Alhaji Moshood Olatunji & Anor V. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (2002)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
ADEREMI, J.C.A.
In the Federal High Court, sitting in Lagos (Coram R. N. UKEJE, J., as she then was), the appellants, stand charged with three counts viz:-
Count(1)That you Alhaji Moshood Olatunji, male, adult, Nigerian, Augelito Marinay (a.k.a. little or lito) male, adult, Philipino, sometimes in the month of August, 2001, at Lagos, within the jurisdiction of this court, conspired with one Ade Emmanuel (now at large), to use the facilities of Brazillian Merchant Vessel Clipper ITA JAI to import 60 kilogrammes of cocaine, a narcotic drug into Nigeria and you thereby, committed an offence contrary to and punishable under section 10 (b) of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (Amendment) Act No. 15 of 1992.
Count(2)That you, Alhaji Moshood Olatunji, male, adult, Nigerian, Augelito Marinay (a.k.a. “little” or “Lito”) male, adult, Philipino on or about the 27th day of August, 2001, at Berth Number 2 Tincan Island Port, Lagos, within the jurisdiction of this Court, using the facilities of Brazillian Merchant Vessel Clipper ITA JAI, without lawful authority imported 60 kilogrammes of cocaine, a narcotic drug into Nigeria and you thereby, committed an offence contrary to and punishable under section 10(a) of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act, Cap. 253, L.F.N. 1990.
Count(3) That you, Alhaji Moshood Olatunji, male, adult, Nigerian citizen on or about the 27th day of August, 2001, at Berth Number 2 Tincan Island Port, Lagos, within the jurisdiction of this court knowingly and without lawful authority, possessed 60 kilogrammes of cocaine a narcotic drug and you thereby, committed an offence contrary to and punishable under section 10(a) of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (Amendment) Act No. 15 of 1992.
The two appellants were arraigned and charged before the court below on 24th September, 2001. The plea of the accused persons/appellants was taken on that day. Each of them pleaded not guilty.
By a summons dated and filed on the 20th September, 2001, the appellants applied for an order of the court below admitting them to bail, pending the hearing of the charge preferred against them. Arguments of counsel on the application were taken, and in a reserved ruling delivered on the 4th of October, 2001, the court below refused the application. Dissatisfied with the said ruling, the accused persons/appellants have appealed there from to this court. In the notice of appeal, the appellants raised seven grounds and had there from identified seven issues for determination. They are as follows:
(i) Whether in the circumstances of the charge the quantity disentitles the appellants to bail?
(ii) Whether the absence of Ade Emmanuel allegedly a co-accused who is still at large will disentitle the
appellants to their bail?
(iii) Whether the emphasis on the weight of evidence amassed in proof of the prosecution’s case does not
prejudice the case of the appellants to suggest being guilty before the trial?
(iv) Whether the fact that the second accused, who is the second appellant is not a Nigerian, is a ground to refuse their application for bail?
(v) Whether on the materials before the court, the second appellant could be said to have contacts to disentitle them to their bail application?
(vi) Whether it was appropriate to rely on an assumption that the offence for which the accused persons are charged, is one of confinement only as the basis for the refusal of bail while the law provides an option of fine?
(vii) Whether the appellants are not entitled to bail on the strength of the medical reports before the court?
For their part, the respondent has raised three issues for determination; and as set out in their brief of argument they are in the following terms:
(i) Whether the factors taken into consideration in refusing bail to the appellants by the learned trial Judge to wit; the quantity of the alleged imported drugs, weight of evidence amassed in proof of prosecution’s case, the fact that Ade Emmanuel, a co-accused is still at large, the fact that the second accused/appellant is not a Nigerian and the assumption that the offences for which the accused persons are charged, is one of confinement without option of fine are proper in law?
(ii) Whether the absence of Ade Emmanuel a co-accused at large and other materials placed before the court were enough evidence of contacts abroad to disentitle the appellants to bail?
(iii) Whether the appellants are not entitled to bail on the strength of the medical reports before the court?
