Audu Mala Yerima & Ors. V. The State (2009)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

UZO NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.

The three Appellants were charged with one Mohammed Tukur now deceased and others at large with a two count charge of conspiracy under Section 97 and Culpable Homicide under Section 221 of the Penal Code.

The brief facts of the case are as follows:

On 19th May, 2003, the 1st Appellant Audu Mala Yerima returned to his home and discovered that his electronic gadgets were missing. He went to the house of the 3rd Appellant Sheriff Ismail where he met the 2nd Appellant Mohammed Ngabura. He then told them that his electronics have been stolen. He also contacted the deceased. All of them went back to his house. The 2nd Appellant then advised that the 1st Appellant should go and report to the Police.

On the way to the police Station he met the 4th accused person now deceased who advised him on the contrary. They then decided to seek the assistance of two air force men on guard. The two air force men then accompanied the 1st Appellant to his house where the deceased, 2nd and 3rd Appellants were waiting. 1st Appellant pointed at the deceased as his main suspect.

The air force men ordered all of them out and put the deceased in the boot of the 1st Appellant’s car. They all went to the duty post of the air force men. There the air force men thoroughly beat the deceased and he confessed keeping the electronics in his family house. They found nothing in his family house, when they went there and searched.

They all left and dropped one of the air force men on the way. The 1st Appellant asked the other air force man to keep the deceased in their cell. He was informed they had no cell but he could keep the deceased in an open space until the next day. The Appellants came back the next day but did not see the deceased nor the air force men.

Later a corpse was found by villagers. With the permission of the G.R.A. Police, it was buried on 21st May, 2003, the Appellants were arrested by the Police in Maiduguri and later transferred to State CID. They were subsequently arraigned on a two count charge thus:

“COUNT I

That you Audu Mala Yerima, Mohammed Ngabura, Sherrif Ismail, Mohammed Tukur Ahmed and others now at large on or about the 19th day of May, 2003 at Polo Jiddari Ward which is within the jurisdiction of this court agreed among yourselves to do an illegal act to wit “thoroughly beaten one Abubakar Audu Waya to death” and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 97 of Penal Code Law.

COUNT II

That you Audu Mala Yerima, Mohammed Ngabura, Sheriff Ismail, Mohammed Tukur Ahmed and others now at large on or about the 19th of May, 2003, at Jiddari Polo Ward which is within the jurisdiction of this court, committed Culpable Homicide punishable with death in that you caused the death of one Abubakar Audu Waya by thoroughly beating him to death and later threw away his dead body at the outskirts of Jiddari Polo Ward, with the knowledge that death was the probable consequence of your act and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code Law.”

The pleas of the three Appellants were taken and the trial proceeded. A total of 13 witnesses were called and exhibits tendered. At the end of trial, the three Appellants were found guilty of the offences charged and sentenced to death.

Being dissatisfied, the Appellants filed their separate notices and grounds of appeal.

The 1st and 3rd Appellants’ counsel A. A. Airadion by an order of Court of 1st November, 2007 filed his amended brief of argument. Counsel adopted the said brief and formulated 7 issues for determination as follows:

(1) Have the Appellant suffered miscarriage of justice to warrant this Court to set aside the decision of the trial court which was delivered outside the 90 days period allowed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria despite the reasons proffered by the trial Judge for so doing?

(This issue is covered by grounds of appeal No.1 and 3 of the amended notice of appeal).

(2) Whether the trial Court could import the doctrine of common intention or joint act to link the Appellant with the acts of others at large when the charge before her did not contain such? (This issue is covered by ground of appeal No. 4 of amended notice of appeal).

(3) Whether the case of the prosecution established common intention or joint act against the Appellant acting in conjunction with those at large in furtherance of which an office was committed? (Grounds of appeal No. 2 and 10 of the amended notice refers).

(4) Whether the prosecution was able .to prove that it was the act of the Appellants that caused the death of the deceased? (Grounds of Appeal Nos. 2, 5, 6 and 7 of amended notice of appeal refers).

