Akwa Ibom Property and Investments Company Limited V. Udofel Limited & Anor (2016)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.
This is in respect of an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, Ikot Ekpene Judicial Division delivered on the 21st May, 2013 by Isangedighi J. affirming jurisdiction in respect of the substantive suit.
?The appellant as 1st defendant, had filed a notice of preliminary objection contesting the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the suit instituted by the 1st respondent against it and the 2nd respondent challenging the implications of a letter of 14th February, 2011 written by the Appellant, in respect of the operations of a certain Daaty Hotel, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State of which the 1st respondent is the owner and proprietor, on grounds that the 1st respondent lacked the requisite locus standi to institute the said suit.
The said objection was duly argued by counsel for the two sides and in a considered ruling delivered as aforesaid on the 21st May, 2013, the learned trial Judge found no merit in the said preliminary objection and accordingly dismissed it with cost. The said suit which was already part-heard prior to the
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filing of the preliminary objection was then adjourned for continuation of hearing.
Dissatisfied, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on the 24th June, 2013 containing 2 grounds.
At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Ekasah, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent drew attention to his Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on 20th December, 2013 challenging the competence of this appeal on the grounds that being interlocutory in nature and not restricted to pure law, leave ought to have been sought and obtained before the filing thereof pursuant to Section 14 of the Court of Appeal, Act, Cap C36, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and also that it was not filed within 14 days of the delivery of the decision complained against.
The learned counsel adopted the arguments in respect thereof contained in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.5 of the 1st Respondent’s brief filed on 20th December, 2013.
The appellant countered the contentions of the 1st Respondent on the said Preliminary Objection and in this regard, its learned counsel Mr. Idika adopted the arguments contained in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.17 of his Appellant’s Reply brief filed on
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11th February, 2014 but deemed properly filed and served on the 25th April, 2016.
Considering the fundamental implications of the Preliminary Objection for this appeal, it shall be my take off point.
?Arguing the objection, Mr. Ekasah submitted that the grounds of appeal here were not based on pure law but of mixed law and fact in respect of which appeal could not proceed as a matter of right and that failure of the appellant to obtain leave either of the trial Court or of this Court, is fatal to the appeal. He referred to OJEMEN & ORS v. MOMODU 11 & ORS (1983) 14 NSCC 135 at 145.
The learned counsel for the 1st respondent further submitted that the Court has a duty to examine the grounds of appeal and the particulars thereof together in arriving at a conclusive classification thereof and referred to OSAHON v. F.R.N. (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 89 at 116, FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. T.S.A. INDUSTRIES LTD (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 247 at 291 and ORGAN & ORS v. NIGERIA LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS LTD (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 506 at 531.
Mr. Ekasah further contended that the decision complained of did not finally determine the
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rights of the parties and was as such interlocutory. That time for appeal was limited to 14 days unless extended and that the appeal here was filed outside the stipulated time frame without any extension being sought or obtained thereby rendering the notice of appeal incompetent. He referred to ALOR & ANOR v. NGENE & ORS (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 163 at 184 and OWONIBOYS TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD v. JOHN HOLT LTD (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 550 at 558.
He urged the Court to strike out the appeal for being incompetent.
Responding, Mr. Idika submitted that the appeal was on jurisdiction and as a point of law could be raised at any stage of the proceedings or appeal without leave. He referred to ELABANJO v. DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76; SOFEKUN v. AKINYEMI & ORS (1980) 5-7 SC 1 at 86-87 and MOSES v. STATE (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 992) 458 at 503.
The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that a decision on jurisdiction is a final decision on the rights of the parties in respect of which the period limited for filing of notice of appeal is three month thereby validating the notice of appeal. He referred to Section 24
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(2) of the Court of Appeal, Act, 2004, WESTERN STEEL WORKS v. IRON STEEL WORKERS UNION (1986) 2 NSCC 786; (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 301) 617; AKINSANYA v. U.B.A. LTD (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 35) 273, ERNEST OJUKWU et al “INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE” (2nd EDITION) HELEN ROBERTS, (2005) Abuja at 377 and A. F. AFOLAYAN et al “MODERN CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW” DEESAGE NIG. LTD (2007) Lagos at 354.