When this appeal came before us on the 21st November, 2001, Chief Idowu Sofola, SAN learned Counsel for the appellants adopted the appellants brief filed on the 8th of November, 2001 and the reply brief filed on 20th November, 2001 and urged the court to allow the appeal and grant the accused persons/appellants bail. Mr. Oloruntoba, learned Counsel for the respondent, also adopted the respondent’s brief of argument deemed to have been filed on the 21st of November, 2001, and urged that the appeal be dismissed. He urged this court not to consider the issue of transfer of the case to another Judge.
A careful perusal of issues Nos. 1, 2 ,3, 4 and 6, in the appellants’ brief of argument, leave me in no doubt that they are subsumed in issues Nos. 1 and 2, raised by the respondent. Issue No.5 in the appellants’ brief is materially identical with issue No.2 in the respondent’s brief; while issue No.7 in the appellants’ brief, is a replica of issue No.3 in the respondent’s brief. I will therefore, proceed to treat all the issues raised by both parties and the respective arguments canvassed thereon in their respective briefs in the groupings that I have set them above. On issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, the appellants had argued in their brief that by virtue of section 118 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 90, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, which according to them, is relevant here, they are entitled to bail. They contend that the learned trial Judge was in error to have held that the quantity i.e., 60 kilogrammes of cocaine allegedly imported by the appellants constituted a disentitlement to their bail such quantity, they reasoned, may only be relevant for consideration in pronouncing sentence after the accused might have been found guilty and convicted under our Constitution, they further argued an accused person is presumed innocent until he is found guilty under the due process of law; reliance was placed on the decision in Seidu v. The State (1982) 4 SC 41, (1982) 1 N.C.R 49. While referring to the cases of Anaekwe v. C.O.P. (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.436) 320 at 323 and Ogueri v. The State (2000) 5 WRN 27, they submitted that Anaekwe’s case is distinguishable as it is a case of murder.
No matter the degree of the seriousness of an offence, a court of law is not precluded from granting a bail they opined while citing the decision on Danbaba v. The State (2000) 14 NWLR (Pt. 687) 396 for that proposition. On issue No.2 they argued that it is prejudicial to the appellants to refuse them bail for the simple reason, that Ade Emmanuel, an alleged co-accused is outside the country. On issue No.3, it is their argument that the emphasis by the trial court on the weight of evidence amassed as proof of the prosecution’s case is prejudicial to the appellants in that, according to them, is an inclination to finding the accused persons guilty. On issue No.4 they submitted that there is nothing in Nigerian Law, which disentitles an accused person to bail purely on a reason that he is not a Nigerian.
Where however, there is a cogent material before the court which points to the fact that the accused would abscond from the country, if granted bail, the court may still grant bail on very stringent conditions that will ensure their attendance for the trial. On Issue No.6 the argument of the appellants is that given if the only punishment for the offence for which the accused/appellants are charged is imprisonment that itself might not dissent title the accused persons/appellants/applicants from being granted bail. Indeed, by virtue of the provisions of section 382(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the trial Judge, may in the exercise of his discretion impose a fine in respect of count two; they relied on the decisions in (1) Apamadari v. The State (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt.493) 289 and (2) Ebhohimen v. The State (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 422) 44.
On issue No.1, in the respondent’s brief of argument which issue encompasses Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, in the appellants’ brief, the respondent argued that the question of grant or refusal of bail by a court is a matter of discretion, which is exercised in accordance with laid-down rules, and once the exercise of that discretion has been carried out in accordance with the laid-down rules an appellate court will not interfere with that exercise. Reviewing the facts of this case, the respondent argued that the court below properly exercised its discretion by refusing bail to the appellants. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Chief P.O. Anaekwe v. Com. of Police (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.430) 320; (2) Okpe v. The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.345) 490 and (3) Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of Celestial Church of Christ (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.675) 315, (2000) WRN29.
Issue No.5 on the appellants’ brief is materially similar to Issue No.2 on the respondent’s brief. On this issue the appellants had submitted that since the basis for bail is constitutional, the mere fact without more that an accused person has contacts abroad will not ipso facto disentitle him to a bail, the learned trial Judge was therefore wrong to have praised the refusal of bail also on that point.