(5) Whether the case of the prosecution established conspiracy on the part of the Appellant and those at large? (Ground No. 9 of amended notice of appeal refers).

(6) Whether the prosecution proved that the Appellants had intention or knowledge that the death of the deceased would be the probable consequence of their act vis-a-vis their educational background? (Ground 8 of amended notice of appeal refers).

(7) Whether the contradictions in the prosecution’s case were material in nature to render the case unbelievable? (Ground 11 of amended notice of appeal refers).

The 2nd Appellant’s brief was settled by P.A. Akubo SAN who adopted the said brief and formulated 7 issues for determination as follows:

(1) Whether upon a careful and dispassionate appraisal/evaluation of evidence in this case, the Prosecution (the Respondent herein) discharged the requisite burden of proof upon it so as to justify the conclusion, conviction and sentence of the 2nd Appellant for the offences of Criminal Conspiracy and Culpable Homicide punishable with death by the learned trial Judge contrary to Section 97 and 221 of the Penal Code. (Grounds 2, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 15).

(2) Whether the trial Court was right in overlooking or trivializing the manifold and manifest contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses in this case. (Ground 13).

(3) Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right in admitting and utilizing inadmissible evidence, to wit; Exhibit “9”. (Grounds 9 and 10).

(4) Whether the learned Trial Judge was right in his conclusion that Exhibits “D1” – “D7” represented what happened between the accused persons and the deceased on the ground that Exhibit “9” corroborated Exhibits “D1 – D7″. (Ground 14).

(5) Whether the Learned Trial Judge accorded fair hearing to the 2nd Appellant by convicting and sentencing him for offences different from those, with which he was arraigned, charged and tried and for which no pleas were taken or issues joined. (Grounds 4, 5 and 6).

(6) Whether the arraignment, trial conviction and sentence of the Appellants, particularly the 2nd Appellant by the trial court for the offences of criminal conspiracy and Culpable Homicide was valid in law when no proper pleas were taken in this case having regard to Section 187(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (Ground 3).

(7) Whether the judgment of the Lower Court delivered in this case on 17th November, 2006, more than 90 days after the conclusion of addresses is not a nullity, having regard to Section 294(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (Ground 1).”

The Respondent’s brief was settled by B.M. Umar Senior State Counsel Ministry of Justice Borno State. He adopted the said brief, formulated only one issue, but however proffered arguments on all the issues formulated by the three Appellants.

The learned counsel to the 1st and 3rd Appellants raised a question on jurisdiction in his issue one. The 2nd Appellant’s learned counsel raised the same issue in his issue 7.

The issue was –

Whether the judgment of the Lower Court, delivered in this case on 17th November, 2006, more than 90 days after the conclusion of addresses is not a nullity, having regard to Section 294(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

The learned counsel to the 2nd Appellant, raised another issue on jurisdiction in his issue 6 which reads thus:

Whether the arraignment, trial conviction and sentence of the Appellants, particularly the 2nd Appellant by the trial court for the offences of criminal conspiracy and Culpable Homicide was valid in law when no proper pleas were taken in this case having regard to Section 187(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. (Ground 3).

In view of the nature of this issue in the 2nd Appellant’s brief of argument which is fundamental and capable of disposing of the appeal, I will consider it first.

Learned Counsel for the 2nd Appellant submitted that Section 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code requires that a person facing a criminal trial as in this case shall have the charge read to him in a manner that the person understands. Section 187 CPC provides:

“When the High Court is ready to commence the trial the accused shall appear or be brought before it and the charge shall be read out in Court and explained to him and he shall be asked whether he is guilty or not guilty of the offence or offences charged.”

In Adeniji Vs. the State (2001) 5 SCNJ 371 at 379 the Supreme Court per Katsina-Alu JSC held as follows:

“By the combined effect of these provisions a valid arraignment of an accused person must satisfy the following requirements:

1. The accused shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause to the contrary or otherwise order.

2. The charge or information shall be read over and explained to him in the satisfaction of the court by the Registrar or other officer.

