Abdullahi Mohammed Iyaka V. Sani Chindo & Ors. (2010)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A,
This appeal is against the decision of the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) sitting in Gusau. Abdullahi Mohammed Iyaka, the Appellant herein was the candidate of the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) while Sani Chindo, the 1st Respondent herein was the candidate of All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), the 2nd Respondent, for the election of member representing Gummi 1 State Constituency in the Zamfara State House of Assembly. The said election which took place on 14th April, 2007 was conducted by the 3rd Respondent who is statutorily charged with the conduct of the election through it’s agents – 4th Respondent inclusive among others. The 3rd and 4th Respondents declared and returned the 1st Respondent as the winner of the election.
Dissatisfied with the return and declaration of the 1st Respondent, the Appellant filed a petition before the Tribunal, challenging the said return and declaration of the 1st Respondent as the winner, on the ground of disqualification by reason of non resignation of his appointment as a Staff of Gummi Local Government Council, at least 30 days before the election.
All the Respondents opposed the petition and filed diverse court processes in respect thereof. After the disposal of all preliminary issues raised during the hearing, close of pleadings and at the pre-trial hearing session, it was agreed that the only issue for trial is whether or not, the 1st Respondent was disqualified from participating as a contestant in the said election, by reason of failure to resign his appointment with the Gummi Local Government; 30 days before the election as provided by law.
During the hearing before the Tribunal all the parties dispensed with oral testimonies of witnesses. The Appellant, 1st and 2nd Respondents tendered documents, which were admitted into evidence without objection. Exhibits A, B and C were duly admitted and marked accordingly. Learned counsel for the parties with the exception of the learned counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents, filed their written addresses after the close of hearing. In its judgment delivered on 17th July, 2007 the Tribunal found no merit in the petition and accordingly dismissed it.
Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision, the Appellant appealed to this Court. The notice of appeal contained two grounds of appeal. Briefs of argument were duly filed and exchanged. Two issues were formulated in the Appellant’s brief for the determination of this appeal. They are:
“(a) Whether a serious miscarriage of justice was not occasioned when the trial Judges discountenanced petitioners reply on point of law that any duly authorized public officer can certify documents.
(b) Whether the judgment of the Tribunal can stand when its entire weight is rested on a document which offends Sections 91(3) and Section 11(1) of the Evidence Act, it not being a certified true copy as required by law.”
The 1st and 2nd Respondents also distilled the following two issues for consideration and determination in this appeal.
“(a) Whether the Tribunal below properly discountenanced Exhibits A and B admitted at the instance of the Appellant.
(b) Whether the Tribunal below was right in admitting and placing reliance on Exhibit C as evidence that the 1st responder did resign or retired for his employment with Gummi Local Government Council least 30 days before the election of 14/4/07. (sic).”
Similarly, the 3rd and 4th Respondents framed two issues in their brief for the determination of this appeal. They are:-
“A. Whether the Tribunal below has properly discountenanced Exhibits A and B admitted at the instance of the petitioner (now appellant) in proof of his ground of appeal above, (sic)
B. Whether the Tribunal below was right in admitting and relying on Exhibit C as evidence that the 1st respondent has resigned from the employment of Gummi Local government Council 30 days before Election as stipulated by law, (sic)
In the course of hearing of this appeal and on 2nd July, 2009 to be precise, this Court observed that the date of declaration of the result of the election was not stated in the petition. The Court then asked the learned counsel for the parties to respond to this observation. Both Dr Ali, learned counsel for the Appellant and Shaka Esq., learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents were ad idem on the fact that the result of the election in question was declared on 14th April, 2007. With this development, the Court suo motu raised the issue of competence of the petition before the Tribunal and subsequently, the instant appeal. The Court accordingly directed the learned counsel for the parties to file written addresses in respect of the point which bordered on jurisdiction. Thereafter on 10th July, 2009, learned counsel for the Appellant filed a process titled, “Address in support of list of additional authorities dated 25/06/09 for the Appellant’s brief dated 26/09/2007.” Paragraphs 3 – 4 at pages 6 -10 of the said written address contained the arguments/submissions of Appellant’s counsel, in respect of the issue raised suo motu by the Court. The 1st- 4th Respondents did not file their respective written addresses on the ground that they were not served with Appellant’s written address.
It is trite that the issue of jurisdiction is crucial, fundamental and a threshold issue. It is the heartbeat of the adjudication process. Thus, a proceeding commenced or continued without jurisdiction is futility personified and failure dignified, because it is null and void ab initio. The matter must be initiated by due process of law and sustained therewith by the fulfillment of any condition precedent in relation thereto. Indeed, that is why the issue is capable of being raised at any stage of the proceeding and even on appeal, by either of the parties or suo motu by the Court. See SHOLA V. AJIBOYE (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 352) 506; OGBEBOR V. DANJUMA (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 403 and ELABANJO V. DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76. Again, once the issue crops up, it must be addressed immediately and disposed of timeously.
As stated in paragraphs 3. 2. 1 of Appellant’s afore-described written address, the central issue here is:
“Whether the date of the declaration of an election result is inclusive in the computation of the thirty (30) days within which to present an election petition by virtue of the provision of Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006.
Appellant’s learned counsel, brilliantly and commendably well too, examined the two sides of the divide – for and against on the point in issue. He strongly subscribed to the position that the date of declaration of the election result, should not be included in the computation of the thirty days within which an election petition should be presented. He urged us to disregard the other position which maintained that the date of the declaration of the result, should be included in the computation of the thirty days stipulated by the electoral law for the presentation of an election petition. He made copious references to case law authorities on both sides of the equation, with weighty arguments and amplified submissions postulated thereon.
