Barrister Dozie Ike V. Godfrey N. Ofokaja & Ors (1992)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MOHAMMED, J.C.A.
At the National Assembly Election, held on the 4th of July, 1992, to the House of Representatives for the Orumba North L.G.A. Constituency, of Anambra State, the appellant was declared the winner, having scored a majority of 12,435 votes against the score of the 1st respondent which was 12,209 votes. The appellant was sponsored by the National Republican Convention (N.R.C). and the 1st respondent was fielded by the Social Democratic Party (S.D.P.).
Soon after the National Electoral Commission (N.E.C) had declared that the appellant was the winner, the 1st respondent filed a petition before the National Assembly Election Tribunal, sitting at Awka, and challenged the return of the appellant, on the following ground:
“(A) That the 1st respondent was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes at the election because of forgeries, and falsification of votes perpetrated by all the respondents in favour of the 1st respondent in the final result.”
The 1st respondent disclosed in the petition that the original result sheet in Form EC 8A(1), No. AN 002359, for the polling station, at Ndikelionwu ward, known as Town School, Aronota Ndike, had been falsified and or forged. In the falsification votes the appellant score at the polling booth were altered to read 690 votes, instead of90 votes which were lawfully recorded by the Presiding Officer.
The petition was concluded with a claim for the following relief:
“WHEREOF your petitioner prays that it may be determined that the said Barrister Dozie Ike (1st respondent) was not duly elected or returned and that the petitioner was duly elected and ought to
have been returned and should be so returned.
In proof of the allegation that the original result sheet, in Form EC8A(1) had been falsified, the 1st respondent called 8 witnesses, including the Presiding Officer who was appointed by N.E.C to conduct the election, at Town School, Aronota Polling Booth. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent tendered two Forms ECSA(1) the original and a copy which were admitted and marked as exhibits 1 and 2. The appellant denied the claim and called 4 witnesses to buttress his defence that he had never been a party or privy to any falsification of the returns made at the election. The officials of N.E.C viz, the 2nd and 3rd respondents, also denied the claim and explained that there was no falsification and or forgery of the election result in respect of Town School, Aronota Polling Booth.
The Electoral Tribunal considered all the evidence adduced by the parties, in this petition, and in a considered judgment, accepted the submission of the 1st respondent that in exhibit 2 the number of accredited voters was changed and falsified from “090” to read “690”. The tribunal also agreed that the number of accredited voters in queue and votes scored by the 1st respondent at Town School, Aronota Ndikelionwu polling station, was unlawfully increased or inflated by 600 votes. The tribunal went further and said that if the 600 unlawfully inflated votes deducted from the total votes of 12,435 scored by the appellant, there would be a balance of 11,835 votes. That figure of 11,835 votes would be less than 12,209 scored by the petitioner (1st respondent in this appeal) at the election held on 4/7/92. In conclusion the tribunal held that the appellant, Barrister Dozie Ike, was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes, at the election held on 4th July, 1992, for Orumba North Local Government Area Federal Constituency to the House of Representatives.
In consequence, the tribunal nullified the election and ordered for a bye-election to be conducted in the constituency by the Federal Electoral commission (N.E.C). Dissatisfied with the said judgment the appellant appealed to this court on seven grounds of appeal. The grounds and the particulars given to them cover seven pages of a foolscap paper and I do not think it necessary to reproduce all of them in this judgment, because the six issues formulated by the learned Senior advocate, J .A.C. Okola, against those grounds cover all the arguments and points raised in those grounds. The issues are as follows:
“(i) Whether on the sale complaint raised in the petition, the Presiding Officer whose return was being questioned and who testified as P.W.1, was a competent witness in support of the petition, in the light of the provisions of Decree No.18 of 1992?
(ii) Whether the tribunal was right in avoiding the election of the appellant and ordering a bye-election when the petitioner did not seek any of such reliefs in his prayer.
(iii) Whether in view of Exhibit 6, a previous affidavit sworn to by P.W.1 on 10/7/92 contradicting his present testimony before the tribunal on the pertinent issue of the alleged falsification, did not in law render him an unreliable witness, totally unworthy of credence?
(iv) Whether the failure of the tribunal to properly evaluate the pleadings and evidence on both sides, did not lead to a serious miscarriage of justice?
(v) Whether there was proof on the required standard establishing the serious allegations of falsification and forgery made in the petition?
