Chief Damian a. Ozurumba V. Chinagorom Nwankpa & Ors (1999)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

IKONGBEH, J.C.A.

This is an appeal by the petitioner before the Imo State Local Government Election Tribunal. He had contested the office of Chairman of Isiala Ngwa South Local Government against the 1st respondent, who had the 2nd respondent as his running mate. He was defeated in the election and so filed his petition against the election of the two respondents. One of the grounds on which he challenged their election was that at the time of their election neither one of them was qualified to be elected. He averred that this was so because neither of them paid his/her tax as and when due as required by the enabling law. The enabling law is the Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree, No. 36 of 1998. He averred additionally that at the time of his election the 1st respondent did not possess the requisite educational qualification.

Although the parties placed a mass of evidence, both oral and documentary, before the tribunal to prove or disprove the averments, the tribunal declined to make a ruling one way or the other on the issue joined and canvassed. It adopted this approach because, in its view, it lacked the jurisdiction to pronounce on the issue. The jurisdiction to do so is vested, according to it, in I.N.E.C. or its duly accredited official. It arrived at this conclusion on a consideration of the effect of paragraph 6(2)(a) and (3) of Schedule 4 to Decree 36 of 1998 on sections 51(b) and 84(1)(a) of the Decree. The sections provide:

“51. A person shall be qualified for election under this Decree if –

(b) he produces evidence of tax payment as and when due for a period of three consecutive years immediately preceding the year of the election;

84.(1) An election may be questioned on any of the following grounds, that is

(a) That a person whose election is questioned was, at the time of the election not qualified, or was disqualified from being elected;”

Paragraph 6(2)(a) and (3) provides:

“(2) The Electoral Officer shall be entitled to declare the nomination form invalid only on one or more of the following grounds-

(a) that the candidate has not produced evidence of tax payment as and when due for a period of three years immediately preceding the year of election or a valid evidence of exemption from the payment of all or any of the tax; or

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Decree or any other law, the decision of the Electoral Officer, that a candidate has been validly nominated under the sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph shall not be the ground of an election petition under this Decree.”

From its reading of these two paragraphs the tribunal concluded at pages 104 – 105 of the record that:-

“If a candidate is declared qualified to contest an election under sub-paragraph (2) the Electoral Officer’s decision that the candidate has been validly nominated shall not be the ground of a petition, since such decision is final.” (Italics mine)

It reproduced paragraph 6(3) and continued at page 105,

“The provision is clear enough. This means that section 84(1)(a) which makes non-payment of tax as and when due a ground for petition must give way since the schedule has taken care of it. It is our view that qualification or disqualification of candidates for contesting an election is the exclusive preserve of the Independent National Electoral Commission, which acts through its officers at Federal, State or Local Government levels. Screening of candidates are (sic) carried out by screening committees to ensure that those qualified to contest the election satisfy all the requirements in the provisions stated above.” (italics mine)

It then referred to the following decisions of this court, the first four of which decided against jurisdiction in the tribunal, and the last two of which decided in favour: Duokpolagha v. George (l992) 4 NWLR (Pt.236) 444; Ikuomola v. Ige (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.236) 511; Chime v. Ndu (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt.277) 233; Chibok v. Bello (1992) 2 LRECN 68; Uko v. Ukpai (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt.569) 285; Chukwu v. Igwe (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.90) 609. It then went on at page 108, “Both the decision of the Court of Appeal which held the view that once an electoral officer has declared a candidate qualified to contest an election such decision shall not be a ground for an election petition and those of their Lordships who hold otherwise are binding on this tribunal. We are not in the least competent to say which of the decisions is wrong but we will be free to prefer one of their Lordship’s (sic) decisions. We therefore prefer the decision of the Court of Appeal that where the Chief Electoral Officer of the Federation or any officer delegated by him in that behalf decided that the nomination or qualification is in order, the nomination or qualification of a candidate to all election cannot be a ground in a petition to question the result of the election. This view was held as far back as 1960 in the case of Lasebikan v. Dada (1960) NRNLR 12. In the result the petitions of Richard Alaribe and that of Chief Damian Ozurumba which grounds are based on qualification to have (sic) failed as this tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to inquire into issues relating to the validity or nomination of the 1st and 2nd respondents to contest the December 5, 1998 Local Government Elections as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Isia!a Ngwa Local Government Council.” (Italics mine)

