Mr. Ogbu Egbuta & Ors. V. Agbaeke Kalu Onuna (2007)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
SAULAWA, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Abia State High Court Ohafia Judicial Division, Coram C. B. U. Wogu, J; delivered on 31/7/96, in two consolidated suits; HOH/13/80 and HOH14/80. The two consolidated suits were both filed by the present respondent against the 13 appellants. The respondent’s reliefs in the first suit (HOH13/80) as contained in the “Further Amended Statement of Claim” filed on 04/4/89 are to the effect that –
“11. By reason of the above facts the plaintiffs had suffered damages and claims from all the defendants jointly and severally as
(a) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the customary rights of occupancy and has been (and is still) in possession of a piece or parcel of land known as and called “EDO UZO NDI OKORONTA” situate at Abiriba within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court the annual rent of which is not more than ten Naira (N10.00).
(b) One hundred thousand Naira (N100,000.00) being general and special damages for trespass against the 1st set of defendants.
(c) A perpetual injunction restraining all the defendants, their servants and or agents from further trespass upon or in any way interfering with the said land.
Special damages: 8,000 Cassava stands at N5.00 each = N40,000.00
General damages N60,000. 00
N100,000.00
The respondent’s reliefs claimed in the second suit (HOH/14/80) filed on 11/6/80 are thus:
- Wherefore the plaintiff claims from the defendants jointly and severally:
(a) A declaration that he is entitled to the customary right of occupancy of that piece or parcel of land known as and called ALI OKAZU being and situate at Abiriba within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court the annual value of which is N10.00.
(b) One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000.00) general and special damages for trespass.
(c) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, workmen and or agents from further trespass upon or in any way interfering with the said plaintiffs’ land.
PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
5,000 Yams at N5.00 each …
= N25,000.00
General Damages …. N75,000.00
N 100,000.00
At the conclusion of the trial of the two consolidated suits, the learned trial Judge delivered the judgment in question to the effect, inter alia, that:
To summarise – on this head – I find that since the two lands are no (sic) family land, the defendants can not claim the land as such. Since also the court accepts that the Iwaji ceremony was performed within its defendant consequences, the land can not revest (sic) to its original owners and in this case the defendants are not the original owners and the land vests in the plaintiff. The plaintiff has a good title to the land and is entitled thereto.
See page 111 of the record of the trial Court.
Consequently, the learned trial Judge granted the orders for damages and injunction sought in favour of the respondent against the appellants.
Thus, not unnaturally, being dissatisfied with the judgment in question, the appellants filed a notice of appeal along with three grounds of appeal, dated 05/8/96. However, the appellants had on 23/10/96 also filed a second notice of appeal containing 14 grounds of appeal, thus abandoning the first one earlier filed by them. Thus, the first notice of appeal filed on 05/8/96 is hereby struck out.
It’s instructive that both parties had filed and exchanged their briefs of argument. In particular, the appellants’ brief (dated 02/3/01) was filed on 04/4/01 but deemed properly filed and served on 27/11/01. It was duly adopted by the learned counsel on 06/11/06.
Five issues were formulated therein for determination, to wit:
- Were not the history of the lands in dispute the genealogy and family tree of the defendants as traced and prepared by the learned trial Judge completely different from the pleadings and evidence of the parties before him?
If yes, did not this misdirection on the facts lead to improper evaluation of evidence of the defendants, perverse findings and a miscarriage of justice?
(This is based on grounds 2, 3, 9, 10 and 14 of the grounds of appeal).
- Was the learned trial Judge right when he held that all the evidence given by the defendants were hearsay and so the evidence of the plaintiff was uncontroverted? (grounds 4 and 5).
- Was the learned trial Judge right in his treatment of exhibit C and if not did this not occasion a miscarriage of justice? (grounds 1 and 6).
- Was the learned trial Judge right when he relied on the alleged Iwaji custom and declared title to the lands in dispute in favour of the plaintiff? (Ground 7 and 8).
- Was the learned trial Judge right when he held that the plaintiff proved trespass and was the damages awarded by him against the defendants proper in the circumstance? (grounds 12 and 13).