Concluding his submissions on the objection, Mr. Idika submitted that the grounds of appeal are all questions of law as they relate to application of law to undisputed facts thereby precluding the necessity for the appellant to obtain leave. He referred to S241 (1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution and RABIU v. ADEBAJO (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1322) 125 at 143-144.
He urged the Court to dismiss the objection.
The objection here is on two legs i.e. the nature of the decision appealed against whether interlocutory or final, and whether the appeal was on pure law and did not require leave or was of mixed law and facts which required leave.
The answer to the first leg would determine the relevance of the second leg. This is because, if the decision appealed
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against was adjudged to be final, then leave would become otiose.
Section 24 (2) (a) of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976 (as amended) provides for time stipulated for filing of appeals as follows:
“24. Time for Appealing
(1) Where a person desires to appeal to the Court of Appeal, he shall give notice of appeal or notice of his application for leave to appeal in such manner as may be directed by rules of Court within the period prescribed by the provision of Subsection (2) of this section that is applicable to the case.
(2) The periods for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal are –
(a) in an appeal in a civil cause or matter, fourteen days where the appeal is against an interlocutory decision and three months where the appeal is against a final decision;”
Furthermore, pursuant to Sections 241 and 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) interlocutory appeals to the Court of Appeal from the High Court would only lie as of right where the grounds of appeal involve questions of law simpliciter. Where they involve facts or mixed law and facts, then leave must be
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obtained. The said provisions are as follows:
241.(1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases –
Appeals from Sharia Court of Appeal
(a) Final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court or a High Court sitting at first instance;
(b) Where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings;
(c) Decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution;
(d) Decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to whether any of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be, contravened in relation to any person;
(e) Decisions in any criminal proceedings in which the Federal High Court or a High Court has imposed a sentence of death; Appeals form Customary Court of Appeal of a state.
(f) Decisions made or given by the Federal High Court or a High Court –
(i) where the liberty of a person or the custody of an infant is concerned,<br< p=””
</br<
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(ii) where an injunction or the appointment of a receiver is granted or refused,
(iii) In the case of a decision determining the case of a creditor or the liability of a contributory or other officer under any enactment relating to companies in respect of misfeasance or otherwise,
(iv) In the case of a decree nisi in a matrimonial cause or a decision in an admiralty action determining liability, and
(v) in such other cases as may be prescribed by any law in force in Nigeria.
(2) Nothing in this section shall confer any of appeal –
(a) from a decision of the Federal High Court or any High Court granting unconditional leave to defend an action;
(b) from an order absolute for the dissolution or nullity of marriage in favour of any party who, having had time and opportunity to appeal from the decree nision which the order was founded, has not appealed from that decree nisi; and
(c) Without the leave of the Federal High Court or a High Court or of Appeal, from a decision of the Federal High Court High Court mode with the consent of the parties or as to costs only
Appeals with leave
242.(1) Subject to the provisions of
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Section 241 of this Constitution, an appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal with the leave of the Federal High Court or that High Court or the Court Appeal
(2) The Court of Appeal may dispose of any application for leave to appeal from any decision of the Federal High Court or a High Court in respect of any civil or criminal proceedings in which an appeal has been brought to the Federal High Court or a High Court from any other Court after consideration of the record of the proceedings, if the Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the interests of justice do not require an oral hearing of the application.
The determination of the question whether a decision of a Court is interlocutory or final for the purposes of the competence of an appeal emanating therefrom, could constitute a Gordian knot. It is a question that had engaged the best of legal minds over time with two schools of thought emerging in English jurisprudence.
One can be described as favoring the nature of the order made while the other is inclined towards the nature of the application.
The nature of order test
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considers whether the order made finally disposes of the rights of the parties in the case or whether after the said order they would still return for fufther determinations. This test is traceable to the English case of BOZSON v. ALTRINCHAM U.D.C. (1903) 1 QB 547.