3. He shall then be called upon to plead instantly thereto.

This court has held in a number of cases that these Requirements must be satisfied. Nothing should be left to speculation. The records of the trial must show that these conditions are complied with. This is so because the object of the constitution is to safeguard the interest and fair trial of those arraigned before the Court.”

See also Kajubo vs. The State (1988) 1 NWLR Pt 73 Pg 121; Erekanure vs. The State (1993) 5 NWLR Pt. 294 Pg 385, Idemudia vs The State (1999) 7 NWLR Pt. 610 Pg 202, Kalu vs. The State (1998)3 NWLR Pt. 585 Pg 531.

Counsel submitted that the record of the Court must of necessity show that the charge was read out to the accused persons before they took their plea. Another error was that the charge on page 3 of the Record of Proceeding was different from the one in the judgment.

Counsel referred the Court to Rufai Vs. The State (2001) 7 SCNJ Pg 122 at 127 and compared it to the instant case as regards the plea of the accused persons in both cases.

This position of the law was further driven home in the case of RUFAI V STATE (2001) 7 SCNJ 122 at 127 which is essentially on all fours with the instant case. For clarity and emphasis, we set out the relevant portion of the record in that case as follows:

“THE STATE V. ISIAKA RUFAI & ORS

Accused persons present:

Mr. O. Oyesina Oyesina, Legal Officer,

Re. Prosecution

Mr. O.O. Sonibare for 2nd and 3rd Accused

PLEA TAKEN

1st Accused – pleaded not guilty

2nd Accused – pleaded not guilty

3rd Accused – pleaded not guilty

Prosecution opens its case”

We now compare the above with the relevant portion in the instant case as follows:

“THE STATE V. AUDU MALA YERIMA & 3 ORS

Accused person in Court and speaks English B.M. Umar, SSC, for prosecution

A.A. Airadion for the accused person

Umar We are applying that the charge be read out to the accused person.

1st Accused – pleaded not guilty

2nd Accused – pleaded not guilty” … etc.

Counsel pointed out that there was no indication that the charge was even read in the instant case as opposed to Rufai vs. The State (supra). Wali JSC (as he then was) has this to say in Rufai vs. The State (supra).

“the record did not show that the charge was read and explained to the appellant … in compliance with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 33(3)(a) of the 1979 Constitution. I therefore agree with learned counsel for the Appellants that the plea of the Appellant purportedly taken was in contravention of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 33(3)(a) of the 1979 Constitution and the trial was null and void … this in my view, is sufficient to dispose of the appeal without considering other issues that touch on the merit of the case.”

Counsel also drew the attention of the Court to the fact that the accused persons took a composite plea to the two counts in this case without any indication that each count was separately read out to the accused persons. The position of the law was confirmed in the case of Akpiri Ewe Vs. The State (1992) 7 SCNJ Pg 15 at 20 where the Supreme Court per Ogwuegbu JSC (as he then was) held as follows:

“Where in a criminal trial the charge contains more than one count, each must be read separately to the accused and he must plead separately to them. The record of proceedings must show that the counts were read separately to the accused and that he pleaded to them.”

Failure to comply with the provisions of Section 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code renders the whole trial a nullity. Counsel urged The Court to resolve this issue in favour of the 2nd Appellant.

The 1st and 3rd Appellants had nothing to say on this issue.

The Learned counsel to the Respondent stated that the difference between the charge on page 3 and page 109 of the Record of Proceedings were mere typographic; counsel also stated that the instant case was different from the case of Rufai Vs. The State (supra) in that in the instant case the state counsel applied that the charge be read out to the accused persons. If the charge was not read, the defence counsel should have objected at the time. Having failed to do so he can no longer complain about the procedure adopted by the Court on appeal. See Shazali vs. The State (1988) 5 NWLR Pt. 93 Pg 164. at 166, Edet Akpan Vs. The State (1986) 3 NWLR Pt. 27 Pg 255 at 277. In Sunday Amala vs. The State (2004) 18 NSCQR 834 at 861 the Supreme Court per Iguh JSC (as he then was) held:

“I need to stress that there is no provision of section 125 of the CPA which stipulates or makes it mandatory that a note shall be made in the record of proceedings to the effect that a charge was read over and explained to the accused person to the satisfaction of the trial court before his plea was taken. What the law enjoins the trial court to do is to satisfy itself that the accused person on the charge been read to him understand the nature therefore before he pleaded thereto. In my opinion the test to this requirement is subjective and not objective.”