On issue 2 on the respondent’s brief a contrary argument to justify the stand of the court below has been professed. The respondent submitted that given the facts that Ade Emmanuel who was charged for conspiracy with the appellants in this case to import sixty kilogrammes of cocaine is still at large and given the written admission of the appellants that the drug was imported with the connivance of Ade Emmanuel, who is said to be presently residing in Brazil the trial Judge was right into the conclusion that the fact that Ade Emmanuel still remains at large necessarily heightens the risk of probability that the appellants if released on bail would flee from justice by jumping bail. Issue No.7 on the appellant’s brief poses the question whether the appellants are not entitled to bail on the strength of the medical report before the court.
They argued that ill-health which is the basis of exhibits A and B – the medical reports tendered on behalf of the appellants at the court below, constitute a special circumstance that warrants the grant of bail pending the determination of the case preferred against the accused persons; reliance was placed on the decisions in (1) Fawehinmi v. The State (1990) 1NWLR (Pt.l27) 486 at 488 and (2) Jamal v. The State (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt.472) 352. The respondent countered the appellants on this submission when they, in dealing with issue No.3 on their brief, submitted that ill-health simpliciter does not constitute special circumstance warranting the grant of a bail. They further submitted that the medical reports put forward by the appellants particularly that of the second appellant, is fraught with suspicion in that as at 28th of June, 2001, when the second appellant purportedly attended the Lagos State Hospital, he was actually on the high sea on his way back to Brazil. The medical reports they further argued do not give the current state of health of the appellants’ rather, they relate to what their state of health was before they were arrested.
In refusing the bail for the appellants, the learned trial Judge held:
“Applying all the parameters set-out in the two superior judicial decisions supra, to the facts of this case, the following scenario emerges:
(a) the two accused persons are together charged along with one Ade Emmanuel, now at large, with importing into Nigeria, 60 kilogrammes of cocaine, on board a Brazilian Merchant Vessel, ITA JAS (Count one) contrary to section 10(b) of NDLEA (Amendment) Act, 1992.
(b) the two accused persons are also charged jointly with importing 60 kilogrammes into Nigeria, an offence punishable under section local of the NDLEA Act, (Cap. 253) LFN, 1990.
(c)) the 1st accused, Alhaji Moshood Olatunji alone is charged with possession of 60 kilogrammes of cocaine, contrary to section 10(H) of the NDLEA (Amendment) Act, 1992.”
There is in the court’s file, proof of evidence, which includes the statement of not less than 20 witnesses including the statement of the two accused persons. There is also before the Court 5 documentary exhibits, being the result of tests conducted on the exhibits, the subject-matter of the charge herein.
In this case, I have read the charge against the accused persons, the facts of the case and the proof of evidence in support of the prosecution’s case, and all other processes are in the file.
In the entire circumstances of this charge, the odds weigh heavily against the grant of bail to the accused persons, pending trial, because –
(1) having regard to the enormity of the cargo alleged to be imported (60 kilogrammes of cocaine).
(2) the fact that Ade Emmanuel, co-accused person, is still at large, presumably outside Nigeria.
(3) the weight of evidence amassed in proof of the prosecution’s case (including the statements of the two accused persons)
(4) the fact that the 2nd accused person is a foreigner,
(5) the accused persons have contacts abroad; and
(6) not least, the sentence which the offence would attract, should the accused person be convicted, (sentences of between 15 – 25 years and for life sentence, respectively) .
“I therefore, rule that this case is not a proper one in which this Court may exercise its discretion in favour
of granting bail to either of the two accused persons. In place of an order granting bail, I shall lean in favour of expedited trial.
In that regard, both the prosecution and the defence shall use their best endeavours to ensure that the trial
of the accused person shall proceed expeditiously and without any needless delay.
That alone will ensure that the two accused persons are available to stand trial and in addition, are not held in custody awaiting trial, over a long period of time:
Accordingly, the application for bail fails it is refused and dismissed.”
