Alhaji Habib Bako V. Mallam Samaila Mai-adashi (1996)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

OGEBE, J.C.A. 

The appellant sued the respondent in the High Court of Justice Kaduna claiming as follows in paragraph 17 of the Statement of Claim:-

“Whereof the plaintiff claims right of way over the passage on the left hand side of plot B. 12 Ibrahim Taiwo Road, Kaduna which the defendant claims forms part of his land, a right to light and declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of the said passage and he is so entitled to those reliefs.

The plaintiff also claims a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his successors in title and assignee from preventing it obstructing the plaintiff in the exercise of the rights claimed.”

The trial court gave judgment in its concluding part as follows:-

“I accordingly find merit in the plaintiff’s claim and it succeeds but only with regards to his right of way over the passage on the left hand side of plot B. 12, Ibrahim Taiwo Road, Kaduna which passage goes through the defendant’s plot, that is, plot B 12. I also find because the plaintiff did not adduce an evidence to support his claims for right to light. I therefore deem it so abandoned.

I also make the following orders:

1. The plaintiff is hereby granted right of way over the passage on the left hand side of plot B. 12 Ibrahim Taiwo Road, Kaduna which passage goes through the defendant’s plot B. 12 to the plaintiff’s plot 12A.
2. The plaintiff is also hereby granted a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his successors in title and assigns from preventing or obstructing the plaintiff in the exercise of the right of way just granted him.”

This judgment was delivered on the 30th of January, 1992. On the 11th of February 1992 the appellant brought an application before the trial court for the respondent to show cause why committal order should not be made against him for disobeying the order of court made in its judgment given in his favour. The application reads:-

“Take Notice that this Honourable Court will be moved on the … day of … 1992 at the hour of 9 o’clock in the forenoon or so soon thereafter as counsel can be heard on behalf of the judgment Creditor/Application for the following orders:-

1. An order to commit the above named judgment debtor/respondent to prison custody for contempt of court which he committed by depriving the judgment creditor/applicant from reaping the fruits of the judgment of this honourable court on 30.1.92 to wit: – he obtained the judgment creditor/applicant from using the said passage and making improvement thereon.
2. An order to so commit the judgment debtor/respondent to prison until he has purged himself of the contempt and ready and willing to comply with the judgment and orders of this honourable. And take Notice that the ground upon which this application is sought:-

a. The judgment debtor/respondent hired people to physically obstruct the judgment creditor and he along with these people [laced a kerosene tank on the passage to obstruct the judgment creditor/applicant’s use and improvement of same.

3. And for such further or other orders in reply to this motion and the trial court after hearing the motion on the 16th of May, 1993 visited the locus in quo and gave its ruling on the 24th of June, 1993. The concluding part of the ruling reads:-

“On the issue of committing the respondent to prison, it is my considered view that I cannot commit the respondent for contempt, since from what I have seen on visiting the place in dispute, the respondent has not completely obstructed the passage. At any rate, paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit has not been controverted. A doubt has, therefore, been cast in my mind as to when this partial obstruction was set up. Was it before or after my judgment of January, 1992? Contempt is a criminal offence and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. That, the applicant has failed to do. Be that as may be, however, the kerosene tank is clearly causing a partial obstruction and in order for the applicant to fully enjoy the fruits of my judgment, that tank has to be removed forthwith. I accordingly so order and also make the following orders:-

1. The presence shall henceforth be kept free of any obstruction whatsoever by both the applicant and the respondent.
2. The applicant is also entitled to keep the passage to his plot in motorable condition.
3. Both the applicant and respondent, their successors in title and assignee or privies are hereby restrained from parking cars or putting any obstruction whatsoever on the passage.”

The appellant was dissatisfied with this ruling with particular reference to the orders made by the trial Judge which had the effect of amending its judgment and appealed to this court on 3 grounds of appeal. In accordance with the rule of this court the appellant filed a brief of argument and identified one issue for determination as follows:-

“a. Whether or not the learned trial court was functus officio on the matter of the grant of the right of way, after delivering the first judgment on the 30th of January, 1992, in this case;

or in the alternative

b. Whether the learned trial judge can give an unconditional grant in the first judgment, on the 30th January, 1992, and thereafter, suo motu, review the said judgment, and attach fresh conditions to the grant 18 months later, on the 24th of June, 1993, as if it can sit on appeal on its own earlier judgment in the case.”

