Home » Nigerian Cases » Court of Appeal » Marius Ameh (ASP) V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009) LLJR-CA

Marius Ameh (ASP) V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009) LLJR-CA

Marius Ameh (Asp) V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009)

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MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A.

This is an Appeal against the decision of the High Court of Justice of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in Charge No. FCT/ABJ/CR/66/2005 contained in the Judgment of Honourable Justice J. Oniyangi dated on 16th day of January 2007 in which the Appellant as accused was convicted and sentenced on Counts 1 and 2 to two (2) years Imprisonment which conviction and sentence were to run concurrently without an option of a fine.

FACTS:

The Appellant was before now a Police Officer of the Rank of assistant Superintendent to the Criminal Security and Intelligence Bureau, Force Headquarters, Abuja. He was enlisted into the Nigerian Police force on 1st September 1972.

Sometime between April and May 2005, a case of Criminal Conspiracy, theft and receiving of a table drawer belonging to a company known as Chigo International A.C. was assigned to the Appellant for investigation. In the course of that investigation, the Appellant arrested and detained one Sunday Waksu.

The Appellant was arrested by officers of the Independent Practices Commission (ICPC) on an allegation of demanding and receiving the sum of N5, 000.00 gratification for the purpose of releasing the suspect on bail. The Appellant was arraigned before the High Court Abuja on 31st May on a three (3) count charge contrary to Section 8 (i) (A) and punishable under Section 8 (i) (B) (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. The prosecution called seven (7) witnesses and closed its case. The Appellant gave evidence on his own behalf and did not call any other witness.

At the close of the Appellant’s defence the prosecution sought leave to amend the charges against the accused by adding additional three (3) counts thereby making the charge a six (6) count charge.

The allegations in the amended charge were that Appellant demanded and received gratification to release the suspect on bail and also that he solicited and received the said sum of N5, 000.00 as transportation money to recover exhibits. At the close of the case of the parties, the parties adopted their written addresses on 15th November, 2006 and on 16th January, 2007 the judgment was delivered and the trial judge convicted the Appellant and sentenced him to a term of two years imprisonment on counts 1 and 2. Appellant was discharged on counts 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Being dissatisfied the Appellant filed the Notice of Appeal dated 23rd January 2007 against his conviction and sentence.

On the day of hearing of this appeal, 21st day of May 2009, the Appellant through counsel adopted their Brief filed on 28/11/07 and deemed filed on 7/7/08 and urged the Court to allow the appeal.

The Respondent’s Brief was taken as adopted since counsel was absent even though aware of the date as he was in Court when hearing date was taken.

Their Brief was filed on 19/1/09 and deemed filed on 26/2/09 urging the Court to dismiss the appeal.

The GROUNDS OF APPEAL without the particulars are hereunder stated viz;-

  1. GROUND ONE:

The learned trial Judge erred in law in convicting the Appellant for the offences of corruptly asking and receiving gratification when the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

  1. GROUND TWO:

The learned trial Judge erred in law in convicting the Accused/Appellant for the offences of corruptly soliciting, demanding and receiving gratification when the said allegations were not proved.

  1. GROUNDTHREE:

The learned trial Judge erred in Law in convicting the Appellant on the prosecution’s evidence which is manifestly unreliable.

  1. GROUND FOUR:

The learned trial Judge erred in law in convicting the Accused/Appellant on a charge which counts were diagonally opposite and same occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

  1. GROUND FIVE:

The learned trial Judge misdirected himself in law in sentencing the Accused/Appellant to two years imprisonment without the option of fine.

  1. GROUND SIX:

That the judgment is unwarranted, unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

In the Appellant’s Brief were formulated five issues for determination which are viz:-

  1. Whether having regard to the evidence adduced by the prosecution and particularly that of PW4 and PW7 which clearly supports the case of the defence the learned trial Judge was right to have convicted the Appellant for the offences of corruptly asking and receiving gratification when the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether having regard to the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses particularly PW3, PW4 and PW7 the learned trial Judge was right in convicting the Appellant for the offences of corruptly soliciting, demanding and receiving gratification when the said allegations were not proved.

