Abubakar Saidu Ainoko V. Hon. Yakubu Yunusa & Ors. (2008)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
OLUFUNLOLA OYELOLA ADEKEYE, J.C.A.
The appellant Abubakar Saidu Ainoko and the 1st Respondent Han. Yakubu Yunusa were ‘both candidates who contested with three others the election to the Kogi State House of Assembly for Igala-mela/Odolu State constituency, on Saturday the 14th of April, 2007. The appellant contested the election on the platform of the All Nigeria peoples party (ANPP) while the 1st respondent contested on the – platform of the People Democratic Party (PDP). The 1st Respondent was declared the winner of the election by the 2nd Respondent, Independent National Electoral Commission.
The appellant filed a petition at the Governorship/Legislative Houses Election Petition Tribunal holding at Lokoja on 15th of May, 2007. The appellant questioned the election of the 1st Respondent on grounds as follows:-
(a) That the election was invalid by reason of corrupt practices and non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act.
(b) That the 1st Respondent was not duly elected by majority of the lawful votes cast at the election.
The appellant consequently asked for reliefs as follows:-
(I) That it be determined that Ismaila Hussein, the 1st Respondent was not duly elected and that his election was void.
(ii) As a consequence of the above, an order for a fresh election in Igala Mela/Odolu constituency of the Kogi State House of Assembly on the 7th of June, 2007.
The 1st Respondent filed a conditional memorandum of appearance followed with a reply to the petition filed on the 21st of June, 2007. The 1st Respondent there and then indicated his intention to raise a preliminary objection at or before the hearing, to challenge the competence of the petition.
On the 10th of July the 1st Respondent filed a motion praying for an order to dismiss the petition for being incompetent. On the 19th of July, 2007 the application filed by the 1st Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the competence of the petition to which he annexed a certified True Copy of the declaration of Results of election Form EC8E(1) for the constituency. The application was heard by the Tribunal and on the 7th of August, 2007, a considered Ruling was delivered wherein the petition was dismissed for being incompetent having been filed out of time. Being aggrieved by the decision of the lower tribunal the petitioner now appellant appealed to this court by filing a notice of appeal with three grounds of appeal on the 27th of August 2007. At the time of the hearing of this appeal on the 24th of January, 2008, the appellant adopted and relied on the appellants brief filed on 17/9/07.
Three issues were distilled therein for determination as follows:-
(a) Whether the Tribunal was correct when it reached the conclusion that the date of the declaration of the election result was 14th instead of the 15th of April, 2007 in view of the petitioners counter affidavit and his protest that the result was declared on 15th in his presence and In the presence of others.
(b) Whether the Tribunal was correct when it refused to call oral evidence to resolve the conflict in the affidavit evidence of the parties
(e) Whether the tribunal was correct to have heard the motion without jurisdiction.
The 1st Respondent adopted and relied on the brief filed on 28/9/07 where two issues were formulated for determination by this court, as follows:-
(i) whether the tribunal was right when it held that the petition was filed out of time and therefore incompetent
(ii) Whether the Tribunal was right in entertaining the preliminary objection questioning the competence of the petition.
ISSUE NUMBER ONE
Whether the Tribunal was correct when it reached the conclusion that the date of the declaration of the election result was 14th instead of the 15th of April, 2007 in view of the petitioners counter affidavit and his protest that the result was declared on 15th in his presence and in the presence of others.
Mr. Okwute learned counsel for the appellant argued and submitted that the 1st Respondent filed a Certified True Copy of Form EC8E(1) which indicated the date of the declaration of result as 14th April, 2007, and Form EC8C(1) the summary of result at the ward level.
Whereas the date of the declaration of result was the 15th of April as mentioned in the petitioner’s counter affidavit which is the actual date of declaration of result in the presence of the petitioner and the other eye-witnesses. The petitioner relied on the declaration of result at the constituency final collation centre in his presence and the presence of other persons including the ANPP agent to hold that the result was declared on 15th April, 2007. The 2nd respondent INEC, refused to supply the petitioner/appellant with a Certified True Copy of form EC8E (1) when he applied for it and filed notice to produce which was served on the 2nd Respondent.
