Ibacehm (Ibafon Chemicals) Limited V. Visa Investment & Securities Ltd Anor (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI, J.C.A.
The appeal at hand is against the Ruling of the High Court of Lagos State in dismissing the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, brought pursuant to order 29 rules 6 of the High Court of Lagos State Civil Procedure Rules 1994. (LSHCCPR)
The brief facts of this case were that by a motion on notice dated 7th November, 2001, the appellant as plaintiff in the court below brought an application seeking summary judgment by admission against the Respondent, who was the 1st defendant under order 29 rules 6 of the Lagos State High Court Civil Procedure Rules 1994. In moving the application, the appellant drew the court’s attention to certain averments in the statement of defence of the Respondent, more particularly paragraphs 2(f)-(i) of the said statement of defence contained at pages 5-7 of the Record of Appeal, as the basis for seeking judgment under the aforementioned Rule of Court.
The appellant therein, further placed much reliance on Exhibit A attached to its application, being a returned cheque given to it by the 2nd defendant in the court below, Spectrade Nigeria Limited, with whom it had a business relationship and claiming that the respondent now, who was the 1st defendant, was the drawer of the cheque and by the legal effect of being the drawer had impliedly admitted the claim of the appellant. The returned cheque was an African International Bank Ltd. cheque No.00003370 dated 20th September, 2001 for the sum of N19Million and reference at page 10 of the record of appeal.
Upon the conclusion of arguments by counsel, the court below held that for the appellant to succeed in an application brought under order 29 rule 6 supra there had to be an admission of fact in the statement of defence as envisaged under the rule but that the statement of defence of the respondent at hand denied the appellant’s claim. Further more that Exhibit A relied upon extensively in the argument of the appellant was not a clear, unambiguous and freely made admission necessary to enable the court grant judgment to the appellant under the said order 29 rules 6 as envisaged. The application was consequently, on the 27th March, 2002, dismissed and hence this appeal.
The original notice of appeal was filed on the 28th March, 2002 and an amended notice further filed on the 10th May, 2002 but deemed properly filed on the 17th March, 2003 by the order of this court and containing six grounds of appeal.
The appellant’s brief of argument was dated 7th April, 2003 and filed the same day, while that of the respondent dated 21st April, 2004 was also deemed properly filed and served on the said date. The appellant’s reply brief was further deemed properly filed and served on the 26th October, 2004.
On the 3rd November, 2008 when this appeal was called up for hearing, the learned appellant’s counsel Mr. E. R. Emukpoerno adopted and relied on their said briefs under reference supra and submitted that while issue no.1 is distilled from grounds 1,2,3,4, and 6 of the grounds of appeal, issue 2 was from ground 5. The learned counsel urged that the appeal be allowed therefore.
Mr. E. D. Onyeke on behalf of the respondent also adopted and relied on the respondent’s brief supra and re-iterated their lone issue formulated from all the grounds of appeal put together and impressed upon the court to dismiss the appeal with substantial and punitive costs.
On the one hand, the appellant’s two issues reproduced are as follows:-
(1) Whether there is an admission of the appellant’s claim by the Respondent in its statement of defence and or on the cheque to entitle the appellant to judgment under order 29 rules 6 of the High Court of Lagos State Civil Procedure Rules of 1994.
(2) Whether the lower court exercised its discretion under order 29 rules 6 judiciously and judicially in its determination of the appellant’s motion.
On the other, the respondent’s only lone issue is to the effect that:-
“In an application for judgment by admission under order 29 rules 6, what is/are the essential elements(s) necessary in a pleading to enable a court exercise its discretion judiciously and judicially in granting judgment to an applicant?”