As I have said above, aggrieved with this ruling, the accused/appellants have lodged an appeal there from to this court. They subsequently brought an application for bail.
The summons for bail before the court below was brought pursuant to section 118(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 80, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, sections 35 (4) and 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Section 118(2) of C.P.A. provides:
“Where a person is charged with any felony other than a felony punishable with death, the court may, if it thinks fit, admit him to bail.”
This provision confers discretionary power on the court to grant bail.
Section 35(4) of the 1999 Constitution provides:
“Any person who is arrested or detained in accordance with subsection (1) (c) of this section, shall be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time and if he is not tried within a period of;
(a) two months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who is in custody or is not entitled to bail; or
(b) three months from the date of his arrest or detention in the case of a person who has been released on bail,
he shall (without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him) be released either
unconditionally or upon such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for trial at a
later date.”
Sub-section (1)(c) of section 35, envisages a situation where the detention or arrest is for the purpose of bringing the person to court in execution of the order of a court or upon a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offence or to a reasonable degree of preventing him from committing a criminal offence. Section 36 (5) of the Constitution prescribes that, an accused person is presumed to be innocent, until he is proved, by due process of the law, to be guilty. The 1st and 2nd accused/appellants are jointly charged under section 10 (a) and (b) of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (Amendment) Act, No’. 15 of 1992 while the 1st accused/appellant alone is charged under section 10(H).
Section 10(A) of the Act provides:
“Any person, who being the occupier or is concerned in the management of any premises, unlawfully permits or causes the premises to be used for the purpose of storing, concealing, processing or dealing in the drug popularly known as cocaine, LSD, heroine or any other similar drug shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and liable on conviction to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty-five years.”
Section 10 (B) provides:
“Any person who is unlawfully concerned in the storage custody, movement, carriage or concealment of the drug popularly known as cocaine, LSD, heroin or any other similar drug and who, while so concerned is armed with any offensive weapon or disguised in any way shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and liable on conviction to be sentenced to imprisonment for life.”
Section 10(H)
“Any person who, without lawful authority, knowingly possesses the drugs popularly known as cocaine, LSD, heroine or any other similar drug shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and liable an conviction, to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than fifteen years and not exceeding twenty-five years.”
The above are the provisions of the law under which the appellants are charged and the provisions of the law and the Constitution under which they are now seeking bail. I bear in mind that it is the sacred duty of a Judge. to apply the law by seeking conscientiously to give fair effect to the wordings of legislative provisions.
That is a duty which every Judge assumes as part of the price of his independence. That again in my opinion, is his ethical duty. To do otherwise is to act improperly. The general rule that I can deduce from section 118 (2) of the C.P.A. is that in case of imprisonable offences bail may be granted if it can be established that there is no risk that he will fail to surrender himself to custody, or that he will commit an offence while on bail or even interfere with witnesses or even jump bail, thus, not surrendering himself to justice. These are the factors, which in my view, a Judge must always bear in mind in the exercise of his discretion to grant or refuse bail. But, like all applications seeking orders of court, an applicant for bail must first place before the court, for its consideration, materials upon which to found the exercise of its discretion. It is after the applicant for bail has discharged the onus that rests on him to place before the court for its consideration that the onus will shift to the prosecution to show cause why the bail should not be granted. This principle of shifting of onus of proof in criminal jurisprudence with respect to bail, is akin to the principle of proof in civil jurisprudence, which stipulates that burden of proof shifts from plaintiff to the defendant, and vice versa, from time to time, as the case progresses. This duty of proof called “onus probandi” rests on the party who would fail if no evidence at all, or no more evidence, as the case may be, were given on either side. In the instant case, the applicants for bail are the accused/appellants. It is they who are challenging their detention in custody and consequently, asking the court to release them.
They are asserting the affirmative of the issue, which is granting of bail. The duty of proof is on them. I hasten to say that the mere fact that the prosecution fails to file a counter-affidavit in opposition to the affidavit filed by an applicant for bail or even where an application for bail is made orally and the prosecution does not oppose, is not conclusive enough to admit an accused/applicant to bail as a matter of course.
