Amobi V. Ogidi Union (Nig) & Ors (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

This Appeal involving a Chieftaincy matter, turns on a narrow issue of whether it is the exclusive preserve of the Uru Ogidi Quarters in Ogidi, Anambra State, and the Amobi Family in particular, to produce the IGWE or EZE of the town.

In 2003, the President of the Uru Ogidi Union, and six other Plaintiffs, including fifth and sixth Respondents herein, instituted an action for themselves and on behalf of the Uru Ogidi Quarters, Ogidi, at the Idemili Judicial Division of Anambra State High Court, sitting in Ogidi, wherein they claimed as follows:

(a) A Declaration – that the document purporting to be the Igwe Ogidi Constitution which was made by the 1st to 3rd Defendants is not a legal document in that the production of the same did not comply with the norms, rules, and regulations for the production of such important document and therefore null and void.

(b) A Declaration – that from time immemorial URU QUARTER of Ogidi is the provider of EZE or IGWE Ogidi and that there has not been any reason for a change.

(c) An Order – restraining the Defendants, their agents, or privies from the proposed selection of Eze or Igwe Ogidi from any quarter except URU QUARTER Ogidi, in accordance with the traditional history and custom of Ogidi.

(d) A Declaration – that the proposed selection of EZE or IGWE Ogidi on 11/10/2003 is not in conformity with the history, culture, and tradition of Ogidi and is therefore unconstitutional and a negation of the customs and practices of Ogidi people.

(e) A Declaration that the appellation of EZE CHUAMAGHA 1 as the new Eze or Igwe Ogidi is a total negation of the history and tradition of Ogidi people since it presupposes that Ogidi is now getting an Igwe or Eze for the first time.

(f) An Order – that Eze or Igwe Ogidi shall be selected from the URU QUARTER Ogidi in keeping with the custom and tradition of the people of Ogidi.

(g) An Order of injunction against the Defendants, their agents, or privies in any manner whatsoever from imposing the so called IGWE OGIDI CONSTITUTION 2003 (REVISED) on the Ogidi people particularly Uru Ogidi Community.

There were four Defendants – first, third and fourth Respondents herein as the first, third and fourth Defendants, and one “Chief Sir Chudi Obiakor, President General, Ogidi Union, Nigeria”, as second Defendant, and their stand was that there is nowhere in the Constitution of Ogidi or tradition where it is provided or shown that the said Stool resides in the exclusive preserve of Amobi Family of Uru Quarter or in Uru Quarter itself. In his judgment delivered on 17/12/2012, the learned trial Judge, Anigbogu, J, dismissed the said claims and concluded:

It is hereby declared that from the available evidence, and the Constitution based on the existing facts and Exhibits, the Stool of Igwe or Eze Ogidi is not hereditary and every free born of Ogidi, including the Plaintiffs and the 4th Defendant, is entitled to aspire to be selected to that throne.

The said Plaintiffs, who were dissatisfied, then appealed to the Court of Appeal, wherein they also lost, because the Court of Appeal in its judgment delivered on 10/5/2017, dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial Court.

The Appellant, who was substituted at the Court of Appeal as the sixth Appellant after the death of “Chief Collins Ibaku Amobi”, appealed to this Court with a Notice of Appeal that he later amended. The amended Notice of Appeal has eight Grounds of Appeal, and he has distilled five Issues for Determination.

For now, the first to fourth Respondents filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection urging this Court to strike out the Appeal on eight Grounds but they withdrew Grounds A to E, at the hearing of the Appeal, and are relying on the following:

F. The 1st to 4th Respondents to this Appeal and as contained in the Notice of Appeal filed on 01/08/2017 are not the same 1st to 4th Respondents, who were sued as the 1st to 4th Defendants at the trial Court nor are the same 1st to 4th Respondents against whom an appeal was lodged at the Court of Appeal vide Notice of Appeal filed on 19/12/2012.

G. Leave of Court neither sought nor obtained by the Appellants before changing or substituting any of the Parties that appeared at the lower Court.

H. In the circumstances, there is no competent or valid appeal before this Hon. Court.

In addition to the 18-paragraph Affidavit in support and 14-paragraph Counter Affidavit in opposition to the Notice of Preliminary Objection, parties filed and adopted their respective Written Addresses. The first to fourth Respondents submitted in their Address that the sole Issue for determination by this Court is “Whether the Appeal of the Appellants as constituted is competent and can be determined by this Honourable Court”, and the Appellant adopted same in his.

The said Respondents’ contention is that the Appellant had substituted the name of -Sir Chudi Obiakor with another Party, “Sir Chudi Okafor, without the leave of the Court of Appeal, therefore, the Notice of Appeal (Exhibit D) filed in this Court on 01/08/2017 is incompetent, and it ought to be struck out.

They cited Order 2 Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules and PPA v. INEC (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 215 SC and Obi v. Etiaba (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 377) 388 CA, in support of their arguments. The Appellant, however, argued that the authorities cited by the Respondents do not apply in this case because he did not substitute any Party at the Court below and the names of the Parties were as reflected in its judgment; that “the Judgment was the guiding factor used to initiate this Appeal”; and that assuming but without conceding that his name was wrongly written by the Court of Appeal, “this Appeal does not hang on the 2nd Respondent, of which without him, this Appeal will not be vitiated”.

​Now, in their supporting Affidavit, the said Respondents listed the seven Plaintiffs at the trial Court in paragraph 6, and further averred in paragraph 7:

On 17/12/2012 coram the Hon. Justice Anigbogu, judgment was entered against the Plaintiffs named in paragraph 6 (a copy is attached as Exhibit A). The then Plaintiffs aggrieved with the judgment lodged a Notice of Appeal against same (copy attached as Exhibit B). Chief Sir Chuddy (sic) Okafor was not a Party to the Suit determined by the trial Court nor a named Party on Exhibit B nor was there an Order of Court joining or substituting him as a Party.

How the Appellant came into the picture is not clear in the Record transmitted to this Court, but the Court can look at any document in the file to resolve any issues before it – see Agbaisi v. Ebikorefe (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 630 SC.

