Anyiam Godwin Vs The Queen (1961)
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ADEMOLA, C.J.F.
The appellant has appealed against his conviction in the High Court of Eastern Nigeria holden at Calabar on an information containing two counts which are as follows:-
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE:
(1) Official corruption not judicial, contrary to section 116 (1) of the Criminal Code.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE:
GODWIN ANYIAM, on or about the 7th day of November, 1959, at Calabar in the Province of Calabar, being a person employed in the Public Service in any capacity not Judicial for the Prosecution of Offenders to wit; a member of the Nigeria Police Force, corruptly asked for £15 for your senior officer from Okefi Azu on account of anything to be afterwards done by you namely, not to prosecute Okeke Agwu for road traffic offences, with a view to improper interference with the due administration of Justice.
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
(2) Official corruption not judicial, contrary to section 116 (1) of the Criminal Code.
The facts which led to the prosecution are that the appellant, a Police Constable, was given instructions by his superior officer one Ukpong, an Assistant Superintendent of Police, to make investigations and take particulars of a lorry he had stopped on the road because he suspected it of being mechanically defective, a suspicion which had been justified after the Vehicle Inspection Officer had tested the lorry. The appellant was also instructed to prepare a summons against the owner of the lorry. One Azu, who was looking after the lorry for the owner, was accordingly informed by the driver of the lorry. Next day Azu went to the appellant at the Police Station and begged him to withdraw the summons and not prosecute. The appellant said he was unable to withdraw the summons as it was his senior officer and not himself who originally brought up the matter, but that the officer had asked him to receive £15 before the summons could be withdrawn. Azu thereupon reported this to Mr. Smith the Senior Superintendent of Police who gave five marked £1 notes to Azu to give to the appellant, which he later did. The appellant was thereby arrested with the five £1 notes on him. His defence at the trial that the money was given in payment of a debt was disbelieved by the learned trial Judge, but for the purposes of this appeal it is unnecessary to consider this defence.
Nine grounds of appeal were filed. Of the nine grounds, Counsel abandoned four and five were argued on which only grounds 2 and 3 need be considered for the purpose of this appeal. The two grounds are as follows:-
(1) All the essential ingredients of the offence were not proved in either count.
(2) The counts did not disclose any offence under section 116 (1) of the Criminal Code.
Counsel argued that the evidence before the learned trial Judge presented two sets of facts for which the money was demanded and was given. The first was that the lorry which was put off the road would be put back on the road if the demand of £15 were met. The second set of facts was that the £15 should be given so that prosecution might be withdrawn.
The learned trial Judge, it was pointed out, accepted one set of facts, as he was entitled to do, which was the second set of facts. But it was argued that the gravamen of the case for the prosecution, which the learned Judge failed to advert his mind to, was the fact that the demand was made on behalf of the Assistant Superintendent of Police who on receipt of the money would withdraw the charge, and that this evidence was hardly in accord with the charge before the Court.
To understand the force of this argument, we set out the evidence of Azu about the demand, the relevant portion of which was as follows:-
He said he could not withdraw the summons as he was not the person who contravened the lorry. He said it was his senior police officer. He said the senior police officer who contravened the lorry asked him to receive £15 before the summons could be withdrawn.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution as to power to withdraw summonses was given by Zaccheus Okakpu an Inspector of Police who deposed to the fact that “a junior police officer cannot withdraw a case. It is only the Assistant Superintendent of Police in charge of traffic who has the power to direct what should happen to any such case.”
Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence of Azu about the demand, as set out above, is capable only of one meaning, namely, that the appellant was to receive the sum of £15 for his superior officer (A.S.P. Ukpong) in order that Ukpong might withdraw the charge.
On the other hand, we have been asked to say that the evidence can be properly construed as meaning that the appellant received the money for his senior officer on the understanding that he (the appellant) would discontinue the prosecution in accordance with the directions of his senior officer.
We doubt if the evidence is capable of the latter interpretation but if the evidence is capable of two interpretations, it is clear that the one favourable to the appellant must be adopted.
The section of the Code under which the appellant was charged reads as follows:-
116. Any person who-
(1) being a peace officer not acting judicially, or being a person employed in the public service in any capacity not judicial for the prosecution or detention or punishment of offenders, corruptly asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person, on account of anything already done or omitted to be done, or to be afterwards done or omitted to be done, by him, with a view to corrupt or improper Interference with the due administration of justice, or the procurement or facilitation of the commission of any offence, or the protection of any offender or intending offender from detection or punishment.
On a careful examination of this section, we agree that a peace officer who asks for or receives money or any property corruptly for any other person on account of anything to be done or already done or omitted to be done by him (that is, to be done by the officer who asks for or receives the money), as laid down in the above charges, is covered by the section, but we are unable to agree with the learned Senior Crown Counsel that the section covers a case of a peace officer who asks for or receives money or any property corruptly for any other person on account of anything to be done or already done or omitted to be done by that other person, as was the evidence before the learned trial Judge in this case. The section, it would appear, envisaged a peace officer, in the circumstances set out, asking for or receiving money or any other property corruptly for his family or his relatives for example, in order that he himself might interfere improperly with due administration of Justice.
The sum total of this as it concerns this appeal is that if the charges as laid had been proved, an offence under the section would have been established. On the facts adduced by the prosecution at the trial however we are of the view that a charge under this section will not lie.
We cannot in the circumstances sustain the conviction in this matter as the facts proved before the learned trial Judge conflicts with the charges laid in the information.
The appeal will therefore be allowed. The convictions are quashed and sentences passed are set aside: a verdict of acquitted is entered. The appellant is discharged.
Other Citation: (1961) LCN/0937(SC)