  1. Whether having regard to the fact that PW4 informed the Court that he does not understand English and that he only understands Hausa and he communicated in court in Hausa and his testimony was translated into English through an interpreter that the failure of the prosecution to lead evidence on what language PW4 used in communicating with the accused/Appellant when the Appellant solicited the sum of N10, 000.00 (Ten Thousand Naira) from him before releasing him on bail renders the prosecution evidence manifestly unreliable.
  2. Whether the prosecution could charge the accused person for offences which were diagonally opposite.
  3. Whether the trial Judge could sentence the Appellant to two years imprisonment without the option of fine having regard to the fact that the Accused/Appellant was a first offender and had no record of previous conviction at the time he was convicted by the trial Court.

The Respondent had two issues couched in their Brief which are as follows:-

  1. Whether from the facts and evidence tendered at the trial, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant.
  2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in convicting and sentencing the Appellant to two years imprisonment on counts one (1) and two (2) without an option of fine.

I shall for ease of reference use the issues as couched by the Respondent.

ISSUE NO.1:

Whether from the facts and evidence tendered before the trial court, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant.

Learned Senior Advocate, S. I. Ameh stated that the gravamen of the prosecution’s case is that the accused in the course of his duties as a public officer corruptly solicited, demanded and received gratification with the purpose of releasing Yohanna B. Waksu on bail. That the evidence adduced by the prosecution witness in their evidence in Chief and under cross-examination did not disclose these offences and serious doubts attended the case of the prosecution. He referred to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

He further stated that the trial Judge did not consider the submission of the defence counsel as to whether the bail of PW2, Yohanna B. Waksu was an issue as to tally with the prosecution’s case that Appellant corruptly asked for the sum of N10, 000.00 gratifications for himself. That the circumstances created a doubt as to whether the sum of N10, 000.00 was demanded by the appellant in lieu of transportation expenses incurred during investigation or whether the money was demanded by the appellant in lieu of bail for PW2. That the Appellant had stated in his statement that he told Yohanna that since he is in possession of the properties and refused to disclose this fact which made him Appellant spend money on transportation to Jos and other places he had to refund him for that transportation and while in evidence before the court, the Appellant had stated that it was PW4 (Waksu Waje) who promised to refund him his transportation expenses. That these minor contradictions in the statement of the appellant do not render Appellant’s stand incorrect nor does that release the prosecution of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. He went on to contend that assuming but not conceding that the Appellant was telling lies the mere fact that a person told lies is by itself not sufficient to convict him of an offence unconnected with mendacity nor does the fact of accused telling lies relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He cited Okpele v. State (1971) 1 All NLR 1 at 5; Haruna &. anor v. Police (1967) NMLR 145 at 153; Ogidi v. The State (2005) 1 SCNJ 67 at 71.

See also  Chief Eyo Ogboni & Ors V. Chief Ojah Ojah & Ors (1988) LLJR-CA

S. I. Ameh SAN submitted that the prosecution did not cross examine the Appellant as to the propriety of receiving N5, 000.00 to offset his travelling expenses. That this vital omission or gap in the evidence of the prosecution left open the possibility that the Appellant’s defence might be true.

Learned senior Advocate stated on that prosecution did not lead any evidence to show what language PW4 used in communicating with the Appellant on the 13th and 16th May, 2005. Also prosecution did not lead any evidence to show what language PW3 (Hafia Mohammed) spoke on the 16th June, 2005 in the presence of PW4. That the learned trial Judge failed and or omitted to consider in its judgment this material issue of the evidence for the defence. He referred to Section 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He submitted that if the learned trial Judge had considered this material part of the evidence of the defence the result would have been an acquittal for the Appellant. That this doubts that arose as to the language spoken by PW3 in the accuser’s office co- related to the fact that PW4 did not understand English, the doubt should be resolved in favour of the Accused. He cited Abdu’ Dan sarki Noma v. Zaria Native Authority (1963) NNLR 97.