In this case, the first to fourth Respondents filed a Counter-Affidavit to another Application filed by the Appellant in this Court, wherein they averred:

9. The herein named Applicant, Chief Cyril Uzor Amobi [the Appellant herein), applied for leave to appeal as an Interested Party and vide the Ruling of the Honourable Court of Appeal delivered on 9/12/2014 his application was refused. A copy of the Ruling is hereby exhibited as Exhibit F. The said Ruling does not form part of the Records compiled by the Applicant.
10. Upon the demise of the 6th Appellant, Chief Collins Ibaku Amobi, who was a Party to the proceedings as a Member, Uru, Ogidi, the Honourable Court of Appeal granted the 6th Appellant (the Appellant herein) leave to be substituted in the stead of the late Chief Collins Ibaku Amobi. Exhibit E is referred to.

In the said Exhibit E, an enrolled Order of the Court of Appeal dated 1/12/2016, it was ordered inter alia that “the Application by Chief Cyril Uzor Amobi praying to be substituted for the deceased 6th Appellant is hereby granted”. In effect, the Appellant herein became a Party to the Appeal when that Order was made. I have gone through the Record of Appeal and there is nowhere therein where the Appellant substituted the name of the second Respondent in this Appeal, after he himself was substituted for the deceased 6th Appellant in the Appeal.

There is nothing in the processes filed at the Court of Appeal that shows how or why the name of the second Defendant at the trial Court changed to “Chief Sir Chudi Okafor”, as the second Respondent at the Court of Appeal and I do not see why the Appellant should be held responsible or be penalized for a wrong name listed by the Court of Appeal in the judgment appealed against.

As it is, “Chief Chudi Obiakor’ at the trial Court and “Chief Chudi Okafor’ at Court of Appeal is said to be the “President-General, Ogidi Union, Nigeria”, and Appellant is right that this Appeal does not hang on the said Respondent. The bottom line is that the Appellant cannot be blamed for the name change, therefore, the said Preliminary Objection lacks merit, and it is hereby overruled.

As to the main Appeal, the Appellant submitted in his Brief of Argument that having abandoned Grounds VI, VII and VIII of the Grounds of Appeal and adding a new Ground VI thereto, the Issues for Determination are as follows:

I. Did the Court of Appeal Justices err in law by rejecting “Igwe Ogidi Constitution 2003”, which the 1st to 3rd Respondents relied upon to hold that “Igwe Ogidi Constitution 1975”, which did not emanate from the Plaintiffs’ Pleadings, which indeed determines issues at stake in a matter, more so there is no counter claim; and went on to hold that if any “Igwe elect” made a declaration under the 1975 Constitution, every Ogidi man is bound by the declaration.

II. Was the Court of Appeal right by deciding that if any Igwe elect made a declaration under the 1975 Constitution before coronation as required by that Constitution or custom, every Ogidi man whether of Uru or not is bound, as that declaration is valid as stated at page 441 – and does Exhibits Q to Q11 show that Uru people and Amobi family cannot exclusively produce the Igwe of Ogidi?

III. Is the decision of the Court of Appeal that the remark by the trial Judge that every free born son of Ogidi is entitled to aspire to be selected to that throne a passing remark, which so called passing remark forms the basis of the case, without taking into consideration that the Parties joined issues in that respect, which is therefore ratio decidendi instead of obiter dictum as decided by the Court, thereby caused miscarriage of justice.

IV. Did the noble Justices of the Court of Appeal err in law by not having the reliefs sought in the case in view, after rejecting the purported Igwe Ogidi 2003 Constitution, went ahead to decide the case based on other Igwe Ogidi Constitution of 1944 and 1975 particularly the 1975 Constitution which were not the Constitutions applied in the contest, and lost sight of the evidence placed before the Court.

V. Did the Court of Appeal fail to evaluate the oral and documentary evidence before the Court, which caused miscarriage of justice and came to an erroneous decision.

The first to fourth Respondents “reformulated’ the Issues for Determination as distilled by the Appellant “for better clarity and cohesive understanding”, thus:

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the judgment of the Trial Court rejecting the 2003 Igwe Ogidi Chieftaincy Constitution and subsequently relying on the 1975 Igwe Ogidi Chieftaincy Constitution as the Constitution governing chieftaincy matters in Ogidi in the absence of any counter claim by the Defendants.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the decision of the Trial Court holding that the Uru Quarter and the Amobi Family were bound by Exhibits Q1 to Q11 and in holding that the Declaration of an Igwe elect in Ogidi binds every Ogidi man.
3. Is the decision of the Court of Appeal that the remark by the trial Judge that every free born son of Ogidi is entitled to aspire to be selected to that throne a passing remark, an obiter dictum rather than a ratio decidendi, correct in view of the fact that Parties joined issues on same.
4. Did the Court of Appeal fail to evaluate the oral and documentary evidence before the Court which caused miscarriage of Justice and came to an erroneous decision.

The fifth and sixth Respondents did not file any brief of argument or processes in this Appeal, therefore, this Appeal shall be determined on the existing Briefs, and I shall hereinafter refer to first to fourth Respondents as the Respondents.

I will readily accept the Issues “reformulated’ by the Respondents since, in my view, the Appellants’ Issues are quite verbose and inelegantly drafted. The Respondents’ Issues are concise and straight to the point. For instance, their Issue 1 covers Issues I, II & IV formulated by the Appellant, which deals with the questions surrounding the Ogidi Constitutions of 1944, 1975 and 2003.

The Plaintiffs’ case was that the 2003 Constitution did not conform with the Traditional Rulers Law, and was not made with the Community’s approval, but they did not tender it in evidence. When fourth Defendant’s Counsel applied to do so, the Plaintiffs’ Counsel raised an objection, and the trial Court ruled:

The Constitution sought to be tendered- is not in agreement with what is pleaded. The document listed is different from what was pleaded and what is being tendered is entirely different from the 2003 Constitution of Ogidi Community – listed. The Igwe Ogidi Constitution being tendered is rejected.