In taking the two issues together, the central focus of submission by the appellant’s counsel was order 29 rule 6 of the said High Court Civil Procedure Rules 1994 and Exhibit A; wherein he had placed much reliance in stretching the effect of admission of facts as well as the legal consequences of an issued cheque exhibit A. It is the appellant’s contention also that a position of privity exists between it and the respondent and which supports and establishes a business relationship of a contractual nature. The learned counsel submitted also that the Respondent in its statement of defence admitted all the material facts needed to found and sustain the appellant’s cause of action on the cheque. The Supreme Court authority of the case of Meridien Trade Corporation Ltd. v Metal Construction (W.A.) Ltd. (1998) 3 SC 20 at 29-30 was cited in support of the argument wherein his Lordship Ogundare JSC stated:
“The basic rule of pleadings is that a traverse whether by denial or refusal to admit, must not be evasive but must answer the point of substance. The pleader must deal specifically with every allegation of fact made by his opponent; he must either admit it frankly or deny it boldly. Any half-admission or half-denial is evasive. In Thorp v Holdsworth (1876) 3 Ch.D 637 at 639 Jessel, M.R. put the rule in these words:
“The whole object of pleadings is to bring the parties to an issue, and the meaning of the rules of order XIX was to prevent the issue being enlarged, which would prevent either party from knowing when the cause came on for trial, what the real point to be discussed and decided was.
In fact, the whole meaning of the system is to narrow the parties to definite issues…
See also, Tildesley v Harper (1877) 7 Ch.D 403; Harris v Gamble (1878) 7 Ch.D 748 for examples of insufficient traverses. The two courts below, in their respective judgments, relied on a passage at pages 83-84 of Bullen & Leake and Jacobs: Precedents of Pleadings (12th edition) wherein it is stated:
“Where the defendant traverses any allegation of fact in the statement of claim, whether by denial or refusal to admit, he must not do so evasively but must answer the point of substance. This is a basic rule of pleading, since a traverse which is evasive or ambiguous, or equivocal or does not answer the point of substance will not amount to specific traverse allegation. Thus, if it be alleged that the defendant received a certain sum of money, it will not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular sum, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof or else set out how much he received.”
The same principle, learned counsel argued, was propounded in the case of Alhaji Goni Kyari v Alhaji Ciroma Alkali. The counsel in analyzing the definition of the phrase “the point of substance” as captured from appellant’s relief deducted same from the respondents’ “answer”. He restated and emphasized the relief against the respondent; “as the Drawer of the dishonoured cheque No.00003370 in the sum of N9 Million with interest at the rate of 25% per annum from 21st of September, 2001 until payment…”
This averment, learned counsel submitted, was not specifically answered but dealt with evasively. Further more that Exhibit A, the Respondent’s cheque was an admission of its claim against the Respondent. Section 19 of the Evidence Act was cited in support. That exhibit A, directly and unequivocally touched upon the appellant’s relief against the respondent, and which serves the only admissible evidence of the appellant’s claim against the Respondent. Learned counsel relied further on the case of Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v Benjamin Nwaokolo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.400) at 127 at 142 per Onu JSC wherein Halburys Laws of England was quoted with approval.
Submitting on the discretionary exercise of power by the court below, the learned counsel argued the ultra vires attitude by the court wherein it took irrelevant matters into consideration and therefore failed to take cognizance of relevant facts which would have tilted the decision in favour of the appellant’s application. That the court failed to consider the provision of order 19 rules 2 of its Rules. That the irrelevant matter was the statement of defence of the Respondent, in determining whether the cheque Exhibit A was a clear and unequivocal admission of the appellant’s claim. The learned counsel also submitted at great length on section 3(1), 55(1) (a) and 73(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act Cap.35 Laws of the Federation 1990. He zeroed down on a cheque being a bill of Exchange which is an unconditional order by the (in this case the respondent) to its banker (African International Bank Limited) to pay the payee (the appellant) the sum of N9Million. That it is an unqualified and unambiguous order to pay a sum certain in money to the appellant.
The learned counsel in summary concluded therefore that the Respondent did not in its statement of defence deny any matter of fact as required by order 19 rules 2 of the High Court of Lagos State Civil Procedure Rules 1994.
Further more and in close relation he submitted also, that the said respondent’s statement of defence was not only evasive but that it did not answer the point of substance in the appellant’s statement of claim. Rather it amounted to an admission of the appellant’s claim since it was not a defence in specific denial of any matter of fact in the statement claim. In laying great and significant emphasis on the cheque Exhibit A, counsel re-iterated same also as a clear and an unequivocal admission of the appellant’s said claim against the respondent. He submitted a grievous error on the part of the court below therefore wherein it ignored relevant matters in preference to the irrelevant and thereby affecting its decision substantially and the reason why he argued the appeal should therefore be allowed.
