Lawrence Oguno & Anor V. The State (2006)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
UZO NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
The 1st Appellant was charged with the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death contrary to Section 221 of the Penal Code Law Cap 89, Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963 as applicable to Plateau State of Nigeria for stabbing his father Chief Patrick Oguno, to death on 31st August, 1998.
The 2nd Appellant was charged with the offence of abetting the offence of Culpable Homicide punishable with death.
At the trial the prosecution called 5 Prosecution Witnesses and tendered 5 Exhibits. The Defendants/Appellants testified for themselves as DW1 and DW2 and called no other witness nor tendered any exhibit.
At the end of the trial the trial Judge delivered a well considered judgment and convicted the two Appellants as charged and sentenced them to death by hanging.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment, they both filed their separate notice and grounds of appeal.
In a nutshell, the 1st Appellant Lawrence Oguno and 2nd Appellant Joel Oguno are blood brothers. Both brothers are children of Chief Patrick Oguno, the deceased and Veronica Oguno their mother. It was alleged that on 31st August, 1998, a complaint was lodged by Mrs. Veronica Oguno and 2nd Appellant Joel Oguno to the Police that their father Chief Patrick Oguno was missing. They were advised to report the next day. Later in the evening, Adaobi Oguno daughter of the deceased discovered the body of their father under the stairs. A further complaint was lodged at the Police station. This time the 2nd Appellant was arrested. The 1st Appellant was also arrested the next day when he came back from Rikkos having visited his friend Uche. The Appellants were detained and later charged to Court and convicted of the offences charged.
The Appellants brief was settled by Dr. S.S. Ameh SAN. In his brief, the learned SAN formulated 4 issues for determination on behalf of the 1st Appellant.
(1) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in law in relying on Exhibits 3 and 4 wholly in convicting the 1st Appellant when the purported confessions were not voluntary? (Ground 3).
(2) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in law when she held that the defence of alibi does not avail the 1st Appellant just because she alleged that the defence was not raised at the earliest opportunity? (ground 2).
(3) Whether the failure of the learned trial Judge to consider the defence of self defence available to the 1st Appellant did not vitiate the judgment? (Ground 4).
(4) Whether the judgment is not against the evidence? (Ground 1).
On behalf of the 2nd Appellant learned SAN articulated 3 issues for determination viz:
(1) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in Law in relying on Exhibits 1 and 2 wholly in convicting the 2nd Appellant when the purported confessions were not voluntary? (Ground 2).
(2) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in Law in convicting the 2nd Appellant for abetment without an amendment of the charge? (ground 3).
(3) Whether the judgment is not against the evidence? (ground 1).
The Respondent’s brief was settled by R.K. Shaseet, Principal State Counsel. In it she articulated 3 issues for determination viz:
(1) Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt given the circumstantial evidence before the trial Court.
(2) Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution can sustain the judgment of the trial court.
(3) Whether any form of defence known in law avails the 1st Appellant.
In dealing with this appeal I intend to use the issues as formulated by the learned counsel to the Appellants S.S. Ameh, SAN.
Issue 1 for the 1st Appellant.
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in law in relying on Exhibits 3 and 4 wholly in convicting the 1st Appellant when the purported confessions were not voluntary? (Ground 3).
The learned counsel to the Appellants submitted that the trial Judge in convicting the 1st Appellant relied heavily on Exhibit 3 – the purported confessional statement of the 1st Appellant. Counsel stated that there was a vigorous trial within trial as to the voluntariness of the confession. Counsel drew the attention of the Court to the findings of the learned trial Judge at page 252 lines 11 and 12 which is:
“In effect, the 1st accused made Exhibit 3 and 4 but not voluntarily.”
With this finding counsel submitted that there was no evidence at all connecting the 1st Appellant with the death for which he has been convicted. Okoro Vs. The State (1988) 5 NWLR Pt 94 Pg 255. Umaru Vs. The State (1990) 3 NWLR Pt. 138 Pg 363.
Counsel submitted that for a Confessional Statement to be admissible there must be evidence to corroborate it. Akpan Vs; The State (1994) 5 NWLR Pt. 344 Pg 269.
