Home » Nigerian Cases » Court of Appeal » Architect Ekong Etuk V. Obong Akpan Isemin & Ors (1992) LLJR-CA

Architect Ekong Etuk V. Obong Akpan Isemin & Ors (1992) LLJR-CA

Architect Ekong Etuk V. Obong Akpan Isemin & Ors (1992)

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ONU, J.C.A. 

This is an appeal emanating from the judgment of the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal sitting at Uyo. The judgment was delivered on February 6, 1992.

The brief facts of the case are as follows:-

The petitioner/appellant and the 1st respondent were candidates (at the December 14, 1991 Gubernatorial Elections in Akwa Ibom State on the platform of the Social Democratic Party (SDP)and the National Republican Convention (NRC) respectively. The petitioner/appellant (hereinafter in this judgment referred to as appellant simpliciter) having lost to the 1st respondent, whose running mate was the 2nd respondent, and they were both thus declared winners (as Governor and Deputy Governor respectively) at the said election organised by the 5th respondent (the National Electoral Commission (NEC) for short), whose agents were the 3rd and 4th respondents filed a petition dated 6th January, 1992 challenging the declaration in which a number of allegations of election malpractices to wit: thuggery, intimidation, harassment of NEC officials, mutilation and alteration of figures, etc., were made. The appellant’s contention thereat was that the 1st respondent was not elected by majority of lawful votes; that the election was invalid due to corrupt practices and offences under the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1991 otherwise hereinafter referred to as Decree No. 50 0f 1991. The petition is at pages 1 to 6 while the replies of 1st and 2nd respondents as well as that of the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents respectively are at pages 7 to 9 and 11 to 15 of the Tribunal Record of proceedings respectively. The appellant in the result prayed in his petition that it be determined that the 1st and 2nd Respondents were not duly elected and returned and that he (appellant) was duly elected and ought to have been returned. He also prayed in the alternative that the election to the office of the Governor in Akwa Ibom State was void.

As transpired, the appellant called eight witnesses and also testified for himself as P. W. 9. The respondents for their part called two witnesses in support of their case. Counsel on both sides addressed the Tribunal and on February 6, 1992, it (the Tribunal) as stated hereinbefore, by a majority of four to one, dismissed the petition and upheld the return of the 1st respondent and afortiori, the 2nd respondent, his deputy.

It is against this majority judgment that the appellant herein has appealed to this Court on five grounds of appeal contained in his Notice of Appeal dated March 3, 1992 (See pages 142-145 of the Record). The grounds without their particulars

  1. The Tribunal erred in law and misdirected itself when it held (a) that “Any List of Objections to Votes filed after 14/1/92 will have no capacity to help any petition against the election of the 14th December, 1991.’ (page 124, line 32 to page 125 lines 1 to 2 of the Record of Appeal) and (b) that “This material therefore came into C force some 14days after the expiry of the statutory one month from the date of the election of 14.12.91. At best it would be said to have come into force days after the one month time limit.” (Page 125 line 29 to page 126 line 1).
  2. The Tribunal erred in law in failing to make findings regarding any irregularities or otherwise on evidence (oral and documentary) which were duly pleaded and admitted during trial, such failure amounting, in the circumstance, to excluding valid evidence.
  3. The Tribunal erred in law and misdirected itself when it held that election petitions were subject to the same strict rules of pleadings as contained in the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules.
  4. The Tribunal erred in law in failing to find that the 1st Respondent was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes at the election.
  5. Judgment is against the weight of evidence.

Learned counsel on both sides acting in consonance with Practice Directions No.1 of 1992 of January 6, 1992 and issuing at the instance of the President of this Court pursuant to section 93 of Decree No. 50 of 1991, filed and exchanged briefs

of arguments and other relevant documents, all aimed at facilitating the quicker

hearing of this appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant, Chief Bayo Kehinde, SAN., submitted the