In response to the submission by the appellant’s counsel, the learned counsel for the respondent copiously recited the provision of order 29 rules 6 under reference and vigorously gave a vivid explanation on what constitutes an admission under the said rule of court. The explanation counsel argued will also require a further perusal of rule 7 to the said order. That the appellant’s counsel had over stretched the effect by placing reliance on the admission of facts to include the legal consequences of an issued cheque which is quite distinct from the purport of order 29 rule 6, under which the appellant sought judgment against the respondent. That the Respondent as 1st defendant in the court below did not in its statement of defence admit the claim of the appellant in any way or at all; but in compliance with the rules of pleadings, traversed the appellant’s allegations of liability against it. That this was done by setting out in detail its defence against the appellant’s claim and its role, if any, in the transaction between the appellant and a company known as Spectrade Nig. Ltd., the 2nd defendant in the court below.
Counsel submitted further that the usual practice of the respondent as is the practice of other institutions carrying on business as finance companies, is to pay its customers who desire to draw their funds with a 3rd party cheque endorsed to the customer or in compliance with its customers directive to any other party whom its customers may have business relationship with. That in answer to the contention of the appellant that the Respondent is the drawer of the returned cheques afore-mentioned, the counsel restated the respondent being a financial Institution licensed under the Banks and other financial Institutions Decree No.25 of 1991 (now Act) to carryon business as a financial Institution as distinct from normal banking business as defined under the act. By virtue of the combined effect of the provisions of sections 56(1), 57(1), 58(1) and (2) and the definitive interpretation and distinction of banking business and the business of other financial institution contained in section 61 of the Act, it was not possible for the Respondent to issue cheque books to its customers for the purpose of drawing their funds without recourse to it. That the 2nd defendant in the court below, Spectrade Nig. Ltd. is the drawer of the returned cheque and not the respondent as contended by the appellant.
Reference was made to the appellant’s letter of 30/10/01 written to the 2nd defendant on page 13 of the records of appeal. That the appellant sought to extend the provisions of order 29 rule 6 to legal conclusions on actions relating to bills of exchange which is not applicable to the requirement of the order, under which it sought judgment at the lower court.
Counsel further garnered that the cases cited by the appellant in its brief to support its contention on express or implied admissions are merely restatement of the position of the law on a wide range of legal principles that are not in issue between the parties and should therefore be disregarded as mere academic.
The learned respondent submitted further that there is not factual admission of liability in the statement of defence as required under order 29 rule 6 and that the court below was therefore in order to have dismissed the appellant’s motion. Reference in support was made to the case of Ananson Farms Ltd. v Nal Merchant Bank Ltd. (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.331) p.241 at 251-252 per Tobi JCA. That the averments in its statement of defence on pages 5-7 of the record of appeal on its role in the business between the appellant and the 2nd defendant, more particularly paragraphs 2(a)-(i), are not direct and unequivocal admissions but merely peripheral and incidental explanations to the claim of the appellant and could therefore not amount to an admission necessary to obtain judgment under order 29 rule 6, as same is not factual, full, clear unambiguous and freely made. Further reliance was made on the case of National Bank v Guthrie (1994) 4 SCNJ 11.
In proving and sustaining the allegation against the 1st defendant being a financier of the 2nd defendant, the counsel laid down three conditions that needed to be fulfilled by the appellant, before it could benefit from such an assertion namely:-
“(i) That there is a contract between the Respondent, the appellant and Spectrade Nig. Ltd, the 2nd defendant at the lower court, whereat the Respondent was to act as financier of the 2nd defendant as alleged by the Appellant in its brief and in the statement of claim.
(ii) That the respondent by its action, omission or in any way manner or form howsoever described, represented to the appellant that it was financing the 2nd defendants’ contract as alleged by the appellant in its statement of claim.
(iii) That there is contract of Guarantee of Indemnity between the Respondent and the Appellant in respect to its dealings with the 2nd defendant.”