In its judgment, the trial Court held as follows on the issue of the Constitutions:

As for 1944 and 1975 Constitutions, which predates the present dispensation – it is safe to conclude that the last Constitution. i.e., the 1975 Constitution, which is being relied upon, was accepted, and approved by Government – As for 2003 Constitution – it is incumbent on the Defendants to prove it as accepted and approved by the Government and that they can do only by tendering in evidence a certified true copy of what is in the possession of the State Government – I hold that the 2003 purported Constitution of Ogidi is invalid, void and of no effect. Any evidence based on [it] – is hereby rejected and expunged from our Records as if it were never admitted. Any exercise or purported exercise under the auspices of the said Constitution in relation to the subject matter of this Suit, the selection of Igwe Ogidi is hereby declared null and void. It must be stated that the defence submitted that they do not dispute that the approval of the State Government to the 2003 Constitution was not obtained prior to the commencement of the selection process. Any such selection process done without the approval is, therefore, an exercise in futility and is null and void and of no effect, the fact that candidates have obtained and completed necessary documents/declarations is immaterial.

As to the effect of the other Constitutions, the trial Court further held as follows:

I presume that the 1975 Constitution, which predates the Traditional Rulers Law – is the Constitution by which the Government recognized the Igwe of Ogidi. There cannot be two Constitutions and the 1975 Constitution as tendered said it all – I hold that it is the valid document as at today for the selection and coronation of Igwe Ogidi. As to the hereditary nature of the – I found nowhere in the said Constitution where it was provided that Stool – the Stool is hereditary or the exclusive preserve of any one Community, Quarter of family in Ogidi. Section 3 of the Constitution provides inter alia:

3. To qualify for selection for the office of Igwe Ogidi, the candidate shall satisfy the following conditions: –

(a) The candidate shall be a male person of at least twenty-one years of age and shall be married

(b) The father shall be a native of Ogidi.

(c) The parents shall be lawfully married to each other.

(d) He shall be literate, and among other things.

(e) He shall be ordinarily resident in Ogidi.

Section 6 Accession

(a) The office of the Igwe Ogidi does not vest automatically or immediately on any person as no particular person is entitled to so succeed to the office, the two processes of selection and coronation are, therefore, indispensable.

(b) The office of Igwe Ogidi is non-hereditary and non-denominational. I must say here and without fear of contradiction that these provisions of the 1975 Constitution are in consonance with the letters and spirit of the Report of the enquiry of 1926, which said that the Stool does not belong to Amobi, Uru and any other Quarter exclusively. Having said this much, I answer the issues raised by the respective Counsel – and say that the Plaintiffs have not proved from their pleading and evidence that the Stool of Igwe Ogidi belongs to either Uru Quarter or Amobi Family. The Stool is not hereditary. And since I ruled earlier that – all the issues related to and raised in this case hinge around this single factor of non-hereditary or hereditary, I can say without any hesitation that the Plaintiffs have not proved entitlement to the reliefs sought in this claim. I am convinced from the pleading and the evidence led by the Plaintiffs’ Witnesses that they know and accept as fact that the Report of the Enquiry, the custom of Ogidi and Constitution of 1975 admit of the fact that they are not entitled to the throne by birth in that it is not hereditary, despite the fact that several Amobi’s in succession have been selected and enthroned. The selection and enthronement were by the Ogidi Community – and not by virtue of a birthright to into Amobi or Uru but by virtue of a birthright of being born into any of the Quarters that make up Ogidi. In the circumstance, therefore, the Plaintiffs’ claim in paragraph 13 (b), (c) and (e) and (f) of their claims fail accordingly and are dismissed.

In affirming the trial Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal observed as follows:

The said 2003 Constitution, though pleaded but the Court rejected the Application to tender it and consequently, it was marked rejected. It was, therefore, not part of the evidence led at the trial. It is trite that when a document is rejected and not admitted in evidence, then the document or its contents thereof cannot be used or relied upon in the determination of any issue in the case. It follows, therefore, that 2nd Appellant’s contention that the trial Judge made far-reaching consideration on the said 2003 Constitution does not enhance the merit of his argument – No wonder that the learned trial Judge appeared to have adverted his mind to the above principle when he held that any evidence based on the 2003 Constitution is hereby rejected and expunged from the records as if it were never admitted. Worthy of note, however, is that the Respondents on record – have filed no Cross Appeals. On the 2003 Constitution, the Appellants never thought it wise to tender [it]. The effort made to tender same was made by 4th Defendant at the lower Court. It is, therefore, surprising that it did not occur to the Appellants that it was worth-while to tender in Court a document, which they pleaded time without end and on which they based their trunk card in the two reliefs i.e., paragraph 13(a) & (g). There was, therefore, no justification in giving judgment to the Appellants on those two claims touching on the 2003 Constitution. No injustice has been occasioned to the 2nd Appellant but to the Respondents. Accordingly, I do not see any way where the trial Court was in error in not giving the Appellant’s judgment on the reliefs stated in paragraph 13(a) (d) & (g). I therefore resolve Issue No. 1 in favour of the Respondent and hereby hold that the learned trial Judge rightly declined to grant reliefs 13(a) (d) (e) & (g), having struck-out the Igwe Ogidi Constitution (of) 2003.

The Court of Appeal further observed as follows in other parts of its judgment:

Evaluation of evidence is the primary function of a trial Court. And so, where the trial Court has performed that primary function of evaluating the evidence and correctly ascribing probative value as was done in this case, the Appellant Court has no business interfering with findings on such evidence – This appellate Court has no business interfering with the findings of the trial Court on the traditional [evidence] already considered, evaluated and probative value duly ascribed to them. To lend support to the above assertion, there is enough evidence, traditional and documentary – 1994 (sic) and 1975 Constitutions to support the finding/Judgment of the Trial Court on traditional evidence or history – What appears to be the last straw that broke the camel’s back are the unchallenged documentary evidence manifest in the 1944 and 1975 – Constitutions in Section 7 and Section 6 respectively that unambiguously declared that there is no hereditary crown in Ogidi. Even PW2 stated under cross-examination that custom is a mirror of accepted usage and the Ogidi Union can make or change custom where necessary.

The Appellants contention is that the Court of Appeal erred when it stated that they never thought it wise to tender the 2003 Constitution because the issue of whether they tendered it or not is no longer relevant as the trial Court declared it null and void and of no effect; that they never based their reliefs on the said 2003 Constitution, and that having made nonsense of the 2003 Constitution, the Court of Appeal should not have declined to grant Reliefs 13 (a), (d) (e) (g).

