rules of practice and yet granted the respondents’ objection inspite of objection on non-compliance with Rules, raised against his notice of preliminary objection. That by overruling the objection of the applicant and proceeding to determine the preliminary objection on its merit, that it seemed that the trial judge chose and picked which of the objections to treat on the merit. That if treated on the merit, the matter would have been heard and concluded by now, hence the prayer for the exercise of this Court’s power under Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act to hear and determine the appeal on its merit.
ISSUE THREE
Whether the appellants’ mode of commencement of action complies with the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement procedure) Rules and Section 17 (10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law 2007? (Grounds 3, 6 and 7).
It was submitted that the fundamental right of the appellant had been infringed and the
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action was brought rightly as provided in the Constitution, the Enforcement Rules and the University Act authorized same reconfirming the desire and intent of the respondent to be bound by that procedure even in disciplinary matters involving students.
That the law was enacted after the 1999 Constitution and the Enforcement Procedure Rules; and that this was more so that the earlier Enforcement Procedure Rules First made by the Chief Justice of Nigeria in 1981 existed before the Law of the University (1st Respondent) recognized and permitting the application of Enforcement of Fundamental Rights even in student disciplinary actions was enacted.
That the University had the mind of being bound by the Rule of Law. That the founders had so evinced their intent The learned counsel queried – “what procedure could the drafters of the 2007 Adekunle Ajasin University Law have in mind to be complied with other than the existing 1981 fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules that was the subsisting Regulations then in view of the clear mandate in its law, Section 17 (10) thereof for students to enforce their fundamental rights in Courts of law
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unhindered?.
That the respondents’ cannot turn round to contend that the Courts do not have jurisdiction any longer; that where there is a right, there is a remedy. Bello v. Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 826 was referred; for the aforesaid reasons it was submitted and urged on us to hold that the mode of commencement of this action was legal and complied with the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules and Section 17 (10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law, 2007 and that the trial Court was wrong to have held the case of the appellant to be incompetent.
ISSUE FOUR
Whether the trial Court had jurisdiction over the appellant?s suit, being a case of enforcement of the appellant’s fundamental human right?
It was submitted that the Federal High Court does have jurisdiction to enforce Fundamental Human Rights. That Section 17(10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law, 2007 had clearly made the complaint of breach as brought, a main claim and there was no question of ancillary or main claim or principal claim in that regard.
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Counsel argued that the Federal High Court was competently constituted in respect of the subject
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matter and procedure of action to handle and decide on the case of the appellant on its merit.
That there was no authority (cases) cited by the trial judge to justify the view that the applicant/appellant was strictly required to take out a writ of summons to enforce his fundamental human rights.
The learned counsel submitted thus – “we submit on all the statutory and judicial authorities referred to in treating issues 1, 2 and 3 for determination, that the findings of the trial Court is an error in law. That a wholistic interpretation of the Fundamental Rights Rules and the Adekunle Ajasin University Law, show clearly that the Federal High Court is a competent Court, duty constituted to entertain suits by aggrieved citizens, to enforce their fundamental rights as done by the appellants even though such rights may be related to or originate from their relationship with the university” submitted that Section 17 dealt with determination of studentship rights generally and thus it deliberately confers jurisdiction on Courts, to entertain suits by aggrieved citizens, to enforce their fundamental rights, even though such may originate from or be
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related to studentship.
On the force of the arguments supra, we have been urged to allow the appeal and to set aside the decision of the trial Court.
On his part the respondents formulated the following issues;
1. Whether the lower Court was right to hold that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the applicant’s suit as the same was not properly constituted, commenced by the proper procedure and at the appropriate Court.
2. Whether the respondents’ preliminary objection on points of law was an abuse of Court process and if so, whether the trial Court was right to entertain and uphold same.
Arguing the 1st issue, it was submitted that for a Court to be competent to adjudicate on a matter, the following 4 conditions must be met:
1. The Court must be properly constituted with respect to the number and qualification of its membership
2. The subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction.
3. The action is initiated by due process of law.
4. Every condition precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction has been filled.
Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587 @ 575 and Roserk V. ACB Ltd. (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312)
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Page 382, Paragraphs C-D were referred to.
