Chief Denman Odivwri Abeke & Ors V. Rowland Imafidon & Ors (1998)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AKINTAN, J.C.A.
The respondents’ as plaintiffs instituted this action by originating summons at the Federal High Court Benin City as suit No. FHC/B/62/M2/96. Their claim before the court was, inter alia, for:
(1) a declaration that by virtue of the right of residence and other economic rights vested in them they are entitled to just, fair and adequate compensation for any interference with and violation of their possessory surface rights over a parcel of land carved out at Ukpe-Sobo; and
(2) an order for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents and or privies from use of force, strong arm and or multitude to enter into the said 87 acres of land or thereabout carved out of the Ukpe-Sobo Native Administration Reserves vested in the plaintiffs.
As soon as the defendants were served with the court process, they (defendants) filed a notice of preliminary objection. The three grounds of objection read as follows:
“1. This honourable court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine this case as the subject matter of the action is not within the jurisdiction of this honourable court.
- The affidavits are in conflict and that being the case, the issues raised cannot be determined by originating summons.
- The reliefs sought by the plaintiffs are purely academic and no more.”
At the hearing of the case before Abutu J., learned counsel for each of the parties addressed the court on the preliminary objection and the court thereafter delivered a considered ruling in the matter on 28th October. 1996. The court held in its said ruling that it had jurisdiction to entertain the action and that the claim was not purely an academic matter. It however agreed that there were in fact, conflicts in the affidavit evidence filed by the respective panics and the learned trial Judge accordingly ordered that each of the parties should file their pleadings.
The learned trial Judge held, inter alia, as follows in the concluding portion of his said ruling:
“By the provision of section 19 of the Oil Pipelines Act (Cap. 338) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, any dispute as to whether any compensation is payable under the provisions of the Act, or as to the amount thereof or as to the persons to whom such compensation should he paid shall be determined by a magistrate or a High Court having jurisdiction in the area, depending on the quantum of compensation. By the provision of section 230(1)(g) of the 1979 Constitution, as modified by Decree No.107 of 1993, this court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction in relation to all actions in respect of mines and minerals including oil fields, mining, geological surveys and natural gas. It seems to me therefore that by the combined effect of the provision of section 19 of the Oil Pipelines Act 1990 and section 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution as modified by Decree No.107 of 1993, this court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any action in relation to a dispute as to whom compensation should be paid. By section 6 of the Pipelines Act 1990, compensation is to be paid to owners of the improvements on the land for the improvements … In the result, I hold that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.”
The defendants were dissatisfied with the portion of the ruling of the court by which the court assumed jurisdiction in the matter. They have accordingly appealed against it to this court. Two grounds of appeal were filed against the ruling. The parties filed their respective briefs of argument in this court.
The appellants formulated the following issue as arising for determination in the appeal. “Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the summons of the plaintiffs/respondents can be said to come under section 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution as modified by Decree 107 of 1993.”
The respondents also formulated one similar issue for determination in the respondents’ brief. But since I consider the issue formulated in the appellants’ brief as quite appropriate in resolving the issue in controversy in the appeal. I do not consider it necessary to reproduce the issue formulated in the respondents’ brief.
Reference is made in the appellants’ brief to the affidavits filed in support of the originating summons and the plaintiffs’ claim as formulated. It is then argued that the totality of what the plaintiffs claim is ownership of the 87 acres of land.
That since the summons was not saying that the defendants/appellants are operators of the oil pipelines on the and or that there was compensation money payable by oil pipeline operators on the land which the defendants prevented them from claiming, the plaintiffs’ claim can only be restricted to nothing but to land. It is therefore submitted that the lower court was wrong to assume jurisdiction over the claim under section 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993.
It is submitted in reply in the respondents’ brief that the land in question is an oil field and the plaintiffs aver that the defendants prevented them from seeking compensation from the oil operators, an action could therefore he maintained against the defendants in the Federal High Court over the question of who is entitled to the compensation even though the oil operators were not joined as parties.
Section 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 provides as follows:
“230(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matter’s arising from:
(0) – mines and minerals (including oil fields, mining, geological surveys and natural gas).”
It is trite law that in determining whether or not a trial court has jurisdiction to entertain an action, it is the plaintiff’s claim that is relevant and taken into consideration: see Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 S.C. 31: Okonma v. Nwaegbu (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.225) 622; and Opawande v. Oyedokun (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.248) 512. Thus in the instant case, the question to be resolved is whether the plaintiffs’ claim could be said to come within disputes arising from “mines and minerals (including oil fields, mining, geological surveys and natural gas).”
The plaintiffs’ claim, as already set out above, is for (1) declaration that by virtue of the right of residence and other economic rights vested in them, they are entitled to just, fair and adequate compensation for any interference with and violation of their possessory surface right over the parcel of land specified in the claim; and (2) an order for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents and privies from use of force, strong arm, and or multitude to enter into the said land vested in the plaintiffs.
I cannot see how the plaintiffs’ claim as framed, can be said to be in respect of dispute relating to mines and minerals. Rather, I believe the claim is in respect of interference with their normal enjoyment of their rights over the parcel of land specified in the claim and an injunction restraining the defendants from further interfering with their enjoyment of the parcel of land. The plaintiffs did not claim that any of their rights being interfered with in respect of the land included any mining or minerals rights in the parcel of land. Similarly, they have not claimed that they had any oil field or mining exploration activities on the land of which the defendants interfered with or were about to interfere with.
I therefore cannot see how the plaintiffs’ claim, as presently framed before the lower court, could be said to have come within “matters arising from mines and minerals” as a result or which the provisions of section 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 could be made applicable. In conclusion therefore, I hold that there is merit in the appeal in that the learned trial Judge was wrong when he held that his court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim by virtue of the afore-mentioned provisions of section 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993. I therefore allow the appeal, set aside the ruling of the Federal High Court holden in Benin City delivered on 28th October, 1996 in suit No. FHC/B/62/M2/96. In its place, I hereby substitute an order striking out the claim before the court with N2,000 costs to the appellants.
Other Citations: (1998)LCN/0421(CA)