Aggrieved by this conclusion the petitioner appealed to the Constitutional Court (as which this court is sitting) on four grounds. In the appellant’s brief of argument, Chief N.U. Udechukwu, S.A.N., identified two issues as arising from the grounds of appeal for determination. Mr. A.U. Kalu in the 1st and 2nd respondents’ brief accepted these issues as the only issues called for by the appeal. The two issues are as follows:

(i) Whether the tribunal below was right when it relied on paragraph 6(3) of Schedule 4 to Decree No. 36 of 1998 to hold that it lacked the jurisdiction to decide whether a candidate for the position of Chairman of a Local Government was qualified or disqualified.

(ii) Whether from the evidence before the tribunal below, the 1st respondent was qualified to be Chairman of a Local Government having regard to Sections 10(c) and 84(1)(a) of Decree No. 36 of 1998.”

Submissions of counsel:

Arguing the appeal on the first issue, the learned S.A.N. first drew attention to the principle of interpretation of statutes, which holds that “in the interpretation of a statute, the courts must proceed from the stand point that the legislature does not make a prescription in vain”, He also drew attention to the provisions of Sections 10(c) of Decree 36 of 1998, which prescribes positively that a person shall be qualified to hold office as Chairman of a Local Government if he is educated up to at least the School Certificate Level or its equivalent as defined under Section 99(1) of the … Decree No. 31 of 1998, and Section 84(1)(a) of the Decree, which stipulates that one of the grounds upon which an election may be questioned is that the person whose election is questioned was at the time of the election not qualified to be or was disqualified from being elected. He then submitted that it would be startling and strange to interpret paragraph 6(3) of the Schedule to the Decree “so as to totally negate the purport of the positive enactment by the legislator as contained” in Sections 10(c) and 84(1)(a). He submitted further that paragraph 6(3) “relates to validity of nominations and the implications of a valid nomination. The provision did not pretend to relate to question of qualification or disqualification”. He urged the court to interpret the paragraph within the context of the purport of validity of nomination only as was done in Chukwu v. Igwe, supra. He pointed out that the appellant was not questioning the nomination of the 1st respondent as being invalid. He distinguished Enagi v. Inuwa, supra, and the other cases decided along the same line by pointing out that “the limitation of grounds for questioning elections was not contained in a schedule but enacted positively in the main body of the Electoral Statute i.e., section 91 of Decree No. 50 of 1991. He submitted further that ;the expression that even if a contestant obtained validation of his nomination by lying to I.N.E.C. the tribunal would shut its eyes and refuse to see when it is pointed out to it that the contestant lied and that the contestant is in fact, disqualified from holding office … is nothing but an abdication of judicial responsibility. Such an attitude would amount to granting judicial blessing to falsehood at (sic) deception”. The learned S.A.N. also referred to the other decision of this court that went along the same line as Chukwu v. Igwe supra. That is the decision in Uko v. Ukpai, supra,

In the 1st and 2nd respondents’ brief, Mr. A.U. Kalu made the following submissions,

“3.50 In the instant case, the framers of Decree No. 36, 1998 appear to be determined to have the provision of paragraphs 6(2) and (3) of Schedule 4 to the Decree override the substantive provisions of the Decree. It is correct to say that Sections 10(c) and 84(1)(a) of Decree No. 36 of 1998 have made provisions with regard to the qualifications of candidates for Local Government Council elections and grounds upon which an election may be questioned, respectively.

3.60 What appears indisputable is that paragraph 6(3) of the same Decree opens with the phrase “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Decree or any other law -“. It is our humble view that the word “Notwithstanding” is to be contrasted with the more often used words “subject to”. The Supreme Court in A.G. Anambra State v. A.G. Federation supra, emphasized that the expression “subject to” in an enactment has acquired a special meaning. The phrase implies that the provision is subordinate to the section to which it is subject. On the contrary, we submit that when a statute or other enactment specifically makes a provision “notwithstanding any other provision” then such a statute ought to be taken as stating that such a provision is superior to and indeed overrides any other provisions which may seem inconsistent thereto. It does not appear to be material that this overriding provision is to be found in the schedule rather than the substantive provisions of the enactment or statute. To that extent, the intendment of paragraphs 6(2) and (3) appear to be to supercede any provisions of the same decree which may appear to be inconsistent.”