Counsel contended that the respondent was entitled to raise their objection on grounds of law as they did. He referred to Duzu V. Yunusa (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 120) 80 @ 101-102 and Order III Rule 2 of the Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009.
Counsel concedes that there is jurisdiction in both the Federal High Court and the State High Court to adjudicate on cases of alleged violations of fundamental rights. Counsel said however that where the main claim is not the enforcement of the breached right the action must be commenced under the High Court Civil Procedure Rules of the State concerned and not at the Federal High Court. Refers to Egbuonu V. Bornu Radio Television Corporation (1997) WAEC v. Adeyanju (2005) supra F.B.B Plc v. AG Federation (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1422) 470 at PP. 504-505; SEA Truck (Nig.) Ltd. v. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) Dangote v. Plateau State (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132.
The counsel posited that the rationale for holding that it was the main or principal relief that would show whether the suit was properly constituted was because a declaratory relief was unenforceable.
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That the reliefs claimed showed that the principal relief was for an order restoring the applicant/appellant as a student.
It was also argued that Section 17(10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law, does not confer jurisdiction in the Federal High Court, but was only a reminder to citizens that they could enforce their fundamental rights in appropriate cases. That the Section only talks of rights and not jurisdiction.
The learned counsel urged us to resolve issue one in favour of the respondent contending that the suit was not properly constituted.
ISSUE TWO:
Whether the respondent’s preliminary objection was an abuse of Court process and if so whether the trial Court was right to uphold same. It was argued that even if the notice of preliminary objection was not filed along with the counter affidavit it was not rendered invalid but merely irregular and the proceedings pursuant thereto was not by that fact rendered void.
Order II Rule 1(i) F (ii) of the Fundamental Rules Enforcement Procedure Rules referred.
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That the challenge relating to jurisdiction may be raised at any time and at any stage and even for
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the first time on appeal; for before the appropriate Court provided the relevant facts to enable the Court determine whether or not it had jurisdiction over the matter are before the said Court.
Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron & Steel Workers Union (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 3561 618 – 619 paragraphs G – G. That is because jurisdiction is a fundamental and a condition precedent to the hearing of any suit before a Court of law in Nigeria, that it was never too early or too late to raise it.
It was also argued that a wholistic reading of the Order 2 Rules 8 of the FREPR shows that applications or objections should be filed along with the counter affidavit(s) and the Court should take them along with the application for the purpose of expeditious determination of the case one way or the other and nothing more.
That the appellant had argued that the notice of preliminary objection was not filed timeously and along with the counter affidavit against the application did not amount to a waiver as the issue of jurisdiction cannot be compromised or waived by the parties to an action.
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That even if this Court holds that the notice of preliminary
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objection was not filed along with their counter affidavit it is submitted that this amounted to an irregularity and cannot nullify the proceedings; which counsel describes as the counter affidavit, preliminary objection on points of law and the judgment of the trial Court.
We have been urged to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent and uphold the judgment of the trial Court, The learned counsel proceeded to contend that the appellant had proliferated his issues and raised and argued the issue of jurisdiction in issues 1, 3 and 4. He argued that the appellant’s brief was repetitive in argument on the aforesaid issues.
Referring to Anaeze v. Anyaso (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 1 and Anie & Ors v. Uzorka & Ors. (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 309) 1 counsel submitted that both this Court and the Supreme Court have deprecated the practice of proliferation of issues in a brief.
That some of the arguments by the appellant was based on sentiments and not on facts and/or law and that sentiments have no place in legal jurisprudence.
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Learned counsel said the appellant’s action had been struck out at the High Court of Ondo State for being statute
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barred and hence the rush to the Lower Court with the application leading to this appeal and on a similar claim.
From my study of the record of appeal and all processes filed in respect of this case, I think the appellant’s issues 1, 3, and 4, sing the same tune. They however seek to show that the application or suit of the appellant related to the question of fundamental human rights enforcement and to have been instituted properly Under the Enforcement Rules promulgated for that purpose.
The trial Court however does not see the action as one with a fundamental right character and was therefore, in the Court’s view not rightly brought to the Federal High Court (Lower Court).