Mr. Ameh SAN contended that the evidence led by the prosecution did not establish any of the allegations in counts 3 and 4 and contradicts materially thereby making the whole case of the prosecution unreliable, speculative and an attempt to secure conviction by all means in negation of all known principles of criminal jurisprudence. He cited Ikemson v. The State (1998) 1 ACLR 80 at 90.

Learned counsel said there were doubts as to the facts and so the conviction cannot be sustained. He referred to Edu v. Commissioner of Police 14 WACA 163 at 167; Ekechukwu v. Commissioner of Police (1966) NMLR 96.

In response, learned counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Bassi submitted that the Respondent did prove the offence of accepting the gratification against the Appellant by tendering the written statement of the Appellant which was a confessional statement voluntarily written by the Accused/Appellant himself. He cited Uluebeka v. State (2000) 7 NWLR (pt. 665) at 428.

That where as in this case the confessional statement of an accused is voluntary and properly admitted the fact that the same is retracted is immaterial? He cited Uluebeka v. State (supra; Ikpo v. State (1995) 9 NWLR (pt. 421) 540 para G- H. That the evidence of PW7, Inspector Emmanuel Ogbileba effectively rested any doubts that might have existed on whether Appellant demanded for gratification in the discharge of his official duties.

Learned counsel for the respondent said that the written statement of the Appellant as contained in Exhibit P3 that he demanded for the N10, 000.00 from Waje Waksu to defray for the expenses he incurred in the course of his investigation of the matter was in total contrast and in conflict with his sworn testimony in court when he said the money was a pledge made to him (the Appellant) by Waje Waksu (PE4) to the effect that if he eventually finds out that the table drawer was stolen by the son Sunda Waksu, he (PW4) would bear the expenses of Appellant’s movements. Learned counsel for the Respondent said this later explanation is not tenable but an afterthought. He further stated that the Appellant’s statement to the ICPC dated 16/5/05 amounts to a voluntary confessional statement, showing and cogent enough to ground a conviction of the Appellant. He referred Idowu v. State (1998) 13 NWLR (pt. 582) 399; Effong v. State (1998) 8 QLE (pt. 562) 371- 372.

The six Counts of the amended Charge are as follows:-

COUNT 1:

That you Marius Ameh (M) on or about 13th day of May, 2005 at Force Headquarters, Abuja, being an Investigating Police Officer (IPO) did corruptly ask for the sum of N10, 000.00 (Ten Thousand Naira) gratification for yourself from Mr. Waksu Waje in the discharge of your official duties in order to release his son on Police bail and you thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 8 (i) (a) and punishable under section 8 (i) (b) (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 2000.

COUNT 2:

That you Marius Ameh (M) on or about 16th day of May, 2005, at force Headquarters, Abuja being an Investigating Police Officer (IPO) did receive the sum of N5, 000.00 (Five Thousand Naira) for yourself from Mr. Yohanna “8” Waksu in the discharge of your official duties, for releasing him from detention and you thereby committed an offence contrary to section 10 (a) (i) and punishable under Section 10 (a) (ii) of the corrupt Practices and Other related Offences Act 2000.

COUNT 3:

That you Marius Ameh (M) on or about 16th day of May 2005, at Force Headquarters, Abuja being an Investigating Police Officer (IPO) did agree to receive the sum of N5, 000.00 (Five Thousand Naira) for yourself from Waksu Waje in the discharge of your official duties, as transportation money for a trip undertaken by you to recover exhibit and you thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 10 (a) (i) and punishable under section 10 (a) (ii) of the corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.

COUNT 4:

That you Marius Ameh (M) on or about 16th day of May 2005, at Force Headquarters, Abuja being an Investigating Police Officer (IPO) did agree to receive the sum of N5, 000.00 (Five Thousand Naira)for yourself from Waksu Waje in the discharge of your official duties, as transportation money for a trip undertaken by you to recover exhibit and you thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 10 (a) and punishable under section (a) (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.

COUNT 5:

That you Marius Ameh (M) on or about 13th of May 2005, at force Headquarters Abuja, being a public Officer did solicit the sum of N10, 000.00 (Ten Thousand Naira) gratification from Waksu Waje as an inducement to release his son on bail and you thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 18 (b) and punishable under Section 18 (d) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.