(vi)Whether the award of costs against the appellant in favour of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, was proper?”
The learned counsel for the 1st respondent, Chief Onyali, formulated similar issues, although couched in simpler terminology, for the determination of this appeal. Before I go further into this judgment it is pertinent to deal with the preliminary objection raised by Chief Onyali against the competency of grounds 3, 5 and 6 of this appeal. The learned counsel’s argument is that the grounds raised points of law when they are merely complaints against findings of fact. He referred to the cases of Nigerian National Supply Co. Ltd. v. Establishment Senia of Vaduz (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.164) 526 at 537 and United Bank for Africa Ltd. v. Stahlban GMBH & Co. K.G. (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 374 at410.
I have looked into the two cases cited above. In the U.B.A. v. GMBH (supra) the opinion of Obaseki, J.S.C. in the case of Ojemen & Ors v. Momodu II & Ors (1983) 3 S.C. 173 at 211; (1983) 1 SCNLR 188 was reproduced by Oputa, J.S.C. in his contribution to the lead judgment. Obaseki, J .S.C., said:
“This court (referring to Supreme Court) will not be misled by the mere description of a ground of appeal as a ground complaining of Error in law when in fact, the particulars show clearly that the complaint or the substance thereof is against the evaluation, assessment, weight of evidence, findings of fact or a complaint or misdirection on the fact or the law.”
Chief Onyali submitted that those grounds are grounds challenging findings of fact by the tribunal and as such must be couched in the usual form of an omnibus ground. He referred to Okey Ehay & Anor v. Maria trek (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.160) 83 at 91. and Auachuna Auyaoke & 30rs v. Dr. Felix Adi & 5 Ors (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.31) 731 at 742. Okolo, S.A.N., did not write a reply to this preliminary objection because, according to him, he was served with the respondents brief not long ago. He however submitted orally that the grounds are competent. He referred to the particulars given to the grounds and argued that they explained clearly what amounted to error of law.
Since, grounds 3, 5 and 6 are subject to this objection it is relevant to reproduce those grounds. I have declined earlier, to reproduce all the grounds of appeal, in this judgment, because they cover 7 pages of foolscap paper. However, the three grounds must be reproduced in order to consider the objection of Chief Onyali against them. Grounds 3, 5 and 6 read as follows:
“(iii) The Election Tribunal erred in law by relying or placing any relevance on the evidence of P.W.1 to support its conclusion that the Aronota polling station return was forged and falsified. Particulars of Error
(a) The principal and relevant evidence of the alleged forgery and falsification came from the P.W.1, who on the evidence was the only person who contends he witnessed the same.
(b) The same P.W.1 swore to an affidavit of facts on 10/7/92 tendered as Exhibit 6, paragraph 9 of which states that he got to know about the falsification through Dennis Nwanagu the S.D.P. candidate agent, who informed him of the falsification.
(c) P.W.1 ‘s evidence at the hearing turned out to be that he personally falsified the result in Exhibits 2 and 8 under duress form the 1st respondent/appellant, in circumstances clearly establishing the absence of the said Dennis at the alleged falsification.
(d) That testimony was contradictory in material particulars of how the alleged falsification came to his knowledge on 4/7/92, when compared with his sworn affidavit in Exhibit 6; consequent upon which P.W.1 asked the tribunal to prefer and accept his present version of the event rather than the said paragraph 9 which contained what he then described as typographical error.
(e) Where a party contradicts his previous statement material to the proceedings, in the course of his evidence, he becomes an unreliable witness and ought not to be believed on that issue.
(f) the tribunal was wrong in law to hold that it did not consider that affidavit of fact material to the determination of the main issue of who scored the majority of lawful votes at the election.
(v) The Election Tribunal erred in law in failing to appreciate the palpable contradiction between the pleadings and the evidence led in support of the alleged falsification of result, regarding the authenticity of Exhibit 1.
Particulars of Error.
(a) The cardinal contention on the pleadings as at paragraph 5 of the petition alleged that the falsification of the result for Town School. Aronota was made on the ORIGINAL. DUPLICATE and QUADRUPLICATE copies of Form EC8A(1).
(b) Allegations of fraud must be pleaded with the utmost particularity and thereafter established by cogent evidence.
(c) Petitioner’s case at the trial was that the falsification was made only on the original (Exhibit 2) and no attempt whatsoever was made to prove the alleged falsifications on the duplicate and quadruplicate, which in law must be taken as having been abandoned and unestablished.