Learned counsel also submitted that the trial Judge relied on Exhibit 5, the Medical Report for corroboration. Counsel stated that the medical report was made by one Dr. Mandong and the PW5 who testified was Dr. Manasseh. Counsel also pointed at the discrepancies in date observed on the statement of the 2nd Appellant and that on the medical report. Also that the Court should discountenance the medical report as it does not exclude other causes of death Okoro Vs. The State (1988) 5 NWLR Pt. 94 Pg 255.
Furthermore counsel stated that Exhibit 5, the Medical Report is a photocopy and no explanation given as to the where about of the original. Only a certified true copy can surfice since it is a public document.
Counsel then urged the Court to resolve this issue for the 1st Appellant.
Exhibit 3, i.e Confessional Statement of the 1st Appellant was tendered without objection. The question of voluntariness of the Exhibit 3 was trashed during the Examination in Chief. At that time, the Court could not conduct a trial within trial as required by Law A Confessional Statement to the Police does not become inadmissible because the accused that made it denies ever making it or retracts the confession on oath. The confessional statement cannot also be regarded as unreliable by the mere denial or retraction. However, the denial or retraction is a matter to be taken into consideration to decide what weight could be attached to it. Dibie V. State (2007) 9 NWLR Pt 1038 Pg 30. Oche V. State (2007) 5 NWLR Pt 1027 Pg 214, Ukpong V. Queen (No.1) (1961) 1 SCNLR Pg 53.
The learned defence counsel did not object to Exhibit 3 being tendered in evidence.
It is trite that the mere retraction of a confessional statement does not necessarily make it inadmissible. The totality of the two Exhibits, 3 and 4 must be looked at dispassionately. The 1st Appellant during his examination-in-chief and cross examination denied making Exhibits 3 and 4 voluntarily. 1st Appellant said he was tortured to submission before Prosecution Witness 4 dictated to him what to write. In his evidence 1st Appellant said he had not met with the Prosecution Witness 4 – the Investigation Police Officer who took his statement before. This was mutual as the 1st Appellant and the Prosecution witness 4 had not met each other prior to this case. It is instructive that there were other details in Exhibits 3 and 4 that were within the peculiar knowledge of the 1st Appellant and probably members of the Oguno family It therefore cannot be possible, the assertion that PW4 – IPO dictated the confession for him to write.
The trial Judge in his judgment warned himself and has this to say.
“I am indeed worry, (sic) and have cautioned myself of the inherent danger in relying solely on Exhibit 3. Not only is it necessary to closely examine Exhibit 3, it is desirable to have outside the confession some material evidence no matter how slight of circumstances which made feasible that the confession is factual.”
No statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution that it is a voluntary statement. Saidu Vs. State (1982) NSCC Vol. 13 Pg 70.
In the arguments by the learned counsel to the 1st Appellant there was nowhere the Appellant demonstrated in any clear terms that the language used was not his own, but obtained by force or trick or a non-recognisable legal way. Lt. Commander Steve Obisi v. Chief of Naval Staff (2005) Suit No SC 157/2002.
The learned Senior Counsel to the 1st Appellant argued that the trial Judge in his judgment stated:
“In effect, the 1st accused made Exhibits 3 and 4 but not voluntarily.”
The learned counsel just lifted this statement, out of con. The statement should be read together with the paragraph before it. The Learned trial Judge was evaluating the evidence of Prosecution Witness 4, vis a vis the statement of 1st Appellant where it was argued on his behalf that he indeed made the confessional statement but not voluntarily. For clarity I will recap the words of the trial Judge.
“The accused wrote down his statement in his own handwriting. Prosecution Witness 4 was not cross-examine on this part at all, it was only during trial while testifying in his defence that the accused made a concerted effort to distance myself (sic) from Exhibits 3 and 4 by claiming he was tortured and the contents dictated to him. In effect the 1st accused made Exhibits 3 and 4 but not voluntarily.”
It can be deciphered that this is not a finding of the trial Judge but the sum total of the 1st Appellant’s view as regards Exhibits 3 and 4.
It is glaring that this recap of the 1st Appellant’s attitude towards Exhibits 3 and 4 were taken out of con. It is not a finding by the trial Judge.