That for the appellant to rely on the cheque as a basis of an admission against it, the said three conditions enumerated above must be present as it would be highly presumptuous of the appellant to presume that there existed a contract finance relationship between the 2nd defendant and the Respondent as stated in its statement of claim and upon which it is pursuing the respondent for the value of the returned cheque. That the averments in paragraph 3(1) of the affidavit in support of the appellant’s motion at Pages 8-10 of the record are submitted to be misleading, also 3(iii) and 3(iv) of same affidavit. The court is therefore urged to discountenance the arguments in the appellant’s brief in relation to the issue of admission and hold that the respondent did not admit the appellant’s claim as expressly provided for in the wordings of order 29 rules 6 for the judgment of the lower court to be set aside or reversed.
On the exercise of discretion by the lower court, the respondent’s counsel emphasized that the court must avert its mind to the provision of order 29 rule 6 under which the appellant sought judgment against the respondent as that is what it ought to take into consideration in determining the application.
On the totality of the respondent’s arguments counsel concluded and urged the court to hold that this appeal is lacking in merit and should therefore be dismissed.
In his further submission in reply, the appellant’s counsel urged us to discountenance the issue raised by the respondent as same does not flow from any ground of appeal filed by the appellant. The arguments and citation of authorities that issues must be formulated upon the ground of appeal are all of no moment but an admitted principle of law.
On the totality of the respondent’s response, counsel concluded that same had failed to answer the material point of substance and the court is rather invited to allow the appeal and enter judgment in favour of the appellant.
Without having to belabour the arguments advanced by the appellant’s counsel relating the competence of the respondent’s issue, I am of the considered view, with all respect, that the objection he sought to raise does not hold any water. This I say because all that the issue attempts at doing is to consolidate and condense the two issues by the appellant and thus bringing it within the ambit of order 29 rules 6 as the pre-requisite necessary, before judgment could be obtained. The provision which encompasses proof of admission of facts and also the necessity of exercising discretion thereon.
The cardinal starting point for the determination of this appeal is the decision of the lower court at page 21 of the record of appeal wherein the judge said:-
“The lengthy legal exposition of learned counsel to the plaintiff on the legal effect and implications of Exhibit A (as a bill of exchange) is not considered as the court finds that it is not relevant to the issue for determination.
The rule guiding judgments on admissions specifically provides that admission of fact must have been made, the exposition of learned counsel to the plaintiffs sought to extend this provision to admissions of law.
It is therefore ordered as follows:-
The plaintiff’s application to enter final judgment against the 1st defendant based on admissions fails and is hereby dismissed.’
Paramount to the determination are order 29 rule 6 under which the application was brought and also Exhibit A (cheque issued by 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiff) and which was attached to the affidavit in support of the application, which the appellant alleged amounted to the admission of the claim of plaintiff against it.
The reproduction of order 29 rules 6 of the High Court Law under reference provides as follows:-
“Any party may at any stage of a cause or matter, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings or otherwise apply to the court or judge in chambers for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the court or judge in chambers may upon such application make such order or give such judgment as the court or judge in chambers may think just.”
It is paramount to restate that from the provision of the rule supra, the admissions must be of fact and can be made either on the pleadings or otherwise. The rule also places much discretionary power in the judge who must in the exercise of such power be judicial and judicious. The exercise of such discretion must, I hold, be with great caution as the effect of its outcome would lead to final termination of the matter in limine.
In the case of Anason Farms Ltd. v Nal Merchant Bank under reference supra, Tobi JCA (as he then was) said:-
“For an admission to qualify as basis for entering a judgment under the rule, it must directly and unequivocally touch upon or relate to the relief or reliefs in the matter. Admissions which are merely peripheral or incidental to the relief or reliefs sought in the matter cannot qualify as basis for entering judgment under the rule. The element of substantiality of the admission is therefore material to the entire consideration whether the trial judge will deliver judgment in favour of the applicant. It is by and large a factual matter which the trial judge must resolve by examining the content of the admission.”
Before a court can rely on an admission therefore it must be full, clear, unambiguous and freely made by the party; the authority of the case of National Bank v Guthrie (supra) is in point. It could also be made either in the pleadings or in any other court process or document. The trial judge therefore has the duty to examine the factual matter of the content of the admission without the need to call oral evidence. By the very act of admission, the person does not show any objection or opposition to the factual situation. He accepts it as correct.