On the other hand, the respondent’s brief was dated 11/12/01 and filed on the same date. Therein, three issues have been formulated for determination, thus:
(i) Whether the 2 pieces of land in dispute are owned exclusively by late Kalu Mba – 4th defendants (grounds 2, 3, 9, 10 and 14).
(ii) Whether the sale of the 2 pieces of land in dispute was valid under Abiriba Native Law and Custom (grounds 1, 6, 7 and 8).
(iii) Whether the plaintiff/respondent proved this case as required by law as to entitled him to his claims as per the claim and further amended statement of claim, (grounds 4, 5, 12 and 13).
I have critically considered the two briefs of argument. In contrast with the respondent’s brief, the five issues formulated in the appellants’ brief are rather cumbersome. It’s trite law that in an appeal, what counsel should argue are normally the issues raised or formulated in the brief. The grounds are not argued as such. However, such issues must relate to the grounds of appeal. See Oceanic Bank International Ltd. v. Chitex Ind. Ltd. (2001) FWLR (Pt. 4) 678 at 689 paragraph H; (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt.661) 464; Dada v. Dosunmu (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1010) 134 at 165 – 166 paragraphs C – C; Idika v. Erisi (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 78) 563; Animashaun v. U.C.H. (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) 65.
It’s also trite that issues for determination formulated in a brief of argument must be precise and devoid of irrelevant complexity and ambiguity for easy comprehension of the matters to be adjudicated upon. See Guda v. Kitta (1991) 12 NWLR (Pt. 629) 21. Hence, for the purposes of this appeal, I have deemed it expedient to adopt the three issues raised in the respondents brief, which I believe are not only concise but also adequate to accommodate the points raised in the appellants’ issues.
Issue 1:
“(i) Whether the 2 pieces (parcels) of land are owned exclusively by late Kalu Mba 4th defendant (grounds 2, 3, 9, 10 and 14). ”
Instructively, the 1st appellants’ issue No 1 is likewise predicated on the above five grounds. The argument thereupon is contained in pages 5 – 10 of the appellants brief. The crux of the appellants’ complaint in this issue is hinged upon the genealogy of the appellants and “the family tree” prepared by the learned trial Judge that were allegedly –
“Completely different from the pleadings of the parties and their evidence before the learned trial Judge.”
See page 5, paragraph 4.00 of the appellants’ brief.
Thus, it’s been alleged that the learned trial Judge “turned the pleadings and evidence of the parties upside down and consequently arrived at a wrong conclusion”. It was argued that:
“(a) On the pleadings and evidence led, Mgbofuma was not the mother of Ukoji or Omu or Nwamagh Nwasu Ukoji also was not a sister to the 4th defendant. Ukoji was the primogenitor of the Ikwu Emeri Olughu maternal family she was the mother of Mgbofgumia and Omu. Omu was the mother of the 4th defendant meaning that 4th defendant is the maternal grandson of Ukoji and could not have been her brother…
In paragraph 8(b) lines 1 and 2 it was specifically pleaded “IKWU EMERI OLUGHU comprise of maternal relations who are descendants of the daughters of Ukoji.”
Contrariwise, the contention of respondent is that the learned trial Judge was fully conversant with the facts of the case to the effect that the said two parcels of land in dispute belonged to the 4th defendant.
Reference was made to the evidence in chief of DW1 thus:
“I know of one Mgbofuma. Ukoji is the daughter of Mgbofuma page 62 lines 10 – 11 of the records. This evidence agrees with the genealogical tree as drawn by the court below at page 109 of the records. ”
It’s further argued that from the DW1’s testimony at page 62 lines 10 – 23 of the record, Ukoji was not the common ancestor of the appellants; that the finding of the trial court that the 2 pieces of land in dispute are not family land is correct. It was urged on us not to disturb the finding of fact of the trial court. See Adeye & Ors. v. Adesanya & Ors. (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt.708) 1; (2001) 2 SCNR 97 and that issue No 1 should be resolved in favour of the respondent. That ground 2, 3, 9, 10 and 14 of the grounds of appeal should be dismissed.