The respondents’ issue Number one that asks the question whether the Court was right to hold that it had no jurisdiction as the suit was not properly constituted and commenced by the proper procedure and at the appropriate Court is, to me, the most opposite and apt issue that would answer the complaint of the appellant vis–vis the judgment as delivered.
The issue 2 framed by the appellant is same with the respondent?s 2nd issue. I shall
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therefore adopt the respondent?s issues for the determination of the appeal herein, but shall take the issues in a reverse order, starting from issue number 2.
The appellant had argued in the main that the respondent’s counter affidavit preceded the notice of objection which was supposed to have been filed contemporaneously and that was in violation of the Rules and amounted to a waiver of the right to object to the application as filed.
That it was in-equitable to condone this violation of the Rules of procedure and to on the otherhand endorse the objection by the respondent against the appellant’s application on procedural Rules.
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I agree with the respondent’s learned counsel when he argues that the purpose of and intendment of the Order 8 Rules 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is to ensure that applications in respect of alleged violations of such rights are heard and determined expeditiously. It is not the intendment of the Rules that strict legalism in the nature of defeating the hearing of such applications or delaying them or objections thereto shall stand tall in preeminence to fair, just and expeditious
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determination of justice. The respondent’s counsel is right in so arguing on the rationale for the provision.
It is correct that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and can be raised at any stage of a proceeding and at any hierarchy of the Court’s. Indeed it may be raised for the first time even on appeal and even before the Supreme Court.
However, it may be raised even without leave of Court. See Zakari V. Nigerian Army (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt 1487) SC 77: A-G Lagos State v. A-G Federation, (2014) 9 NWLR 217 (Pt. 1412).
However, the facts upon which it is raised must be brought to the notice of the Court and the opponent must be appraised of the facts with a view to effecting his right to challenge the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court as raised. This could be by an answer to the notice of preliminary objection.
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That is why by the Rules on the Enforcement of Fundamental Rights as conceded by the respondent’s counsel in his brief of argument, page 12, paragraph 7 .04, the application for the enforcement of fundamental right and the preliminary objection shall be heard together on the date fixed for hearing and upon the failure or
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success of the objection, the Court can either decline jurisdiction or proceed with the hearing of the substantive application.
It appears clear from the aforesaid that the objection shall not be heard alone without the application for the enforcement of the fundamental right.
They shall be heard together before an order one way or other shall be made taking the objection in to account.
That it is a jurisdictional question does not mean that having been raised it should be determined in isolation without a consideration of the facts upon which it sought to be raised, so as to give it anchor.
A Court shall not stand askance and ‘akimbo’ and “hands up? at the mere touting of a challenge on jurisdiction and merely because it may be raised at any time.
It is true that parties cannot by agreement, inadvertence or omission confer jurisdiction on a Court, where none exist and where the Court has no competence to hear the case. This as was held by the Supreme Court in
Alhaji Umaru Abba Turkur v. Gongola State Government, (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 @ 546-547 was because the principal claim of the appellant at the Federal High Court
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related to his deposition as the Emir of Muri (Now in Taraba State), the action for the enforcement of his fundamental right against banishment and detention was held to be tied to his deposition as an Emir and that the claim of breach of fundamental right was necessarily tied to the deposition which he had challenged at the High Court.
That the alleged violation of right was ancillary to the main claim and could only be heard at the State High Court, where the principal relief was filed and pending to be heard together.
What is more, demurer, having been abolished at the High Court of Ondo State and Osun State, even a suit thereat without pleadings and evidence disclosing the facts would not entitle the respondent to isolate and raise the issue of competence and or lack of jurisdiction.
It is the determination of the issue of jurisdiction that is required to be settled first in the case, but the facts on which the issue is raised has to be led.
?
Order 16 – Federal High Court Procedure Rules 2009 applicable to the proceedings at the time of proceedings appealed provides thus:-
1. No demurer shall be allowed.
2. A party shall be
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allowed to raise by his pleadings any point of law, and any point so raised shall be disposed of by the judge who tries the cause at or after the trial.