In conclusion, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant, that we should exclude the date of declaration of the result of the election from the time allowed by Section 141 (supra) for the presentation of the petition. It was further contended that recourse should be had to the Interpretation Act, as it was done in YUSUFU V. OBASANJO (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 846) 554 and a host of other case law authorities. We were then urged to hold that the Appellant’s petition filed on 14th May, 2007 when the result of the election was declared on 14th April, 2007 was proper and competently presented before the Tribunal since it was filed within time.
As previously stated above, we do not have the positions of the 1st – 4th Respondents in this regard, as they were unable to file their respective written addresses for whatever reasons – valid or otherwise.
Limitation law is not strange or unusual in our body of laws. Indeed, limitation legislations prescribe imitational durations or periods for different categories of cases. Thus, invariably, certain classes of cases cannot be brought after the expiration of the time fixed and upon accrual of the cause of action. Electoral laws advocate expeditious adjudication of election petition and mostly without condoning delay or tardiness of whatever sort. All these and more are geared towards ensuring that the electorates and the contestants are not left on the lurch or tenterhooks for too long, regarding the ascertainment of the outcome of the election in which they participated by voting for their candidates.
Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 states: –
“An election petition under this Act shall be presented within thirty (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared.
To my understanding, the operative words in this provision are: “shall”, “within”, “days”, “from” and “the date”. The word “shall” therein is imperative or mandatory and not merely permissive. The word “within” when it is used as a preposition means, inside the limits of something such as period or place, before a particular period of time has passed or during a particular period of time. In OGBEBOR V. DANJUMA (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 403/432, while construing Section 132 of the Electoral Act, 2002 which is in pan materia with Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 Augie, JCA enunciated thus: –
“To my mind, the operative words therein are “shall be presented within (30) thirty days.” When used relative to time the word “within” has been defined variously as meaning any time before; at or before; at the end of; before the expiration of; not beyond, not exceeding; and not later than…”
The word “day”denotes a period of twenty four hours or part thereof. For instance we tend to ask: how long is your working day or say that the school day ends at 1.00 p.m. “Date” means the day when an event happened or will happen. See Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, P. 422. For instance, the statement on a letter giving the day of the month and year. We talk of date of trial, return date or filing date. We also ask: what is your date of birth? What is today’s date? Thus, “day” is not “date” and date is not day.
The word “from” indicates outward movement or distance in relation to a particular point in time, space and so on. It denotes capability of commencement from a specific point in time or place. See IKHARAIALE V. OKOH (2009) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1154) 1
In the instant case, there is no dispute whatsoever among the parties that the election took place and the result was declared on the same date, that is, 14th April, 2007. Furthermore, it is common ground that the petition in question which gave rise to the instant appeal was filed by the Appellant on 14th May, 2007. The strong contention centred squarely on whether 14th April, 2007 should be included or excluded in the computation of the thirty days prescribed by Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 for the presentation of an election petition.
It is a golden cum cardinal principle of interpretation that where in their plain, literal, ordinary grammatical meaning, the wordings of a provision in a statute are clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to them without the need of having recourse to any internal or external aid of construction. The Courts have the bounden duty of interpreting the words used by the lawmakers in the manner in which they are used, without adding or subtracting therefrom. It could be seen, that the section under consideration, did not say thirty days from the day of declaration of result. It provides that an election petition “shall be presented within thirty (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared.” Thus, the instant case is one of such instances when there is no need for a fallback position, such as reference or recourse being had to aids of construction, statutory or otherwise. See ATT. GEN. ONDO STATE V. ATT. GEN. EKITI STATE (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 743) 706.
In some recent decisions of this Court, the position has been restated that by virtue of Section 1 of the Interpretation Act, the said Act shall apply to provisions of any enactment, except in so far as the contrary intention appears in the Act or the enactment in question. Furthermore, that by virtue of Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006, an election petition filed under the Electoral Act, shall be presented within thirty days from the date the result of the election is declared. See KUMALIA V. SHERIFF (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 420; AGBAI V. INEC (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1108) 417; AKUME V. LIM (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 490; SHA’ABAN & ANOR. V. SAMBO & ORS. Unreported Appeal No. CA/K/EP/GOV/22/2008 delivered on 6th March, 2009 and IKHARAIALE V. OKOH (2009) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1154) 1.
Having obtained guidance and bindingness from the above cited decisions of this Court, I have duly considered and construed the provision of Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006. I found the provision to be plain, clear, straight-forward and unambiguous. With that state of affairs, I do not see the need to look elsewhere in a bid to construe the same. I therefore find no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the thirty days allowed by the electoral law for the presentation of an election petition, starts to run from the date of declaration of the election result and where the result of the election was declared on 14th April, 2007, the last day for filing of the petition by the necessary intendment of Section 141 (supra) is 13th May, 2007. The petition herein was filed on 14th May, 2007. It was thus filed out of time having been filed on the 31st day after the date of declaration of election result. It was a day too late and with resultant fatal consequences. It is not the duration of the delay but the effect that matters most.
It is trite that a trial before a court or tribunal, however well conducted is to no avail if the court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction.
On the whole and in the final analysis, it is my humble viewpoint that the petition has been caught by the bug of limitation law embedded in Section 141 (supra) and it is thus statute barred. The tribunal accordingly lacked competence to entertain, talk less of determining the petition. The entire proceeding thereon is therefore a nullity which is void ab initio and I so declare it. Since the entire proceedings before the Tribunal has been declared a nullity, I accordingly set it aside. It therefore becomes a mere academic exercise if further consideration is given to all other issues raised in this appeal. I do not intend to embark on such a fruitless journey.
In the given premises, this appeal is incompetent having arisen from an incompetent petition. The petition herein filed in this matter on 14th May, 2007 is accordingly struck out. The return of the 1st Respondent is hereby confirmed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Other Citations: (2010)LCN/3522(CA)
