Alh. Yau Isa Mai Alewa V. Sokoto State Independent Electoral Commission (2007)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.C.A.
The appellant in this appeal was elected Chairman of Goronyo Local Government Council, Sokoto State sometime in 1990 and again in 1998. On 21/2/2000, the Governor of Sokoto State assented to a bill titled, Local Government Law 2000, which the Sokoto State House of Assembly had hitherto passed into law. Section 13 (4) of the law provides:
“No person shall be qualified for election to the office of Chairman if he has been elected into such office at any two previous elections”.
In April 2002, the appellant informed his party of his intention to contest the post of Chairman, Goronyo Local Government once again on the expiration of his current term.
He was advised by his party that pursuant to directives from the respondent (Sokoto State Independent Electoral Commission), he was not eligible to contest having regard to the provisions of Section 13 (4) of the Local Government law 2000. The respondent confirmed this position when the appellant wrote to it seeking clarification. Consequently, the appellant filed an Originating Summons against the respondent before the High Court of Sokoto State on 3/6/02 for the determination of the following questions:
- “WHETHER the application of the provision of Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended) which came into force on the 21st day of February 2000 is retroactive.
- WHETHER the plaintiff who was elected as Chairman of Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto State on two consecutive occasions prior to the coming into force of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended) is a person affected by the disqualification spelt out in Section 13(4) of the said Local Government Law such that he is forthwith disqualified from being elected into the same office solely on that ground of disqualification.”
The appellant also sought the following reliefs:
a) “A DECLARATION that the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended) which Law came into force on the 21st day of February 2000 is not retroactive.
b) A DECLARATION that as the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended) came in10 force on the 21st day of February 2000, “any two previous elections” contemplated by section 13(4) of the said Law are elections conducted only in pursuance of the said Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended).
c) A DECLARATION that as the plaintiff has never been elected into the office of Chairman, Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto State in pursuance or in contemplation of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended), he is not a person affected by the disqualification spelt out in Section 13(4) of the said Law.
d) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, its Servants, Agents or Privies from disqualifying the said plaintiff from contesting any future election to the office of Chairman of Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto State on ground only as spelt out in Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto Slate (as amended) UNLESS AFTER the plaintiff has been elected into the said office on two consecutive occasions in an election conducted in pursuance of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended).
e) SUCH further order of other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.”
The originating summons was supported by a 12 paragraph affidavit with two exhibits attached. The defendant filed a 5 paragraph counter affidavit in response. Learned counsel for the respective parties subsequently addressed the court. In a considered judgment delivered on 11/10/02 the learned trial Judge at page 29 of the printed record held as follows:
“In conclusion, the main issue calling for determination having been considered and answered in the affirmative, I he Plaintiff is and hereby (sic) disqualified from contesting for the third time to the office of Chairman Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto State.
The disqualification is by virtue of the Local Government Law 2000 prescribes (sic) under Section 13 (4) of same.”
The appellant, aggrieved by the decision of the Sokoto State High Court, has appealed to this court by a notice of appeal dated 8/1/03 consisting of six grounds of appeal. The grounds of appeal without their particulars are as follows:
‘GROUND ONE
The Court below erred in law when it held that Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State (as amended) is clear and unambiguous such that the Appellant is forthwith disqualified to stand for ejection into the office of Chairman of Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto Slate for a third lime.
GROUND TWO
The Court below refused, failed or neglected to adequately consider and resolve question number one submitted before it by the Appellant for consideration which was whether or not the application of the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State as amended which came into force on 21/2/2000 is retroactive. The Court below regarded the same question as merely academic and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.
GROUND THREE
The Court below contradicted itself when it held in its judgment that the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State as amended is not intended to have any retrospective effect but nonetheless proceeded in the same judgment to disqualify the Appellant from contesting any future election to the office of Chairman of Goronyo Local Government Council Sokoto State in pursuance of the provisions of the said Local Government Law.
GROUND FOUR
The Court below erred in law when it held that the Appellant has not suffered any disability nor has his accrued rights taken away by the provision of Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State as amended.
GROUND FIVE
The Court below erred in law when it held in its judgment that the disqualification spell out in Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State as amended is neither tied down to any point in time nor to any effective dale of operation despite the fact that on the face of the materials placed before the said court, each and every provision of the said law came into force only on the 21st February 2000.
GROUND SIX
The Presiding Judge of the Court below showed bias against the Appellant as he did not adequately consider the submissions and the legal authorities cited for the Appellant before him but on the other hand considered the submissions and legal authorities cited for the Respondent in detail, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice against the Appellant.”