The Tribunal relied on the Form EC8E(1) supplied by the 2nd Respondent to the 1st Respondent. The petitioners counsel also protested that there was collusion as to the date by the 1st and 2nd Respondents to injure or defeat the objects of the petition, and that the petitioners Form EC8E(1) issued to ANPP agent at the constituency collusion centre be accepted. The learned counsel submitted that where a party to a suit withheld a piece of document which the petitioner intend to use in evidence against him and refused to produce the document on application and even when notice to produce under Section 98 of the Evidence Act had been served on him, the party will not be allowed to use the document in evidence against the party that applied for the document.
By virtue of Section 222 of the Evidence Act, when a party refuses to produce a document which he had been served notice to produce, he cannot afterwards use the document as evidence without the consent of the other party or the leave of the court. The effect of Section 222 of the Evidence Act is that you must either produce a document when it is called for or never. The learned counsel referred to the case of, Ayogu V Nnamani & Anor (2006) 8 NWLR (pt.981) pg 160 at 193. The Respondents did not obtain the consent of the petitioner/appellant or obtained leave from the Tribunal before using the document in the affidavit evidence.
Mr. Abalaka learned counsel for 1st Respondent replied that this issue relates to the correctness of the Tribunal’s decision that the appellants petition was filed out of time and therefore incompetent. By the provisions of Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006, an election petition must be presented within thirty days from the date the result is declared. The compliance according to paragraph 43(1) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act is very strict. Any petition presented outside the thirty days stipulated by the Section is statute barred and therefore incompetent. The election was held on the 14th of April, 2007. It is the date of declaration of the result that determines the commencement of the thirty days period for the presentation of the petition. The declaration was made by the Returning Officer in a specially designed form called Declaration of Results of election (Form EC8E(1). It is submitted that the production of the form is conclusive proof of the declaration and its date. A Certified True Copy of the Declaration as date of Declaration is attached to the 1st Respondents Motion as Annexture. It is apparent from form EC8E(1) that the results of the election was declared on 14th of April, 2007. In the computation of the 30 days limited for presentation of petition, the date of declaration is excluded. In this case counting from the 15th of May, 2007, the 30 days lapsed on the 14th of April, 2007.
The petition was presented on the 31st day after the declaration and therefore clearly outside the statutory period stipulated by Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 and consequently it is statute-barred and incompetent. The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent cited cases- Balogun V Odumosu (1999) 2 NWLR (pt.592) pg 590, Otu V INEC Chibueze V Ibediro (1999) 3 NWLR (pt.594) pg 206 at pg 212 (1999) 5 NWLR (pt.602) pg 250.
The petitioner/appellant relied on the affidavit deposed to by one of the lawyers that declaration was made on the 15th of April, 2007 as against the 14th made on Form EC8E(1) based on mere assertion and speculation as neither of them was present at the declaration. The appellant submission predicated on Section 222 of the Evidence Act is misconceived. The Notice to produce relates to the trial which had not commenced at the time the 1st respondent moved his application. The Respondent issued Certified True Copy of the summary of Results Form ECBE to the appellant – it could not have withheld the declaration of result which bore the same date. The 1st Respondent is not the custodian of the declaration of result which is the 2nd Respondent. The 1st Respondent does not require the leave of the Tribunal or appellants consent to use the document. The 1st Respondent urged this court to resolve issue No. one in the affirmative.
ISSUE NUMBER TWO
Whether the Tribunal was correct when it refused to call oral evidence to resolve the conflict in the affidavit evidence of the parties.
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the presumption created by Section 125 Evidence Act is not a conclusive presumption which applies where collusion or fraud is suspected like this case .
Ordinarily where a document bearing a date has been proved, it is presumed to have been made on the day on which it bears the date. An independent proof of correctness may be required where collusion as to the date is suspected. Proof of collusion or fraud will be admitted to rebut the presumption under Section 125 of the Evidence Act.