3. A point of law so raised may, by consent of the parties, or by order of the Court or a judge in chambers on the application of either party, be set down for hearing and disposed of at any time before the trial;
4. No action or proceedings shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not.
Indeed, objection to jurisdiction, it is now trite may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and even for the very first time on appeal however, subject to the rider that the adversary and the Court must be availed the facts and the circumstances. This is better done vide pleadings and evidence led. This will not designate and render invalid the fact that the jurisdictional issue will be settled first before the conclusion and determination of the case on the merit for it is not illegal or wrong in law to hear a matter so as to get
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evidence that will dispose the Court in deciding whether it has jurisdiction to decide the merit of the case i.e give a judgment.
It is only wrong, where a judgment is given and there is no power to so do. Hearing, per se constitutes no wrong, except that it may be a strenuous and wasteful exercise if the ultimate result proves that there was no need.
By and large, not filing the processes in the contemporaneous manner envisaged by the law was, on the part of the respondent, a mere irregularity that was curable and in the same manner, that there was in my view no abuse of process on the part of the appellant.
The Courts have long moved away from the narrow path of technicality and are now in the pursuit of substantial justice.
Issue two of the respondent and which is also the appellant’s issue No 2 is resolved against the appellant. That is to say, the respondents’ preliminary objection was not an abuse of Court process and the trial Court was not wrong to entertain it.
?
On the second and determinate issue, that is whether the trial Court was right to hold that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the applicant’s suit as the same
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was not properly constituted, commenced by the proper procedure and at the appropriate Court.
The appellant’s learned counsel by his argument on his clients issues 1, 3 and 4, in a summary form is contending that the trial lower Court had jurisdiction in law to entertain the appellant’s claims as instituted vide the application for the enforcement of his fundamental right to fair hearing. It is his contention that the infringement of the right was the crux and reason for the action before the Court.
It was the principal claim as it is clear that the animus of the claimant had been evidenced by what he claimed. The inquiry into facts so as to discover the subject from whence the denial of the right of fair hearing arose; which would then be an incidental action, if challenged in other respect. It was not the cause of action, here, in those other respect.
?
A cause of action is the combination of facts that give a claimant a right of relief in a Court of law. It is therefore the various acts leading to or omissions complained of that cumulatively constitute a cause of action; i.e a damage is alleged and a relief is claimed. It is decipherable from the
37
statement of claim and its relief as in the originating process.
See again A-G Lagos State v. A-G Federation (Supra).
Therefore, it is not the fact of being a student or studentship status or expulsion that constituted a cause of action. It is the denial of the right of fair hearing that could be termed a cause of action for which a claim could be made. If it is made, then it is the principal claim and within the jurisdiction of both the Federal High Court and State High Court.
The incidental reliefs or ancillary reliefs or claims as they are commonly referred to may be such orders as damages, mandatory injunction compelling the defaulting party to give a hearing to the aggrieved and vindicated complainant. It may, in some instances in the interest of justice and equity entail a consequential order of undoing any or all actions that had been taken pursuant to the denial of the right of fair hearing so that the status quo ante be maintained or reverted to pending the conclusion of the trial either by the Court seized of the matter or upon a transfer of the case, as the case may be.
?By no means will a Court seized of jurisdiction decline
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jurisdiction as that will be abdicatory of its power. It is for the party to ask of the Court such reliefs that are beneficial to it and lawful to extract from the Court. The fact that some of his reliefs would fail does not erode the Court of jurisdiction see Odom v. PDP (2015) 6 NWLR (pt. 1456) 527. Jurisdiction is statutorily conferred and in relation to Courts it is a matter of law. Once it is conferred and thereby assumed, the power is not vitiated merely because the applicant may not get the benefit of the other reliefs sought as is contended in this appeal see Odom V. PDP (supra) page 566 paragraphs A-C.
The right or jurisdiction of a Court to hear a matter is also not defeated by the non-compliance with the rules of procedure or practice. It is only when it is expressly stated that non compliance with the Rules particularly renders a cause of action incompetent as the Court’s pre occupation must be the doing of substantial justice between the parties in respect of the dispute the Court is asked to resolve. See ODOM V. PDP (supra).
?The claims of the appellant herein vide the declaratory reliefs sought by him are amply accommodated by Section
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46 of the 1999 Constitution which confers jurisdiction thereon in any High Court in the State. “A High Court in the State” includes the Federal High Court having jurisdiction in the place where the cause of action arose or where the defendant resides.