following five issues for determination:-

  1. Whether the Tribunal’s statements as to the time of filing the List of Objections to Votes amounted to an erroneous interpretation of paragraph 16 of Schedule 6 of Decree No. 50 of 1991, sufficient to find that the Tribunal did not look at the List and therefore failed to consider the main and important basis on which the petitioner questioned the election.
  2. Whether the Tribunal’s failure to make any findings regarding any irregularities or otherwise on evidence amounted to an admission by the Tribunal of the irregularities complained of by the petition, sufficient to warrant nullifying the election.
  3. Whether the Tribunal was right in adhering strictly to the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules relating to pleadings instead of employing the provisions of paragraph 15 (2) of Schedule 6 to Decree No. 50 of 1991 in the interest of justice.
  4. Whether the uncontradicted evidence of the National Electoral Commission’s Administrative Secretary (DW1) that 532 unauthorised polling units were created and his admission that NRC score was falsified and that he would not say that everything went well in the election, was not sufficient to nullify the election.
  5. Whether considering the totality of the evidence at the trial, it would not be said that the judgment is against the weight of evidence and that the Tribunal ought to have nullified the election.

No issues were formulated on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents. Be that as it may, as will be shown shortly hereunder, learned counsel for them did indeed argue seriatim in the brief proffered on their behalf all the issues submitted at the appellant’s instance set out above, a ruling on the point after hearing counsel on both sides is as considered shortly hereunder. On behalf of the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents the following five questions were submitted in their joint brief of

argument for our determination. They are:-

  1. Whether list of objections to votes can substitute or extend pleadings, and whether what was not pleaded could be introduced by way of List of Objections to Votes.
  2. Whether it is necessary for a court to decide issues that arise out of pleadings whether or not evidence is led in support of the averments contained therein.
  3. Whether the principles of pleading that evidence on facts not pleaded go to no issue applied to an election by virtue of paragraph 51 (1) of Schedule 6 of Decree 50 of 1991.
  4. Whether the Tribunal was obliged to invoke the provisions of paragraph 15 (2) of Schedule 6 to Decree No. 50 of 1991 when no issue was raised or became apparent within the time limited by paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to Decree 50 of 1991 for presenting an election petition.
  5. Whether the Petitioner’s prayer- WHEREFORE your petitioner prays that it be determined that the 1st and 2nd respondents were not duly elected/returned AND that the said Arch. Ekong Etuk was duly elected and ought to be returned. OR in the alternative, that the election to the Office of the Governor in Akwa Ibom State is void” is sustainable at Law.

At the hearing of this appeal on 23rd March, 1992, Chief Bayo Kehinde, SAN, learned counsel for the appellant, adopted the appellant’s brief and also highlighted its salient points in his oral submissions.

On issue 1, he submitted that the Election Tribunal’s wrongful rejection of the List of Objections to Votes on the ground that it was filed out of time arose from its misdirection of itself on the interpretation and application of the provisions of paragraph 16 of Schedule 6 to Decree No.50 of 1991. It was submitted that the List of Objections to Votes dated 27th January, 1992 was filed within time on 28th January, 1992. The election was conducted on 14th December, 1991, and the petition dated 3rd January, 1992 was filed on 6th January, 1992. See page 2 of the Record of Proceedings of the Tribunal and paragraph 4 of the petition. Under paragraph 16 (1) of Decree 50 of 1991 the time for filing of List of Objections to Votes is within six days after the filing of the Reply where appearance is entered

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and where appearance is not entered, six days before the date fixed for the trial. As can be seen at page 8 of the Record, the first and second respondents filed their reply to the petition on 20th January, 1992. The 3rd to 22nd Respondents filed their reply on 27th January, 1992. Thus, the time for filing of Objections to Votes commenced to run from 28th January 1992, the date the petitioner filed his List of Objections to Votes.

It was then submitted that the object of the List of Objections to Votes was to enable the petitioner to give evidence on those objections and that the Tribunal erred when it held that votes objected to in the pleadings could not be given in evidence unless listed in the Objection to Votes. It was however conceded that the said objection does not form part of the petition; it was the only valid form for attacking or verifying bad votes. The Tribunal therefore erred in rejecting the said

objection to votes.