(d) The triplicate copy tendered as Exhibit 1 which is different from the rest of the other copies must not have been made at the same time with the original- Exhibit 2 – and the other copies.
(e) The evidence adduced at the hearing is at variance with the particulars pleaded.
(vi) The Electoral tribunal erred in law by refusing or failing to dismiss the petition on the totality of the evidence adduced at the trial.
Particulars of Error
(a) The petitioner specifically pleaded that the alleged falsification was equally effected on the original (Exhibit 2), duplicate and quadruplicate, but failed to establish the allegations in respect of the duplicate and quadruplicate copies as will lend credence to the fact that Exhibit 1 (the Triplicate copy) is an authentic copy of Exhibit 2 produced at the election venue.
(b) P.W.1 tendered Exhibits 3 and 4 (the voters registers) which he used at the election for accreditation, showing that many more than 90 voters were in fact accredited by him, all in the black him he used at the election and bearing the same consistent character of markings or tickings. His denial of the use of Exhibit 4 is a contradiction of documentary evidence, and ought not to be believed.
(c) Exhibits 2 and 8, both of which he admitted were made by him (P.W.1). contain the same features in the entries and his explanation of how the entries came about totally unsatisfactory, especially in the light of the requisite standard of proof applicable to such an allegation.
(d) P. W.1 did not allege or tell anyone of the duress imposed on him by the appellant from 4/7/92 until he gave evidence at the tribunal on 25/8/92 and 27/8/92. The facts as disclosed in his affidavit of facts of 10/7/92 contradict the substance of his evidence on how the falsification carne about. Further, paragraph 13 of Exhibit 7 contradicts the evidence of P.W.1.
(e) Contrary to the evidence of P.W.1; D.W.1 and D.W.2 assert that P.W.1 was with the party agents (P.WA and D.W.1) when he delivered Exhibits 2 and 8 and Exhibit 4 at the collation centre on the election day, yet the tribunal made no finding whatsoever on this crucial factor.
(f) The alleged other copy of Exhibit 8 which P.W.1 said was also falsified at the same time by the appellant and which must be with him (P. W.1), was not produced to settle that fact.
(g) There were palpable and serious material contradictions in the evidence as between P.W.1. P.WA, P.W.6 on one side and as against the evidence of D.W.1, D.W.2, D.W.3 and D.W4. without the necessary evaluation thereto by the tribunal.
(h) Tribunal failed to make any finding on the issues canvassed in relation to Exhibit 13 and the refusal of the petitioners agents at the election to produce Exhibit 1 to D.WA when requested at the collation centre.
(i) The tribunal failed and/or refused to consider the petitioners evidence side by side with the respondents case.”
Looking at the grounds, shorn of their particulars, one can easily agree that those grounds are grounds of law and capable of standing by themselves, because their respective particulars of errors of law are embodied in them. Eso, learned retired Justice of the Supreme Court, when dealing with the approach to the determination whether a ground of appeal is a ground of law or a ground of mixed law and fact or fact had the following to say in the case of Oghechie v. Onochie (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.23) 484 at page 491:
“There is no doubt that it is always difficult to distinguish a ground of law from a ground of fact but what is required is to examine thoroughly the grounds of appeal in the case concerned to see whether the grounds reveal a misunderstanding by the lower tribunal of the law or a misapplication of the law to the facts already proved or admitted in which case it would he question of law or one that would require questioning the evaluation o1’facls by the lower tribunal before the application of the law in which case it would amount to question of mixed law and fact. The issue of pure facts is easier to determine.”
In U.B.A. v. GMBH (supra) Obaseki, J.S.C. referred to an article titled “Error of Law in Administrative Law” by C.T. Emery a Lecturer in Law in Durham University and Professor B. Smythe, of the same University contained in Vol. 100 of October 1984 issue of the Law Quarterly Review where the learned authors opined as follows:
“1. If the tribunal purports to find that particular event occurred although it is seized of no admissible evidence that the events did in fact occur, it is a question of law. But where admissible evidence has been led, its assessment is entirely for the tribunal, in other words, it is a question of fact.
- If the tribunal approached the construction of a legal term of art in a statute on the erroneous basis that the statutory wording bears its ordinary meaning, it is a question of law.
- If the tribunal approaches the construction of a statutory word or phrase bearing an ordinary meaning on the erroneous basis that it is a legal term of art, it is a question of law.