Counsel also submitted that the issue of taking composite pleas does not arise. He stated what was found in the Record of Proceeding as this:

“1st Accused – pleaded not guilty to the first count charge.

2nd Accused – pleaded not guilty to the first count charge etc.

1st Accused – pleaded not guilty to the second count charge.

2nd Accused – pleaded not guilty to the second count charge etc.”

From the above counsel stated that the 1st count was read and the accused took their plea and then the 2nd count was read too.

Also counsel submitted that absence of a record of the explanation of a charge is not fatal to an arraignment under Section 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code which is similar to Section 215 Criminal Procedure Law.

See also the case of Solola Vs. State (2005) 3 QCCR Pg 160 at 176.

Counsel urged the Court not to allow technicalities to defeat the course of justice as stated in Edet Akpan Vs. The State (supra) and resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent.

First and foremost I will start with the charge which is the first step in any criminal proceeding.

The three Appellants were charged on a two count charge in the High Court of Borno State. See Page 3 of the Record of Proceedings which reads thus:

“COUNT I

That you Audu Mala Yerima, Mohammed Ngabura, Sherrif Ismail, Mohammed Tukur Ahmed and others now at large on or about the 19th day of May, 2003 at Polo Jiddari Ward which is within the jurisdiction of this court agreed among yourselves to do an illegal act to wit “thoroughly beat one Abubakar Audu Waya to death” and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 97 of Penal Code Law.

COUNT II

That you Audu Mala Yerima, Mohammed Ngabura, Sheriff Ismail, Mohammed Tukur Ahmed and others now at large on or about the 19th of May, 2003, at Jiddari Polo Ward which is within the jurisdiction of this court, committed Culpable Homicide punishable with death in that you caused the death of one Abubakar Audu Waya by thoroughly beating him to death and later threw away his dead body at the outskirts of Jiddari Polo Ward, with the knowledge that death was the probable consequence of your act and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code Law.”

Surprisingly in the judgment of the trial Judge on page 109 of the Record of Proceedings there is another two count charge which reads thus:

“COUNT I

That you Audu Mala Yerima Mohammed Ngabura, Sheriff Ismail Mohammed Tukur and others now at large on or about the 21/5/2003 at Polo Jiddari Ward within the jurisdiction of this court agreed among yourselves to do an illegal act’ to wit. tourchered one Abubakar Audu to death and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 97 of the Penal Code Law.

COUNT 2

That you Audu Mala Yerima Mohammed Ngabura, Sheriff Ismail, Mohammed Tukur and others now at large on or about the 21/5/2003 at Jiddari Polo Ward which is within the jurisdiction of this court commit Culpable Homicide Punishable with death in that you caused the death of one Abubakar Audu by tutoring him to death and abandoned his dead body at the outskirt of Jiddari Polo Ward with the knowledge that death was the probable consequence of your act, and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 of the Penal Code Law.”

The wordings of these two charges are different contrary to the learned Respondent’s counsel opinion. The learned counsel to the Respondent argued that it was just a topographical (sic) error. I dare say, that this is more than a typographical error. The wordings of both charges are different even though the Sections referred to are the same.

The law enjoins that the prosecution when drafting a charge should follow the words of the provisions under which it was laid. In other words the drafter is not allowed to import extraneous words or elements into the Count. See Ofuani Vs. Nig Navy (2007) 8 NWLR Pt. 1037 Pg 470, Asuguo Vs. The State (1967) 1 All NLR Pg 123 at 125.