He also argued that Court of Appeal erred when it went on to rely on the so-called unchallenged documentary evidence manifest on the abrogated and obsolete 1944 and 1975 Constitutions, and even cited Sections 6 & 7 to declare that there is “no hereditary Crown in Ogidi”. He cited Lipede v. Sonekan (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 668/690, wherein this Court held that once an enabling law is repealed or revoked, any delegated legislation or order made thereunder becomes spent, obsolete, and has no legal root which it can continue to stand, and submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in law, particularly as none of the Respondents Counter Claimed, so making any declaration tacitly or impliedly to grant a relief that was not sought by a Defendant, is completely erroneous.

He submitted under his Issue IV that although they could not and did not tender the 2003 Constitution, the point remains that it was tendered in the same Court by another Party, and they should not be indicted for not being the one, who tendered it; that the reliefs sought include a Declaration that the purported 2003 Constitution is null and void, and so, the Reliefs in Paragraph 13(a) & (g), should have been granted since the 2003 Constitution was declared invalid, though rejected in evidence; and that the two lower Courts cannot fall back on the 1975 and 1944 Constitutions, which are obsolete and inapplicable, citing Mustapha v. Governor, Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 539 at 541.

The Respondents, on their part, countered that for a law to be abrogated, it must have been abrogated and replaced by a valid and/or existing law; that the 2003 Constitution was declared a nullity, none of its provisions were saved, including provisions abrogating the existing Constitutions, and it is a fallacy for the Appellant to contend that the 2003 Constitution and previous Constitutions, purportedly abrogated are no longer in existence, leaving Ogidi to be governed without an enabling law; that on the contrary, evidence adduced at trial show that both the 1975 and 1944 Constitutions were communally accepted and had governed the community prior to the institution of this Suit; that it is not enough to claim that the 1944 or 1975 Constitutions were non-starters without evidence to back said assertions; and that his argument that the said Constitutions are obsolete is neither here nor there, as the point was not raised in their Pleadings or arise at the Court below and so ought not to be canvassed before this Court.

They argued that even if the 1944 Constitution is obsolete having been replaced by 1975 Constitution, same cannot be said for the 1975 Constitution, in view of the evidence led that it was the law under which the last two Igwes were enthroned, and as can be seen from the trial Court’s Judgment affirmed by Court of Appeal, it was upon the 1975 Constitution that the trial Court held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the other reliefs sought; that as at the time of filing the substantive suit and judgments delivered by the two lower Courts, there was no enthronement of an Igwe predicated upon the 1975 Constitution.

Furthermore, that having established that the lower Courts did not err in considering the governing procedure for selection or enthronement of an Igwe, it is clear that there were no errors or miscarriage of justice occasioned by their concurrent decisions nor were their concurrent findings shown to be perverse.

The Appellant filed a Reply Brief wherein he reiterated same arguments canvassed in his main brief, which is, certainly, not the purpose of a reply brief -see Okpala & Anor v. Ibeme & Ors (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 102) 208 at 220SC, where Nnaemaka-Agu, JSC, explained that a reply brief, where it is necessary, “should be limited to – any new points arising from the Respondent’s Brief”.

​As it is, I will refer to fresh arguments in the Reply Brief where necessary. The Appellant’s contention is that the other reliefs sought flow from Relief (a) – a Declaration that the 2003 Constitution is invalid, and since it was so declared, the 2003 Constitution cannot be used in the selection or election of Igwe Ogidi, and the Court must accept the Plaintiffs’ position at the trial Court that under the Ogidi custom and tradition, an Igwe is selected from the Uru Quarter alone.

What he is saying is that having declared the 2003 Constitution invalid, which is the prayer in Relief (a), the trial Court should have proceeded to grant the other reliefs flowing from the said Relief (a) blindly and without question.

But that is a faulty argument; it is, certainly, not how the Court functions. The primary duty of the Court is to evaluate the totality of the evidence adduced before it and ascribe probative value thereto. Evaluation of evidence has been described as the “do or die” parallel in the adjudication process, and it means assessment or estimation of evidence by the Court to give credit or value to it.

​A civil case is won on the preponderance of evidence and where a Court is convinced that a Party’s case is deficient in substance and weight or mired in confusion and not readily understandable, it cannot assist the Party – Ansa v. Ishie (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt 918) 210 SC. In effect, evaluation of evidence involves a reasoned belief of the evidence of one of the contending Parties and disbelief of the other or a reasoned preference of one version to the other one.

In this case, the Plaintiffs in their Relief (a), sought a Declaration that the “document purporting to be the Igwe Ogidi Constitution – made by the 1st – 3rd Defendants is not a legal document – and (it is) therefore null and void”. They had averred as follows in paragraph 10 of their Amended Statement of Claim:

10. That the Defendants did not adhere to the provisions of the Traditional Rulers Law 1981, particularly with respect to the contents and validity of Towns or Community Constitution.

(a) That the Defendants hurriedly set up a committee and by themselves produced a document referred to as the IGWE OGIDI CONSTITUTION (2003) (REVISED) and that this Constitution was not written or produced with the consent of the OGIDI Community or according to the required norms and/or formalities for the production of such very important document and that the same has been rejected by the Community.

(b) That the said Igwe Ogidi Constitution (2003) (Revised) through which the Defendants are trying to impose an Igwe on Ogidi people is an illegal document.

In clear terms, the Plaintiffs were praying the trial Court for a declaratory relief, and the law places a legal burden on them to establish their claim. It is settled law that a Claimant seeking declaratory reliefs, must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the Respondent’s case – see Emenike v. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1315) 556 and Dumez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt 1119) 361 at 373-374, wherein this Court held as follows:

The law on the requirements of the Plaintiff to plead and prove his claims for declaratory reliefs on the evidence called by him without relying on the evidence called by the Defendant is, indeed, well settled. The burden of proof on the Plaintiff in establishing declaratory reliefs to the satisfaction of the Court is quite heavy in the sense that such declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission by the Defendant, where the Plaintiff fails to establish his entitlement to the declaration by his own evidence.

A Claimant must prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is entitled to the declaratory relief sought. He cannot point fingers at any weakness, omission, or default on the part of the Respondent. He stands or falls on the strength of his case; if his case is strong, he wins, and if his case is weak, then he loses.

In this case, Plaintiffs claimed four declaratory reliefs; the other three are consequential reliefs, which are predicated on the success of the declaratory reliefs, particularly Relief (a), and they had to prove to the satisfaction of the trial Court that they were entitled to the said Reliefs – Emenike v. PDP (supra).