As alluded to above, the crux of the appellants’ complaint is that the evidence in the court below by the parties had not been properly evaluated by the learned trial Judge. Most undoubtedly, it’s a trite principle of law that wherein a case a trial court fails to properly evaluate the evidence before it, an appeal court has a duty to intervene in order to save the situation. Generally, an appellate court does not interfere with trial court’s finding of facts. This is premised on the altruism that the ascription of probative value to evidence is the sole responsibility of the trial Judge who has the unique advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses that give evidence. However, in exceptional cases, especially where trial Judge draws mistaken conclusions from indisputable primary facts –
It would be completely invidious to suggest that a court of appeal should not intervene and do what justice requires but should abdicate its own responsibility and rubber – stamp an error, however, glaring. Thus, in a case where there is no question of the credibility of any witness and in cases where the point in dispute is the proper inference from proven facts, an appeal court is generally in as good a position to evaluate the evidence as the trial court and ought not to shrink from that task, though it ought to give weight to its opinion. See Bunge v. Gov. Rivers State (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 573 at 609 – 610 Paragraphs D – H, A – C per Oguntade, JSC; Lawal v. Dawodu (1972) 8 – 9 SC 83; Gwawoh v. C.O.P (1974) 11 SC 243.
Paragraph 8(a) – (d) of the amended statement of defence of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th – 8th defendants is to the effect that the original owner of the two parcels of land in dispute was one UWAKA UBAMIRI OF UMUESO AMEKE ABIRIBA who made a gift of same inter vivos to his first daughter Ukoji who begat sons and daughters. That MGBOFUMA and OMU were two of Ukoji’s daughters. And that OMU begat the 4th defendant amongst others. Not surprisingly, paragraph 7(a) – (d) of the amended statement of defence of the 4th defence is exactly the same with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th – 8th defendants’ amended statement of defence. Sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 7 in particular, is to the effect inter alia that: –
“(d) Omu was the mother of Kalu Mba the 4th defendant …”
However, the evidence in chief of DW 1 at page 62 of the record, lines 5 – 12 is to the following effect:
I have heard of a woman called Ukoji. Our maternal family is made up of the descendants of Ukoji. I can still remember the name of some her daughters I know of Omu.
Omu is the daughter of Ukoji and this Omu is my maternal grand mother. I know of one Mgbofuma. Ukoji is the daughter of Mgbofuma. Mgbofuma is also the mother of the 4th defendant (now deceased).
Thus, its rather obvious while paragraphs 8 and 7 of the amended statement of defence of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th – 8th defendants and 4th defendant claim “Omu” to be the mother of the 4th defendant, the evidence of DW1 is to the effect that it was Mgbofuma and not Omu (who begat 4th defendant). To that extent, therefore, the learned trial Judge was right in his finding that Ukoji was the 4th defendant’s sister (having been beg at by Mgbofuma). See pages 109 – 110 of the record. It’s trite that where evidence adduced by a party is at variance with the pleadings thereof, the contradiction or inconsistency must be resolved in favour of the opposing party.
However, the above postulation notwithstanding, the finding by the learned trial Judge that the two parcels of land in dispute are not family land is rather erroneous.
It was the finding of the learned trial Judge at page III lines 26 – 33 of the record that –
To summarise on this head – I find that since the two lands are no family land, the defendants cannot claim the land as such. Since also the court accepts that the Iwaji ceremony was performed with its attendant consequences the land cannot revest (sic) to its original owners and in this case the defendants are not the original owners and the land vests in the plaintiff. The plaintiff has a good title to the land and is entitled thereto.
There is a very serious lacuna in the judgment of the trial court, especially regarding the circumstances surrounding the 4th defendant’s ownership and/or possession of the two parcels of land in dispute. No definite finding had been made by the learned trial Judge on the 4th defendant’s title or even possession upon the two parcels of land in question. Certainly, its not enough for the learned trial Judge to merely allude to the fact that he found it very difficult to reconcile the claim of DW1. It was his finding that”
This land was exclusively donated to Ukoji.