The charge on page 109 is different to that in page 3 of the Record of Proceedings. However Section 208(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the Court the discretion to alter, add or frame a new charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. In doing this, the Court is required to read and explain the new charge to the accused and record a fresh plea for the accused. It is also trite law that where there is an amendment to a charge, there shall be a fresh plea after which the accused has a right to be allowed to recall witnesses where necessary. See Attah Vs. The State 7 NWLR Pt. 305 Pg 257, Puncent Vs. The State (1997) 1 NWLR Pt. 480 Pg234.

In the instant case, there is no record that there was an amendment to the charge drafted by the Senior State Counsel neither was a fresh plea taken. The new charge was only seen and recorded in the judgment of the trial Judge. It is doubtful which of the charges was read out to the Appellants to take their plea.

A valid arraignment in law consists of the following:

(a) That the accused person who is to be tried should be physically present before the trial court unfettered;

(b) That the charge preferred against him shall be read and explained to him in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the judge by the registrar of the court;

(c) That the accused shall then be called upon to plead instantly to the charge; and

(d) That the plea of the accused shall also be instantly recorded by the judge. These requirements must co-exist and failure to comply with them will render the whole trial a nullity.

Lufadeju v. Johnson (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 538; Amanchukwu v. F.R.N. (2007) 6 NWLR Pt. 1029) 1; Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460; Chukwu v. State (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 908) 520, Amala v. State (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 520, Ezeze v. State (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 491, Umuolo v. State (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 808) 493 Okeke v. State (2003) 15 NLWR (Pt. 842) 25.

The above requirements are mandatory and not directory. The mandatory nature is further confirmed by Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution. Non-compliance with the requirements will warrant an order of re-trial as the trial will be vitiated and rendered a nullity.

The court is bound by its record. In the instant case the Court recorded as follows:

Umar: We are applying that the charge be read out to the accused persons.

1st accused pleaded not guilty to the 1st count.

2nd accused pleaded not guilty to the 1st count.

3rd accused pleaded not guilty to the 1st count.

4th accused pleaded not guilty to the 1st count

1st accused not guilty to the 2nd count charge

2nd accused not guilty to the 2nd count charge.

3rd accused not guilty to 2nd count charge.

4th accused not guilty to the 2nd count charge.

Umar: In view of the plea of the accused person we shall be asking for a date to enable us summon our witnesses.”

I agree that the Senior State Counsel B.M. Umar applied for the charge to be read out to the accused person. One wonders which of the charges was read out to the Appellants. The one on page 3 or the one on page 109 of the Record of Proceedings.

The law requires that the charge preferred against an accused shall be read and explained to him in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Judge by Registrar of Court. There is no record that the charge was indeed read out nor was the charge explained to the Appellants. It is not also on record that the charge was explained to them before their plea was taken.

More appalling was the supposed recording of the 2nd count. One wonders whether the trial Judge had already passed sentence on them. It was recorded (for emphasis I will quote the recording).

1st accused not guilty to the 2nd count.

2nd accused not guilty to the 2nd count.

3rd accused not guilty to the 2nd count.

4th accused not guilty to the 2nd count.

One wonders whether this is a plea or a sentence.

Like I re-iterated earlier one is bound by the records of the court. An arraignment is the first step in a criminal proceedings. If an arraignment is defective, it robs ths Court of jurisdiction to entertain the charge against the accused persons. See YAHAYA V. STATE (2002) 3 NWLR Pt 754 Pg. 289. By section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution applicable to the instant case every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands in detail the nature of the offence. In the instant case not only were the provisions of the section 187 of the CPC (which is equivalent of Section 215 CPL) breached but also those of Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution.

Uwais CJN (as he then was) held in Yahaya V. State (supra) that-

“Once the provisions of Section 215 CPL (Section 187 CPC) and those of Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution are not followed in a criminal trial, the trial is rendered null and void abnitio. All the other matters that follow thereafter amount to an exercise in futility and are of no significance. It is therefore necessary for courts and counsel involved in criminal trials to note that compliance with the provision is a sine qua non before the commencement of trial of accused persons.”