It is the plaintiff/appellant’s contention that by the combined effect of the 1st defendant/respondent statement of defence coupled up with Exhibit A, same constitute an admission of the 1st defendant’s indebtedness to the plaintiff.
Paragraph 4 of the plaintiffs amended statement of claim for instance and dated 31st January, 2002 at page 3 of the record here under reproduced state as follows:-
“The 1st defendant is the drawer of an African International Bank Limited cheque No.00003370 for the sum of N9 Million (Nine Million Naira) dated 20th September, 2001 drawn on African International Bank Limited. AIB Plaza Akin Adesola Street, Victoria Island Lagos and payable to the Plaintiff in liquidation of an outstanding storage charge of N12, 618, 808.30k.”
In response thereof, para.2 of the 1st defendant/respondent’s statement of defence at pages 5-6 of the record stated thus:-
“2. The 1st defendant denies paragraph 4 of the statement of claim stated by the plaintiff and avers as follows:-
(a) That it is a finance institution, whose customers operate accounts with it, through the placing of deposit, on short, medium or long term basis.
(b) That it is also in the business of financing transactions of its customers on favourable terms.
(c) That the 2nd defendant is not its customer howsoever described or at all and it has no business dealings or transaction with the 2nd defendant in relation to the claim of the plaintiff.
(d) That sometimes in June 2001 a company known as Spectrade Nigeria Limited, a customer of the 1st defendant deposited some funds in its (Spectrade) account with the 1st defendant.
(e) That the purpose of the funds was for a short term deposit from which the said company later instructed the 1st defendant to issue cheques in various sum to different companies for services rendered to it (Spectrade).
(f) That some of the cheques issued by the 1st defendant on behalf of the said Spectrade limited can be gleaned from paragraph (7)(i)-(iv) of the plaintiff’s statement of claim.
(g) That because the 1st defendant is not a commercial bank, its customers cannot be issued with a cheque book from which they issue their cheque independently of the 1st defendant.
(h) That the usual practice for its customers is to fund their deposit account with the 1st defendant and instruct it (the 1st defendant) to issue cheques to various organizations on their behalf.
(i) That the cheque issued to the plaintiff mentioned in paragraph (10) of the statement of claim for N19M is one of such cheques.”
From the deductive summary of the averments by the 1st defendant/respondent on the pleadings supra, can it be correct to say that same is a clear cut admission of indebtedness of the sum of N9 Million to the plaintiff/appellant as alleged in this appeal? In other words are there a clear and an unambiguous admission by the 1st respondent to warrant judgment having been entered in favour of the appellant? An admission to entitle judgment could be express or implied. While the former occurs when in accordance with the rules of pleadings a party fails to traverse a material allegation of fact of the opposite party, the latter, just as the name signifies, must be expressly and unambiguously stated. Presumption or insinuation would not qualify. The legal effect of both types is the same and both can be the basis of an application for judgment under order 29 rules 6. An authority in support is again the case of Anasons Farms Ltd. v Nal Merchant Bank supra. Also the case of International Merchant Bank Plc v Comrade Cycle Co. Ltd. (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.574) at 460 a decision of this court.
Section 19 of the Evidence Act provides that:
“An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons and in the circumstances hereinafter mentioned.”
From the conclusive exposition of the pleadings of the 1st defendant/respondent supra, it is obvious that the facts thereon have not admitted the indebtedness, contrary to the submission by the appellant’s counsel. His argument on that score cannot therefore hold in my opinion. The authority of Meridien Trade Corporation Limited v Metal Construction (W. A.) Ltd. (1998) 3 SC 20 at 29-30 and the other related authorities cited by the learned appellant’s counsel only serve to expatiate the basic rule of pleading:
“That a traverse whether by denial or refusal to admit, must not be evasive but must answer the point of substance… Any half-admission or half-denial is evasive…”
The authority concluded that an allegation not denied expressly or by implication by the defendant, must be deemed to be indirectly admitted. The averment on the 1st defendant/respondent’s defence reproduced supra, is neither ambiguous nor evasive. It cannot come under the said authority as wrongly submitted by the learned appellant’s counsel.