Learned counsel distinguished Uko v. Ukpai, supra, by pointing out that, unlike the present case, that case came before this court, sitting as the Constitutional Court, by way of review rather than by way of normal appeal. It was his contention that having regard to Section 108 of Decree 7 of 1997 our decision, per Uwaifo, J.C.A (as he then was), in that case was reached per incuriam. It was his further contention that the value of that decision as authority was further lessened by the fact that we made no reference to “any provision of the Electoral Law or Decree” to enable the tribunal compare its provisions with those of Decree 36 of 1998. He commended to us the other cases in which this court had decided against the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

My Decision

Now, I have already reproduced the provisions of Section 51(b) and 84(1)(a) of Decree 36 of 1998 as well as paragraph 6(2) and (3) of Schedule 4 thereto. To see the full picture and be better able to place matters in their correct perspective it is necessary, I think, to examine other related or affiliated provisions of the Decree. Section 10 specifies three things, numbered (a) – (c), which, if true, qualifies a person to hold the office of chairman of a Local Government. Item (c), with which we are directly concerned, qualifies a person for the office if he is educated up to at least the School Certificate Level or its equivalent. Section 11(1) specifies eight matters, numbered (a) – (h), which, if true, disqualifies a person from holding that office. Section 13(1) provides that a candidate for the office of chairman of a local government shall not be deemed to have been validly nominated for such office unless he nominates a running mate. Section 51 lists twelve items, numbered (a) – (l), which, if true, qualifies a person for election under the Decree. Item (b), as we have seen, qualifies a person for election if he produces evidence of payment of tax as and when due for the three preceding years. Section 72 makes a person who has been convicted of the offence of treating, dealing fraudulently with nomination forms or ballot papers, voting or getting some one else to vote illegally, and tampering with statements of result ineligible, for a period of three years, to vote or be voted for. Section 80 prescribes that an election or return at an election under the Decree can be questioned only by way of a petition presented to a Local Government Election Tribunal. Section 81(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal to hear and determine any question, inter alia, as to whether any person has been validly elected at an election under the Decree. Section 84(1) specifies four grounds, numbered (a) – (d), on which an aggrieved petitioner may question an election. As we have already seen, ground (a) is a complaint that the person whose election is questioned was, at the time of the election, not qualified to be, or was disqualified from being elected. Then comes paragraph 6(3) of the schedule, which, as has been seen, provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of the Decree or any other law, the decision of the electoral officer that a person has been validly nominated under subparagraph (2) shall not be a ground of an election petition under the Decree. Now, putting together all these provisions, what is the picture that emerges. What I see is this; it is the declared intention of the Federal Military Government, in promulgating Decree 36 of 1998 that nobody who is not qualified under section 10 to hold the office of Chairman, or is disqualified under Section 11(1) or who is not qualified under Section 51 for any election or who has been convicted of any of the offences specified under Section 72, gets elected into that office. To ensure that this does not happen it set up I.N.E.C. to screen all candidates and see that no person who is not qualified, or who is disqualified, is allowed to contest the election. In the possible event that any undesirable element manages to slip through I.N.E.C.’s screening filter, the government set up the election tribunals under 81(1) and invested them with authority to ensure that whoever was elected, was elected on the majority of lawful votes cast, or that such persons who should not have been allowed to contest the election in the first place are fished out. In order to enable aggrieved persons to invoke the authority of the tribunals it authorized such persons under Section 80 to proceed by way of an election petition and specified the grounds upon which they may so proceed. One of those grounds is that the person whose election is questioned was at the time of his election not qualified to, or was disqualified from, being elected. By Section 87(1) the tribunals are empowered to nullify the election if they determine that the candidate who was returned was not validly elected on any ground. That must surely include the ground that he was not qualified to contest.