Where an objection is taken to the admission of a confessional statement on the grounds of duress, promise et al a trial within trial ought to be conducted.
Nwosu Vs. State (1998) 8 NWLR Pt 562 Pg 433, Idowu v. The State (2000) 7 SC Pt 11 Pg 50 Ihuebeka Vs. the State (2000) 4 SC Pt 1 Pg 203.
However in the instant case, a retraction was made during the 1st Appellant’s evidence in chief, therefore a trial within trial could not be conducted. It therefore follows that the trial Judge would ascertain from other pieces of evidence whether the confessional statement is statement is true, voluntary, direct and positive. Where it is found to the so it is therefore admissible and the retraction is immaterial.
The trial Judge elicited from the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 that both Appellants were in the house with their deceased father when Prosecution Witness 2 went downstairs to open the shop. It was the Appellants that saw the deceased last alive from the evidence of PW2 and PW3.
The doctrine of “last seen” means that the Law presumes that the person last seen with a deceased bears full responsibility for his own. Thus, where an accused person was the last person to be seen in the company of the deceased and circumstantial evidence is overwhelming and leads to no other conclusion, there is no room for requital. It is the duty of the accused persons to give an explanation as to how the deceased met his death. In the absence of an explanation, a trial Court and even an appellate Court will be justified in having the inference that the accused persons killed the deceased abele v. State (2006) 6 NWLR Pt. 975 Pg. 100.
It was in evidence that both Appellants acted very curiously and really the day of the murder.
The confessional statement of the 2nd Appellant was admitted after a trial within trial. The learned trial Judge gave a very well considered Ruling where he held that the 2nd Appellant who had the burden, of proving the involuntariness of his confession could not prove it to the satisfaction of the Court.
It can be gleaned from the confessional statements of the Appellants that both gave the graphic details of the cause of their father’s death and how his corpse was taken downstairs and hidden under the staircase.
The Confessional Statement of both Appellants were in pari material as regards the essential details of the charge of Culpable Homicide punishable with death and the abetment of the crime.
The learned Senior Advocate also argued that the trial Judge did not consider that the statement was not recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Statement to Police Officers Rules) 1960.
Although it is not a requirement of the Law in Nigeria, the practice of taking an accused person along with his Confessional Statement to a superior Police Officer who reads and interprets the statement to him and where he confirms it is his voluntary statement, has been highly commended and a wise one as giving extra assurance of fairness to the accused person and the voluntariness of his confession. Confessional Statement not so treated should not necessarily be viewed with suspicion. Dibie Vs. State (2007) 9 NWLR Pt. 1038 30. Kim Vs. State (1992) 4 NWLR Pt 233 Pg. 17.
These Rules are for convenience and the non observance of which is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of the confessional statement. Igago Vs. The State (1999) 6 NWLR Pt. 608 Pg 581. Uche Vs. Queen (1964) 1 All NLR 195.
The learned counsel to the 1st Appellant had made a strenuous effort to disparage the medical report Exhibit 5. He stated that the medical report was signed by Dr. Mandong but Dr. Manasseh gave evidence in Court and tendered Exhibit 5. He also argued that the name of the person who identified the corpse was not stated in the form.
In Isiekwe Vs. State (1999)9 NWLR Pt. 617 Pg 43 and by the provisions of Section 42(1) of the Evidence Act, it is not mandatory for a medical officer who performed an autopsy on a deceased to be present in Court in order to give evidence during trial. Production by either party of a certificate signed by the Medical Officer may be taken as sufficient evidence of the facts.
However, the Court has the power to summon the Medical Officer suo motu or on the application of either party if it deems it necessary in the interest of justice. See also Eghoghonore Vs. The State (1993) 9 SCN Vol. 5 Pg 1. So also in the case of Akinyemi Vs. State (1999) 6 NWLR Pt. 607 Pg 449, it was held that –
“Ascertainment of death is not within the exclusive preserve of medical experts.”
It is not in all cases that medical evidence in proof of cause of death is necessary. A Court can in the absence of a medical report properly infer the cause of death from the evidence and circumstances of the case. Igago Vs. State (1999) 6 NWLR Pt 608 Pg 581 Oforlete Vs. The State (2000) 7 SC Pt 1 Pg 80.