In the preliminary objection the Tribunal failed to consider the affidavit evidence of the petitioner where the actual date of declaration of the result at the constituency final collation centre in the presence of the petitioner and other eye witnesses was stated. The presumption of withholding evidence under Section 149 of the Evidence Act is to be invoked. The learned counsel further submitted that it is settled law that when a court is faced with affidavit which are irreconcilable in conflict, the judge hearing the case should first hear oral evidence as the parties may call, in order to resolve the conflict properly. The Tribunal failed to call oral evidence to resolve the conflict and declined jurisdiction. The Tribunal heard the motion without jurisdiction contrary to paragraph 3(6) (c) and 7(d) of the Court Practice Direction. He cited the case of Ladipo V Oduyoye (2004) EPR (Pg.705 at pg 708
Uku & Ors V Okumagba & Ors (1974) 3 SC 35 at Pg 56, Eboh V Oki & Ors (1974) 1 SC Pg.179
Akinsete V Akindutire (1966) 1 All NLR pg 147, A-G Ondo State V A.G Ekitl State (2001) 9.10 SC 116
Mr. Abalaka – learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted on this issue that the appellant’s contention that there was an irreconcilable conflict in the affidavit of the parties to warrant a resort to oral evidence to resolve the conflict is misconceived and not well founded in law. The appellant attached a Certified True Copy of the Summary of Results Form EC8C to his petition. The summary of results was concluded and signed on 14th of April, 2007. The summary of Results Forms the basis of the declaration in Form EC8E(1). The learned counsel further submitted that it is now trite law that it is not every case of conflicting affidavits that the court has to resort to oral evidence to resolve the conflict in issue. The court can also rely on authentic documentary evidence at its disposal to resolve the conflict thereby obviating the need to call oral Evidence.
The learned counsel relied on the case of Bawa V Phenias (2007) 4 NWLR (pt.1024) pg 251 at page 267-268.
Further submitted that the Tribunal declined the appellant’s invitation to call oral evidence to resolve the conflict because there was enough and authentic documentary evidence at its disposal to resolve the conflict. By virtue of the provision of Section 114(1) of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption of authenticity in favour of the declaration of result form EC8E(1) which was attached to the 1stt Respondent motion as Annexture “A”.
The appellants submission predicated on Section 125 of the Evidence Act are completely misconceived. No issue of alteration of date in Form EC8E (1) arises in this case. This issue is urged to be resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.
ISSUE NUMBER THREE
Whether the tribunal was correct to have heard the motion without jurisdiction.
The learned counsel submitted on this issue that the hearing of objections in this matter was heard not at the pre-hearing or with the leave of the Tribunal or court and therefore it was heard without jurisdiction. The Tribunal in the exercise of its duty ought to comply strictly with the Electoral Act as it relates to the manner of presentation of defence to the petition, but also with the Court of Appeal Rules and the Practice Directions made by the President of the Court of Appeal pursuant to Section 285 of the 1999 Constitution. The learned counsel made reference to paragraph 3( 6)(c) and 7 (d) of the Election Tribunal or Court Practice Directions 2007, paragraph 26(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2006 as amended, and paragraph 6(1) of the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Direction 2007. The Practice Direction is part of the Electoral Act 2006 and should therefore be complied with strictly. Omeh V Okoro (1999) 8 NWLR (pt.615) pg 356 at pg 359, Engineer Nura V Alhaji Musa Yar’adua & Ors (2003) 16 NWLR (pt.847) pg 446 at 486.
The court is urged to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant and in sum allow the appeal and remit the petition for trial before the lower tribunal.
Mr. Abalaka learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the issue relates to the correctness or otherwise of the Tribunal’s decision to entertain the preliminary objection at or before the hearing of the petition. The challenge to the competence of the petition had been raised by the 1st Respondent at the earliest opportunity. The motions filed to challenge the competence of the petition based on the preliminary issues raised in the reply were already pending before the Tribunal at the time the pre-hearing session was conducted.
At the time the preliminary objection came up for hearing on 3/8/07 – the pre-hearing had not even commenced. The contention of the appellant that the preliminary objection was raised at the hearing contrary to the Practice Direction is misconceived. Paragraph 49(5) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act 2006 makes it imperative for the Tribunal to take preliminary objection before taking any further steps in the hearing of the petition. The learned counsel supported the foregoing submission with cases – Khalil V Yar’adua (2003) 16 NWLR (pt.847) Pg 446
Okonkwo V INEC (2004) 1 NWLR (pt.854) Pg 242 at pg 277, Daggash V Bulama (2004) 14 NWLR (pt.892) Pg 144
Obiekwe V Obi (2005) 10 NWLR (pt.932) P9 60 at Pg 76
The court is urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent finally dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the tribunal.