- If the tribunal though correctly treating a statutory word or phrase as a legal term of art errs in elucidation of the word or phrase, it is a question of law.
- If the tribunal errs in its conclusion (that is. in applying the law to the facts) in a case where this process requires the skill of a trained lawyer, it is error in law.
- If in a case where conclusion can as well he drawn by a layman (properly instructed on the law) as by a lawyer, the tribunal reaches a conclusion which cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts as found. In that event, the superior court has no option but to assume that there has been some misconception of the law. But the issue may admit of more than one possible resolutions, yet it may be a conclusion which the superior court (had it been seized of the issue) would not have reached. Nevertheless, the inferior tribunal does not err in law. The matter is one of degree, and a superior court with jurisdiction to correct only errors in law will not intervene. ”
It is without doubt, after considering the above legal postulations that grounds 3, 5 and 6 could fit in the definition given as grounds of law. I therefore dismiss the preliminary objection being unmeritorious.
I now move to the first issue which Chief Okolo S.A.N., formulated for the determination of this appeal. Chief Okolo S.A.N., referred to the provisions of paragraph 42(1) of the 4th Schedule to National Assembly (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 18 of 1992, hereinafter called Decree 18 of 1992, and submitted that P.W.I Eugine Onyemaechi who acted as the Presiding Officer at Town School Aronota Polling Booth was an incompetent witness for or in support of the petitions. The learned S.A.N. argued that P.W.1 could only be capable of giving evidence in support of the petition after he had obtained written 8 consent from the Attorney General. Counsel went further and pointed out that although a defendant in civil proceedings can be both competent and compellable witness for the opponent, an election petition is not a civil proceeding, and referred to Ifegbe v. Awa (1989) 2 N.E.P.L. 91 at 99. Counsel referred also to Obih v. Mbakwe (1984) 1 S.C. 325; (1984) 1 SCNLR 192 and submitted that an election petition is a lis inter partes and must be confined to the four walls of the relevant Chief Onyali replied on this issue and submitted that paragraph 42(1) of 4th Schedule to Decree 18 of 1992 has no relevance to the capacity of P.W.1 to give evidence. P.W.1 has not given notice to the Tribunal indicating his intention to oppose the petition; rather he came to give evidence after receiving a subpoena from the Tribunal to do so. I quite agree with Chief Onyali that P.W.1 had become a competent witness to testify before the Tribunal the moment he received a summons from the Tribunal to appear before it. In order to understand the import of the provisions of para. 42(1) of Decree 18of 1992 it is pertinent to reproduce that paragraph. It reads as follows:
“When an election petition complains of the conduct of the Chief Electoral Commissioner of the Federation, a Resident Electoral Commissioner, the Electoral Officer, the Presiding Officer or Returning Officer, he shall for all purposes “be deemed to be a respondent but an Electoral officer, Presiding Officer or Residing Officer shall not be at liberty to give notice that he does not intend to oppose the petition except with the written consent of the Attorney General of the Federation or State Government concerned, and if such consent is withheld the Federal or State Government shall indemnify the Electoral Officer, Presiding Officer or Returning Officer against any award of costs made against him by the Tribunal upon the hearing of such petition.”
It can therefore be seen from the provisions of paragraph 42(1) above, that an Electoral Officer, Presiding Officer or Returning Officer are required to obtain consent of the Attorney General only when they fanned an intention not to oppose the petition. There is no evidence before the Election Tribunal that P.W.1 had indicated his intention not to oppose the petition. The argument in support of issue number one has therefore failed.
The second issue is based on the relief sought by the petitioner at the end of his pleadings where he prayed thus:
“Prays that it may be determined that the said Barrister Dozie Ike (1st respondent) was not duly elected or returned and that the petitioner was duly elected and ought to have been returned and should be so returned.”
Chief Okolo, S.A.N., submitted that the Tribunal, on that pleading, prayer and evidence, had neither jurisdiction nor competence to grant the petitioner any other relief outside his clearly expressed claim. The learned S.A.N. supported his submission by reference to the cases of Mohammed v Mallam Ibrahim Ali & Ors (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.103) 349: Ekpeyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 S.C. 71 and Ige v. Olunloyo (1984) 1 S.C. 250; (1984) 1 SCNLR 158.