As I have said above, the court has the discretion to grant bail in this case. But the exercise of that power must not be whimsical. Then what are the guidelines to be followed in exercising that discretion? On settled judicial authorities, the considerations that guide the court in granting or refusing application for bail pending trial as opposed to those pending the determination of an appeal are in the following terms: –
(1) the nature of the charge.
(2) the strength of the evidence by which the charge is supported.
(3) the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction.
(4) the criminal record of the accused, if any.
(5) the likelihood of the repetition of the offence.
(6) the probability that the accused may not surrender himself for trial; thus not bringing himself to justice.
(7) the risk that if released, the accused may interfere with witnesses or suppress the evidence likely to incriminate him.
See (1) Bamaiyi v. The State & Ors. (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt.715) 270; (2) Chinemelu v. Com. of Police (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.390) 467 and (3) Danbaba v. The State (2000) 14 NWLR (Pt.687) 396. I shall now proceed to examine the materials placed before the court which they hold, should warrant the exercise of the court’s discretion to grant them bail. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, of the appellant’s affidavit before the court below, represent the material evidence which they placed before the court in support of their prayer for the grant of bail. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, of the counter-affidavit are the materials put forward in opposing the application.
Paragraph 4 reads:
Para. 4: That I have been informed by the accused/applicants and I verily believe to be true that;
(a) they were arrested on 27th August, 2001, at the Tincan Island Port, Apapa, Lagos, by the officers of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA),
(b) since they were arrested they have been in detention,
(c) they were charged for conspiracy to import and/or illegal importation and possession of cocaine under the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act, Cap. 253, Laws of the Federation, 1990.
Para. 5: “That I was informed by the 1st accused/applicant and I verily believe to be true that his health is seriously deteriorating and has been diagnosed with chronic diabetes.
Para. 6: That the 1st accused/applicant who had been treated and managed at the General Hospital, Lagos has been referred to the General Hospital for further treatment due to the complications involved in his ailment.
Attached herewith and marked Exhibit A is a Medical Report dated 3rd September, 2001.
Para. 7: That I was equally informed by the 2nd accused/applicant and I verily believe to be true that his health is seriously deteriorating and he has been diagnosed with chronic hypertension.
Para. 8: That the 3rd accused/applicant had been treated and managed at the General Hospital Lagos and has been referred to the Specialist Hospital for further treatment as a result of the complication arising from his ailment.
Attached herewith and marked Exh. B is a Medical Report dated 6th September, 2001.
Para. 9: That the accused/applicants are required to see their doctors on regular basis.
Para.11: That I have been informed by the accused/applicants and I verily believe to be true that their health is presently deteriorating, as a result of their continued incarceration and the medical facilities are not readily available to treat them.
Para. 12: That the accused/applicants health would assume a terrible dimension if they are not granted bail to enable them seek urgent medical- attention.
Para. 13: That I have been informed further by the accused/applicants and I verily believe to be true that:
(a) they will not jump bail if granted, neither is there any risk of their escaping from justice.
(b) they will not commit any offence, neither will they interfere with any further investigations or prosecution of this case.
Para.14:That the accused/applicants are law abiding citizens of Nigeria and Philipines with no record of previous conviction by any court of law in this country or any part of the world.
Para.15: That the accused/applicants are ready to provide substantial sureties to stand for them on such terms and conditions as this honourable court may deem fit to make if they are granted bail.
Para. 16: That the accused/applicants will suffer great hardship if they are refused bail.
Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9, of the counter-affidavit sworn to in opposition to the grant of bail read:
Para.6: That I depose to the facts within my knowledge and as having been disclosed to me by the Investigation Officer, Raymond Obaji Njor, I very believe:
(a) That Exhibit A which is the medical report dated 3/9/2001, as well as Exh. B medical report dated 6th September, 2001, appear to be false and spurious documents calculated to deceive this honourable court in this case.