The nature of application test traces back to another English case SALAMAN v. WARNER (1891) 1 QB 734 which considers whether the application before the Court is of such a nature in which the order made thereon would have finally disposed of the matter in dispute.
It would however seem unequivocal that the legal position in this country right from BLAY v. SOLOMON (1947) 12 WACA 175 has been in favour of the nature of order test.
BRETT, FJ stated thus:
“Does the order as made finally dispose of the rights of the parties? If it does then I think it ought to be treated as a final order; but if it does not it is then, in my opinion, an interlocutory order”. See UDE v. AGU delivered by the then Federal Supreme Court on 23rd February, 1961 and reported in (2009) 3 LC 678 at 682.
For his legal postulations which is more in tandem with the nature of application test, the
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learned counsel for the appellant relied on two decisions of the apex Court, WESTERN STEEL WORKS v. IRON STEEL WORKERS UNION (1986) 2 NSCC 786; (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 301) 617 and AKINSANYA v. U.B.A. LTD (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 35) 273.
The two decisions shall be examined in detail.
The brief facts in WESTERN STEEL WORKS v. IRON STEEL WORKERS UNION (supra) are that there was an objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos State where the action was commenced. After hearing counsel for the parties, the learned trial Judge declined jurisdiction and struck out the suit.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the learned trial Judge was found to have wrongfully declined jurisdiction and the Court of Appeal held that indeed the High Court of Lagos State had jurisdiction in the matter. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended that the decision of the Court of Appeal in reinstating the jurisdiction of the trial Court was an interlocutory decision as it kept the suit alive in the trial Court and that as such appeal against the decision should have been filed within 14 days.
?This issue was then extensively considered by the
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apex Court and it was eventually decided that to the extent that the only issue before the Court of Appeal had been decided leaving no other pending issue before it, the decision of the Court of Appeal was final.
Although OBASEKI, JSC in the said case made allusions which would appear to deviate from the consistent position in favour of the nature of order test, however, the issue before the apex Court in the said WESTERN STEEL WORKS v. IRON STEEL WORKERS UNION (supra) was what constituted final or interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal and the eventual decision in that case aligned with the nature of order test.
It is trite that a case is precedent only in respect of the issue decided by it and not in respect of its obiter. That case cannot therefore avail the resolution of the present legal conundrum.
The other case relied on by counsel however considered the issue of interlocutory and final decisions of the trial Court. That is AKINSANYA v. SUBA LTD (supra).
The decision of the Supreme Court here came after WESTERN STEEL WORKS v. IRON STEEL WORKERS UNION (supra) and afforded the apex Court the opportunity to review
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the decision therein as well as lay out the proper guidance for the Courts on this issue.
The brief facts here were that the parties had a dispute in respect of a letter of credit opened for a cement importation from a Swiss company upon which the appellant sued the respondent bank at the High Court of Lagos State and lost after a full trial.
On appeal, the Court of appeal invited address on the issue of jurisdiction and although both sides were ad idem that the matter was mere banker customer dispute, the Court of Appeal decided by split decision that the matter was an admiralty matter in respect of which the High Court of Lagos State lacked jurisdiction but unanimously dismissed the appeal on the merits thereof. Both parties were aggrieved and approached the Supreme Court.
The question then was whether the majority decision of the Court of Appeal was a final or interlocutory one had it been made by the trial Court which would throw up the necessity for leave to be obtained in respect of the appeal. The Court extensively considered the issue and applied the nature of order test before concluding that indeed it was a final order as the
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decision declining jurisdiction left no other issue to be determined.