COUNT 6:

That you Marius Ameh (M) on or about 18th day of May 2005, at force Headquarters Abuja being a public Officer did accept the sum of N5, 000.00 (Five Thousand Naira) gratification from Waksu Waje as an inducement for releasing his son on bail and you thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 18 (b) and punishable under Section 18 (d) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.

The learned trial Judge in his judgment stated:

“In my view; it is not in dispute that the accused was investigating the complaint of a table drawer. While in that capacity, he arrested Sunday Waksu and Yohanna Waksu. PW4, their father visited the Police Station to take on bail his children. On the face of it going by the evidence of the accused, there was a discussion as to payment of money ie. Transport expenses incurred by the accused in the course of investigating the allegation against Sunday Waksu and Yohanna Waksu, Pw2. The act of PW2 and PW4 reporting to a Lawyer who caused a petition, Exhibit P5 to be written to ICPC complaining of a demand for N10, 000.00 and coupled with the indisputable fact that Sunday and Yohanna were detained to me is a more convincing story of a demand by the accused Exhibit P5 talks of a demand of N10, 000.00. PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 gave evidence on the sum of N10, 000.00. The accused’s defence is on N10, 000.00 but according to him was to offset his travelling expenses. Also PW7 testified to the fact that the accused borrowed N10, 000.00 from him to solve domestic financial problems against the testimony of the accused that the money was for travelling expenses while on investigation. This piece of evidence makes the sum of N10, 000.00 common. If Sunday Waksu, Yohanna Waksu were not detained, there would be no need for the visit of PW4, Waje Waksu. Also, if there is no such request, there would be no need for PW2 and PW4 to report the Accused to the counsel which led to the writing and presentation of Exhibit P5 (the petition to ICPC). In the circumstance of the foregoing piece of evidence I hold that the accused demanded for the sum of N10, 000.00 from Waksu Waje for himself. This story that the father of the detainee promised to offset his travelling expenses is not only unreasonable but unbelievable in the circumstance.

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On the next ingredient that the N10, 000.00 was asked for by the accused in the course of performing his official duties for him to release on bail the son of Waksu Waje.

The visit of PW4 to the Police station and coming in contact with the accused was to request for bail of his children. This request was never disputed by the accused. The only defence of the accused is that he did not demand but that PW4 offered to offset his traveling expenses in the cause of investigating the alleged complaint against his sons. At the point of this discussion, the accused is still investigating the alleged offence and that both Sunday and Yohanna were under arrest. The evidence of the accused that his Organization does not provide investigations with money to travel thereby subjecting relations of detainees to sponsoring the journey or journeys of investigations in legally not acceptable and unrealistic. lf the accused said that PW4 asserted and insisted that his children would not involve themselves in criminal activities, that should not be a leeway for the accused to ask PW4 to sponsor his trip while on investigation. Again, the evidence of PW3 and PW5 who went with PW2 and PW4 to meet the accused and pleaded and gave Exhibit P5 to the accused brings the confirmation of the story of PW2 and Pw4 that the accused asked for the said money more so when at that time Sunday Waksu was still in custody. Another point to note is the testimony of PW4 when he said he told the accused he had no money but if he could release PW2 Yohanna, they would be able to bring the money. This is not disputed. If this is joined with the event that led to the coming into existence of Exhibit PWS (the petition) one would be left with no doubt than to come to the conclusion based on foregoing fact that the accused demanded for the sum of N10, 000.00 for the bail of the son of Waksu Waje. Accordingly, I hold that the prosecution has proved this ingredient against the accused. By this token I hold that the story of the accused cannot be believed if compared with the evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4 and Pw5 and Exhibit P5. I therefore come to the conclusion that the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt all the ingredients of the offence under Section 8(i) (a) beyond any doubt against the accused and I find him guilty as charged and punishable under Section 8(i) (b) (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000”.