In this instance, it was the Federal High Court, Akure Judicial Division or the State High Court of Ondo State. The principal relief or claim was the infringement of the right of fair hearing and must take precedence over the subject whether land or studentship if the claim is not in the main raised on the list. See Adio v. A-G. Oyo State (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 163) @ 488.
The rules of Court should not provide the means of compromising the appellant’s right of ventilating his right as conferred by the Constitution and recognized by Section 10 (7) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law. See Ogunremi v. Dada (1962) 1 ALL NLR 663 at 671 (1962) 2 SCNLR 417; the Court should rather give an aggrieved party the opportunity of being heard. See Dr. Okonjo v. Mudiaga Odie & Ors. (1985) 10 SC 267; and Joseph Afolabi & Ors v. John Adekunle & Ors (1983) 8 SC 98; 1983 2 SCNLR 141, referred to in Odom v. PDP
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(Supra).
The gate of justice cannot be closed or shut in the beckoning face of the appellant who has an uncanalysed license by the fact of the phrase in Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution thus: “Any person who alleges that any of his fundamental rights has been, is being or likely to be breached may apply to a High Court in the State…” For its enforcement.
All that the trial Court would have done was to determine first whether the application was brought pursuant to the stipulations in the procedure for the enforcement; thereafter to consider the application on its merit. This is more so when a hearing is challenged as either being unfair or not existing at all. That was a violation of a fundamental right guaranteed in Part 4 of the 1999 Constitution and for which Section 46 thereof grants a High Court jurisdiction to entertain.
The reliefs A, B, C, are declaratory reliefs for the enforcement of the fundamental right to fair hearing. The other reliefs are only consequential reliefs which may only be granted where the first 3 declaratory reliefs succeed, and do not attach as a fundamental right but are the necessary effects of the benefits of
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the rights having been recognized and enforced by the Court.
The cases referred to by the respondents’ learned counsel which were the basis for the trial judge’s abdication of jurisdiction are, with due respect, inapplicable as in those cases the principal claims and reliefs as made by the claimants were a frontal attack and prayers that their dismissal or rustication as the case may be were wrongful and prayers for re-instatement and damages were made.
Those cases are clearly distinguishable from the present. A claim is as formulated by a claimant; and it is the claim as formulated in the writ or originating process e.g a petition that determines jurisdiction.
It is the gravamen of the claim that is to be considered. See Attorney?General, Lagos State V. A-G Federation (2014) 9 NWLR (pt. 1412). Page 217 at 318 where His Lordship stated—-. It is trite that it is the claim of the plaintiff which determines the jurisdiction of the Court.
The said entrenched constitutional provision guaranteeing the recognition and enforcement of the fundamental right of every citizen of Nigeria has been further re-emphasized by the
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provision of Section 17 of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law, 2007, where it provides in Section 17(10) thereof specifically that nothing in the Section 17 of that Law (that provided for disciplinary measures, procedure and bodies and Agencies of the University and how disciplinary powers shall be exercised even in studentship discipline including allegation of examination malpractices) shall affect any power of a Court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the fundamental right of any aggrieved citizen as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.”
In my view, the words “Court of competent jurisdiction” simply means a High Court, as is provided in the Section providing for the enforcement of the rights.
When the Section 17(10) provides “nothing in the law shall affect the power of a competent Court of law to enforce the fundamental right of an aggrieved citizen as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999” it is intended to or meant to exclude an impinging or impeding effect of any other provisions of the Statute or other subordinate legislations so that the Section may fulfill itself, NDIC
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V. Okem Ent. Ltd. (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 880) 107 see A.G. Lagos State V. A – G Federation (Supra).
As stated earlier, a Court’s jurisdiction is determined from the averments in the statement of claim and not from the statement of defence. In this matter, it is from the affidavit in support of the motion or application for the enforcement of fundamental right to fair hearing and not the counter affidavit that donates the facts from whence the jurisdiction of the Court may be determined; the claim donates the jurisdiction and not otherwise.