(b) That, as 28/6/2001, when Augelito Marinay was said to have been presented at Lagos State General Hospital, Broad Street, Lagos, his ship and himself were not in Nigeria but in the high sea on their way back to Ita in Brazil.
(c) That the medical report for the 1st accused was made for the purpose of this proceedings and to deceive this court.
(d) That the accused/applicants have been in good condition health-wise without any complaint of any illness throughout their detention in NDLEA cell.
Para. 7: That Femi Oloruntoba, one of the counsel in this case informed me in our office on 21/9/2001 and I verily believe him
(a) That bail is a discretion of the court,
(b) That the applicants are not entitle to the discretion of this court as they have misled this court by presenting spurious medical reports.
(c) That the scourge of drug trafficking has brought Nigeria into a lot of contempt in the comity of nations.
(d) That the offences the applicants are charged, will carry life imprisonment punishment.
(e) That the applicants will jump bail once released on bail as they have connections outside this country.
Para. 8: That the applicants have confessed to these offences in their statements as contained in the proof of Evidence before this court.
The above depositions in the affidavit and counter-affidavit represent the case for the grant and refusal of bail presented by the parties. It is on these depositions that the learned trial Judge had founded, after evaluation, the order refusing the application on the exercise of her discretion. I have read the ruling of the trial Judge and related it to the printed evidence. She has made some findings which I have reproduced above. No Judge has discretion in making his findings of fact. She has reviewed actually all the known judicial authorities on the issue of bail. Again no Judge is conferred with any discretion in his rulings on law. Having made necessary findings of fact and necessary ruling on law, the stage reached at the tail end of the ruling is the asking of the question as to what is the fair and just thing to do or order to make in the instant case. To me in answering that question, the learned trial Judge embarked on the exercise of a discretion. That exercise has led to this appeal. I repeat what I have said above that section 118(2) of the C.P.A. confers discretionary power on the court. In answering that question and in coming into the decision reached in the said ruling it would appear that a trial Judge might be seen to be at large. But that is not so; for in a democratic society governed by the rule of law no one-literally no one-is entrusted with unfettered power. A proper exercise of judicial discretion so said the Supreme Court in the decision in The University of Lagos & Ors. v. Olaniyan & Ors. (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 156, (1985) 1 SC 295, must be done according to law and not humour, it is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular; the Apex Court approved of the decision of LORD MANSFIELD in R. v. Wilkes 4, BURR, 2839. I would say that the exercise must be logical; it must flow directly from a thorough appraisal of the materials presented before the court. Where that exercise is lacking in logicality, an appellate court has a right and duty to interfere. The gravity or seriousness of the charge is not in doubt. The severity of the punishment admits of no argument. Giving a balanced assessment or evaluation of the printed evidence and taking judicial notice of the fact as I must do, that drug trafficking has done incalculable damage to the reputation of this country -a solid point made by the respondent and which has not been denied, I cannot say with certainty that the accused/appellants will later surrender themselves for trial if granted bail. I have again cast a careful search – light on the materials before the court, I cannot identify any inhibition in the quick trial of the case. It therefore defies all explanation why the accused/appellants are not pursuing the commencement of the trial of the case instead of running after the grant of bail. Can I then, in the light of all I have said above, say that the learned trial Judge has not exercised her discretion judicially and judiciously with one view in mind and that is dispensing justice? It is without hesitation that I proffer an answer in the negative. I agree entirely with the learned trial Judge when in her ruling, she said in place of an order granting bail, she would lean in favour of an expedited trial. The time and energy wasted in the pursuit of grant of bail would have been better utilized in pursuing the quick trial of the substantive case. I enjoin all concerned to quickly set into motion machinery for the immediate trial of the case at the court below in the interest of justice and for the preservation of the good name of this country. Justice of this matter, at this stage, cannot find a better expression. Consequently, all the issues identified by the accused/ appellants are resolved against them. The three issues raised by the respondents are resolved in their favour.
In the final result, this appeal which is immeritorious is hereby dismissed.
Other Citations: (2002)LCN/1065(CA)