In respect to Count 2 the learned trial judge said:-

“Under this provision (section 10 (a) (ii) of the corrupt Practices And Related Offences Act 2000), the ingredient the Prosecution should establish in order to secure a conviction are:

(i) That the accused person received or obtained any benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person.

(ii) That the asking was for anything already done or omitted to be done or to be afterwards done or omitted to be done or favour or disfavour to be afterwards shown to any person by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any matter.

On the first ingredient, the question is whether the accused received the sum of N5, 000.00 for himself or for any other persons…

The defence of the accused is that the N5, 000.00 brought was in fulfillment of the pledge of PW4 that he would offset any expenses incurred by him in the course of investigating the case for which Sunday Waksu and PW2 were arrested and detained. The money was to offset partly the N10, 000.00 he borrowed from PW7, Inspector Ogbuleba, when proceeding to Kaduna and Plateau States respectively for investigation. The contradicting nature of the evidence of the accused in Court and his statement to the Police wherein one breath he said he asked Yohanna to refund and in evidence in Court he said PW4 offered to offset his expenses weakens the strength of the evidence of the accused. I therefore hold that the accused received the sum of N5, 000.00 from Waksu for himself and for his own benefit. The subsequent release of PW2 and their mission to a lawyer’s chambers, the petition to ICPC and the subsequent return to the accused and the giving of the

N5, 000.00 to the accused while Sunday Waksu was still in detention established the fact that the accused asked for the money to perform his official duty as a Policeman in releasing the son of PW4 on bail. The story by the accused that the money was placed on the table in debunked by his own testimony that he asked PW7 to pick or give the money to PW7, Inspector Ogbuleba to offset part of the N10, 000.00 he borrowed from PW7. It follows that he gave out what he had taken possession of. He had exercised his right of possession and ownership over the said N5, 000.00… The Prosecution has therefore proved the ingredients of this offence under count two against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and I find him guilty and convicted as charged under Section 10 (a) (i) and punishable under Section 10 (a) (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000”.

The learned trial Judge struck out counts 3 – 6 on the basis that they were duplications of counts 1 and 2 earlier dealt with.

Having considered the findings and evaluation of the learned trial judge and having gone into the record and perused the evidence myself, it is difficult to find any route to disturb those findings and conclusions of the Appellant as accused had lied is without question or doubt.

Even though a man may lie because he is guilty, he may just as well lie because he is stupid or afraid or both and whether he is guilty or not. It has never been the law that the mere fact that a person told lies is by itself sufficient to convict him of an offence unconnected with him, nor does the fact that an accused person told lies relieve the prosecution of its duty of proving the guilt of an accused of the offence charged beyond all reasonable doubt. Per Oguntade JSC in Ogidi v. The State (2005) 5 NWLR (pt. 918) 286 at 318; Haruna v. Police (1967) NMLR 145.

See also  Alh. Bello Usman & Anor V. The State (2005) LLJR-CA

It is settled that the mere fact that a person told lies is by itself not sufficient to convict him of an offence unconnected with mendacity nor does the fact that an accused person has told lies relieve the prosecution of its duty of proving the guilt of the accused of the offence charged beyond reasonable doubt. See Akpene v. The state (1971) NSCC 1 (SC).

In the case in hand just as the learned trial Court found the accused/appellant in his statement to the police said the N5, 000.00 was for his transport expenses in the investigation, in court he said the PW4 had pledged to give him the money so that the clearance of his sons of culpability of the alleged crime could be facilitated by trips needed in the course of the investigation. Also the Appellant said in Court that he had borrowed the money he used in the trips during his investigation from PW7, Inspector Ogbuleba. That witness, PW7 had said he had lent money to the appellant earlier for appellant to solve some personal problems. Appellant did not give any cogent reasons for the inconsistency nor challenged the version proffered by PW7 and so this court just like the one below had no option but to regard the evidence of Appellant as unreliable. I place reliance on Onubogu & anor. V. The state (1974) 9 NSCC 358.