From the scenario presented by these provisions, it is clear to me that it was the intention of the Federal Military Government, as shown by the words it has used, that before the actual election the responsibility for seeing that those who are not qualified to be elected do not contest the election is cast on I.N.E.C. It was further its intention that after the election the responsibility for fishing out those who should not have been allowed to contest but who somehow managed to slip through and win the election, and for nullifying their election, shifts to the tribunals. It carries out this responsibility to the exclusion of any other court or tribunal. This is made crystal clear from the language of Section 81(1).

Now, the 1st and 2nd respondents persuaded the tribunal, and have pressed upon us, to accept their contention that “the framers of Decree No. 36 of 1998 appear to be determined to have the provisions of paragraphs 6(2) and (3) of Schedule 4 … override the substantive provisions of the Decree”, including of course Section 84(1)(a). “This means”, as the tribunal positively held, “that Section 84(1)(a) which makes non-payment of tax a ground of petition must give way since the schedule has taken care of it. … Qualification or disqualification of candidates for contesting an election is the exclusive preserve of the Independent National Electoral Commission …..

To determine whether or not the respondents’ contention here represents the correct view I think it is pertinent to have a closer look at paragraph 6(3). It says, at the risk of repetition,

“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Decree or any other law, the decision of the electoral officer that a person has been validly nominated under sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph shall not be the ground of an election petition under this Decree.” (Italics mine)

The first point to note, as was noted by Chief Udechukwu, S.A.N., in the appellant’s brief, is that the decision of the electoral officer withdrawn from the competence of the tribunal is not the decision declaring a person qualified to contest pursuant to paragraph 2(2) but the decision under paragraph 6(2), relating to the nomination paper. That such is the case is made abundantly clear in paragraph 6(3) itself. Screening is done by scrutinizing the personal particulars of the candidate forwarded to I.N.E.C. in Form C.F. 001 by the political party concerned in compliance with paragraph 2(1)(a). I.N.E.C. is required by paragraph 2(2)(a) and (b) to deliver to the political party Form C.F. 003 containing a list of candidates it has “adjudged qualified to contest the election”. It is also required to deliver Form C.F. 004, containing a list of candidates rejected by it. It is after this that the process of nomination in the strict sense within the context of election under the Decree commences. The process consists in the requisite number of nominators (depending on the office being contested) filling out the nomination form as in Form E.C. 4 and delivering same back to I.N.E.C. The candidates and their nominators are required to fulfill certain conditions. Then the candidate is required to pay the prescribed deposit, without which his nomination cannot be valid. Once all the requirements of paragraphs 4 and 5 are met, then, in the words of paragraph 6(1),

“the candidate shall be deemed to stand nominated unless and until

(a) the electoral officer decides that the nomination paper is invalid; or

(b) proof is given to the satisfaction of the electoral officer of the candidate’s death; or

(c) the candidate withdraws his candidature as specified in paragraph 8 of this Schedule.”

The electoral officer is required under paragraph 7(1) to publish the names of the candidates standing nominated.

It can be seen from sub-paragraph (a) that the power given to the electoral officer is in relation to the validity or otherwise of the nomination paper and not the qualification or disqualification of a candidate.

It is evident from the portions of the tribunal’s judgment that I set out earlier on that the tribunal did not seem to appreciate that there is a difference between the screening and clearing or declaring a person qualified for election and deciding that the person has been validly nominated. Hence it used the terms interchangeably as is evident in the portions of its quoted judgment italicised by me. The portions of the judgment of the tribunal italicised by me, i.e. “qualification or disqualification of candidates for election is the exclusive preserve of the Independent Electoral Commission ..” “the nomination or qualification of candidate to an election ….. and “this tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to inquire into issues relating to the validity or nomination of the 1st and 2nd respondents … “, all show clearly that the tribunal did not appreciate that there is a difference between the situation treated under paragraph 6(3) and that treated under Section 84(1)(a). I shall return to this point later.

My conclusion that paragraph 6(3) is concerned with the validity or otherwise of the nomination paper rather than the qualification or disqualification of the candidate takes much of the steam out of the submissions of Mr. Kalu concerning the superiority of the paragraph over Section 84(1)(a). This has to be so because the two provisions deal with two entirely different situations. Paragraph 6(3) deals with the validity or otherwise of the nomination paper while Section 84(1)(a) deals with the qualification or disqualification of a candidate for election.