From the six grounds of appeal, the appellant formulated three issues for the determination of this appeal thus:
- Whether by Section 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State which came into force on the 21st of February 2000 the appellant who has been elected into the office of Chairman of Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto State on two previous occasions before the coming into force of the said Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State is henceforth disqualified from being elected into the same office solely on the ground of disqualification spelt out in Section 13 (4) of the said Local Government Law.
- Did the court below adequately consider the issue as to whether or not Section 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State has retrospective effect before holden (sic) as it did that the appellant is forthwith disqualified from being elected into the office of Chairman of Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto State on grounds of the disqualification set out in the said section 13 (4) of the said law?
- Is the provision of Section 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State specific enough as to its date of operation?
The respondent adopted t he issues as formulated by the appellant but also raised and argued a preliminary objection in its brief of argument. The appellant filed a reply brief to the preliminary objection.
Al the hearing of the appeal Mr. Isa Mohammed, of counsel for the respondent moved the preliminary objection argued in the respondent’s brief. He urged the court to uphold the objection, strike out ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal and issue 2 predicated thereon, Mr. J.E. Ochidi, learned counsel for the appellant adopted the arguments contained in the appellant’s reply brief in answer to the preliminary objection. He urged the court to dismiss it. He also adopted the appellant’s brief and urged the court to allow the appeal and grant the reliefs sought.
Mr. Mohammed adopted the respondent’s brief and urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
Before going into the merits of the appeal, I shall first consider the preliminary objection to Ground 2 of the notice of appeal. The objection is that the appellant failed to supply the particulars of the error alleged thereby rendering ground 2 and issue 2 formulated thereon incompetent.
He relied on the Supreme Court decision in: Nwokoro v. Onuma (1999) 9 SCNJ 63 at 66.
In his reply brief, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that ground 2 does not allege an error in law or misdirection but deals with an issue of fact. He submitted that in the circumstances the ground of appeal does not require particulars as provided for in Order 3 Rule 2 (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002. He relied on: Ogbechie v. Onochie (1986)2 NWLR (26) 484 at 491; Comex Ltd. v. NAB. Ltd. (1997) 3 NWLR (496) 643 at 656.
He submitted, without conceding, that even if the ground required particulars, the necessary particulars are fully incorporated therein and it is therefore unnecessary to set them out under a separate heading of “particulars”. He submitted that the ground is competent and relied on: Atuyeye v. Ashamu (1987)1 NWLR (49) 267; Nsirim v. Nsirim (1990) 3 NWLR (138) 285; Global Transport Oceanico S.A. & Anor. v. Free Enterprises Nig. Ltd. (2001) FWLR (40) 1706 at 1719. He urged the court to hold that ground 2 is a valid ground of appeal and dismiss the preliminary objection.
Order 3 Rule 2 (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002 provides:
“If the grounds of appeal allege misdirection or error in law, the particulars and the nature of the error or misdirection shall be clearly stated.”
From the above provision, it is clear that a ground of appeal alleging an error in law or misdirection must contain particulars. This is to enable the respondent meet the case of the appellant and the court to properly consider and determine the error or misdirection, which is the subject of the complaint. See: Global Transport Oceanica S.A. & Anor. v. Free Enterprises Nig. Ltd. (2001) 5 NWLR (706) 426 at 439 A.B: Atuyeye v. Ashamu (1987) 1 NWLR (49) 267. However, although customary it is not mandatory to state the particulars in a separate paragraph from the main ground. Where the ground of appeal is clear and unambiguous and the complaint made requires no further explanation, it is permissible to incorporate the particulars in the main ground itself. See: Global Transport Oceanico S.A. & Anor. v. Free Enterprises Nig. Ltd. (supra); Onanye v. Chukwuma (2005) 17 NWLR (953) 90 at 109-110 H-A: Arinze v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (2000) 7 NWLR (665) 383; Atuyeye v. Ashamu (supra), Ground 2 of the notice of appeal reads thus:
“The Court below refused, failed or neglected to adequately consider and resolve question number one submitted before it by the Appellant for consideration which was whether or not the application of the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State as amended which came into force on 21/2/2000 is retroactive. The Court below regarded the same question as merely academic and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.” (Emphasis supplied).