Section 46 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Constitution that confers jurisdiction in both the Federal and State High Court has so provided, that power or jurisdiction must be interpreted liberally as the Supreme Court so enjoined; such that its obvious intent is not defeated.
?It is also in this respect that I also agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant when he submitted that the antecedent of the Section 17 (10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law 2007 should be taken into consideration and that when it is noted that the 1999 Constitution exists for the enforcement of
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the Rights granted therein and its Enforcement Rules and that decisions of Courts existed which tendered to tie the jurisdiction of enforcement of those rights to the jurisdiction in respect to the subject matter from which or in respect of which the breach emanates or pertains, that makes it the more reasonable to infer that the re-assurance in Section 17 (10) of the Adekunle Ajasin University Law, of 2007 is a re-confirmation of the fact that notwithstanding the subject matter and procedure stipulated for settlement or complaints that would not prejudice the exercise of an aggrieved person’s right to challenge an action by an application for the enforcement of a fundamental right to fair hearing.
The learned respondent’s counsel is of the view that the Court would only have jurisdiction where the application strictly complies with the Enforcement Procedure Rules and also that declaratory reliefs are not enforceable and so not principal reliefs.
That is not with due respect, any longer the current trend in the administration of justice. In a long line of cases including Gwonto V. State: Bello V. State etc. The Supreme Court has held that the
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Rules of Courts are subservient hand maids and not omnipotent masters and what is more do not confer jurisdiction in the Courts.
They are only made to regulate the procedure for fast and just determination of cases.
Of course, where the main plank of the claim is not complaint on breach of fundamental right and not one cognizable by the Federal High Court, that Court will have no jurisdiction. That is obvious. However, where the plank is a violation of the guaranteed right to fair hearing before a decision is or was taken by any person or authority or Court or Tribunal against any person in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, the right exists and the jurisdiction exists, also to hear.
The appellant alleges ?non service? of any process or notice on him before the alleged sessions and decision respondents rusticating her on the grave criminal allegation of examination malpractices.
It is that violation of the right of hearing that offends the principle of audi alteram partem. A threat to her freedom or liberty from arrest and prosecution and detention. A threat to a reputation violation. It is a constitutional
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requirement that such rights be protected. See the decision of this Court Per Danjuma, JCA on this right and its effect of nullity of actions for non – compliance in the case of B. O. I. Ltd. V. Adediran (2015) 7 NWLR (pt. 1487) at page 128 paragraphs F – G.
It is for the above reason, that a Court of law must guide its jurisdiction jealously and must do everything to preserve its jurisdiction in favour of litigation, as Statutes dealing with jurisdiction must be interpreted strictly so as not to displace litigants.
See Clemco V. MV Arabs (2002) 37 WLR 140 at 149 line 5 CA and the recent and unreported decision of this Division of this Court delivered in Tokunbo Aderingbeye v. Attorney General of Federation and Federal Ministry of Justice, appeal. No. CA/AK/100/2014 of 31st May 2016, Per Danjuma JCA.
A Court of law, therefore, has no jurisdiction to decline jurisdiction, except where the law denies same to it. Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution specifically provides that (1) Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution providing for Fundamental Human Rights have been, is being or likely to be
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contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this Section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any rights to which the person who makes the application may be entitled, under this Chapter.
It is therefore clear that if the claim is that XYZ should be declared or it be determined that there is a wrong or an entitlement or damages is sought principally before the question of breach of fundamental right is projected, then it will not be an action principally for the enforcement of such a fundamental right. If it is the reverse then of course in my view it is one, such application cognizable as such. It should be so treated.
It must be in consonance with the modern trend in substantial justice that Femi Falana (SAN) in his book – Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement first Edition
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Published by Legal publishing Company Limited, 2004 posits at page 72 thus:-
However students challenging their rustication or expulsion from school or cancellation of their results by examination bodies have successfully maintained actions Pursuant to the Fundamental Human Rights Enforcement Rules Garba V. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 18) 550: Ibietan & 44 Ors. V. University of Abuja (1995) FHCLR 7: West African Examinations Council V. Akinola Oladipo Akinkunmi (2002) 3 LHCR (pt. 30) 64 Abia State University Uturu V. Chima Anvaibe (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 719: University of Calabar V. Ghiekwe Ikunze Esiaqa (1985) 1 SCNLR 296: Adeyanju V. West African Examinations Council (2002) 13 NWLR (pt. 785) 479. Osita Nnamani Ogbu, in his “Human Rights Law and Practice in Nigeria: An introduction, Cidjap publishers Enugu 1999 P.241 has stated that the distinction been drawn between cases of Chiefs or Civil Servants be in deposed or terminated and a breach of fair hearing is alleged and that of a student rusticated or having his exams cancelled is unjustified.