There is another reason why I would agree with Chief Udechukwu, S.A.N., that the effect of Mr. Kalu’s submissions would be startling and strange. As Mr. Kalu pointed out, if his contention is right, then paragraph 6(3) would be thrown into violent conflict with section 84(1)(a). If the former provision is taken to supercede the latter, the effect would be to render the latter completely otiose.

Chief Udechukwu, S.A.N., gave the correct statement of the law when he stated that in the interpretation of statutes the court is to proceed from the stand point that the legislature makes no prescription in vain. At page 36 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition, appears the following statement:

“A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected.”

The learned editors cited in support three decisions. At pages 187 and 188 of the same work appears another statement on the same subject::

“If two sections of the same statute are repugnant, the known rules are that the last must prevail. But, on the general principle that an author must be supposed not to have intended to contradict himself, the court will endeavour to construe the language of the legislature in such a way as to avoid having to apply the rule, leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant. One way in which repugnancy can be avoided is by regarding two apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with distinct matters or situations.

Collision may also be avoided by holding that one section, which is ex facie in conflict with another, merely provides for an exception from the general rule contained in that other.”

These principles are part of our law. In R v. Zik’s Press Ltd. (1947) 12 WACA 202, the court was faced with two conflicting sections of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. In seeking a solution to the problem of interpreting them, the West African Court of Appeal (Verity, C.J., Brookes and Ames, JJ) said,

“As was said by Cockburn, C.J., in Regina v. Bishop of Oxford (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 525

‘A statute ought to be construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.’

Or again. Lord Hobhouse in delivering the opinion of the Privy Council in Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 A.C. 627 said-

‘It is however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of law. It may be necessary for a court of justice to come to such a conclusion but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify it except necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used.

It is, therefore, the urgent duty of this court to attempt without violence to the language used by the legislature. to give effect to the intention of the enactment both in respect of section 77 and 275 and of section 340(2)(b), whether by discovery that the apparent conflict does not really exist upon closer examination or by modification of the language of the earlier section or by the application of that “cardinal principle’ enunciated by Lord Justice James in Ebbs v. Boulnois (1875),10 Ch. App. 479 in the following terms:-

‘If there are two inconsistent enactments it must be seen if one cannot be read as a qualification of the other.”

In Bendel State & Ors. v. The Federation & Ors. (1981) 10 SC 1, at 132 – 134, Obasek, J.S.C., restated twelve principles of interpretation, and the first two were-

“1. Effect must be given to every word.

2. A construction nullifying a specific clause will not be given … unless absolutely required by the contest.”

Now, would it be reasonable to suppose that the Federal Military Government has used all those words in framing Section 84(1)(a) if it did not intend them to have any effect, especially when, as I have demonstrated, it is plain that the two provisions deal with different matters?

Speaking for myself, I see it plainly that by the combined effect of Sections 81(1) and 84(1)(a) the Federal Government intended that the tribunal and not I.N.E.C. should determine, after the election, whether or not a person who was returned as having been duly elected had in fact paid his tax as and when due in the last three preceding years or whether in fact he possessed the requisite educational qualification. I see it plainly also that by paragraph 6(3) the government intended that I.N.E.C., and nobody else, should determine, before the election, whether or not the nomination papers of a candidate for the election are in order.

The jurisdiction of I.N.E.C. under paragraph 6(3) is exercisable before the election, and is limited to ascertaining whether or not the nomination papers presented to it are valid. That of the tribunal is not exerciseable until after the election. I have searched through the Decree but have not found any provision conferring jurisdiction on I.N.E.C. to do any thing after an election in relation to the issue whether or not any person was qualified on any ground to contest the election. On the contrary, I see section 81(1), which confers original jurisdiction on the Tribunal, to the exclusion of any other court or tribunal to hear and determine any question as to whether, inter alia, any person has been validly elected.

Section 11(c) makes it clear that only persons who have been educated up to at least the School Certificate Level or its equivalent are qualified to hold the office of chairman. Anybody who has not been so educated is not. In similar vein, section 51(b) makes it clear that only persons who produce evidence of tax payment as and when due in respect of the last three preceding years are qualified for election under the Decree. Anybody who does not produce evidence of such tax payment is not.