It would be taken from the above that the trial Judge neglected to comply strictly with the provisions of Section 187 CPC and Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution in the arraignment of the Appellants. The record of the trial Judge did not show that either the charge in page 3 or page 109 of the Record of Proceedings was indeed read out to the Appellants. It is not also on record that their individual plea was recorded correctly.

The effect of the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 187 CPC and Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 constitution is that the trial is a nullity. See Kajubo v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR Pt. 73 Pg 721, Okon v The State (1991) 8 NWLR Pt. 210 Pg 424, Peter v. State (1997) 12 NWLR Pt. 531 Pg 1, Kalu v. State (1998) 13 NWLR Pt. 583 Pg 531, Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR Pt. 604 Pg 548, Idemudia v. The State (1999) 7 NWLR Pt. 610 Pg 202.

Having declared that the trial is a nullity, what would be the consequential orders to be made in the circumstances of this case?

The learned counsel to the 1st and 3rd Appellants urged the Court “to order the discharge and acquittal of the 1st and 3rd Appellants by also quashing the order of conviction and sentence on the ground that the prosecution did not prove a case of conspiracy and culpable homicide punishable with death against the Appellants.”

The learned counsel to the 2nd Appellant urged the Court “to allow the appeal of the 2nd Appellants, set aside the judgment of the Lower Court delivered on 17th November, 2006, the conviction and sentence of the 2nd Appellant to death for Culpable Homicide punishable with death.”

Uwais CJN (as he then was) considered the relevant factors to be considered in ordering a retrial or trial of a case in the case of Yahaya v. State (supra).

“In ordering a retrial, the facts of the case must contain the following factors:

(a) That there has been an error or an irregularity in procedure of such a character that on the one hand trial was rendered a nullity and on the other hand the court is unable to say that there has been no miscarriage of justice;

(b) That leaving aside the error or irregularity, the evidence taken as a whole discloses a substantial case against the appellant;

(c) That there are no such special circumstances as would render it oppressive to put the appellant on trial a second time;

(d) That the offence or offences of which the appellant was convicted, or the consequences to the appellant or any other person of the conviction or acquittal of the appellant, are not merely trivial;

(e) That to refuse an order of retrial would occasion a greater miscarriage of justice than to grant it; and

(f) That to enable the prosecution adduces evidence against the appellant which evidence may convict him when his success at the appeal is based on the absence of that same evidence.

The foregoing factors must co-exist conjunctively for a retrial to be ordered.

In the instant case, an order of retrial will not be oppressive and no greater miscarriage of justice will be occasioned.”

Uwais CJN went on to discuss the distinction between “retrial” and “fresh trial” and when each will be ordered.

“A retrial is ordered only when there has infact been a previous trial that was properly conducted, but which is vitiated by reason of an error in law or procedure. Where, however, there has been no trial in the sense that the purported trial has been vitiated ab initio and is therefore null and void, the proper order to make is not an order of retrial but of a fresh trial. In the instant case, there has been no trial because the purported trial whatsoever was vitiated ab initio. Therefore, the order to be made is for a proper trial to take place and not a retrial. This distinction is very important in deciding the consequential order to be made. (Erekanure v. State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 385 followed. (Pp. 305, paras F – B).”

In the instant case, there was no trial as the purported trial had been vitiated by the invalid arraignment of the Appellants. Therefore the proper order to make in this case is for a fresh trial.

I have earlier found that this trial has been vitiated ab initio and therefore null and void, I will therefore not consider the other issues formulated by the Appellants as it will serve no useful purpose.

The Appeal therefore succeeds and it is allowed. The conviction and sentences of each of the three Appellants are hereby quashed. I order a fresh trial of the three Appellants before another Judge of the High Court of Borno State other than C.A. Mamza J to be assigned by the Chief Judge of Borno State. It is also ordered that the Director of Public Prosecution shall initiate a new trial within 3 months from today 8th July, 2009.

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Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3371(CA)