Chief Onyali replied that once the tribunal found that the appellant did not win the election by a majority of lawful votes, it had no alternative than to declare the election void and order a bye-election. The learned counsel, quite correctly referred to S. 42(3) of Decree 18 of 1992, which provides thus;
“Where the tribunal or the Court of Appeal finds that a candidate elected was not duly nominated or elected; the Tribunal or the court of Appeal shall order a bye-election and no more.”
It is indeed correct, as Chief Onyali had submitted, that the Tribunal must comply with the law and order a bye-election. The meaning of S.42 (3) of Decree 18 of 1992 is very clear and unambiguous. This court has made several decisions on this issue and it is our resolve that even if the parties fail to pray for the Tribunal to order a bye-election if the Tribunal nullifies the election for any reason it must order for a bye-election see Opia v. Ibru (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.231) 658 at 686. The order-is mandatory and it could be seen that the legislature is emphatic on what the Tribunal of the Court of Appeal shall do where the election is nullified. The Decree says “shall order a bye-election and no more.” The Tribunal at Awka is therefore in order when it nullified the election and ordered a bye-election. The case cited by Okolo, S.A.N. can be distinguished from the facts of the case in hand. There were no such mandatory provisions in Local government Election Decree No.3? of 1987 or in the Electoral Act, 1982 upon which the decisions of those cases were based.
The third issue dealt with the testimony of P.W.1 before the Tribunal. Okolo, S.A.N. argued that the witness had made two contradictory statements in connection with the falsification of Exhibit 2, the Result Sheet in Form EC8A (1). The learned counsel pointed out that P.W.1 went to the High Court Registry, Awka, and sworn to an affidavit in which he said at paragraph 9 as follows:.
“That on 4th July, 1992 at about 5.30 p.m. I was at the N.E.C. collating Centre at Orumba North Local Government Headquarters Ajalli to defend the Aronota Poll Booth result of ninety genuine votes cast, because Dennis Nwanagu the S.D.P. Candidate Agent informed me of the falsification and that he must protest against that.”
Later when P.W.1 gave evidence, on 25th August, 1992, he gave a different version of what happened over the alteration seen in the Election Result Sheet and in which 600 votes were on lawfully added to the original 90 votes which the appellant scored at Town School. Aronota Polling Booth. Chief Okolo, S.A.N. reproduced the relevant testimony of P.W. 1 before the Tribunal which run thus:
“We were all in the compound of the unoccupied house, when the 1st respondent brought out the result sheet from the N.E.C. bag and with a black biro he altered the figure 090 to read 690. The 1st respondent then asked me to sign the alteration but I refused to sign it. The 1st respondent then ordered the men to finish me. One of the thugs who is now in this Tribunal brought out a pistol and pointed it near my right ear, I was very frightened and I signed without any waste of time. I also wrote in (wrote in) (sic) words ‘six hundred, and then signed it. But it was not in the line for figures, but on top of it.”
In view of the, above apparent conflict between the averments in paragraph 9 of Exhibit 6, which is the affidavit sworn to by P.W.1 and his testimony in court, Chief Okolo submitted that the evidence given by P.W.1 should have been castigated by the Tribunal, because the witness was unreliable. Chief Okolo made similar submission before the Tribunal and after it had reviewed the area where it was alleged that there were material contradictions Le., in the affidavit, Exhibit 6, the testimonies of P.W.1 and P.WA, the Tribunal found as follows:
“We do not consider that the said affidavit of fact sworn to by P.W.1 is material to the determination of the main issue in the instant case concerning the candidate who obtained the majority of lawful votes at the election of 4/7/92. Nor do we attach any importance to a statement of fact which has not been subjected to the rigours of cross examination and we have not discovered any contradiction on material facts in the evidence of P.W.1 and P.WA.”
I have considered the submission of the learned S.A.N. Chief Okolo, and with respect, I must say that the argument is not convincing enough to justify the reversal of the decision of the Tribunal.