I have painstakingly considered the submission of counsel. The appellants filed three issues for the determination of this court in this appeal. The cruxial or germain issue is issue No. one which is to determine whether the election petition was presented outside the period limited by the Electoral Act 2006, and consequently makes it statute barred and incompetent. This being a fundamental issue of jurisdiction, the 1st Respondent upon filing a conditional appearance in the petition indicated an intention to raise a preliminary objection at or before the hearing to challenge the competence of the petition. On the 19th of July 2006 – the 1st Respondent filed another motion to raise a preliminary objection to the competence of the petition. The issue of jurisdiction is so fundamental that the adjudicating court should determine the issue first before embarking on any proceedings. If the court proceeds to hear a matter and it is later discovered that he has no jurisdiction in the matter all the proceedings however well-conducted, would amount to nothing and are a complete nullity. Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR Pg.341,Katto v. C.B.N. (1991) 9 NWLR (pt.214) pg 126
Buhari v. Obasanjo (2003) 17 NWLR (pt.850) pg 423
Before a court can exercise jurisdiction in respect of any matter it must:-
(a) Be properly constituted as regards members and qualification of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other
(b) The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction and
(c) The case comes by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
An election petition not presented within the time stipulated by the Electoral Act has obviously not fulfilled the condition precedent to adjudication and this lapse would obviously inhibit the tribunal from assuming jurisdiction in the matter. A.G Anambra State V A-G Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 09 692 , Madukolu V Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR pg 341
On hearing the application the lower tribunal held that:-
“In the light of the above it is our view that this Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the petition, the petitioner having presented his petition outside the prescribed time. This issue is resolved in favour of the -pt Respondent. Accordingly this petition is dismissed for failure to comply with Section 141 of the electoral Act 2006 as amended.”
Since the foregoing order is now being challenged in this appeal, I shall promptly examine the contents of Section 141 of the electoral Act 2006 which is the enabling statute for presenting an election petition.
Section 141 reads:-
“An election petition under this Act shall be presented within thirty days from the date the result of the election is declared.”
In the affidavit evidence before the Tribunal which is now evidence on Record before this court, there is no dispute about the election being held on the 14th of April, 2007. The bone of contention between the appellant and the 1st Respondent is the date of declaration of result of the election. The appellant put the date as the 15th of April, 2006 – the day after the election was held, and the 1st Respondent the 14th of April, 2002 – the day of the election.
The date is very significant as it is the date of declaration of the result that determines the commencement of the thirty days period for presentation of petition. This affidavit evidence of the parties created before the Tribunal an irreconcilable conflict. In ordinary parlance, a court of law called upon to resolve an issue of fact sought to be established by the conflicting affidavits should not resolve such issue merely on the conflicting affidavits but should hear oral evidence from the deponents and such other witnesses as the party may be advised to call. Attorney General Ondo State V Attorney General Ekiti State (2001) 9.10 SC 116, Falobi V Falobi (1966) 1 All NLR pg 117
In this appeal the printed Record discloses that the appellant attached to the counter affidavit a Certified True Copy of the summary of Results to his petition. Vide pages 16-17 of the Records.
The summary of result was compiled by the returning officer. The summary of Results was concluded and signed on the 14th of April, 2007. It is the summary of Results which forms the basis of the declaration of results in form EC8E(1). The form EC8E(1) is the form specially designed for the declaration of Results of election. A Certified True Copy of the Declaration of Results bearing the 14th of April, 2007 as the date of declaration is also attached to the Respondents motion.