What did they do? They claimed that an “IGWE OGIDI CONSTITUTION (2003) (REVISED), written and produced by the Defendants is not a legal document, and it was null and void, but they did not tender the said document in evidence.

They did not tender the said 2003 Constitution, on which they based the declaratory reliefs sought. Yet, when fourth Defendant applied to tender a 2003 Constitution in evidence, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs objected because:

The document set out in the 4th Defendant’s List of Documents as No. 6 is the 2003 Constitution of Ogidi Community and not a document titled the Igwe Ogidi Constitution 2003 revised.

In its Ruling on the said Objection, the trial Court upheld same and held that-

The document listed is different from what was pleaded and what is being tendered is an entirely different document from the 2003 Constitution of Ogidi Community that was listed. The Igwe Ogidi Constitution being tendered is rejected.

The purported 2003 Constitution was rejected by the trial Court and the effect, as Court of Appeal said, is that it was not part of the evidence led at the trial. It is settled that once a document has been rejected in evidence, it cannot have probative value for the determination of any issue. So, it cannot be made use of either by Counsel during address or commented upon by the trial Court – Agbaje v. Adigun (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 269) 261 SC. In this case, the Appellant argued that although Plaintiffs did not tender the said Constitution in evidence, it was tendered in the same Court by another Party, therefore, they should not be indicted for not being the Party, who tendered the Constitution in evidence. So, the question now is which 2003 Constitution is the Appellant referring to?

Is he referring to the 2003 Constitution, on which the Plaintiffs based the declaratory reliefs sought, which they did not produce or tender in evidence, or is he referring to the 2003 Constitution sought to be tendered by a Defendant which the Plaintiffs objected to on the ground that it is a different Constitution from what the Defendant pleaded, and which the trial Court rejected outrightly?

The 2003 Constitution tendered by the fourth Defendant was rejected by the trial Court, which means that it cannot be used or relied upon by this Court, in the determination of any issue in this Appeal. The Plaintiffs failed to tender the right 2003 Constitution, on which they based their claims, which means that there is no 2003 Igwe Ogidi Constitution in the evidence before the Court, and this Court has nothing from which it can determine Issues arising there-from.

In other words, as far as this Appeal is concerned, the 2003 Constitution does not exist and any issue arising from it or touching on it will be disregarded.

​

As I said, it is the primary duty of a trial Court to evaluate evidence, and as Oputa, JSC, stated in Olufosoye v. Olorunfemi (1989) LPELR-2615(SC):

There is a duty in a trial Court to receive all the available relevant evidence on an issue. This is perception of evidence. After that there is another duty to weigh that evidence in the context of the surrounding circumstances of the case. This is evaluation of evidence.

In other words, a finding of fact involves both perception and evaluation – see Ogundalu v. Macjob (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1460) 96. In this case, the trial Court found as a fact that the 1975 Constitution is the valid document for the selection and coronation of the Igwe Ogidi and based on that Constitution, it stated that:

If any Igwes elect made a declaration under the 1975 Constitution before coronation as required by that Constitution – every Ogidi man whether from Uru or not, is bound as that declaration is valid – Two successive Igwes were enthroned under the 1975 Constitution – The Plaintiffs say that they are not bound by the declaration made by the respective monarchs. I do accede to Oputa’s submission that the Plaintiffs have failed in this regard.

​The Appellant posed the following question as Issue II in his Brief of Argument:

Was the Court of Appeal right by deciding that if any Igwe elect made a declaration under the 1975 Constitution before coronation as required by that Constitution or custom, every Ogidi man whether of Uru or not is bound, as that declaration is valid as stated at page 441 second to last paragraph, and does Exhibit Q to Q11 show that Uru people and Amobi family cannot exclusively produce the Igwe of Ogidi?

He argued that it is “indeed wrong and erroneous” for “Court of Appeal” to hold as it did because the said declaration under the 1975 Constitution is personal to the Igwe-Elect and does not bind other members of Igwe-Amobi 1 Family.

The Respondents pointed out that his argument is not borne out by the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, nor does it form part of issues it determined. Citing CPC v. INEC (2012) 29 WRN 1 and Olufeagba v. Abdulraheem (2010) All (Pt. 512) 1034, they submitted that no appeal could lie from same, having not been part of issues canvassed and determined at the lower Court. They urged the Court to discountenance Ground II of the Grounds of Appeal, Issues distilled therefrom, and the arguments canvassed in support of same.

The Respondents are right; the trial Court made the said pronouncement and nowhere in its judgment did the Court of Appeal ever comment on same. The position of the law is that the findings of the trial Court must be affirmed or reversed by the Court of Appeal before its decision gets to this Court – see Uor v. Loko (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 430, wherein Karibi-Whyte, JSC, observed:

The appellate Court is entitled to have the benefit of the opinions of the Judges in the judgments of the Court below. It is the opinion appealed against, which is affirmed or reversed. Hence, without the benefit of such opinion, an appellate Court will be extremely reluctant to interfere. Any judgment – founded on grounds not canvassed in the Court below and not adverted to and pronounced upon in the judgment appealed against ideally is not an appeal against such a judgment. Since an Appellant’s right of appeal is circumscribed within the parameters of the judgment appealed against, this Court will not lightly permit impugning the judgment on grounds of error other than that contained therein. In this case, it goes without saying that the question posed by the Appellant in the first half of his Issue II, and arguments thereon would be discountenanced.

The second half of the question is hinged on Exhibits Q1 to Q11, which were tendered in evidence at the trial Court by the Respondents to prove that under the Ogidi customs and tradition, as later enshrined in their written Constitutions, the Igweship of Ogidi was not hereditary. The said Exhibits are important, and it is necessary, in my view, to look at the decisions of the lower Courts in detail. In its own judgment, the trial Court stated as follows about the said Exhibits:

Exhibits Q1-Q11 are records of the National Archives (certified) dealing on the subject – “Petition for the Recognition of Walter Amobi as Paramount Chief; Death of Walter Amobi; Walter Amobi of Onitsha; Petition for Subsidy to be made Paramount President of the Native Court”. Exhibit Q2 dated 6/2//1923 from the Lt. Governor, Southern Provinces, to the Senior Resident, Onitsha Province, on Walter Amobi says in part –

“While I recognize fully the good work that Walter Amobi has done in connection with the Ogidi Court and the excellent influence he has exercised in that area, it is contrary to the present policy of Government to place on chief as permanent over towns and villages over which he has no hereditary right of control and I presently believe it to be contrary to the culture of the Ibo people I am, therefore, unable to accede to their request”.