After reading the affidavit sworn to by P.W.1 it became quite clear to me that paragraph 9 of that affidavit could not stand alone. Chief Onyali called the apparent contradiction as “the so called inconsistency.” If one reads all the paragraphs of the affidavit, one can see that P.W.1 was not saying that he did not know about the falsification of the result sheet. In paragraphs 13 and 15 of the affidavit he averred that the appellant warned him against denying or testifying to the fact that his figures were falsified and threatened to kill him if he did so. The tribunal referred, quite helpfully, to two cases in which Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C., postulated on what constitutes contradiction and what is a mere discrepancy. The cases are Ayo Gabriel v. The Stale (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) 457 at 468 – 469 and Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 at 525. In the latter case the learned Justice said:
“So in ordinary parlance, to contradict is to speak or affirm the contrary. Hence in the law of evidence, apiece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other asserts, and not necessarily when there are some minor discrepancies in, say, details between them. As I see it.
contradiction between two pieces of evidence goes rather to the essential of something being or not being at the same time whereas minor, discrepancies depend rather on the person’s astuteness and capacity for observing meticulous details.”
Following the legal exposition above it is plain that if one reads about what the appellant regarded as contradictions between the affidavit of P.W.1. his testimony before the court, and the evidence of P.W4, there is not much difference between those pieces of evidence. What is important is the content of exhibit 2.
During the hearing of this appeal Chief Onyali requested us to look at the document and compare it with Exhibit 1. which is a Triplicate copy of Exhibit 2. and both of which were dealt with by the Tribunal. We observed that the alterations made, in which figure 090 was changed to read 690, and the writing of the same in words, is not reflected in Exhibit 1 which is the carbon Triplicate copy of Exhibit 2. It is my view that the falsification needs no proof. The alteration of figures is evidently clear on the face of Exhibit 2. The two documents have been signed by P.W.1, the Presiding Officer. D.W.1, the N.R.C. agent, and P.W.4, the S.D.P. agent, at Town School, Aronota Polling Booth. I therefore do not entertain any doubt that Exhibit 2 had been falsified. The appeal on issue No.3 has no merit at all. Chief Okolo, S.A.N., went into issue number four and submitted that the evidence given did not tally with the pleadings. He referred to a paragraph in the pleading where the petitioner raised two issues, namely:
“That the falsification of the result for Town School. Aronota was done on the Original, Duplicate and Quadruplicate copies of Form EC8A(1), and secondly that the said falsification was done by the said Presiding Officer, Onyemaechi E.C.
I quite agree with Chief Okolo that the evidence disclosed that the falsification was done on the Original, Duplicate and Quadruplicate copies of form EC8A(1). The evidence shows that P.W.1 was having in his possession the quadruplicate copy of form EC8A(1). But I do not see how the 1st respondent’s failure to produce the quadruplicate copy could help the case of the appellant. The witness who was involved in the alterations of these documents had testified and told the Tribunal that the documents have been altered when he was held at gun point, and he produced the original of the document where the alteration was crystal clear. What else is needed to establish that the appellant had been accredited with 600 votes through unlawful method?
The Tribunal had made a considerable finding on this issue in its judgment and I do not see any ground in disturbing the said finding. For clarity of the Tribunal’s finding I reproduce how it concluded its judgment on the facts of the alteration. It reads as follows:
“We have examined closely the two forms EC.8A(1) No. AN002359 marked Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 and we have compared the figures on Exhibit No.1 which is the correct and authentic result with the disputed figures on Exhibit No.2 which N.E.C used in the final declaration of the result of the election for Orumba North Local Government Area Federal Constituency. It is clear to us and we hold as a fact that in Exhibit No.2 the number of accredited voters was changed and falsified from “090” to read “690”. Thus it is also clear to us and we hold as a fact that the votes scored by the 1st respondent at Town School. Aronota Ndikelionwu Polling Station was unlawfully increased or inflated by 600 votes. The falsification of the election result at the said polling station is too clear for words.
The falsity and criminality is clear on the face of the document marked Exhibit No.2 and from the totality of evidence we so find as a fact.”
On the standard of proof I have no hesitation in accepting that the Original Election Result, in form EC.8A(1) has been falsified and the petitioner had proved such offence beyond reasonable doubt. Chief Ikeazor, S.A.N., who earlier opposed the petition told this court on the instruction of his clients, which they did following his advice, the judgment could not be faulted, He associated himself with the submission of Chief Onyali and urged us to dismiss the appeal.
This appeal has no merit at all and it is dismissed. The judgment of National Assembly Election Tribunal, sitting at Awka, in which it nullified the election of Barrister Dozie Ike as the member of the House of Representative, representing Orumba North Local Government Area, of Federal Constituency, in Anambra State, and ordered a bye-election, to be held in the Constituency, is hereby affirmed. The appellant shall pay N500.00 costs to each set of the respondents.
Other Citations: (1992)LCN/0130(CA)