The two documents duly certified which emanated from the custody of the Independent national electoral Commission by Section 73 of the Electoral Act were at the disposal of the tribunal together with the conflicting affidavit evidence. The Tribunal rightly relied on form EC8E (1) as none of the parties disputed that it did not come from proper custody or not issued by INEC. The allegation by the appellant is that both the 1st Respondent colluded to make it appear that the result of the election was declared on the 14th of April, 2007 whereas it was made on the 15th in the presence of the appellants and witnesses. There was gap of evidence to substantiate this allegation of collusion and fraud which being criminal in nature by virtue of Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act Cap 112 Laws of the Federation should be established beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant also raised the issue that the Tribunal or Respondent cannot rely on form EC8E(1) as INEC had failed to produce a copy to the appellant as petitioner when it was about to present his petition. The effect of Section 222 of the Evidence Act is that you must either produce a document when it is called for or never.
On the issue of notice to produce I have to say that a party on whom notice to produce is served is not under any obligation to produce the document. The service of the notice to produce only entitles the party serving the notice to adduce secondary evidence of the document in question by virtue of Section 98 of the Evidence Act. In other words, the service of a notice to produce a document does not relieve the person serving the notice of the burden of producing the document if he can or of proving its contents. Consequently the non-response to a notice to produce will not cause the court to invoke the presumption of withholding of evidence under Section 149(d) of the Evidence Act against the defaulting party. Buhari V Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (pt.910) pg 241, U.B.N. V Idris (1999) 7 NWLR (pt. 609) pg 105, Gbadamosi V Kabo Travels Ltd (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt.668) Pg 243 In the absence of any evidence to the contrary the presumption of regularity enures in favour of the two forms EC8E(1) and EC8C attached to the application before the lower court under Section 125 of the evidence Act. The lower Tribunal rightly exercised its discretion in favour of granting the application. This court shall rely on the premises that the result of the election was declared on the 14th of April according to form EC8E(1). Was the petition presented within the statutory period of 30 days? In determining whether or not an action is statute barred, it is important to determine first when time begins to run.
As parties have submitted earlier on in this judgment the day of the announcement of an election result in the prescribed mode is the common denominator in the issue of computing the time limit for filing a petition.
The day on which the election is announced is not inclusive in calculating time. Time begins to run on the day following the day of the happening of the event. If the last day of the time limited falls on a holiday the day following the holiday becomes the last day. The act or proceeding must be done or taken at latest on the last day of the limited time. The reason being that one of the most important provisions in all the laws relating to election petition Tribunals is essentially of time. In the case of Balogun v Odumosu (1999) 2 NWLR (pt. 592) Pg 590 at pg 597 – it was observed as follows:-
“The issue of time to complete filing of all processes relating to hearing and determination of an election petition was uppermost in the mind of the legislation. The enactment stretches itself further a field to do away with lardiness and waste of time and endeavoured to construct the time of doing a particular act within a time frame work. In other words, it is the intention of legislation that parties stick strictly to the time stated in the Decree.
The court could not aid anyone who decides to sleep only to wake up when it is too late.”
It is also noteworthy that compliance with statutory provision as to time within which to file an election petition is a fundamental precondition the breach of which had been held to be incurable. Where the statutory provision has not been complied with the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. In effect in determining when to file an election petition recourse must be had to the enabling statute in each particular case which in the instant case is Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006.
In the computation of the thirty days in this case, counting starts from the 15th of April 2007, and the 30 days lapse on the 14th of May 2007. The petition presented on 15th of May 2007 was presented on the 31st day after the declaration of result. By mathematical calculation it is clearly outside the statutory period stipulated by Section 141 of the electoral Act 2006. The Tribunal has rightly declared that it is statute barred and incompetent, and declined jurisdiction to adjudicate on it. Awuse V Odili (2004) 8 NWLR (pt.876) Pg.639, Yusuf V Obasanjo (2003) 16 NWLR (pt.847) Pg.532, Nnonye V Anyichie (1989) Pt.101 at Pg.112, Otu V INEC (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt.602) Pg 250, Alataha V Asin (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt.601) Pg32, Lamido V Turakl (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt.600) Pg.578, Obasanjo V Babafemi (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt.689) Pg 1. This issue IS resolved in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE NUMBER TWO
Whether the Tribunal was correct when it refused to call oral evidence to resolve the conflict in his affidavit evidence of the parties.