Clarifying the situation in respect of the applicability of the said nature of order test to decisions of a trial Court, ESO, JSC stated as follows:
“In other words, if the Court of first instance orders that a matter before it be terminated (struck out) for it has no jurisdiction to determine the issue before it, that is the end of all the issue arising in the cause or matter and there is no longer, any issue between the parties in that cause or matter that remains for determination in that Court. But it would be interlocutory if its order is that it has jurisdiction for there will be reference of the remaining issues in the case to itself. When a Court of Appeal rules and orders that a Court of first instance had no jurisdiction in a cause which had been brought before it that is the end of the matter in so for as that particular litigation goes between the parties in that Court of Appeal. There is no further reference to the Court which has made the order in either case. And that has determined the rights of the parties in both cases before the Court making the order. And
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applying that test to the instant case, if the order made by the majority of the Court of Appeal had been mode by the trial Court itself that trial Court had no jurisdiction that is final. And accordingly to the nature of that order, there is no further reference to that Court of trial. If the order had been by the trial Court that it had jurisdiction, that is interlocutory according to the nature of the order made as there are issues still to be determined. (underlining mine). See AKINSANYA v. U.B.A. (2012) 4 LC 622 at 662-663.
It is therefore evident that the position of counsel for the applicant runs contrary to the legal authority under which he seeks refuge.
The position of the Supreme Court enunciated above was further reiterated in several other decisions. According to Karibi-Whyte, JSC:
“In Omonuwa v. Oshodin (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.10) p.924 in which many of the earlier leading cases were discussed, this Court held that an interlocutory decision is one which has not finally determined the rights of the parties before it even if it might have determined finally an issue in the case whereas a final decision is one which determines finally
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the rights of the parties in the case before it.” (underlining mine). See JAMES B. ORUBU v. NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2007) 3 EPR 734 at 802.
Also Kalgo, JSC similarly stated as follows:
“In plethora of decided cases, this Court decided that in this country, if the order, decision or judgment of a Court finally and completely determines the rights of the parties in the case, it is final. But if it does not, it is interlocutory only. And in order to determine whether the decision is final or interlocutory, the decision must relate to the subject matter in dispute between the parties and not the function of the Court making the order. Therefore the determining factor is not whether the Court has finally determined an issue but it is whether or not it has finally determined the rights of the parties in the claim before the parties. See Oguntimehin v. Omotoye (1957) 2 FSC 56; Afuwape v. Shodipe (1957) SCNLR 265; Omonuwa v. Oshodin (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 924. Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 35) 273; Ude v. Agu (1961) 1 All NLR 61 Ebokum v. Ekwenibe & Sons Trading Co. Ltd (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 242; Ebet v. Kassim (1966)
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NMLR 123 at 124.” (underlining mine).
See ALOR v. NGENE & ORS (2007) 29 NSCQR 114, per KALGO, JSC at 122-123.
As earlier stated, the learned trial Judge ruled that he had jurisdiction and accordingly adjourned the case for continuation of hearing leaving no equivocation that the decision was an interlocutory one in respect of which time for appeal was limited to 14 days. The notice of appeal here was filed well outside the 14 days period without time having been extended by the Court thereby rendering the notice of appeal incompetent.
The second leg of the objection however is as regards the nature of the grounds of appeal, whether it is of pure law or of mixed law and facts.
The guide for resolution of this point had been adequately provided by the apex Court and it was succinctly stated by ESO, JSC thus:
?”There is no doubt that it is always difficult to distinguish a ground of law from a ground of fact but what is required is to examine, thoroughly the grounds of appeal in the case concerned to see whether the grounds reveal a misunderstanding by the lower tribunal of the law or a misapplication of the law to the facts
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already proved or admitted, in which case it would be question of law, or one that requires questioning the evaluation of facts by the lower tribunal before the application of the law in which case it would amount to question of mixed law and fact. The issues of pure fact is easier to determine.” See OGBECHIE v. ONOCHIE & ORS. (1986) 2 NWLR (Part. 23) 484 at 491 and THOR LTD v. F.C.M.B. (2002) 9 NSCQR 266 at 277.
A determination of the question of locus standi necessarily requires a consideration of not just the position of the law on the rights of the claimant or plaintiff but also the facts disclosed in the statement of claim. An appeal from that decision therefore involves an admixture of the law with the facts as disclosed.
