Adikun Oke V. IGP (1954)

LawGlobal Hub Judgment Report – West African Court of Appeal

Criminal Law—Joint trial—Trial a nullity in case of one accused—Trial not a nullity in case ofco-accused. Criminal Procedure Ordinance, section 287 (1)—
Accused without Counsel not informed ofhis rights at close ofprosecution case—Co-accused with Counsel.

Facts

Where at the close of the prosecution case an accused person is called upon for his defence, section 287 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, briefly put, provides that the Court shall, (a) if he has no counsel, inform him that he may, at his choice, (i) make an unsworn statement, in which case he will not be crossexamined, or (ii) give evidence on oath, in which case he will be liable to crossexamination, or (iii) say nothing at all, if he so wishes, and the Court shall also ask him if he has witnesses; and (b) if he has counsel, the Court shall call on his counsel to proceed with the defence.

The appellant was tried jointly with X; X had no counsel, the appellant had. The Magistrate omitted to comply with section 287 (1) (a) in the case of X; in the case of the appellant there was no irregularity. They were both convicted. They failed in the Supreme Court and came to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal, dealing first with the case of X, held that his trial was a nullity owing to the said omission. It was next argued for the appellant that his trial should also be held to be a nullity as he had been tried jointly with X; and the Commissioner of Police v. Thomas Archibong and Henry Inokon was relied upon (App. 2331 decided 10th January, 1946).

In that case one accused was told by the Magistrate that he had a right to be tried in the Supreme Court, the other was not; the Court of Appeal held the trial of the latter to be a nullity, and of the former too on the ground that they had been jointly charged.

Held

The Court had been in error in laying down a general proposition in Commissioner of Police v. Thomas Archibong and Henry Inokon: each case must be decided on its own merits: in the case in hand the procedure was regular and all the evidence admissible so far as the appellant was concerned, and would have been equally admissible against him had he been tried alone; consequently, the Court was not prepared to follow the earlier case and hold that the appellant’s trial was a nullity on the ground that he was jointly charged with a person whose trial was a nullity.

Appeal dismissed.