Now, surely the election of a person who is not qualified to hold the office of chairman because he does not possess the requisite educational qualification, or not qualified for any election under the Decree because he has not produced evidence of tax payment as and when due, can be challenged on the ground that he has not been validly elected. And that is the issue that section 81(1)(a) has conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the tribunal to look into.

As Chief Udechukwu, S.A.N., has pointed out in his brief, the appellant in his petition before the tribunal was not challenging the exercise by I.N.E.C. of its undisputed exclusive power, under paragraph 6(2), of declaring for the validity of the 1st and 2nd respondents’ nomination papers. He was challenging the election of those respondents on the ground that they were not qualified to contest the election. Sections 10(c), 51(b) and 84(1)(a) gave him the right to do so. The fact that one or some of the grounds on which he could do this under these provisions coincide with one or more of the factors that paragraph 2(2) empowers the electoral officer to consider in coming to his decision as to the validity or otherwise of the 1st and 2nd respondents’ nomination papers is totally immaterial. It does not mean that the challenge by the petitioner/appellant on that ground automatically raises an issue under paragraph 6(2), especially when from the tenor of his petition it was clear that he was proceeding under sections 10(c), 51(b) and 84(1)(a).

The petitioner/appellant was, in all the circumstances, therefore, in order to have brought his complaints before the Imo State Tribunal. That tribunal was clearly wrong in declining jurisdiction. It should not have declined it. It should have decided on the merit of the petitioner’s complaints. I agree with Chief Udechukwu, S.A.N., that the action of the tribunal, in the circumstances, amounted to abdication of judicial responsibility.

I do not think this is the occasion for me to express a view on the tribunal’s view that there is conflict in our earlier decisions on the point. We have not been called upon to review our earlier decisions. We were not addressed fully on it. The issue arose only incidentally. Moreover, this panel is not the full court.

On the second issue, i.e., whether or not on the evidence before the tribunal the lst respondent was qualified to be chairman, having regard to Sections 10(c) and 84(1)(a) of Decree 36 of 1998. As noted at the beginning of this judgment, evidence was placed before the tribunal on which it could have come to a decision one way or the other on the point. It however, declined to do so for the reason already discussed.

The question that arises is, can we resolve this issue? It essentially involves a question of fact whether or not the 1st respondent possessed the requisite educational qualification. It involves making findings of fact, which is primarily the function of the court or tribunal of trial. That is, however, not to say that we as an appellate court can never evaluate evidence and come to a decision on fact.

The law is well settled that where there is ample evidence and the trial court or tribunal failed to evaluate it and make correct findings of fact on the issue, an appellate court if the issue of credibility of witnesses is involved is in as much a good position as the trial court or tribunal to deal with the fact and to make proper findings: Awoyale v Ogunbiyi (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.24) 626, at 634.

I will now look at the evidence to decide whether or not, without taking into account the credibility of witnesses, I can come to a decision on the evidence before the tribunal.

The Senior School Certificate used by the 1st respondent to persuade I.N.E.C. as to his educational qualification was tendered as Exhibit II by P.W.5, called by the petitioner. P.W.2 says it is a forgery because their record shows that although the 1st respondent registered for the examination, he was absent throughout. To allege forgery against a person is a serious thing. This is why Section 138(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act require whoever makes the allegation to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

Did the evidence of P.W.2 prove beyond reasonable doubt that Exhibit II is a forgery? I cannot say that. It has not been suggested that the signatures of the WAEC Chairman and Secretary of Council appearing on it are not genuine. Nor has it been suggested that the 1st respondent had himself inserted the grades recorded thereon. I do not think that, in the circumstances, it is enough to show that the grades do not correspond with another document that WAEC has in its custody. In the result, I hold that the petitioner, on the evidence before the tribunal did not prove that the 1st respondent did not possess the requisite educational qualification. I cannot, therefore, resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.

In the result, this appeal fails, since this second issue is the meat of the matter. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal with costs assessed at N1,500.00 against the appellant.

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Other Citations: (1999)LCN/0647(CA)