A perusal of the notice of appeal herein discloses a concurrence with this state of affairs. The appellant therein raised grounds of law with which facts were mixed. Leave of Court ought to have been sought and obtained which was not done.
I hold that the notice of appeal is incompetent on this point as well.
In all, I find merit in the preliminary objection and I accordingly hold that this appeal is
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incompetent and it is hereby struck out.
Notwithstanding my above conclusion, this Court as a penultimate Court has a duty to further consider the appeal on the merits thereof in the event of a further appeal to the apex Court resulting in a decision that the preliminary objection ought to have been dismissed. This practice was enjoined in a number of cases including KATTO v. C.B.N. (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 126 and OKOMALU v. AKINBODE (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 985) 338.
I will therefore proceed to consider the substantive issue in this appeal taking care not to make pronouncements that could prejudice the substantive trial still pending before the High Court.
Mr. Idika, the learned counsel for the appellant formulated 3 issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the 1st respondent can sue based on Exhibit A1, a letter addressed to a non-existent entity.
2. Whether the 1st respondent lacks the locus standi or legal capacity to sue in respect of transactions relating to the name “Daaty Hotel” in default of registration or incorporation of “Daaty Hotel” either as a business name or incorporated company as required by law.
3.
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Whether the 1st respondent can be said to be the proprietor or can be recognized, referred to or described in terms of “Daaty Hotel” in default of registration or incorporation of “Daaty Hotel”.
On his part, Mr. Ekasah the learned counsel for the 1st respondent formulated one issue for determination as follows:
Whether, in the circumstances described in the statement of claim, the 1st respondent has locus standi to institute the suit appealed from.
A cursory appraisal of the issues for determination formulated by the two sides reveals that while the appellant formulated issue 1 from ground 1 of the notice of appeal, issues 2 and 3 were formulated from the remaining ground 2. In other words ground 2 mutated into two issues, a totally unacceptable procedure rendering the said issue incompetent. See LEEDO PRESIDENTIAL HOTEL LTD v. B.O.N. (NIG.) LTD. (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 269) 334 at 347, AGBETOBA v. LAGOS STATE EXCUTIVE COUNCIL (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 188) 664 at 681-682 and UKPO v. IMOKE 6 EPR 851 at 885-886.
Juxtaposed, the sole issue for determination formulated by the 1st respondent best captures the two grounds of appeal and shall be
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adopted by me in deciding this appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Idika submitted that the letter complained about was addressed to “Daaty Hotel” a non-existent entity unknown to law thereby rendering the said correspondence null void and of no legal effect accordingly incapable of vesting any legal right or duty on any person known to law. He referred to GANI FAWEHINMI v. N.B.A. (No. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558, AGBONMAGBE BANK v. GENERAL MANAGER G.B. OLLIVANT LTD (1961) ALL NLR 116, PEAT MARWICK, ANI OGUNDE & CO. v. OKIKE (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 369) 71, ATAGBUA & CO. v. GUARA NIG. LTD (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429 and INAKOJU v. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423 at 602.
Mr. Idika further submitted that in the absence of proper registration of “Daaty Hotel”, the 1st respondent cannot claim legal rights in respect thereof. He referred to Sections 573 (1), 574 (1) and 584 (1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, F.B.N. PLC v. MAIWADA (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 444 at 487 and TAIWO v. ADEGBORO (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 562.
He urged the Court to hold that the 1st respondent lacked locus standi and accordingly allow
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the appeal.
For the 1st respondent, Mr. Ekasah outlined the legal principle of locus standi and submitted that the consideration is limited to the statement of claim which in this case indicated abundantly that the 1st respondent had locus standi. He referred to TAIWO v. ADEGBORO (supra) at 579 and LADEJOBI & ORS v. OGUNTAYO & ORS (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 149 at 173.
He urged the Court to discountenance the submissions of the appellant and dismiss the appeal.
In his reply brief, Mr. Idika reiterated his earlier submissions and urged the Court to allow the appeal.