I am of the view that the ground is clear and unambiguous and requires no further explanation by way of particulars. The appellant’s complaint is that the learned trial Judge did not give the plaintiff’s first question the careful consideration and resolution it required because he considered it academic. The particulars of the ground of appeal have been conveniently incorporated in the ground of appeal. The Supreme Court decision in Nwokoro v. Onuma (supra) cited by learned counsel for the respondent, confirms the requirement to state the particulars of error alleged in a ground of appeal alleging error in law. It did not state that it is mandatory that the particulars must be set out under a separate heading. Ground 2 of the notice of appeal and issue no. 2 formulated thereon are therefore valid and competent. The preliminary objection is therefore overruled.
Having carefully examined the three issues for determination formulated by the appellant, I am of the view that issues 1 and 2 can conveniently be taken together.
On the first issue for determination, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the parties are ad idem as regards the fact that the Local Government Law 2000 of Sakoto State came into effect on 21/2/2000.
He submitted that although the commencement dale is blank, it is evident from the document that the Governor of Sokoto State assented to it on 21/2/2000. In support of his contention that 2/12/2000 is the commencement date of the law, he relied on the provisions of Section 100 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
Learned counsel argued that the appellant’s past two tenures as Chairman, Goronyo Local Government Council do not fall within the contemplation of the Law. He submitted that the Local Government Law 2000 only applies to facts or matters that came into existence after it was passed into law, unless it is shown that the legislature intended a retrospective effect. He submitted that the law is always forward looking.
He relied on: Salami Afolabi & Ors. v. Governor of Oyo State & Ors. (1985) 9 S.C. 117 at 128-129, 136-138 and 164. He submitted further that effect would not be given to words used in a statute merely because that would be their widest, usual, natural or liberal meaning. He cited the case of: Abioye v. Yakubu (2001) FWLR (83)2212 at 2291.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the two laws under which the appellant contested the elections in 1990 and 1998: the local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional) Provisions Decrees of 1989 and 1998 respectively, did not have any provisions similar to Section 13 (4). He argued that if Section 13 (4) were made applicable to the appellant, his accrued right to be elected Chairman of the Local Government, which was previously unlimited, would have been taken away from him and he would suffer disability. He submitted that on a proper interpretation of Section 13 (4), the disqualification spell out therein relates only to elections conducted pursuant to the said Law and that any elections conducted before the Law came into force are not within the contemplation of Section 13 (4).
In reply to this issue, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the construction of a statute or law, the court’s primary concern is the intention of the legislature or lawmaker. He cited the following cases: Anyakora v. Obiakor (1990) 2 NWLR (130) 52; Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1987) 7 SCNJ 1; (1987) NWLR (61) 377 at 402; Judicial Service Committee v. Omo (1990) 6 NWLR (157) 407. He submitted that the provisions of Section 13 (4) of the Law are clear and unambiguous and the trial court could not but give effect to them. He relied on: Kuusu v. Udom (1990) 1 N WLR (127) 4 21 holding 14. He submitted that the appellant had been elected Chairman, Goronyo Local Government Council on two previous occasions was therefore disqualified from contesting the same position again. He argued that his rights under the previous laws were not taken from him, as he had enjoyed his rights under those laws.
He submitted that the learned trial judge was correct to have strictly applied the principles of interpretation as laid down in various decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. He cited the following cases: Okoro v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd. (1990) 2 NWLR (130) 87 holdings 1 & 2; Egbe v. Alhaji (1990)1 NWLR (128) 546; Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) 5 NWLR (190) 130 holding 3; Texaco v. Shell (2002) 14 WRN 121 holding 1; A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Ekiti State (2001) 50 WRN 1 holdng 5; Bamaiyi v. A.G. Federation (2001) 38 WRN 1 holding 13; Ejutami v. Olaiya (2001) 12 SCNJ 140 holding 2; Adewunmi v. AG. Ekiti State (2002) 1 SCNJ 27 holding 13.
The appellant’s main complaint under issue no, 2 is that the learned trial Judge failed to adequately consider the question as to whether the Local Government Law 2000 is retroactive in its application. It was argued that in spite of his finding at page 29 lines 13-17 that the Law is not intended to have a retrospective effect, the learned trial Judge went ahead to declare the appellant disqualified from contesting any future election to the office of Chairman, Goronyo Local Government Council of Sokoto State, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
In reply to issue no. 2 learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Law is prospective and not retrospective. He relied on the principle that a statute operates prospectively and cannot apply retrospectively unless by clear and express terms or where it affects purely procedural matters and does not affect the rights of the parties.