He goes further to allude to the fact that –
“DW4 (Kalu Mba) now is a full brother to Ukoji. This is not disputed. There is no evidence that late DW4 can not inherit the personal property of his sister. It would have been different if any of the contestants is a son to Ukoji. There is no evidence that the land on Ukoji’s death will divulge (sic) on Ikwu Emeri Olugus family. If the worst happens it is the Uwaka’s family who could contest but PW 1 told that the Uwaka’s family pardoved DW4 for the sale.
Most undoubtedly, the above finding is rather speculative and perverse. What’s more, the evidence of PW1 has appeared to be rather unreliable for some obvious reasons. One, its evident that the PW 1 has conceded to the fact that he did not know much about the family background or history of the defendants. According to him –
“I do not know the name of the mother of late 4th defendant.
I do not know the mothers of any of the defendants … I do not know about the rest of the defendants where they descended from. I have never heard of the name of Ukoji … I have seen these two women. I do not know if they belong to Ikwu Emeri Olugu maternal family- the two women are the 6th and 7th defendants. I came to know that late 4th defendant sold the land to the plaintiff … Yes, I said 4th defendant inherited this land from his brother not Okoronkwo but from Emeri Olugu.
See pages 47 – 48 of the record.
Two, contrariwise, there is an abundance of evidence to lend a credence to the defendants’ contention that the two parcels of land in question were family land and thus did not belong to the 4th defendant. As testified by the DW1 –
“These (2) pieces of land belong to our maternal family (Ikwu Emeri Olugu) …”
See page 62, of the record…
See also page 65 of the record wherein the DW 1 stated further that
“This land was originally given to Ukoji. The purpose of giving this land to Ukoji was because on her wedding day this land was given to her as a wedding gift.”
On his own part, the DW2 was emphatic that –
“These (2) pieces of lands does not belong to anyone person. It is owned by the family in general.” See page 71 of the record.
Under cross examination the DW2 also conceded inter alia that-
Yes Kalu Mba (now deceased) is our most senior brother …”
The DW3 also stated inter alia in his evidence thus:
“These (2) pieces of land is (sic) not personally owned by late Kalu Mba. He said it belong to his maternal family … I am conversant about sale of land in Abiriba, one person can not sale a maternal land without the consent of other members of the maternal home…
It is not true that the land belongs to late Kalu Mba’s mother it is a maternal family land.
Thus, as postulated above, there’s sufficient evidence denoting that the two parcels of land in question were actually family land upon which the 4th defendant had no exclusive or ownership title whatsoever.
My answer to issue No 1 is thus most inevitably in the negative.
Issue NO 2:
“(ii) Whether the sale of the 2 pieces of land in dispute was valid under Abiriba Native Law and Custom (grounds 1, 6, 7 and 8).”
It’s instructive that the appellant’s issues Nos. 2, 3 and 4 alluded to above are subsumed in the above issue No 2.
Under the appellants’ issue No 2, it was argued inter alia, that “the learned trial Judge was wrong when he held that all the evidence given by the defendants were hearsay”. It was however contended that the defendants did not even need to prove that there was a sale.
That, it was the respondent (as plaintiff) who alleged a sale according to custom that needed to plead and prove same.
Under issue No 3, the main contention of the appellants is that the learned trial Judge was wrong in treating exhibit C (the Deed of Conveyance) as a document of title in favour of the respondents. It was however argued inter alia that –
(a) The plaintiff did not rely on exhibit C. He relied on customary sale.
(b) Exhibit C was not tendered as a purchase agreement or a Deed of Conveyance or as evidence of a customary sale. It was tendered as a receipt.
(c) The plaintiff was not let into possession by any of the defendant on the basis of exhibit C:
(d) The alleged transaction was not sale of land under English law and the issue of contract of sale or equitable interest or possibility of specific performance did not arise at all.
(e) The defendants had no onus to disprove sale. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove sale.
(f) If the defendant alleged forgery of signatures in exhibit and failed to prove same that situation did not elevate exhibit C to a document of title…
The appellant’s argument under issue No.4 is in a nutshell to the effect that the respondent has –
Failed to plead sufficiently the custom of Iwaji in Abiriba land failed to prove the custom as established in a number of authorities including:
Adeniyi v. Fabiyi (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.242) 489; Oyewunmi v. Ogunesan (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 137) 182.