In the instant case, a medical report was tendered without objection from the learned counsel.
Prosecution Witness 5 Dr. Manasseh stated in cross-examination that he indeed conducted the post mortem examination on the deceased who was identified by one Innocent Oguno Prosecution Witness 3, one of the deceased Son. Prosecution Witness 5 stated that he also signed for Dr. B.M. Mandong.
It is therefore not mandatory that a medical report be tendered and the Court can actually dispense of such medical report. In the instant case, the Medical Doctor did conduct the post mortem examination and determined the cause of death as being multiple deep laceratious to the head, neck and trunk regions. There were also chemical burns.
The Court could have dispensed of the medical report since there was already independent evidence as to the injures sustained by the deceased. Such evidence was given by PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4. Moreover the sort of injury sustained was also in the confessional statement of both Appellants.
In the Medical Report, the date of death was given as 31st August, 1998. The date of the post mortem examination and signature is 3rd September, 1998. The date of death was also given correctly by all the Prosecution Witnesses. The discrepancies in the statement of 2nd Appellant are neither here nor there. It has not changed, the fact that the deceased died on 31st August, 1998.
The learned senior counsel also in his arguments stated that the Medical Report Exhibit 5 was a photocopy and that it should be discountenanced. I will quickly state here that, the learned Senior Counsel did not object to the Medical Report tendered as it was supposedly a photocopy and was not certified being a public document.
I want to state here categorically that wool would not be pulled over the eyes of the Court. The medical report is not a photocopy. It is an original copy that was tendered and it is admissible in its entirety.
The arguments proffered by the learned senior counsel have failed to convince the Court as to the 1st Appellant’s first issue. The first issue is therefore resolved against the 1st Appellant.
Issue Two for the 1st Appellant.
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in law when she held that the defence of alibi does not avail the 1st Appellant just because she alleged that the defence was not raised at the earliest opportunity? (Ground 2)
The learned SAN for the 1st Appellant argued that the 1st Appellant raised the issue of alibi during his trial but was never investigated.
The word Alibi is a latin expression which means “I was elsewhere”. It means also that the accused was somewhere other than where the prosecution alleged that he was at the time of the commission of the offence. Sowemimo Vs. State (2004) 11 NWLR Pt 885 Pg 515. Aiguogreghian v. State (2004) 3 NWLR Pt 860 Pg 367.
Alibi is a defence which seeks to persuade the Court that the accused could not possibly be at the scene of the crime as he was somewhere else, where, most probably, there were people who could testify that at the time of the alleged incident or act he was not at the scene of the crime. In raising the defence of alibi the accused must at the earliest opportunity furnish the police with full details of the alibi, to enable the police to check the details. Failure of the accused to furnish the particulars of the alibi weakens the defence. Sowemimo Vs. State (supra).
However, where an accused person is unequivocally pinned to the locus in quo as the one committing the offence, the defence of alibi, no more avails him. This is because the defence by the accused that he was elsewhere at the material time the offence was committed is destroyed by the unequivocal evidence of a witness or of witnesses tying him to the locus in quo as one who committed the offence. In the instant case, the Prosecution Witnesses placed the 1st Appellant at the scene of the murder. Their evidence show that the 1st Appellant only left for his friend’s house after the act. Moreover for a defence of alibi to avail the Appellant it must be raised at the earliest possible time to allow the police investigate it.
In this case his defence of Alibi was raised during his trial. Even if the 1st Appellant raised this defence of Alibi early and was not investigated, he can still be convicted if there is a stronger and credible evidence before the Court. Sowemimo Vs State (supra).
Aiguoreghian v. State Nwosisi Vs. State (1976)6 SC Pg. 109.
The 1st Appellant did not raise the defence of Alibi timeously and was therefore not investigated. However there was overwhelming evidence pinning him to the scene of the murder.’
This defence of Alibi therefore fails as well as issue 2 of the 1st Appellant.
Issue three for the 1st Appellant.
Whether the failure of the learned trial Judge to consider the defence of self defence available to the 1st Appellant did not vitiate the judgment? (Ground 4).