He relied on the case of: Oshineye v. C.O.P. 5 FSC 110 at 112; Ojokolobo & Ors. v. Alamu & Anor. (1987) 7 SCNJ 98 at 104; Salami Afolabi v. Governor of Oyo State & Ors. (1985) 9 SC 117 at 164-165. He submitted that the presumption against retrospective legislation is however rebuttable. He relied on: Adesanoye v. Adewole (2000) 5 SCNJ 47; Salami Afolabi & Ors. v. Governor of Oyo State & Ors. (supra) Learned counsel submitted further that none of the appellant’s existing rights have been taken away by Section 13 (4) of the Law. He referred to: Ojokolobo & Ors. v. Alamu & Anor. (supra) at 104 and 117 lines 26-32.
Learned counsel argued that in applying the principle of retrospective legislation, there is a distinction between legislation governing practice and procedure and legislation governing substantive law. He submitted that the former is presumed to be retrospective while the latter is presumed to be prospective. He relied on: Nerd v. Gonze (2000) 5 WRN 83: A.G. Abia State & 35 Drs. Vs A.G. Federation (2002) 9 NSCQR 670. He submitted further that Section 13 (4) of the Law is in pari materia with Section 182 (1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution. He submitted that if Section 13 (4) of the Law were differently worded it would have been inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and to that extent void. He relied on: Governor of Ondo State v. Adewumi (1989) 1 MQLRN 49.
The Supreme Court has laid down the general principle regarding the interpretation of statutes in numerous decisions. In the case of: Ahmed v. Kassim (1958) SCNLR 28 at 30 C Foster-Sutton, FCJ stated thus:
“The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of legislation must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained as to what is just or expedient.”
Also in the case of: Ibrahim v Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (474) 513 at 577, Uwais, CJN (as he then was) held:
“It is a cardinal rule of the construction of statutes that statutes should be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves. If the words of the statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more is necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words of the statute do alone, in such a case, best declare the intention of the lawmaker.
See: Ahmed v. Kassim (1958) SCNLR 58; (1958) 1 NSCC 11.”
See also: Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (61) 377 at 402 F.H; Udoh v. O.H.M.B(1993) 7 NWLR (304) 39 at 149 F; Kuusu v. Udom (1990) 1 A.N.L.R. 191 at 207; (1990) 1 NWLR (127) 42; Adewumi v. A-G Ekiti State & Ors. (2002) 1 SCNJ 27 at 50.
In the course of this judgment, I had earlier reproduced Section 13 (4) of the local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State. I find it expedient to repeat it here for ease of reference.
Section 13 (4) provides:
“No person shall be qualified for election to the office of Chairman if he has been elected into such office at any two previous elections”. (Emphasis supplied)
As far as the first issue for determination is concerned, the first question that must be answered is whether upon the plain and grammatical meaning of the language used in Section 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 the appellant stands disqualified from contesting elections to the office of Chairman, Goronyo Local Government. The wording of the above section in my respectful view is clear, precise and unambiguous. It requires no scholarly or erudite interpretation. The duty of the court is to interpret the law according to the intention of the legislature. In the instant case, the intention of the legislature is clear. A person who has been elected to the office of Chairman on any two previous occasions is not entitled to a third bite at the cherry. It is not in dispute between the parties that the appellant had been elected Chairman, Goronyo Local Government in 1990 and again in 1998. It is also not in dispute that those previous ejections were conducted pursuant to the Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decrees of 1989 and 1998 respectively.
The court must therefore go further to determine whether the lawmakers intended the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 to have a retrospective effect. If it is so, the appellant would be caught by the provisions and stand disqualified.
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edition) defines a retroactive law as” a legislative act that looks backward or contemplates the past, affecting acts or facts that existed before the act came into effect. A retroactive law is not unconstitutional unless (1) it is in the nature of an ex post facto law or bill of attainder, (2) impairs the obligation of contracts, (3) divests vested rights, or (4) is constitutionally forbidden.”
Our superior courts have also had cause to determine when a law is said to have retrospective effect. In Adesanoye v. Adewole (2000) 9 NWLR (671) 127 at 165 H, Ogundare, JSC said:
“A statute is deemed to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation; or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.”
On the test of retrospective operation of a statute, Ogwuegbu, JSC in Adesanoye v. Adewole (supra) at 170 H. 171 B held:
“The test of retrospectively of operation is whether there is anything in the Act which indicates that the consequences of an earlier event are changed, not for the time before the enactment but prospectively from the time of the enactment or from the time of commencement of the Act. A retrospective statute operates for the future.
