Suleiman Adamu V. Muhammad Sani Takori & Ors (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
ABUBAKAR ABDULKADIR JEGA, J.C.A.
This is an appeal by the petitioner/Appellant against the judgment of the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal Holden at Gusau delivered on the 27th July, 2007.
The Appellant and the 1st Respondent were both candidates who contested for the Office of member representing Gumi/Bukkugudun Federal Constituency at the April 21st, 2007 general Election. The Appellant was sponsored by the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) while the 1st Respondent was sponsored by the 2nd Respondent.
The 3rd and 4th Respondents were responsible for screening, organizing and conducting the election.
The 1st Respondent was returned as the person duly elected having scored majority of 102,429 votes cast at the said election. The petitioner who scored the next highest votes of 8,508 cast at the election was not happy with the outcome of the said election and proceeded to file a petition in which he challenged the return of the 1st Respondent on the ground that the 1st Respondent was not qualified to contest the said election and be returned as duly elected by reason of the 1st Respondent’s failure to resign his appointment as a Commissioner and Attorney General in the Government of Zamfara State at least 30 days before the date of the said election, and that he swore to a false affidavit of compliance with all constitutional requirement for the elections.
In response to the said petition the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a joint reply in which they denied the allegation of non-qualification. The Appellant filed his reply to the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ joint reply refuting that the 1st Respondent duly resigned his appointment.
The 3rd and 4th Respondents also joined issues with the petitioner by filing a reply with the leave of the Tribunal denying the allegation that the 1st Respondent was disqualified from contesting at the said election on the ground of failure to resign his appointment before the date of the election.
All counsel agreed to dispense with oral evidence and to tender relevant documents from the bar. The Appellant tendered Exhibits A, B, C at the commencement of trial, and upon a subpoena served on the relevant officers of Zamfara State Civil Service tendered Exhibits H1 and H2 and J. However the Tribunal rejected one Exhibit marked rejected “1” that is the receipt book containing the duplicate Exhibit H2 (Receipt No. 033811) to show the fact of non resignation by the 1st Respondent before the election. The 1st Respondent through his counsel tendered Exhibits D, E, F, G and all photocopies without any foundation as to the state of the originals all of which ought to be in the custody of the Respondent.
The Tribunal in a reserved judgment dismissed the petition; the Appellant dissatisfied with the judgment has appealed and filed three grounds of appeal. At the hearing of the appeal on the 14th day of October, 2008, learned counsel for the Appellant Dr H. L. Ali adopted his brief of argument dated 14/2/08 and filed on 21/2/08 and also his reply brief dated and filed on 7/4/08 and urged the court to allow the appeal. Learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents Mr. S. Shuaibu adopted his brief of argument dated and filed on 26/02/08 and urged the court to dismiss the appeal. Learned counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents Mr. A.M Yawuri also adopted his brief of argument dated 15/4/08 and deemed filed on 19/5/08 he also urge the court to dismiss the appeal. In the Appellant’s brief of argument, the following issues were identified for determination:-
I. “Whether the learned trial Judges were right in holding that the 1st Respondent is not a Public officer within the meaning of Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution and thereby not required to resign his appointment 30 days to the April 2007 National Assembly elections.
II. Whether the learned trial Judges were right in law in admitting as Exhibits D, E, F, & G photocopies of documents in custody of the 1st Respondent without any foundation as to the whereabouts or state of the originals contrary to Section 97 (a-h) of the Evidence Act.
III. Whether the learned trial Judges were right in law, when they admitted Exhibit H2 a photocopy of the receipt Number 033811 and rejected the Receipt Book marked “Rejected 1″ containing the duplicate copy of Exhibit ‘F’ also marked Exhibit ‘H2’ which would have shown that Exhibit ‘F’ was only contrived to conceal the fact that the 1st Respondent did not resign his appointment 30 days before the April 21st National Assembly Elections. ”
Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents formulated two issues for determination viz:-
I. “Whether the Tribunal below was right in holding that the 1st Respondent as Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice of Zamfara State was not a public officer required to resign his appointment 30 days before the election within the contemplation of Sections 66 and 318 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
II. Whether the Tribunal below was right in admitting Exhibits D, E, F, G and H tendered by the Respondent and attaching weight to same, while rejecting Exhibit ‘Rejected 1’.”