As regards issue 2, it was submitted that there were no findings on the issues joined in paragraph 4 of the petition namely fictitious polling booths, falsification of votes, first respondent not elected by a majority of lawful votes, thuggery and other malpractices committed in all the Local Government Areas especially at Ekpe Atai, Essien Udim, Etim Ekpo, Etinan, Ikono, Ikot Abasi, Ikot Ekpene, Mbo, Ini, Mkpat Enin, Nsit Ubium, anna, Oron, Oruk Anam, Ukanafun, Uguo-Ibeno and Orue Offong/Oruko. It was then submitted that thuggery, intimidation and harassment of unco-operative NEC officials and SDP supporters, mutilation and alteration of figures, unlawful alteration of votes both in areas where elections were conducted and those where no elections were held and unlimited supply of result sheets to NRC members, were irregularities in the election.

A few examples of these will be shown in the List of Objections to Votes in their details. For all these irregularities see Dumuje v. Iduozo (1978) 2 S.C 1; Bamgboye v. Olarewaju (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.184) 132 at 155. It was then submitted that the additional polling booths and the votes cast in them as shown at page 116 of the record of proceedings together with the evidence of D.W.1 Boniface Sylvester Ekanem at page 94 of the record affected the election substantially.

All these were highlighted by the petitioner in the List of Objections to Votes at page 17-69 of the record. The petitioner in his evidence at page 90 of the record testified that if all the false and unlawful votes in the list of objections were expunged, he was clearly the winner of the elections. With regard to issue No.3, it was submitted that election petitions are proceedings sui qeneris and paragraph 51 (1) of Schedule 6 to Decree No. 50 of 1991 provides that subject to the express provision so of this Decree the practices and procedure of the Tribunal in relation to the election petition shall be assimilated as nearly as may be to the Practices and Procedure in Civil Proceedings in the High Court. The evidence need not be stated in the petitions and any party who wishes to have further particulars may seek such direction from the Tribunal at any time after the entry of appearance taking note that the provisions in Schedule 6 shall override any High Court Rules. See Resident Electoral Commissioner for Anambra State and Anor v. Chief O.O. Nwocha and Ors (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.176) 732 at 749 – 750 per Uwaifo, J.C.A. See also Obih v. Mbakwe (1984) 1SCNLR 190 or (1984) 1 SC 125; Orubu v. NEC (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.94) 323 at 347 per Uwais, J.S.C. It was therefore wrong of the Tribunal to hold that no details have been pleaded in the petition about averment of fictitious polling booths or stations as it was alleged that such existed in almost all the wards. It was further submitted that the Tribunal erred when it failed to utilise all the exhibits admitted by it, in particular, the petitioner’s list of objections to votes filed in accordance with paragraph 16 (1) Schedule 6 Decree No. 50 of 1991. The Tribunal also failed to make a finding on the admission of DW1 that 532 polling stations were created without authority of N.E.C as averred in the petition for which the judgment of the Tribunal should be set aside. In this regard issue No. 4 also complained that the uncontradicted evidence of DW1 that NEC prohibited him from creating additional stations by its letter of 4th October 1991 should have been used by the Tribunal to discount the 532 additional polling stations which he created in addition to the genuinely created 8,000 polling stations against the prohibition by NEC, following the creation of new Local Government Areas. Nwawuba v. Enemuo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.78) 581; Ogunaike v. Ojayemi (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 760; (1987) 3 SC 69 at 76. The admission of DW1 should have been taken into consideration by the Tribunal and was sufficient to nullify the election. See Swem v. Dzungwe (1966) NMLR 297 at 302 and 303; Chief Obafemi Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) 6-7 SC 51 at 112 to 114.

As to issue 5 the Tribunal also failed to make findings on the alleged disorderliness of the election especially as PW 3 was never cross-examined on the photographs he produced. Ikuomola v. Oniwaya (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt.146) 617 – 629.