This view fortifies and is in consonance with my view supported by the
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authorities. I had referred to in this judgment.
Joinder of causes of action may be made in an application for the Enforcement of the Right of fair hearing. The judge may hear same and award the remedy for the breach proved. See Minister of Internal Affairs V. Alhaji Shugaba Abdulrahman Darman (1983) 3 NCLR 915 at 997 where it was held thus:
“The purpose of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure) Rules is to facilitate the enforcement of the infringement of fundamental rights by avoiding the procedure of having two sets of remedies in the enforcement of such rights.”
Thus where the infringement amounts also to a tort and the facts are such that can independently sustain a claim for damages resulting from such injury, it will be depriving the citizens of the right of action legitimately due to him if the only remedy he gets is the quashing of the illegal order constituting the infringement.
Apart from this, there will be the temptation which may be irrestible, for the applicant to bring another action for damages resulting in a multiplicity of the same facts. lt is therefore consistent with the age old maxim, interest rei publicae ut
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sit litis finitum to prevent such expediency. See the case of Opuogu v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2002) 2 LHCR (pt. 15) 92.
A dismissed staff challenged his termination of appointment and detention. The Court held his termination for fraud as proper but awarded him N100,000 damages for illegal detention for alleged fraud committed before the said termination. See also G. S. Sobodu v. UAC Nigeria Ltd. (2000) 1 LHCR (pt. 8) 24 (all of which though persuasive authorities only, are in consonance with my view to water down and make in inappropriate the contention on “principal and main relief” and render of doubtful application to the nature and circumstances of this case before me on appeal.
I am, indeed, fortified and agree with the submissions of the appellant’s learned counsel as contained in his appellant’s reply brief of argument relying on the dictum of Karibi Whyte. JSC in Eguamwense V. Amagbizemwen (1993) NWLR (Pt. 315). Page 1 that:
“It is acceptable that the action for declaration is a useful and important procedural method for ascertaining and determination of a point of law or the construction of a document and for the determination
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of the validity of orders or decisions of inferior Courts or Tribunals — its nature is very much misunderstood.
The action for declaration is used in a great variety of circumstances and is usually accompanied by ancillary reliefs….”
The appellant?s counsel is therefore, correct to submit that the declaratory reliefs claimed were principal reliefs and I would say, in the circumstances of fundamental right claims, as herein, they were. Seeing them in other light and resting on the view to decline jurisdiction makes the reason for the decision one based on a quick legal stand. The foundation has no legal anchor.
I shall say in brief that I do disregard the arguments on proliferation of issues as it is not anchored on an objection filed to strike out any such issue (s) and more so, the issues are distinct and not proliferated by appellants as thought by the respondents’ learned counsel.
?On the whole, and in the face of my discussion above, I hold that issues 1, 3 and 4 of the appellant, which is the same with issue number 1 of the respondents are each answered and resolved in favour of the appellant and against the
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respondents.
The trial Federal High Court Judge was in my view, wrong to have declined jurisdiction to entertain and to determine the application, the subject of this appeal.
Accordingly, the Ruling of the Lower Court i.e the said Federal High Court of Nigeria, sitting in Akure in Suit No. FHC/AK/CS/03/2013 by Honourable Justice I. M. Sani is, therefore, set aside.
2. It is determined and ordered that the aforesaid application ie Suit No. FHC/AK/14/03/2013 shall be relisted on the cause list of the Federal High Court Akure and to be decided by a different judge other than Honourable Justice l. M. Sani, as the Honoulable Chief Judge of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, may designate.
Costs: I award a cost of N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira Only) in favour of the appellant and against the respondents.
Appeal is allowed.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8907(CA)