Learned counsel for 3rd and 4th Respondents also formulated two issues for determination which read thus:-
I. “Whether the 1st Respondent was a public officer within the meaning of Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution.
II. Whether the learned lower Tribunal acted properly when it admitted Exhibit D, E, F and G and rejected the receipt book marked ‘Rejected 1’.”
I have considered the issues as formulated by the Appellant and I am of the view the issues would adequately dispose of the appeal. I however noticed that Issues II & III as formulated overlaps or are interrelated. Accordingly the two issues would be treated jointly in the consideration of this appeal.
On Issue No. I, it is the submission of learned counsel to the Appellant that it is clear from the intendment of Section 195 that the provisions for the appointment of the Attorney-General of a State is mandatory by the use of the word “Shall” and it is a statutory requirement and does not vest any discretion in the Governor of the State nor does it fall among the offices listed by the Constitution as being held at the pleasure of the Governor in Section 208 (5) of the Constitution.
Further, learned counsel to the Appellant argued that it is also clear that “public service of State” as defined in Section 318 of the 1999 Constitution is not intended to be exhaustive hence the use of the phrase “in any capacity” and the word “includes”. That this shows that Attorney-General of a State is a statutory “officer” of the Government of that State and that the Attorney-General holds an established post in the State public service in his capacity as the chief law officer of the State and Head of Justice Department. That this is further supported by the Zamfara
State Civil Service Rules in which the position of the Attorney-General of the State is an establishment post as Head of Justice Department. Hence the 1st Respondent continued drawing his pension after his purported resignation as shown in Exhibits “A” and “H 1” (pay rolls for the months of March and April 2007). Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that it is the duty of the court to adhere strictly to rules governing interpretation of Constitutional provisions so as not to defeat the intendment of law makers and the role of Constitution in the governance of the country. Thus, once the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous the court will give ordinary or literal interpretation. Reference made to Ajadi v. Ajibola (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt.898) 158.
It is also the contention of learned counsel to the Appellant that as a public servant, Section 66 (1)(f) requires the 1st Respondent wishing to contest election to the National Assembly to resign his appointment. That the Tribunal ought to have followed the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Vincent Aondoakaa & 2 Ors V. Nicholas Gyegweh (1989)1 NEPLR 39 at 56 which “no doubt” places an individual appointed as a Commissioner to a State Executive Councilor Minister of the Executive Council of the Federation as a “public servant” and that the Tribunal was therefore in error when it held to the contrary and preferred to follow the judgment of Court of Appeal in Dada V. Adeyeye & Ors (2006)6 NWLR (Pt. 920)6 at 19 – 20 in which no issue arose as to the status of the Commissioner in a State Executive Council.
In response to the submissions on Issue No.1, learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents submits that this issue involves essentially an interpretation or construction of Sections 66 (1)(f) and 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as well as Section 18 of the Interpretation Act. Learned counsel contends that while in the employment of the Zamfara State Government as a Commissioner and Attorney-General, the 1st Respondent was a political appointee of the Governor of Zamfara State and not a public officer required to resign his appointment within the contemplation of Section 66(1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution.
That this is so despite the position as provided by law that the office is a statutory one and that same has been defined to be the Head of the Justice Department of the State as stipulated under Section 208 of the said
Constitution or by rule 01003 of the Zamfara State Civil Rules regarded as the Head of the Justice Department.
Learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents referred to Section 66(1 )(f); Section 18 of the Interpretation Act and Section 318( 1) of the 1999 Constitution and submits that the Appellant has drawn special attention to the words/phrase “any capacity” and “include” to support their argument that the list of officers within the contemplation of Section 318( 1) is not exhaustive and that the Attorney-General is therefore such an officer which Section 66(1 )(f) obliges to resign. Counsel concedes that the word “include” indicates that the list provided under Section 318(1) is not exhaustive but disagree that the office of Attorney-General can be added or fitted into the genre created by that Section.
Learned counsel further argued that resort must be had to the ejus dem generic rule of interpretation and in so doing it would be appreciated that appointment as Attorney/General of a State which by virtue of the provision of Section 195 is by the Governor of the State with recourse to the Civil Service Commission of the State the purpose of assisting the Governor of the State to administer or oversee particular areas or sectors and ensure good governance of the State is not an employment in the public service of the State within the contemplation of Section 318 and 66(1 )(f) of the said Constitution.  Reference made to Dada V. Adeyeye & Ors 1 EPR P. 569 at 584.