The learned senior counsel submitted that the trial Court did not consider the defence of self defence. He stated that the Court ought to have considered the issue of self defence. Gabriel Vs State (1989) 5 NWLR Pt. 261 Pg 515 Williams Vs. State (1984) 12 SC Pg 139 Counsel urged the Court to consider the entire evidence before the Court and give the accused person, the benefit of any defence available therein to him notwithstanding the, fact that it was not raised by him.
Counsel urged the Court to hold that the defence of self defence is available to the 1st Appellant and discharge him accordingly.
The 1st Appellant in his evidence put up a defence of Alibi. You cannot say that you were not at the scene of crime and also put up a defence of self defence.
However for a defence of self defence to avail 1st Appellant he must show that his life was so much endangered by the act of the deceased that the only option that was open to him to save his life was to kill the deceased. Apugo Vs. State (2006) 16 NWLR Pt. 1002 Pg 227.
In the instant case the 1st Appellant gave evidence that he was not at the scene of crime. He then failed to put up a defence of self defence. He did not show that his own live was in danger from the onslaught of the deceased. Apugo Vs. State (supra).
The 1st Appellant did not put up a plea of self defence in his evidence and as such it cannot avail him looking at the totality of the evidence proffered. There is nothing to show that a defence of self defence can be invoked in favour of the 1st Appellant and therefore must fail.
The 3rd issue is also resolved against the 1st Appellant.
Issue four for the 1st Appellant.
Whether the judgment is not against the evidence? (Ground 1).
Learned counsel submitted for the 1st Appellant that there was no eye witness to the alleged act of murder. Also the learned trial Judge relied so much on the confessional statement of 1st Appellant in finding him guilty. That there was no other evidence outside the confessional statement to show that the confession is true.
The trial Judge, in his evaluation of evidence placed before him extracted the relevant pieces of evidence. Prosecution Witness 2 left the house leaving the deceased and both Appellants upstairs. She later saw them about 10.30am standing and discussing before they left. Prosecution witness 3 also met the Appellants in the house when he came back between 9am – 10am. He stated that when he knocked it took the 1st Appellant some time to open the door. When he did, both Appellants gave him a close marking around the house until he left. The 1st Appellant in Exhibit 3 gave a vivid account of what transpired resulting in the death of their father. The confessional statement has been adjudged voluntary having been tested. The account contained therein is within the knowledge of the 1st Appellant. A retraction of the confession made during trial is an after thought which the Court discountenanced.
This issue also fails and is resolved against the 1st Appellant. All the four issues articulated on behalf of the 1st Appellant have all been resolved against him therefore his appeal, is unmeritorious and must fail. Appeal dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the lower Court and the sentencing thereof in respect of the 1st Appellant.
The 2nd Appellant’s counsel as earlier stated formulated 3 issues on behalf of the 2nd Appellant which I have earlier recapped in this judgment.
Issue one for the 2nd Appellant.
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in law in relying on Exhibits 1 and 2 wholly In convicting the 2nd Appellant when the purported confessions were not voluntary? (Ground 2).
This issue touches on the reliance on Exhibits 1 and 2 i.e, the confessional statements of 2nd Appellant. There was an objection as to the voluntariness of Exhibits 1 and 2 when the learned prosecuting counsel sought to tender them in evidence. A trial within trial was conducted. At the end of which, the trial Judge held that Exhibits 1 and 2 were voluntarily made by the 2nd Appellant.
The reason for this finding is that Exhibits 1 and 2 were made by the 2nd Appellant in his own writing and signed. There were, many family details which only members of the Oguno family knew. It is impossible for the Investigation Police Officeer to know such details. The 2nd Appellant did not prove the allegation of torture he alleged during his trial. No statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the prosecution that it was a voluntary statement. Saidu Vs. State (1982) NSCC Vol. 13 Pg 70.
Likewise in this case, the prosecution showed that Exhibits 1 and 2 were voluntarily made because, the Appellant wrote it himself after the cautionary words and signed. There were information in Exhibits 1 and 2 that only family members were privy. Apart from the Appellant stating that he was tortured, hung on the fan and shocked with electricity, there was no further demonstrations to show that he made Exhibits 1 and 2 involuntarily. The trial within trial put paid his assertions that Exhibits 1 and 2 were involuntary.