It is difficult to appreciate the trend of thought of the learned Senior Advocate on the matter of the language of communication between PW4, an illiterate who needed to be interpreted to in court in English language and the Appellant and also PW3 between the 13th and 16th May 2005. Learned counsel, S. I. Ameh SAN wants a doubt created on account as to what language was used between PW4 and Appellant. I see no doubt in this regard as to what transpired between PW4 and Appellant since the Appellant himself had no difficulty understanding the PW4 whom he earlier said pledged without prompting to pay N10, 000.00 to offset the transport fares that would be incurred by the Appellant in the course of investigation through which the innocence of his two sons Sunday and Yohanna would be proved. The Appellant did not raise this matter of a possible misunderstanding in the language used between him, PW4 and PW3 and therefore the learned Senior Advocate bringing the possible or proposed doubt into focus is neither here nor there since the address or submission of counsel cannot acquire the status of proof nor be evidence upon which probative weight or value could be ascribed. I refer to Mains Ventures Ltd. v. Petroplast Ind. Ltd. (2000) 4 NWLR (pt. 651) 151; Niger Construction Ltd. v. Okugbeni (1987) 4 NWLR (pt. 67) 787.

From the foregoing it is safe to say that from the facts and evidence tendered before the trial Court, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant. Therefore the Issue NO.1 is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.

ISSUE NO.2:

Whether the learned trial Judge was right in convicting the Appellant on Counts one (l) and two (2) without the option of a fine.

Mr. Ameh SAN contended that Section 20 of the corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 prescribes for payment of fine of not less than five times the sum of the value of the gratification which is the subject matter of offence where such gratification is capable of being valued or is of a pecuniary nature of N10, 000.00 (Ten thousand naira) whichever is higher. That a perusal of Section 20 of the Act makes it mandatory as the word “SHALL” is used in the said Section 20.

In response, Mr. Bassi for the Respondent said the option of a fine is always at the discretion of the Judge more so where the punishment section does not provide for an option of a fine and therefore cannot form the basis of an appeal. That Section 8 (i) (b) (ii) of the corrupt Practices and Other related Offences act does not provide for an option of a fine as alternative to sentencing to a term of imprisonment. That the same goes for section 10 (a) (I) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, the section under which the appellant was charged, tried, convicted and sentenced. He cited Apamadari v. State (1997) 3 NWLR (pt. 453) 304.

That the trial court was right when it exercised its discretion by sentencing the accused to two (2) years imprisonment without an option of a fine. That there is no duty imposed on the trial court by the statute to impose an option of fine.

The position of the Appellant in this issue is not easy to follow including the introduction of Section 20 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences act. This is because the accused/appellant was charged, convicted and sentenced under Sections 8 (i) (a) and 8 (i) (b) and 10 (a) (i) and (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 which provided for imprisonment of seven (7) years and was silent on the issue of an option of fine. When it is so what is called up is the exercise of the discretionary powers of court. As was held by this court in Apamadari v. The State (1997) 3 NWLR (pt. 493) 304, when this court stated:

“The position of the law is that where the statute or section of the law creating or defining the offence expressly describes that there is no option of fine, the court cannot impose fine. Where however, the statute is silent, even if it only mentions imprisonment and is silent on the fine, the courts have discretion to impose fine a in lieu of imprisonment”.

The above clearly shows what has happened in this case and the discretion the learned trial judge exercised by sentencing the accused/applicant to two years imprisonment without an option of fine. That exercise of discretion I see no reason to disturb and the wishful thinking of learned counsel for the Appellant would not change that course of events which the Court below was entitled to follow. See Okene v, Nlem (1992) 4 NWLR (234) 132; Omadiale v. Adajeroh (1976) 12 SC 87 at 96; NLNG v. African Development Insurance Co. Ltd. (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 426) 677 at 694.

This Issue NO.2 is resolved against the Appellant in view of the circumstances and on that note seeing nothing upon which to hang this appeal which lacks merit, I dismiss it. I affirm the decision of the learned trial Judge including the orders made in convicting and sentencing the accused/appellant to two years imprisonment in counts 1 and 2 respectively.

I also affirm the lower court’s striking out of Counts 3, 4, 5 and 6 for duplication and the subsequent discharge of the Appellant thereby.


Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3359(CA)

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