On the other leg of the submission relating to the effect of the document exhibit A attached to the affidavit in support, the learned appellant’s counsel submitted same constituting contract in writing by the 1st respondent with the appellant, that in the event the respondent’s banker’s failed to honour its cheque, the said respondent will make good the cheque thereof. Counsel referred to the Byles Bills of Exchange; further reference was made to section 132 of the Evidence Act wherein extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict, vary, alter or add to the express terms of a written instrument. This has been well spelt out by their Lordships in the case of Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v Benjamin Nwaokolo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.400) 127 at 142 wherein Onu JSC extensively quoted Halsburys Laws of England with approval and said thus amongst others:-
“Extrinsic, evidence cannot be received in order to prove the object with which a document was executed or that the intention of the parties was other than that appearing on the face of the instrument.”
The question to pose at this juncture is, does Exhibit A suggest any inference as to any fact in issue in this case? In other words, is the said exhibit an admission that the respondent drew a sum of N9 Million on its bankers in favour of the appellant?
I am very mindful of the provision of order 29 rules 6 reproduced supra and in particular the phrase “admission of fact ….. Made on the pleadings or otherwise ” The use of the word “otherwise” clearly brings in other means of admission which is not only limited to the pleadings. The phrase therefore puts the legal effect of the cheque exhibit A into question and upon which the learned appellant’s counsel extensively submitted thereon as an admission. Exhibit A is attached to the affidavit in support of the motion and which is at page 10 of the record. The facts on the affidavit in support were deposed to by one Adeyemi Henry King, a litigation officer in the office of the plaintiff/appellant’s solicitors. The information he deposed to also be obtained from one E. Robert Emukpoerno Esq., of counsel. No further information was given and explaining who the said informant was and whether he had any nexus or connection with the case. The indicting statements against the 1st defendant/respondent in paragraph 3 (i) (ii) (iii) and (iv) of the affidavit in support were related by the said informant E. Robert Emukpoerno Esq., whose status is unknown and a stranger to the application which is the crux of the decision appealed against. The said affidavit and the total facts deposed therein cannot in my opinion, with all respect, be the basis of an admission on the cheque Exhibit A.
With the informant of the affidavit being alien there is therefore no basis or foundation to the facts heavily depended upon by the appellant. The cheque exhibit A cannot be supported with the facts deposed in the affidavit. Rather, the said document stands on its own and has no bearing as there is no fact to explain or expatiate on its use and purpose. I am again mindful however that Robert Emukpoerno Esq., signed the motion on the face of it as the plaintiffs’ solicitor. Those not with standing, facts are contained in an affidavit and should not be sought for in a relief. The facts on the affidavit are to be sufficient to sustain the prayers. Failure to explain and connect E. Robert Emukpoemo Esq., to the relief sought for, should not be the business of the court whose duty is not to conduct a Party’s ease to the detriment of the other party; it must remain an impartial umpire.
The law is trite and needless to emphasize that the court is not to speculate and make assumptions as that would amount to straying on a frolic of its own. The affidavit upon which the appellant is firmly grounded is totally without substance and has no legal effect. The cheque Exhibit A in question cannot amount to an admission by any stretch of imagination as grossly misconceived by the learned appellant’s counsel. The submissions made in respect of the said Exhibit A, therefore are of no relevance.
On the question of discretion, the law is trite that in an exercise of such, the court must be judicious and judicial. Contrary to the submission of learned appellant’s counsel, the lower court did not take into consideration irrelevant matters as alleged. Rather, the relevant matters were duly considered and subsequent to a just decision arrived at by the court.
The appellant’s two issues are therefore resolved against it and in favour of the respondent.
On the totality of this appeal, the appellant clearly could not have sustained its application for judgment brought pursuant to order 29 rule 6 of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules Lagos State 1994, based on the alleged admission, both on the 1st defendant/respondent’s statement of defence and/or the cheque exhibit A. The court below therefore did exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously in the determination of the application and thereby refusing and thus dismissing same.
The appeal is therefore totally devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is further condemned to costs of N50, 000= to the respondent.
Other Citations:(2009)LCN/3104(CA)