In finding the 2nd Appellant guilty of the offence charged the trial Judge warned himself as regard the use of the confessional statements Exhibits 1 and 2. The evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 linked both Appellants to the offence charged. Also the Appellants were the last seen with the deceased. The behavior of the Appellants on that day was unusual and suspicious and points to no other conclusion, that, they were indeed the ones that committed the crime.
It is correct to hold that inspite of the confessional statements other pieces of evidence pieced together linked the Appellants to the crime.
I therefore hold that adopting the exposition of the Law in the determining the issues in the 1st Appellant’s, issue 1 of the 2nd Appellant therefore fails.
2nd issue for the 2nd Appellant.
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in Law in convicting the 2nd Appellant for abetment without an amendment of the charge? (Ground 3).
The learned SAN submitted that the charge against Appellant was faulty. He opined that the best the trial Judge would have done in the circumstance was to rephrase the charge.
When drafting a charge the prosecution should follow the words of the provisions under which it was laid. The prosecution is not allowed to import extraneous elements into the Charge. Ofuani Vs. Nig, Navy (2007) 8 NWLR Pt 1037 Pg 470, Asuquo Vs. State (1967) 1 All NLR Pg 123.
Section 208(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the Court the discretion to alter, add or form a new charge at anytime before judgment is pronounced. Attah Vs. State (1993) 7 NWLR Pt. 305 Pg. 257.
Thus a defective charge could, in appropriate cases, be cured, as defect in charge which does not render it bad in law cannot nullify a conviction so long as an offence known to law is disclosed in the charge and the accused is not misled thereby. Essien Vs. Commissioner of Police (1996) 5 NWLR PT 449 Pg 545.
Prosecution Witness 2 in her evidence stated that the 2nd Appellant persuaded her to go down and open his shop for him. This was to make sure no one else was around. Prosecution witness 1 and Prosecution Witness 3 had already gone out. With everyone out of the house they locked the front door which can only open from inside the house. Prosecution Witness 3 said also in his evidence that when he came back between 9am – 10am, the 1st Appellant took a while to open the door for him. Also Prosecution Witness 3 said both Appellants gave him a close marking until he left the house. At all material Time both Appellants were in the house alone.
From Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 both Appellants were ad idem that 1st Appellant killed the deceased. The 2nd appellant only aided in carrying the corpse downstairs to hide under the staircase.
From Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4, the 2nd Appellant helped in hiding the corpse and also failed to report the crime to the Police.
The trial Judge agreed that the drafting of the second count was inelegant but did not think that there was any doubt that the 2nd Appellant is charged with abetting the 1st Appellant in the commission of Culpable Homicide. The 2nd Appellant was not misled in any way. He understood what he was charged with.
The 2nd Appellant reported that their father was missing but failed to tell them the truth. Was their father really missing when he helped the 1st Appellant to hide his body under the staircase?
All the ingredients of the 2nd count were proved from Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 from the testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW3. The second issue for the 2nd Appellant is resolved against the 2nd Appellant.
Learned counsel for the 2nd Appellant submitted that there was no iota of evidence against the 2nd Appellant; I dare say that the prosecution fixed the 2nd Appellant to the scene of crime from the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3. Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were also part of the evidence against the Appellants.
The prosecution proved that it was the intentional act of the 1st Appellant that killed the deceased. Also that the 2nd Appellant had knowledge of the crime and helped the 2nd Appellant in hiding the body of the deceased. Prosecution Witness 5 also gave evidence as to the primary cause of death of the deceased All these evidence pieced together lead to no other conclusion other than that, the, Appellants killed their father and hid his body under the staircase.
The 3rd issue articulated for the 2nd Appellant also fails.
The 3 issues articulated by learned SAN for the 2nd Appellant are all resolved against him. This appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the lower Court and the sentencing thereof in respect of the 2nd Appellant.
The Appeals of both Appellants are unmeritorious and therefore dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the trial Court. I also affirm the sentence of death by hanging of the 1st appellant Lawrence Oguno and 2nd Appellant Joel Oguno.
Other Citations: (2006)LCN/2003(CA)