Exhibit Q4 indicates that the Petition referred to Exhibit Q3 – first presented to Sir Frederik Lugard in 1951. On 8/12/1923 the Secretary, Southern Province, Lagos wrote Exhibit Q5 to the Resident, Onitsha Province stating: “Amobi has no claim to the position he seeks”. In Exhibit Q6, the Resident at Enugu communicates this decision to the Divisional Officer at Onitsha on 19/12/1923. In Exhibit Q7, the Senior Resident, wrote to the District Officer, on the death of Walter Amobi, which occurred on 18/12/1923 and said –

“He was a useful Chief and would have succeeded very much better if he had not always tried to usurp a position to which he was never entitled, and I hope his son will not follow his example”.

Exhibit Q8 – an extract from Mr. Governor’s handing over notes, it was stated: With reference to enclosure (12) and the enclosures in this they show very clearly that Amobi has no claim whatsoever to the title Igwe or Eze or Obi. It is merely a try by the family, which was to be expected.

2. Undoubtedly each quarter of Ogidi has its own representatives, the same as most other Ibo towns. It was only quite a small town when I first knew it 20 years ago and the name Amobi was conspicuous by its absence.

This was dated 30/4/1926. Exhibit Q10 dated 23/11/1923 from the Secretary, Southern Province, to the Chief Secretary to the Government in Lagos says in paragraph 2 thereon thus –

“His Honour, the Acting Lt. Governor, has commented as follows –

“Chief Walter Amobi has no hereditary claim to such a position, and it would be very inadvisable to make him a paramount chief over towns in Ogidi Native Court Area.

3. I would like to add a fear (sic) remark about Amobi’s latest Petition. I first met him in 1990, when he held no position in Ogidi. It is correct that he was a son of one of the Ogidi Chiefs but there were no hereditary head Chief in this village.

Finally, in Exhibit Q11, the Chief Secretary to the Government on 14/12/1923, wrote to the Secretary, Southern Province thus –

“With reference to your letter No. A 1289/1923 of the 23rd of November, I am directed by the Governor to inform you that his Excellency is satisfied that Amobi has no claim to the position he seeks, and that he must discontinue the use of the title “Obi”, which has nothing to do with rank among the Ibos and I am to add that he be so informed”.

The Plaintiffs (have) argued that the Suit as presently filed is by the Uru Community and not Amobi Family and as such, the Community is not bound by the decision of the Colonial Government on the hereditary title of Amobi to the Stool and moreover that the claim in Amobi’s Petition specifically does not relate to Ogidi town but all the towns that use the Ogidi’ Native Court – It is clear that the claim of Uru Quarter is based on the claim that Amobi Family has produced the Igwe from time immemorial – the argument that a King or Igwe can come from another family in Uru does not appear to be the main plank of the case of the Plaintiffs – Secondly and most importantly too, two colonial officials identified in their Reports that all the quarters in Ogidi had their respective chiefs and no hereditary right over chieftaincy resided in the Amobi Family and that is part of the defence. That is also the main ground of the protests over the claims of Amobi and Uru since the time of Amobi the 1st and Amobi the 2nd till date. At least, that is what I gathered from the pleadings and evidence of the Parties in this case – On the question of the legal effect of the Exhibits under consideration as raised in Issue Two of the Plaintiffs, I have to conclude that these statements were conclusions of the Government of the day, which were not challenged, or set aside by any Court or Tribunal and as such, represent the policy of the Government and are valid in fact and in law. Their effect is that they are binding and cannot be discarded by mere rejection of any of the Parties to this case.

On its own part, the Court of Appeal observed as follows on the said Exhibits:

Exhibits Q1-Q11 are all documentary evidence, and they constitute the yardstick by which the truth or otherwise of oral testimony could be determined – The learned trial Judge rightly relied on these documentary evidence to resolve the conflict that the Exhibits bind the Uru Quarter as well as the Amobi Family – The 2nd Appellant is a member of Uru Ogidi Quarters and had disagreed with the evaluation of the trial Court decision that the documentary evidence as shown in Exhibits Q1-Q11 bind the Amobi Family and the Uru Quarters and are, therefore, estopped from asserting to the contrary to the documentary evidence. The 2nd Appellant is suing for Iba- Igwe Amobi Council of Elders. What this means is that he is not Uru Quarters that have since withdrawn from the Appeal. Arising there-from he lacks the capacity to challenge the finding by the trial Court that Uru Quarter is bound and estopped as the Amobi Family have no issue with the findings of the trial Court that Exhibits Q1-Q11 bind the Amobi family. The position presently in this Appeal is that Uru Quarter excepting the Amobi Family have withdrawn from this Appeal. Evidence even abound on the Records (page 221) that the Uru Quarters was actively involved in the process that led to the production of Exhibits Q1-Q11, which they cannot easily deny. It is on the basis of the above that I agree with the learned trial Judge.

The Appellant’s contention is that there is nowhere in the said Exhibits that an Order was given banning the prerogative of the Amobi family, and indeed, Uru Ogidi, to produce an Igwe; and that the contents of the said Exhibits Q1-Q11, dealt with specific situations involving only one person, that is Igwe Amobi 1; that the results that Igwe Amobi 1 got from all the representation made to the Government of the day shall be founded binding on him alone as an individual, not even the entire Amobi Family, not to talk of Uru Quarters; and that the said Exhibits Q1-Q11 have no legal effect, and they do not in any way bind him.

He also argued that the very best benefit or advantage that the Exhibits could be put to is to construe them as espousing the opinion of the Government of the day; that the contents of the Exhibits were never enacted into law; and that they were not given any coercive force of law and remain what they are – OPINION. He, therefore, urged the Court to resolve this Issue in his favour.