In TAIWO v. ADEGBORO (supra) also in (2011) 46 NSCQR 82 at 99, a judicial authority relied on by both counsel on the appropriate legal position on the issue of locus standi, RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC, stated thus:
A plaintiff satisfies the Court that he has locus standi if he is able to show that his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. There must be a nexus between the claimant and the disclosed cause of action concerning his rights or obligations, and locus standi is determined by examining only the statement of claim.
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Furthermore in determining whether a party has locus standi the chances that the action may not succeed is an irrelevant consideration. See EJIWUNMI v. COSTAIN (W.A.) PLC (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 576) 149 and WILLIAMS v. DAWODU (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 87) P. 189.
Applying the said principles therefore, a perusal of the statement of claim shows averments including paragraph 1, 2, 8, 10 and 14 thereof which state as follows:
1. The Plaintiff is a limited liability Company incorporated in Nigeria. The Plaintiff is the proprietor and promoter of an exquisite, high-end 31-room/suite guest apartments/hotel in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, called and popularly known as Daaty Hotel. The Hotel has other purpose-built facilities, befitting a hotel of that class, including a lobby, restaurant, conference hall, indoor and outdoor bars, boardroom, VIP bar, barbeque ‘sit-out’ and the like. The Hotel opened for business in April, 2009. Dr. Udoma Bob Ekarika, a Medical Practitioner, is the major shareholder, Director and Public face of the Plaintiff. The plaintiff shall rely on its certificate of incorporation.
2. Daaty Hotel is situated at Plot 4, Unit D, Itiam/Eniong/Ewet
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Estate, Uyo more popularly known as ‘Ewet Housing Estate’, and hereinafter referred to as ‘the Estate’. The Estate is on upscale port of Uyo Metropolis, widely regarded as the prime or choice area for business and residence, and has several commercial establishments and outfits, including several prominent hotels, and has retained this status for a couple of decades or longer.
8. The Plaintiff originally acquired its plot in question, known as Plot 4, Unit D, at the 1st Defendant’s aforesaid Ewet Housing Estate, Uyo, (“the property”) from one Engr. Ime Isaiah Udotong who assigned his interest to the Plaintiff. The said Engr. Udotong then applied to the 1st Defendant for its consent to the assignment and change of ownership. The 1st defendant duly granted the consent to assign and conveyed the said consent by its letter of February 4, 2008, with reference number PDA/ES.44/S.26/103. The plaintiff pleads the said letter and shall rely on the same at the hearing of this suit.
10. Consequent upon the acquisition and the consent/approval aforesaid, the 1st Defendant entered into a Deed of Sub-lease with the Plaintiff. The Deed is dated 10th April 2008 and
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is registered as No. 20 at page 20 in Volume 268 of the Lands Registry, Uyo. The Sub-Lease, which was prepared by the 1st Defendant, specifically enjoined and obligated the Plaintiff to use the property for ‘COMMERCIAL’ purpose only. The Plaintiff will found on the said Deed.
14. In the con and against the background of the matters set out in the preceding paragraphs hereof, and in particular of the political situation and principals described in paragraphs 1-7 herein, the 1st defendant, on or about the 14th day of February, 2011, by a letter of the same date referenced as AP/MD.EH/VOL.4/84, without genuine reason or lawful excuse, and in breach of all known principles of Law, Commerce and morality, wrote to the Plaintiff purporting to give it (the Plaintiff) a three-month notice ‘within which you should relocate the Daaty Hotel at Plot 4, Unit D, and convert same to residential purposes. The deadline expires on 31st May 2011’. The Plaintiff pleads the said letter and shall rely on the same at the hearing of this Suit.
These averments sufficiently establish a nexus between the 1st respondent and the rights and obligations in issue in the said
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suit.
I therefore find no justifiable basis to disturb the decision of the learned trial Judge confirming the locus standi of the 1st respondent in respect of the suit pending before him and I accordingly affirm the said decision.
I find no merit in this appeal, it is totally frivolous and I accordingly dismiss it.
Cost of N50,000.00 is awarded against the appellant and in favour of the 1st respondent.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8631(CA)