Learned counsel contends that the Tribunal below was right in holding that the 1st Respondent was not within the category of officers that are required to resign their appointment at least 30 days before the date of the election and urged this court to affirm this decision.
In response to the submissions on issue No. 1 learned counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents submits that the sole determining factor in defining a public servant is the mode of his appointment reference made to Dada V. Adeyeye & Ors (2005) 6 NWLR (PT 960) 6 at 19-20; Rufus Alli Momoh V. Afolabi & Lagos City Council (1977) 6 SC8.
Learned Counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents contends that the Attorney General of a State is not employed by the Public Service of a State, rather he is appointed by the Governor subject to the confirmation by the State House of Assembly.
In reply on points of law learned counsel for the Appellant submits that going by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Vincent Aondoakaa V. Nicholas Gyegwen (Supra) submits that the 1st Respondent is both a Public Officer as well as a civil servant since his appointment as Attorney General of Zamfara State is an establishment position as Head of Justice department in the Zamfara State Civil Service Rule 01003. That the position is thus pensionable under the Zamfara State Civil Service Rules, therefore he is require to resign his appointment 30 days before the date of the election.
Under Issue No.1 the complaint of the Appellant against the decision of the trial Tribunal is that in so far as the Office of the Attorney General is one that is statutorily recognized and one which the governor has no discretion but to appoint and which appointment is not at the pleasure of the governor of the State, couple with the definition of the Attorney-General of State as the Head of Justice Department by virtue of rule 01003 of Zamfara State Civil Service Rules, the 1st Respondent is a Public Officer within the contemplation of section 318 of the constitution and was therefore obliged to resign his appointment at least 30 days before the date of the election.
This issue is concerned essentially with interpretation or construction of sections 66 (1 )(f), 318 (1) of the 1999 constitution as well as section 18 of the Interpretation Act.
Section 66 (1 )(f) creates the disqualification that may ground an election petition in the following “No Person shall be qualified for election to the Senate or house of Representatives if
(a) …
(b) …
(c) …
(d) …
(e) …
(f). “he is a person employed in the public service of the Federation or of any State and has not resigned, withdrawn or retired from such employment thirty days before the date of the election”
Section 18 of the Interpretation Act in defining the term “Public Officer” provides thus:-
“Public Officer” means a member of the public service of the Federation within the meaning of the constitution of Nigeria or Public Service of the State”.
While section 318 (1) of the Constitution defines the term”
Public Service of a State”. In the following terms:-
“Public Service of a State” means the service in any capacity in the government of the State and includes service as:- a). Clerk or other staff of the House of Assembly;
(b). Member of staff of the High Court, the Sharia Court of Appeal, the Customary Court of Appeal or other courts established for a State by this Constitution or by a law of a House of Assembly;
(c) Member of staff of any Commission or Authority Established for the State by this constitution or by a law of a House of assembly;
(d). Staff of any Local Government council;
(e). Staff of any educational Institution established or financed principally by a government of a State; and
(f). Staff of any Company or enterprise in which the government of a State or its agencies holds controlling shares or interest;
The 1st Respondent’s appointment as Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice was done pursuant to the provisions of section 195 of the constitution by the Governor of Zamfara State without recourse to the Civil Service Commission of the State that would have brought the said appointment within the contemplation of section 318 (1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution. It is clear that the sole determining factor in determining a public servant is the mode of his appointment. In Dada V. Adeyeye (2005) 6 NWLR (PT 920) 1 at pages 19-20 this court held thus:-
“By virtue of section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, Public Service of a State means the service of the State in any capacity in respect of the Government of the State. Section 318 (1) further provides for non-political offices in the Government of the State. However, the Governor of a State is not in public Service of the State within the meaning of Section 318 (1) of the 1999 constitution. The Deputy Governor, the speaker and all other Political Office holders are also not in the Public Service of the State”.