The Respondents referred to paragraphs of the Plaintiffs ‘pleadings and excerpts of testimonies of PW1 and PW2, the Plaintiffs’ Witnesses, and argued that despite the attempt to mask their intentions, this Suit has been brought at the behest of the Amobis to solidify their claims to the throne-ship of Ogidi; that the said Exhibits show the full participation of all the quarters in Ogidi including Uru Quarter; that the Reports/findings date from 1923, almost 100 years ago, yet there has not been a single challenge against any of the documents or its findings; that the Appellant, who is being economical with the truth and reality, when he claims that Uru quarters as a whole, were strangers to and ignorant of the documentary evidence, now seeks to challenge the concurrent findings of the lower Courts that they bind Uru Quarters and the Amobi Family; and that the Court of Appeal is right that Uru Quarters were bound by the said Exhibits.

To me, the brouhaha over Exhibits Q1-Q11 is a mere storm in a teacup. The Appellant was not one of the Plaintiffs at the trial Court, he came into the matter at the Court of Appeal, when he was substituted for the sixth Appellant. So, he is standing on the case they made at the trial Court wherein they claimed a Declaration that “from time immemorial, Uru Quarter is the provider of Eze or Igwe Ogidi and there has not been any reason for a change” (Relief (b)), and an Order that the “Eze or Igwe Ogidi shall be selected from Uru Quarter Ogidi in keeping with the custom and tradition of the people of Ogidi” – (Relief (f))

“Time immemorial”, means a time in the past that was so long ago that people have no knowledge or memory of it – see Oxford Languages, therefore, the Plaintiffs were saying that long before there was any memories of that fact, Uru Quarters, Ogidi have always provided the Eze or Igwe Ogidi, and this was a declaratory relief, which they had to prove to the satisfaction of the Court.

As I said, a Claimant, who seeks any declaratory relief, must sink or swim on the strength of his own case, even if the Respondent admits the said claim – Dumez v. Nwakhoba (supra). In this case, to counter the Plaintiffs’ claims, the Respondents tendered Exhibits Q1-Q11 to show that as far back as 1923, almost a 100 years ago, and within living memory, the Colonial Government made it clear that Igwe Amobi 1 had “no hereditary claim to such a position.”

​For starters, there is a presumption of regularity attached to official acts by virtue of Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, which provides that – “when any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with”

This is expressed in a Latin maxim – omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta (all things are presumed to have been done rightly), and it means that where an official act of Government is carried out, it will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the act complied with necessary formalities and is, therefore, valid. In other words, the presumption, which is a rebuttable one subsists until the contrary is proved, and the burden is on the aggrieved Party, who thinks otherwise of its validity, to rebut this presumption and move for its setting aside – Fidelity Bank v. M.T. Tabora (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1632) 135.

In this case, there is no question that the opinions or conclusions of the Colonial Government in Exhibits Q1-Q11 are quite weighty, indeed, and they reveal facts within living memory in contradistinction to the Plaintiffs’ claim that from time immemorial, Amobi Family had the right to produce the Eze or Igwe. As the two lower Courts observed, the said opinions or conclusions were never challenged or set aside, and there is nothing to indicate that the Plaintiffs made any efforts to change the narrative since the last document was written in 1926.

It is not enough for the Appellant to say that the contents of the Exhibits were mere opinions, and that there is no Order made therein that banned the said Family from producing the Eze or Igwe. They had a legal burden to prove their claims without looking at anything said or done by the Respondents, and since the opinions or conclusions of the Colonial Government in the documents are official and binding, as they were never challenged or refuted or set aside, his arguments along these lines, undermines rather than strengthens his case.

The Appellant also argued that the contents of the said Exhibits Q1-Q11 “dealt with specific situations involving one person i.e., Igwe Amobi 1”, and so, the opinions or conclusions therein are binding on the said Igwe Amobi 1 alone as an individual and not even the Amobi Family, not to talk of the Uru Quarters; and they do not in any way bind him, the Appellant. This is a complete fallacy.

They claim that the Stool is hereditary and for anything to be hereditary, there must be a beginning, an originating source, and subsequent successions through blood via the original source. In specific reference to a traditional stool, there is an unbroken lineage and succession from the original King/source and a successor takes the whole interest with all the glamour, assets, and liabilities.

In other words, the successors cannot claim the benefits and then refuse to be bound by the limitations by saying they are personal to the original King. In this case, the Appellant cannot say that the Stool of Igwe Oqidi is hereditary, then argue that contents of Exhibits Q1-Q11 are not binding on the successors of Igwe Amobi 1, from whom they traced their right to provide the Eze or Igwe. The rule is that he, who enjoys the benefit, ought to also bear the burden. So, contents of the said Exhibits, which are valid, are binding on the successors, and the Appellant. This Issue also lacks merit, and it is resolved against him.

​

The next issue is whether the trial Court’s remark that every free born of Ogidi is entitled to aspire to be selected to the said throne is ratio decidendi or obiter dictum, as decided by the Court of Appeal. The trial Court held as follows:

I am convinced from the pleading and the evidence led by the Plaintiffs’ Witnesses that they know and accept as fact that the Report of the Enquiry, the custom of Ogidi and Constitution of 1975 admit of the fact that they are not entitled to the throne by birth in that it is not hereditary, despite the fact that several Amobi’s in succession have been selected and enthroned. The selection and enthronement was by the Ogidi Community as borne out in the evidence and not by virtue of a birth right to into Amobi or Uru but by virtue of a birth right of being born into any of the Quarters that make up Ogidi – therefore, the Plaintiffs’ claim in paragraph 13 (b), (c) and (e) and (f) of their claim fail accordingly and are dismissed – In dismissing the claim – it is hereby declared that from the available evidence, and the Constitution based on the existing facts and Exhibits the Stool of Igwe or Eze Ogidi is not hereditary and every free born of Ogidi, including the Plaintiffs and the 4th Defendant, is entitled to aspire to be selected to that throne.

The Court of Appeal held that the remark complained of was “a passing remark, which did not form the basis of (its) judgment”, and further observed as follows:

By law, ground of appeal and issue there-from can only be valid if it attacks the ratio decidendi or substantial point of controversy in the judgment. It cannot be based on the dicta or words and comments made by a Judge while navigating the route to its decision except the obiter dicta is so linked with the ratio decidendi as to be deemed to have radically influenced the ratio decidendi. The Supreme Court decision in CPC v. INEC (2012) 29 WRN 1 said: “Any ground of Appeal, which do not arise from the ratio of the judgment appealed against, cannot stand for reason of incompetence” …Therefore, the said issue No. 3 which derived from ground 5 (additional ground) was therefore a stranger in this appeal, having not attacked a ratio decidendi or point of controversy in the Judgment. I resolve this against 2nd Appellant.