The appellants thus urged the court to allow the above mentioned grounds.
On the other hand, the respondent argues that he had adequately proved the Iwaji custom by credible evidence as required by law. See pages 4 and 5 lines 32 – 37, the evidence of DW2 at page 50 lines 11 – 19 of the records. It was also contended that the appellants did not plead the Iwaji ceremony/custom in their pleadings. That the evidence of DW4 at pages 74 and 75 was not pleaded and thus ought to be discountenanced. See Onobruchere & Anor v. Esegine & Anor (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 799 ratio 2.
It was further argued that –
Exhibit C is admissible as an acknowledgment of payment of money coupled with the plaintiff being in possession under a contract of sale, and from this arose an equitable interest capable of being converted into a legal estate by specific performance. See page 112 lines 17 – 21 of the records.
Ogumbambi v. Abowab 13 WACA 222. Oniwaya & Ors. v. Ikuomola (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 22), at 387; Olohunkun v. Teniola & 5 Ors. (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 501.
The respondent thus urged on us to dismiss grounds 1, 6, 7 and 8 of the appeal for lacking in merit.
It’s trite that generally, it’s the plaintiff, seeking a decree of declaration of title upon whom the onus of proof usually rests. See Mogaji & Ors. v. Odofin & Ors. (1978) 4 SC 91; Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101 at 117 – 120; Onobruchere & Anor. v. Esegine & Anor. (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 799.
The contention of the respondent is that he has sufficiently pleaded and proved Iwaji ceremony/custom to the effect that the two parcels of land in dispute were sold to him by the 4th defendant. It was further contended that –
“The consequences of the Iwaji custom ceremony in Abiriba community once performed, no matter the circumstances, the land can not revert to the original owner.
See page 13 paragraphs 5.07 of the respondents brief.
It is trite law that under section 14(1) of the Evidence Act, customary law must be established in either of two ways;
“(a) by, the court taking judicial notice of its existence; or
(b) by leading evidence in the particular case.” See Oyewunmi v. Ogunesan (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 137) 182 at 215 – 216 paragraphs G – A.
The onus of proof of a particular custom law undoubtedly rests on the person claiming its existence. The respondent testified as PW2 to the effect inter alia that –
There was the Iwa Ndi ceremony. That Iwa Ndi ceremony was in my house. It was at the time I paid in the ceremony of Iwa Ndi was performed before exhibit C.
I did not say, I did not know what Iwa Ndi is. We use drink and yam for the Iwa Ndi ceremony. See page 56 of the record.
Contrary to the contention of the appellants, the Iwaji customary rites alleged by the respondent have actually been pleaded in paragraph 6 of the further amended statement of claim at page 28 of the record.
However, the evidence of DW4 was to the effect inter alia, that according to the Abiriba custom an individual can not sell a family land without the consent of other members thereof. According to DW4:
Iwa Ndi in our custom means a ceremony performed on the sale of land, unanimously agreed by the family. In olden days, a cap wrapper and walking stick are provided by the purchaser. It also involves the slaughtering of goat during the handing over ceremony, normally conducted in the home or premises of the vendor… It is also against our custom for a single member of a family to pledge family land. See page 75 of the record.
See also the evidence of DW1 at page 67 lines 4 – 16 of the record.
As alluded to above, the case of the appellants at the trial court was that the two parcels of land in dispute were family land; that the 4th defendant, as one of the heads of the defendants family had no right to sell or pledge same without the consent of the other members of the family; that the 4th defendant never obtained such consent prior to his purported selling or pledging the two parcels of land to the respondent. Considering the age of the DW4 (78 years old) and the fact that he was a member of Enachiok’s cabinet, his evidence, most particularly on Iwaji custom of Abiriba is cogent and highly credible. Thus, the opinion of the learned trial Judge to the effect that the DW4’s evidence was of no consequence is rather erroneous, to say the least. It is rather obvious from the evidence of DW1 and DW4 that the ceremony allegedly performed by the respondent was not in accordance with the norms and custom of Abiriba. Their evidence on the issue of Iwaji custom was never cross examined upon and thus remains unchallenged.