In the appeal at hand there is nothing to show that the 1st Respondent was employed by the Civil Service Commission of Zamfara State as Attorney General of the State, there was no letter of employment issued to him by the Civil Service Commission of Zamfara State to bring him within the contemplation of section 66 (1) (f) and 318 (1) of the 1999 constitution. Thus an officer like an Attorney General who does not owe his appointment to the civil service commission of the State, but to the Governor of the State cannot reasonably be regarded as being in the public service of the state.
The 1st Respondent was indeed a Public Officer as Attorney General in the Government of Zamfara State but one has to get down to the real nitty-gritty difference between a “public officer in the service of a State” and a public officer employed in the Service of a State”. The two are definitely not the same though the later includes the former but not the other way round. It must be understood and appreciated that only a public officer employed in the service of the Federation or a State is caught by the provisions of section 318 (1) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, accordingly issue No. 1 is resolved against the Appellant in favour of the Respondents.
On issues (ii) and (iii) learned counsel for the Appellant submits that it is the law that only primary evidence of document (originals) pleaded is admissible in evidence.
Photostat copy of documents annexed to affidavits do not automatically become exhibits of trial – reference made to Jacob V. A. G Akwa Ibom State (2002) 7 NWLR (PT 765) P 18 at 25. That except foundation is laid as to the whereabouts of the originals before secondary (photocopies) can be admissible – reference made to section 96 & 97 of the Evidence Act. That Exhibits D, E, F and G are all photocopies of which no foundation is laid as to the whereabouts of their originals.
Learned counsel to the Appellant argues that original copies of all their documents except Exhibit D ought to be in the custody of the 1st Respondent, he chose not to tender them nor lay any foundation as to their whereabouts. That no weight should have been lent to them and they ought to have been discountenanced than reliance on them particularly exhibit E by the Tribunal has occasioned a miscarriage of Justice when they held that they are evidences of resignation of the 1st Respondent.
It is the submissions of learned counsel to the Appellant that had the Tribunal properly reviewed Exhibits F Photocopy of Treasury receipt No. 033811 purportedly dated 7th March, 2007 purporting to refund the salaries wrongly paid to the 1st Respondent and its duplicate of receipt No. 033811 contained in the receipt book marked “Rejected 1” dated 30/4/2007 issued after the elections.
The tribunal would have found that the 1st Respondent only attempt to regularize his resignation by falsifying the photocopy of the receipt dated 7/03/2007 to show, albeit falsely, that he resigned before the election.
Further learned counsel to the Appellant submits that the Tribunal wrongly rejected the receipt book containing the duplicate of the receipt number 03381. That this ought not to be pleaded before it is admissible as it only goes to identify and establish the existence and authenticity or otherwise of the receipt in issue i.e. photocopy dated 7/03/2007. That the Tribunal was therefore in error in rejecting the receipt book – reference made to Ajadi V. Ajibola (Supra) (pt.170 paras B.E) learned counsel to the Appellant contends that in fact the duplicate as in the receipt book has the status of primary evidence under the Evidence Act and ought to have been admitted reference
made to Jacob V. A.G Akwa Ibom State (Supra) pp 35 35-37 paras D – A.
Finally learned counsel submits that failure/refusal by the 1st Respondent to produce original receipt number 033811 ought to have been construed by the Tribunal against his interest, as it could have shown, as the duplicate that it was issued on 30/04/2007 after the elections and not 7th March, 2007. That the reasonable inference here is that the photocopy of the receipt was manipulated to read 7/03/2007 reference made to section 149 (d) Evidence Act. That the Tribunal was therefore in error when it rejected the receipt book therefore occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
In response to the submissions of the Appellant on issues (ii) (iii) learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents submits that the case of the 1st and 2nd Respondents is that the case of Appellant is misconceived and lacking entirely in merit. Firstly, the Appellant is now estopped from complaining that the exhibits were admitted and relied upon by the Tribunal below having acquiesced and or consented to their admission at the trial knowing that they were secondary evidence for which no foundation had been laid for their admission, reference made to V. S. F Co. LTD V. Xtodues Trading Co. (1993) S NWLR (PT 296) 675 at 695 – 696.