​

The Appellant’s contention is that this is clearly miscarriage of justice because what was raised in the said Ground and the Issue argued therefrom is not obiter dictum but ratio decidendi and should have been considered in the judgment; and that it is clear from Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Amended Statement of Claim that not all the free born sons of Ogidi are entitled to aspire to the said throne.

He cited Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205 SC and NDIC v. Okem Enterprises Ltd. (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt 880) 107 SC, on the distinction between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi, and argued that what Court of Appeal labeled as obiter dictum, cannot be described as a mere side talk or remark made or expressed by the Judge upon the case, which side talk, remark or opinion is just by the way or is merely collateral or incidental and not really directly upon the question or issue before the Court; and that Court of Appeal erred in law when it held that the remark is not ratio decidendi but obiter dictum.

The Respondents cited Ogboru v. Uduaghan (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1311) 357, Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt 264) 156, NDIC v. FMBN (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt 490) 735, Davek Ltd. v. Ompad E.C. (2007) 2 SC 305, Oleksandr & Ors. v. Lonestar Drilling Co, Ltd. & Anor.(2015)9 NWLR (Pt 1464) 337 on the law and submitted that the reference to “free born’ by the trial Court has no bearing and is extraneous to the trial Court’s judgment; that there was no issue on whether a freeborn was entitled to contest for the Stool; and that the remark in no way detracted or added to the trial Court’s judgment.

Now, there are constituent parts in a Courts Judgment. There is ratio decidendi [reason for deciding], and obiter dictum (something said in passing) – Black’s Law Dictionary. Ed. An opinion of the Court upon which no issue had been joined amounts to obiter dictum and ratio decidendi is the principle or rule of law upon which a decision of a Court is founded. Thus, it is not every pronouncement made by the Judge thatc an be made the subject of an appeal – see Onafowokan v. Wema Bank (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1260) 24, wherein this Court held that where an opinion is expressed obiter, such opinion, remark, or observation is baseless and a mere obiter dictum, which is not appealable.

​It is settled law that ratio decidendi is not determined from isolated dictum in the judgment but on consideration of the issues in the dispute between the Parties and facts pleaded and found in support of the contention of the issues – see UBA Ltd. v. Stahlbau GMBH & Co. KG. (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 374.

In this case, the trial Court said, “the issues involved in this case revolve around – the claim to hereditary title over the traditional stool or crown of Igwe or Eze” and it was after it held that the title was not hereditary and dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs that it made the remark complained of, in passing or by the way.

It is trite that the binding part of a decision is its ratio decidendi, as against remaining parts of the judgment, which merely constitute obiter dicta; that is to say, what is not necessary for the decision – see Afro-Continental Nig. Ltd. v. Ayantuyi (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 411 and Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228, wherein this Court per Uwaifo, JSC, stated as follows:

This observation is, no doubt, an obiter dictum of the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal. It was not part of the argument before the Court. The learned Justice adverted to the point on his own in – his judgment. It played no part whatsoever in the decision reached either by the lower Court or even the maker himself. It is not a fit subject for appeal as an appeal is fought on the basis of the decision of the Court and is not taken against mere obiter.

In this case, the Court of Appeal’s finding that the comment complained of was a passing remark, which did not form the basis of the trial Court’s judgment, cannot be faulted. As the Respondents submitted, parties never joined issues on the question of whether a freeborn was entitled to contest for the said Stool.

The decision had already been taken and the Plaintiffs’ claims dismissed before the trial Court made the comment complained of. This is something said in passing, which had nothing to do with the reason for the trial Court’s decision and being a mere opinion, upon which no issue had been joined by the Parties, it is obiter dictum, and not ratio decidendi, therefore, this Issue also lacks merit.

​

The last Issue is on evaluation of evidence, and the Appellant contends that the Court of Appeal failed to evaluate the oral and documentary evidence before the Court, which caused miscarriage of justice. He referred to the oral evidence of PW1 and PW2 and submitted that no pronouncement was made on the traditional history set up by the Plaintiffs, which is relevant to his case; and that an Appellate Court must show a conscientious and deliberate effort to weigh evidence on the imaginary scale of justice and take a definite position, which did not happen in this case, therefore, this Appeal should be allowed.

The Respondents countered that it is not the duty of an appellate Court to evaluate evidence, and an appellate Court can only embark on evaluation of evidence where it is shown that the trial Court did not properly evaluate the evidence before it, citing Esuwoye v. Bosere (2017) 2 WRN 25; that the reliefs sought were declaratory reliefs/injunctive orders, and a Plaintiff must prove his case, which he can only do with clear and compelling evidence; and that the Plaintiffs did not tender evidence to support their assertion that under Ogidi customs and tradition, Uru Quarter is the only quarter that can exclusively produce an Igwe, and no evidence of the alleged custom was produced at trial.

​

The Respondents are right. The function of an appellate Court is limited to finding out whether there was evidence before the trial Court upon which its decision on facts was based; whether it wrongly accepted or rejected evidence; whether evidence called by either Party to the conflict was put on either side of the imaginary balance and weighed one against the other; whether it correctly approached the assessment of evidence before it; and whether the evidence properly admitted was sufficient to support the decision upon inference drawn therefrom – Agbonifor v. Aiwereoba & Anor (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 70) 325.

​In this case, the Court of Appeal clearly said that it was satisfied with the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value done by the trial Court. It also held that there was enough evidence to support the trial Court’s decision. So, the Appellant is challenging evidence, which has been sifted by two Courts, and in respect of which there is concurrent finding. It is trite law that this Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of two lower Courts unless there are exceptional circumstances to justify that, nor would there be interference with the judgments of two lower Courts unless there are substantial errors in law or procedure leading to miscarriage of justice – see Oguanuhu v. Chiegboka (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 588 SC; Okulate v. Awosanya (2000) 1 SC 107.

It is clear from all that I have said so far that the Appellant has not shown or provided this Court with good reasons to interfere with findings of fact arrived at by two lower Courts: the Anambra State High Court and the Court of Appeal. Consequently, this Appeal lacks merit in its entirety, and it is hereby dismissed. The first to fourth Respondents are awarded costs of N500,000.00 each.

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SC.797/2017