It is prospective in character but imposes new results in respect of a past event or transaction where an Act attaches an obligation or disability or imposes a duty as a new consequence, prejudicial in most cases, of a prior event, then it can be said to be retrospective.” (Emphasis supplied)
There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust. Thus, although under our legal system, the Legislature is competent to make retrospective laws, the courts generally lean against giving a statute retrospective effect unless the terms of the statute so state in clear and unequivocal language. In Afolabi v. Governor of Oyo State (1985) 2 NWLR (9) 734 at 752 E, Aniagolu, JSC stated thus,
“The courts have always leaned against giving statutes a retrospective effect and usually regard them as applying to facts or matters which came into existence after the statutes were passed, unless it is clearly shown that a retrospective effect was intended by the Legislature.” Underlining supplied.
See also Adesanoye v. Adewole (supra) at 147 B-C & D-E; West v. Gwyne (1911) 2 CH 1; A.G. Federation v. A.N.P.P. (2003) 15 NWLR (844) 600 at 648 G -H; Sa’ad v. Nyame (2004) All FWLR (201)1678.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that Section 13 (4) does not take away the appellant’s vested rights as he has enjoyed those rights under the previous legislations, having already served two terms as chairman of Goronyo Local Government. It is instructive to note however that if Section 13 (4) were to be interpreted retrospectively, it would have the effect of attaching a disability as a new consequence of a prior event. In other words, a disqualification under Section 13 (4) would mean that a disability has been created in respect of the appellant’s prior terms as Local Government Chairman, which did not exist under the laws pursuant to which he was elected to that office.
In the course of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent rightly observed that Section 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 is in pari materia with Section 182 (1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution, which provides:
- (1) “No person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if –
(b) he has been elected to such office at any two previous elections.”
In the case of A.G. Federation v. A.N.P.P. (supra) this Court had to determine whether the 2nd respondent, Prince Abubakar Audu, was disqualified from seeking re-election into the office of Governor of Kogi State under Section 182 (1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution having been elected into that office at two previous elections in 1991 and 1999. The court had to determine whether the provision had retrospective effect.
One of the factors that the court considered was that the 1999 Constitution came into being on 29th May 1999 and that all rights, liabilities and privileges as contemplated by the Constitution arose on that day. The court held that its provisions could therefore only be considered prospectively. As stated earlier in this judgment it is not in dispute that the Governor of Sokoto State assented to the bill in respect of the Local Government Law 2000 on 21/2/2000. Pursuant to Section 100 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, the law came into effect on 21/2/2000. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued before us that the two previous elections by which the appellant was elected chairman of Goronyo Local Government do not come within the contemplation of Section 13(4).
The Local Government Law 2000 was enacted to provide for the conduct of elections into Local Government Councils pursuant to its provisions, which came into effect on 21/2/2000. I therefore agree with learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of the law, in the absence of any clear and unequivocal provisions to the contrary must be interpreted prospectively. I agree with learned counsel for the appellant that he had not been elected as chairman of any local government in Sokoto State under the local Government Law 2000 and therefore could not be disqualified from contesting elections into that office pursuant to Section 13 (4) of the said Law. Issues 1 and 2 are according resolved in favour of the appellant.
The third issue for determination is whether Section 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 of Sokoto State is specific enough as to its date of operation. This issue was formulated form Ground 5 of the notice of appeal and complains about the view of the learned trial Judge expressed at page 29 lines 2-5 of the record as follows:
“From the clear express words of the section in controversy, it is plain to comprehend that the disqualification by S. 13 (4) of the Local Government Law 2000 is neither tied to any period of time nor effective date of any Law at all.”
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the Law came into force on 21/2/2000, every section of the Law including Section 13 (4) became operational with effect from that date. He submitted on that premise that the disqualification spell out in Section 13 (4) only applies to elections conducted pursuant to the said Law with effect from 21/2/2000.
In his reply brief, learned counsel for the respondent did not address this issue. He merely reiterated his view that the words of the law are plain and unambiguous and the court had a duty to give effect to them.
In the course of resolving issues 1 and 2, I held that by the operation of Section 100 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, since the Governor assented to the bill on 21/2/2000, it came into effect on that day. Issue 3 is therefore resolved in favour of the appellant.
In conclusion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court of Justice, Sokoto State in Suit No. SS/29/2002 delivered on 11/10/2002 is hereby set aside. The two questions raised by the plaintiff on his originating summons dated 3/6/02 are answered in the negative. I hereby grant alt the reliefs sought on the originating summons in favour of the plaintiff.
I make no order for costs.
Other Citations: (2007)LCN/2311(CA)