The Tribunal’s rejection of such evidence affected their judgment adversely, Modupe v. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.87) 130; (1988) 9 SCNJ 1 at 4. The reply of the Tribunal to all these complaints was that evidence in respect of which there was no issue joined is inadmissible and it was submitted that the evidence submitted by the petitioner did not fall into that category as they were uncontradicted especially, as the Supreme Court said in Omoboriowo v. Ajasin (1984) 1SCNLR 108; (1984) 1SC 206 that polling booths are the base of the pyramid which forms the electoral process. It was finally submitted that as the list of objections was filed within time and as it constituted valid and relevant evidence, its rejection by the Tribunal was enough to avoid the election and for the Court to order a bye-election. E. Ekong Bassey Esq., learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondent adopted his brief and also made oral submissions at the hearing of this appeal as well as issues formulated by the appellant on which he relied. Learned Senior Advocate’s attack on the failure of the 1st and 2nd respondents to formulate issues for determination having been withdrawn for the sheer reason that learned counsel in their brief argued appellant’s issues seriatim and that is symptomatic of their adoption, the brief was allowed to be proffered in argument by us without any further ado. As to the List of Objections to Votes, he submitted that the Tribunal indeed made findings on them at pages 125 to 126 of the record where the Tribunal said:

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“There is a claim made about Fictitious Booths and Polling Stations.

These were said to have been created almost in all wards in Akwa Ibom State. The petitioner said he would give details of these in his List of Objections to Votes which shall be filed after inspection of documents in possession of the 1st, 2nd, 21st and 22nd respondents’.

Something must be said about the “List of objections to Votes”, It seems to me that when such a document is filed in an election petition it must not be regarded as a part of the petition and therefore a pleading in the body of the petition. It is only something that will aid a petitioner to seek to prove what he has already averred in his existing pleadings in his petition. It may aid in proof of such petition but it is not a part of it. So that what is not pleaded in the body of the petition cannot be brought into it subsequently by way of List of Objections to votes. Besides, a petition is conditioned under paragraph 1 (1) of Schedule 6 of Decree No. 50 of 1991 to be brought within one month after the date on which the election is held. In this case the limit is 14/1/92. Paragraph 15 (1) in the Proviso stipulates that no amendment shall be made after the one month period set up in paragraph 1 (1) if such amendment will introduce new matter or fresh prayer, or effecting any alteration of substance in the prayer, or which may effect substantial alteration in or addition to the statement of facts and grounds relied on to sustain the prayer of the petition. Any List of Objections to votes filed after 14/1/92 will have no capacity to help any petition against the election of 14th December, 1991. It is then the case that no details have been pleaded in the petition about the averment of fictitious polling booths or polling stations. It was alleged that such creations existed in “almost all wards”, It may very well be that any evidence given in such general terms may not be referable to any pleading and may go to no issues.

I am of the firm view that the petitioner did not plead the number of bad votes just as in Ojukwu v. Onwudiwe(1984) 1 SCNLR 247;(1984) 2 SC 15. The petitioner there failed because he did not plead the number of bad votes under section 136 and 137 of the Electoral Act, 1982 which is inpari materia with paragraph 16 Schedule 6, Decree No. 50 of 1991.

As to allegations of illegal or fictitious polling booths which is allegation of fraud or crime the law requires that the accuser must give details and prove such fraud or crime by admissible evidence beyond reasonable doubt. See the cases of Omoboriowo v. Ajasin (1984) 1 SCNLR 108; (1984) NSCC page 81 at 83 and 85 – 89; Olufunmise v. Falana (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.136) 1 at 3 and 5. The alleged letter by which NEC prohibited the creation of additional polling booths was neither pleaded nor tendered in evidence. The booths were therefore regularly there. The petitioner should have recited the alleged fictitious booths in paragraph 4 (e) of the petition so as to give the respondents an opportunity to respond to the allegations.

Significantly, he submitted the appellant did not appeal on the rejected list of fictitious polling booths and votes -Nwabueze v. Okoye (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.91) 664 at 666. Also falsification is a crime and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See the record at page 132 and section 96 of Decree No. 50 which provides that procedure in the election should be as set out in Schedule to the Decree.

Section 91 (2) of the Decree provides as follows:-

“91 (2) An act or omission which is contrary to an instruction or direction of the Commission or of any officer appointed for the purpose of the election but which is not contrary to this Decree shall not of itself be a ground upon which the election may be questioned. Provided that nothing in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section shall affect or invalidate any decision of the National Electoral Commission or of the Transition to Civil Rule Tribunal that a person has been banned or disqualified pursuant to or under the participation in Politics and Elections (Prohibition) Act, as amended.”