What’s more, there’s no evidence or authority adduced at the trial court to show that the said Iwaji ceremony has the effect of validating the alleged sale of the two pieces of land in dispute; which is most undoubtedly invalid. It’s trite that nobody can give what he does not have or possess nemo dat quod non habet. See Fasoro v. Beyioku (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 263. The facts of this case briefly, are that: The plaintiffs/appellants claimed against the defendants/respondents for declaration of title, damages for trespass and injunction. They pleaded as their root of title sale and conveyance of the land in dispute from the Olayalo family but the deeds of conveyance showed members of Olayalo family who conveyed to the plaintiffs’ vendors conveyed in their individual capacities as beneficial owners and not on behalf of the family.
The learned trial Judge held, inter alia, that the fact that the deeds of conveyance were executed in Olayalo’s family name was not in issue in the case and that the plaintiffs and their vendors had been in undisturbed possession of the land in dispute.
The appeal to this court was allowed. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held, inter alia that –
“It is therefore clear from the pleading that the origin of the root of title claimed by the plaintiffs is Olayalo family. Since the evidence shows that Olayalo family has not conveyed any title to the plaintiffs the claim fails.”
Per Obaseki, JSC at 276.
Instructively, Fasoro v. Beyioku (supra) is no doubt on all fours with the instant case. It’s rather obvious from the pleadings and evidence of the parties that root of title being claimed by the respondent over the two parcels of land in dispute is Ikwu Emeri Olughu of Abiriba. Thus, the totality of the evidence clearly shows that the 4th defendant did not obtain the mandatory consent of the members of the said family before he purportedly sold or pledged the two parcels of land in dispute to the respondent. The claim thereof must obviously fail. Exhibit ‘C’ the purported deed of conveyance is thus of no consequence whatsoever. That being the case, it would not be necessary for this court to dwell on the issue of possession. Suffice it to allude to the fact that it has been established both in the pleadings and evidence that the respondent had never enjoyed a peaceful possession of the two parcels of land in dispute ever since the purported sale thereof. According to the DW1.
“Since 1973 we never permitted the plaintiff to take the land. We have not conceded to the claim. Since that 1973 plaintiff have never farmed on that land till now.”
See page 66 paragraphs 20 – 25 of the record.
However, it was the evidence of the respondent (PW2) that:
“I did farm this land in 1972 and in 1979 I farmed it myself and the economic crops uprooted by the defendants …
The defendants did destroy my crops on that land. To say they removed my beacons against their positions.”
See page 58 lines 1 – 7 of the record.
It is trite that in the absence of valid title, the respondent’s purported possession of the two parcels of land in question has most undoubtedly amounted to an act of trespass.
This is so because, as the Supreme Court has held in Fasoro v. Beyioku’s case (supra) –
“Conversely where, as in this case, the title pleaded had not been proved, it will be unnecessary to consider acts of possession and the dictum in Ekpo v. Ita (1932) 11 NLR 68 for the acts there became no longer acts of possession but acts of trespass (Da Costa v. Ikomi (1968) 1 All NLR 394 followed).
Hence, my answer to issue No 2 is most undoubtedly also in the negative. And I so hold.
Issue No 3 –
(iii) whether the plaintiff/respondent proved his case as required by law as to entitle him to his claims as per the claim and further amended statement of claim (grounds 4, 5, 12 and 13). ”
I have deemed it expedient to allude, at this stage that having answered issues Nos. (i) and (ii) in the negative, my answer to issue No (iii) ought to naturally also be in the negative. It has become rather obvious, as alluded to above, that the plaintiff/respondent had not proved his case as required by law. Thus, it goes without saying that he is not entitled to the claims as per the further amended statement of claim thereof.
In the light of the above postulations, I have no hesitation whatsoever in coming to the most inevitable conclusion that this appeal is meritorious and ought to thus be allowed by me. The appeal is accordingly hereby allowed. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is hereby set aside.
I make no order as to costs.
Other Citations: (2007)LCN/2248(CA)