Secondly, that all counsel had at the pre-hearing agreed to dispense with oral evidence and to tender all documents from the bar, that the foundation which learned counsel for Appellant now insist upon could only have been laid through oral evidence which counsel in their wisdom, agreed to dispense with. That the Appellant having agreed to accept this method or procedure In the prosecution/defence of the petition must be prepared to be subjected to the adverse effect it brings upon him reference made to Onamade V. A. C. 8 LTD (1997) 1 NWLR (PT 480) 123 at 141 -142.
Learned for the 1st and 2nd Respondents submits further that these same exhibits which the Appellant expressly consented to being admitted at the hearing and which counsel clearly and positively accepted as evidence of compliance by the 1st Respondent with the relevant rules of the Zamfara State Civil Service on resignation that the same counsel has turned round to allege is erroneous and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.
That a party or his counsel must endeavour to be consistent in presenting his case as a party would not be allowed to approbate and reprobate on the same issue from one court to another reference made to Iso V. Eno (1999) 2 NWLR (PT 590) 204 at 224 – 225.
Learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents submits that the receipt booklet containing the duplicate copies of receipts which the original of exhibits F (photocopy) was purportedly issued to the 1st Respondent was wrongly rejected in evidence, counsel contends that the decision of the Tribunal below cannot be faulted regard being had to the fact that it was not part of the Appellant’s case/pleadings before the Tribunal that exhibit F was a forgery or that same was back dated. Learned counsel urged us to resolve this issue against the Appellant and to dismiss this ground of appeal.
In response to the submission of counsel to the Appellant on issues (ii) and (iii) learned counsel to 3rd and 4th submits that Dr. Akume, counsel for the Appellant did not object to the tendering of exhibits D, E, F and G that there is no evidence that the said exhibits are photocopies as alleged by the Appellant, that a party who disagree or objects to the admissibility of a document being tendered, must raise his objection at the stage where the document is tendered or presented for admissibility reference made to Ipinlaye II V. Olokotun (1996) 6 NWLR (PT 453) 59.
Further, counsel contends that where no objection is raised by the opposing party as to the admissibility of a document, he cannot subsequently be heard to complain on the issue of admissibility even on appeal reference made to Ekpo V Fagbemi (1978) All NLR 107; Olukade V Alade (1976)1 All NLR (Pt.1)62.
Learned counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents argues that the Appellant contends that the receipt book marked ‘rejected 1’ would have shown that the 1st Respondent only attempted to regularize his resignation by falsifying the photocopies of the receipt dated 7th March, 2007 to show that he resigned before the election. That a party who alleges that a document has a particular effect is obliged to set out as much of the portion of the document which is necessary to show that it has the effect alleged in the pleadings – reference made to Ehimare V. Ehonyon (1985)1 NWLR (Pt.2) 177; Onyioha V. Union Bank Ltd (1993)5 NWLR (Pt.296)687; Great Nigeria Insurance Company Ltd V Lead Group Ltd (1988)4 NWLR (Pt.33).
Further counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents submits that it is the pleadings of the parties that streamline the relevant issues/facts between the parties. Thus for any document to be admissible, the said document must have been duly pleaded or facts in support of the documents pleaded in the pleadings of the party relying on the same reference made to Torti V. Vikpabi (1984)1 SCNLR 214; Agunbiade V. Sasegbon (1968) NMLR 233; Fadlallah V. Arewa Textiles Ltd (1997)8 NWLR (Pt.518) 546.
In reply on points of law, learned counsel for the Appellant submits that it is a requirement of law in Section 96 and 97 that secondary evidence is admissible only upon meeting the requirement stated therein. Therefore consent or no consent these requirements must be met. Further counsel to the Appellant submits that Exhibits D, E, F and G of the 1st & 2nd Respondents being secondary evidence which were tendered without meeting the pre-conditions of Section 97 (a)-(h) of the Evidence Act are therefore of no effect and should be set aside and expunged from evidence.
Issues No (ii) & (iii) – The grouse of the Appellant as canvassed under Issues (ii) & (iii) in the Appellant’s brief of argument is that Exhibits D, E, F and G were photocopies of relevant documents tendered by the 1st & 2nd Respondents to show that in any event the 1st Respondent resigned his appointment before the election and that being photocopies they. were secondary evidence within the contemplation of Section 96 and 97 of the Evidence Act which can only be admitted upon proper foundation being laid. Consequently, the Tribunal ought not to have admitted and placed reliance or weight on the said Exhibits which no such foundation was laid.