Therefore the complaint about new polling booths as to votes cast in them cannot affect the election by operation of law. Similarly, section 124 of the Decree also validates any defects or in any order etc. It states:

“124. Notwithstanding any defect or error in any orders, notices, forms or documents previously made or other thing whatsoever done in pursuance of the provisions of this Decree, such orders forms or documents are hereby validated for all purposes with effect from the dates on which the same were made, given or done respectively.”

In effect, any irregularities complained of by the petitioner are nullified by sections 91 and 124 of the Decree and in particular exhibit AA 16, the revised voters register containing the increased polling booths. It was therefore submitted that there is the legal presumption that the result declared by NEC as per exhibit ‘F’ is correct and that the petitioner has failed to rebut that presumption and prove the figure as incorrect, see Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1; (1984) 15 NSCC 1 at 3. He finally urged that the petition be dismissed and that he would not ask for any order as to costs.

James Essien Esq., the learned Attorney General for Akwa Ibom State, adopted the brief for the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents. He associated himself with the argument submitted on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents. He emphasized that the petitioner in this case failed to plead in his petition, facts which entitled him to use the List of Objections to Votes. He then submitted that the comments of the Tribunal on the time for submitting the List of Objections was obiter dicta and that were the list of objections to be regarded as part of the pleadings, then it would have been caught by the provisions of paragraph 1 (1) of Schedule 6 to Decree No.50 of 1991 which does not allow amendment to be filed on expiration of a stipulated time as the List of Objections amounted to a substantial amendment of the petition. The finding of the Tribunal in this regard is unassailable. Further, all exhibits tendered were tendered pursuant to the List of Objections to Votes. Evidence led by the petitioner on the List of Objections were therefore not valid and went to no issue. The Tribunal was therefore right to hold that what was not pleaded in the body of the petition cannot be brought in subsequently by way of a List of Objections to Votes. Nwobodo’s Case (supra). There was neither evidence nor proof of complaints made in respect of Ubium South I, Nsit Ubium, Etim Ekpo Local Government Area, Ikono and Etinan.

The additional 532 polling booths added to the existing 8,000 units were well known to the appellant and 1st and 2nd respondents who were privy to it. Indeed, the appellant never complained that he did not participate in elections in those additional polling booths and indeed testified that he had his agents posted to all the booths and collation centres during that time. The appellant is therefore estopped from complaining about the additional polling booths. See section 91 (2) of Decree 50 of 1991. As to the evidence of D.W.1, he never said that the 532 additional booths were fictitious or illegal. The 8,532 polling booths were lawfully created before the directive not to increase more than 8,000 units was received from NEC. It is trite law that the petitioner must succeed on the strength of his case, Ojo v. Falaiye (1961) 2 SCNLR (1961-62) Vol. 2 NSCC 150 at 151 and 152 and the statement by D.W.1 that he would not state that every thing went well in the election of 14th December, 1991 because some minor problems arose does not detract from the fact that the election was conducted in substantial conformity with Decree No. 50 of 1991: Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) NSCC vol. 12 page 92. He then submitted that this is not a situation where the Court of Appeal may rightly interfere with findings of facts of the Tribunal in the evaluation of evidence by the Tribunal which were regular, Ebba v. Ogodo & Anor (1984) NSCC Vol. 15 at 255; (1984) 1 SCNLR 372. He finally submitted that the appeal should be dismissed.

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I have considered the entire record of proceedings of the Election Tribunal as well as the briefs of the parties including their oral submissions at the hearing of this appeal.

In the first place, the appellant did not plead that the 532 additional polling stations were unauthorised by the 5th respondent. The appellant elicited from DW1 under cross-examination that 5th respondent by letter No LDG/DL/BB/PS/SI Vol.11 did not authorise the creation of 532 polling stations. The said letter was not tendered in evidence. As neither the appellant nor any of the respondents pleaded that fact, it is inadmissible in evidence and goes to no issue and should be deemed expunged from the record.

Be that as it may, the 5th respondent posted its officials to the 532 polling stations or booths and both the appellant and 1st respondent were voted for in them.

The appellants having acquiesced is estopped from complaining. Further, section 91(2) of Decree No.50 of 1991 provides:

“(2) An act or omission which is contrary to the Commission or of any officer appointed for the purpose of the election but which is not contrary to this Decree shall not of itself be a ground upon which the election may be questioned.