The respondent, with the leave of this court granted on he 13th of May 1996, filed his own brief and identified 3 issues for determination as follows:-

1. Did the trial court act within or outside her powers in defining the scope and intendment of her judgment of 30th January, 1992 in her ruling of 24th June, 1993.
2. Was the ruling of the trial court on the application for committal of the respondent by the appellant on the 24th of June, 1993, a review of its judgment of 30.1.92.
3. Was the interpretation given or boundaries set out by the trial court of the terms and orders made on 30.1.92 correct and legal in definition of the scope and intendment of the said order by its ruling of 24.6.93.”

There is actually one issue in this matter that is whether or not the trial Judge was right in making orders in her ruling of 24th June, 1993 June, 1993 which had the effect of altering her judgment of 30th January 1992.

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that once the judgment of a High Court had been delivered in clear terms and on concrete legal issues the said court cannot re-open, review re-hear or alter the said judgment unless it was obtained by fraud, or it contains accidental slip or omissions or arithmetical errors which may be corrected. He said that once a court has given judgment, it becomes functus officio and can no longer alter that judgment and the matter becomes res judicata. He relied on the case of Ibere v. Ume-Ohana (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt.227) 510. Learned counsel finally submitted that a court is bound by its own judgment against which an appeal has not been lodged and cited the following cases in support: – S.C.D.C.C. Ltd v. Katonecrete Ltd. (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 44) 791 (CA); Arcon v. Fassassi (No.4) (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 42 SC; Bakare v. Area 4 NWLR (Pt.33) 1 SC.

In reply, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the orders made by the trial court in its ruling of the 24th of June, 1993 were further clarifications of its earlier orders of 30th January 1992 for the avoidence of doubt and to inform all parties of their rights and limitations under those orders to prevent the situation where application for committal would be made in future by either party due to misconception of the scope and extent of the court’s orders. The learned counsel in another breath submitted that the trial court did not vary, amend, add/or interfere in its judgment delivered earlier. Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the court which gives a judgment can still exercise powers in respect of that judgment, for example in an application for stay of execution and that it is not in every case that the court becomes functus officio.

Having carefully considered the arguments of learned counsel on either side, I am of the view that the answer to the issue argue before this court is relatively simple. It is trite law that once a court has delivered its judgment it becomes functus officio and ceases to have powers to tamper with that judgment in any way except in situation like correction of clerical mistakes and arithmetical errors. See Badejo v. Federal Ministers of Education & Ors (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt.464) 15 at page 63, and S.G.B. (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor v. Awaye Motors C. Ltd (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.234) 231 at page 244.

It is also trite law that a court of law is bound to limit itself to the claims or reliefs sought before it. In other words a court must not go outside the reliefs sought before it to make gratuitous orders. See Chief Ebba v. Chief Ogodo & Anor (1984) 4 SC 84 at page 99; Imoloame v. WAEC (1992) 9NWLR (Pt.265) at page 321, and Okhideme v. Toto (1962) 1 All NLR 309.In this appeal the trial Judge gave her judgment on the 30th of January 1992 granting a perpetual injunction against the respondent without any conditions whatsoever. That same court, while considering an application for committal of the respondent for contempt of court in its ruling of the 24th of June 1993, made orders which were not asked for by the appellant. The appellant’s application was simply for an order of committal of the respondent to prison for disobeying the orders of the court contained in its judgment of 30th of January, 1992. There was no prayer for expatiation of the judgment or its interpretation. All that the court was required to do was to determine whether the respondent was in contempt of the court’s judgment or not. The trial court found that the respondent was not in contempt, then went out of its way to make the orders sought for, and which had the effect of altering the nature of its earlier judgment by extending the orders of injunction to both parties as distinct from the injunctive orders in the earlier judgment which affected only the respondent. In doing so the trial court acted without jurisdiction.

Consequently I allow this appeal and set aside the 3 orders contained in the last paragraph of the court’s ruling dated the 24th June 1993 as invalid. The appellant is entitled to costs of N 1,000 against the respondent.

Other Citations: (1996)LCN/0238(CA)