The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the presumption created by Section 125 is not a conclusive presumption. It is a rebuttable presumption which applies where conclusion or fraud is suspected. The lower tribunal should have called oral evidence to resolve the issues raised in the conflicting affidavit before the court. The Tribunal by Section 114(1) of the Evidence Act presumed the genuiness of Annexture ‘A’ a Certified True Copy executed in the manner directed by law and further that the production of Annexture ‘A’ is a prima facie proof of the authenticity of the document and the burden now shifts on the petitioner to prove otherwise which he has failed to do.
The lower tribunal in its Ruling relied on the case of Ezesbu V. F.A.T.B. Ltd (1992) 1 NWLR (pt.220) pg 699 at pg 711 to hold that “where the court has enough documentary evidence at its disposal, it can suo motu resolve conflicting affidavit evidence without recourse to oral evidence. I also agree with the case of Bawa V Phenias (2007) 4 NWLR (pt.10247) pg 251 at pgs 267-268 cited by the 1st Respondent where the court of appeal confirmed the law that it is equally the law that it is not only by calling oral evidence that such a conflict in affidavit can be resolved such a conflict can be resolved by authentic documentary evidence which support one of the affidavits in conflict with another. Where the court has enough documentary evidence at its disposal it can suo motu resolve conflicting affidavit evidence by resorting to the documentary evidence.
The Tribunal rightly referred to Annexture EC8E(1) to resolve the conflict in the affidavit evidence of both parties.
Issue No. two is resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.
ISSUE NUMBER THREE
Whether the tribunal was correct to have heard the motion without jurisdiction.
The contention of the appellant on this issue is that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to take a motion outside the pre-hearing session without leave. The appellant referred to paragraph 3(6)(c) and (7)(d) of the Practice Direction, paragraph 26(1) of the First Schedule to the Election Act 2006 as amended and paragraph 6(1) of the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Direction 2007. The Respondent replied that the preliminary objection was raised at the earliest opportunity filed together with the memorandum of appearance. The Tribunal rightly entertained the preliminary objection challenging the competence of the petition.
The Respondent has an absolute right to challenge the jurisdiction of the election tribunal to entertain the petition at any stage of the proceedings in the hearing of the petition. Paragraph 49(5) of the 1st Schedule to the electoral Act 2006 states that “An objection challenging the regularity or competence of an election petition shall be heard and determined before any further steps in the proceedings if the objection is brought immediately the defect on the face of the election petition is noticed.
Section 147(3) states that:-
Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 149 of this Act, on the motion of a respondent in an election action, the election tribunal or court as the case may be, may strike out an election on the ground that it is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act or provision of First Schedule of this Act.
A preliminary question is a question which has to be settled before going into either matter. Accordingly a notice of preliminary objection complaining about the competence of a matter or appeal has to be settled before going into any other matter such as trial, as the court can only exercise jurisdiction where an appeal is competent. In the case of Okonkwo V INEC (2004) 1 NWLR (pt.854) pg 242 at 277 the Court of Appeal said:-
“Where the competence of an election petition is challenged, the election tribunal like the regular court is obliged to inquire as a primary matter whether or not the action is competent because it is upon the competence of a petition that rests the tribunals competence to entertain it.”
I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that the tribunal acted judicially and judiciously within its jurisdiction when it entertained the preliminary objection of the 1st defendant.
Buhari V Obasanjo (2003) 17 NWLR (pt.850) pg 423 , Daggash V Bulama (2004) 14 NWLR (pt.892) P9 144
Issue No.3 is resolved in favour of the appellant. I must finally emphasize that an election petition is a proceeding which is sui generis, as it is of its own kind, possessing an individualist character, unique, or like only to itself. It is not particularly related to ordinary rights and obligations of the parties concerned. The slightest non-compliance with a procedural step which otherwise could either be cured or waived in ordinary civil proceedings could result in a fatal consequence to the petition.
Buhari V Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt.841) Pg 446, Kallamu V Gurin (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt.847) Pg 4923
Buhari V Obasanjo (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt.850) Pg 423
A petitioner must present his petition within thirty days of the declaration of result any steps taken over that period shall be statute barred and incompetent. This appeal therefore lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
N120,000 costs is awarded in favour of the 1st Respondent.
Other Citations: (2008)LCN/2690(CA)