Provided that nothing in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section shall effect or invalidate any decision of the National Electoral Commission or of the Transition to Civil Rule Tribunal that a person has been banned or disqualified pursuant to or under the participation in Politics and Elections (Prohibition) Act, as amended.”

A summary of the findings of the Tribunal are setout herein quite apart from excerpts earlier quoted from the judgment which bear out the most important submissions of the respondents, that where the petitioner pleaded facts, there was either no sufficient evidence in proof or none at all. Further, where the petitioner led evidence, there were either no pleadings to back them up, or where they exist, the evidence is inconclusive. For example, the petitioner alleged falsification of votes. The Police had copies of votes submitted by polling and returning officers; he failed to setout Police figures as genuine, against those figures he averred were false. In Rev. Sabiya v. Alhaji Tukur & Ors (1983) 11 SC 109, Irikefe, J.S.C, opined thus:

“In my view, to prove falsification, it is basic that there should be in existence at least two results, one of which could be stigmatized as genuine and the other false. The weakness of this case lies in the fact that no other conflicting documentary evidence was offered.”

In contrast, see the case of Omoboriowo v. Ajasin (1984) 1 SCNLR 108; (1984) 1 SC 206 at pages 217 & 266 where necessary particulars were put in the paragraphs of the petition itself. This decision was based on sections 136 and 137 of the 1982 Electoral Act which are in pari materia with paragraphs 15 and 16 of the 6th Schedule to Decree No.50 of 1991. See also Chief Chukwemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu v. Dr. Edwin Onwudiwe (1984)1 SCNLR 247; (1984) 2 SC 15.

The gravamen of the submission of Chief Bayo Kehinde, learned SAN for the petitioner/appellant was that the Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s List of Objections to Votes. The respondents, particularly Ekong Bassey Esq, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents in reply submitted that the appellant did not appeal against the rejection of that point and that appellant’s submissions in that regard are misconceived. One of the respondents’ other objections is that the List of Objections was filed out of time. We hold the view that that list was filed within time because under paragraph 16(1) of Schedule 6 to the Decree, when a petitioner claims the seat or office for an unsuccessful candidate, alleging that he had a majority of lawful votes, any party complaining of, and any party defending the election or return shall, within six days after the filing of the reply or where no appearance is entered, not less than six days before the date fixed for trial, file on the registry a list of the votes intended to be objected to by him and of the heads

of objection to each such vote. The first and second respondents filed their reply on 20 January, 1992, and the other respondents on 27 January, 1992 in answer to the petition filed on 6 January, 1992. The list of objection was filed on 28 January 1992, a day after the filing of the Reply. It was therefore clearly admissible in evidence. This is a question of the interpretation of paragraph 16 of the 6th Schedule to Decree No.50 of 1991. It does not touch on the facts found by the Tribunal. In that regard, as it was held by Nasir P. in Chief John Odigie Oyegun v. Lucky Nosa Igbinedion, Appeal No. CA/B/EP/49/92 delivered on 18th March, 1992 (unreported) (Now reported in (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 226) 747) at 758 para. E:

“It is a cardinal principle of our law that an appeal Court will not lightly interfere with the finding of facts of the Court of trial”.

See also Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR 372 at 378 E & F; Ogbechie v. Onochie (1988) 1NWLR (Pt. 70) 370 at 379 G & H. In this regard we agree with the findings of the Tribunal at page 128 of the Record to the effect that:

“Mention was then made of Ubium South I, Nsit Ubium, Etim Ekpo Local Government Area, Ikono, and Etinan, but no specific allegations were made regarding these places, and even where some details were forthcoming there has been no proof of the allegations made. Much of what appears seems to me to be vague, general allegations of malpractices or misconduct, but no proof is made of these allegations. A petition cannot be established in this manner.”

  In the result, this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed. The decision of the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal, Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria sitting at Uyo dated 6th February, 1992 which dismissed the petition of the appellant herein is therefore accordingly affirmed. There shall be no order as to costs as each counsel at the hearing indicated he would not be asking for any.


Other Citations: (1992)LCN/0142(CA)

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