It is clear from pages 95 and 96 of the printed record that when Exhibits D, E, F & G were being sought to be tendered, learned counsel to the Appellant did not object to the said Exhibits being tendered. Beside there is no evidence that the said Exhibits are photocopies as alleged by the Appellant.
On the effect of failure of a party to object to admissibility of a document being tendered, the Supreme Court in V.S.T. Co. Ltd V. Xtodues Trading Co. (1993)5 NWLR (Pt.296)675 at 695-696 states thus:-
“In any event, Mr. Anyduba not having objected to the admissibility of these documents in the court below. The law was well put by this Court, per Aniagolu, JSC in Chief Brauno Etim & Ors V Chief Okon Udo Efekpe & Ors (supra) at pages 36 – 38
“It is a cardinal rule of evidence, and of practice, in civil as well as in criminal case that an objection to the admissibility of a document sought by a party to be put in evidence is taken when the document is offered in evidence. Barring some exceptions, where by law certain documents are rendered inadmissible (consent or no consent) for failing to satisfy some conditions or to meet some criteria, the rule still remains inviolate that where objection has not been raised by the opposing party to the reception in evidence of a document (or other evidence – see: Chukwuka Akunne V. Mathew Ekuno (1952) 14 WACA 59, the document will be admitted in evidence and the opposing party cannot afterwards be heard to complain about its admission (see Alade V. Olukade (1976) 2 SC 183 at 188 – 189, for criminal trials see R. V. Hammond (1941) 3 All ER 318; R. V. Patel (1951) 2 All E.R. 29”.
The law is well settled that where a party did not object to the admissibility of document at the time it is been sought to be tendered in court the document will be admitted in evidence and the opposing party cannot afterwards be heard to complain about its admission. In the instant appeal the counsel to the Appellant clearly did not object to the admissibility of Exhibits D, E, F and G at pages 95 and 96 of the printed record he categorically stated that he has no objection to their admissibility and by settled principles of the law he cannot now turn around and complain about their admission.
On the issue of rejected receipt book marked rejected 1 it is very clear from the case of the Appellant i.e. his pleadings before the Tribunal, it was not his case that exhibit F was a forgery or that same was backdated. The law is that it is the pleadings of the parties that streamline the relevant issues/facts between the parties. Thus for a document to be admissible, the said document must be duly pleaded or facts in support of the document pleaded in the pleadings of the party relying on the same see Torti V. Vikpabi (1984) I SCNLR 214; Agonbiade V. Sasegbon (1968) NMLR 233; Fadlallah V. Arewa Textiles LTD (1997) 8 NWLR (PT 518) 546.
Looking at the petition of the Appellant contained at pages 2 to 5 of the printed record, the receipt book which the Appellant sought to tender and which was rejected was not pleaded, equally facts in support of the receipt book were not pleaded and relied on same by the Appellant, the lower Tribunal was therefore right to have rejected it in evidence.
Beside the Tribunal did not base its conclusion on exhibit F which the said receipt booklet was meant to rely on the evidence available to the Tribunal on this fact the Tribunal’s reason for finding against the Appellant on the issue of resignation of the 1st Respondent are stated at pages 144 to 145 or the printed record thus:-
“We however, find it difficult to see how the mere fact that the employers of the 1st Respondent chose to waste any more on him after he had left their service can be reason why he can be disqualified from contesting an election on the basis of section 66 (1) (f) of the constitution, Supra. In our humble view, where a person in employment claims that he has left the service on a particular day, the best evidence to contradict him on the claim is evidence of actions he still took, including documents he still executed, outside the period he claims to left service; not evidence that his employers still continued to pay his salaries into the bank. Saying otherwise would appear to us to run against the saying of section 34 of the constitution, Supra, which forbids any person to be held in servitude”.
In view of the foregoing therefore, Issues II and III are equally resolved against the Appellant in favour of the Respondents.
Finally, having resolved all the three issues formulate for determination in this appeal against the Appellant in favour of the Respondents, the appeal fails in its entirely and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the lower Tribunal delivered on the 27th July, 2007 is affirmed.
The two set of Respondents are entitled to costs, accordingly N20, 000.00 costs is awarded to each set of Respondents.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3084(CA)
