Chief Evans Ihesi V. Barrister Kenneth Arinze & Anor. (2006)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
SULEIMAN GALADIMA, J.C.A.
Appellant was the applicant at the Court below. He brought exparte application praying for the following:
“1. AN ORDER granting leave to the applicant to apply to this Honourable Court for an order enforcing fundamental right of dignity of human person and fair hearing.
- AN ORDER directing that the order granting leave shall operate as a stay of all actions on matters relating to or connected with the complaint herein until the determination of the substantive motion.
- AN ORDER of injunction restraining the respondents, their servants, agents, privies or whosoever from harassing, molesting or ejecting the applicant from applicant’s office as president of Ogbaru Main Market Amalgamated Traders Association.”
The learned trial Judge in striking out the matter stated thus:
For all the reasons I gave in my ruling of 1st April 2004 in Suit No.FHC/EN/CS/26/2004 PRINCE KENNETH EMEAKANYI V. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, I hereby hold that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter and same is hereby stuck out.”
The appellant aggrieved with this decision, has now appealed to this court positing the following four grounds with particulars in his notice of appeal filed on 2/6/2004:
“(i) ERROR IN LAW:
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he struck out the suit refusing the applicant/appellant leave to enforce his fundamental human right on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the suit without giving reason why he lacked jurisdiction,
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(a) The suit was for leave to enforce fundamental human dignity of the applicant/appellant and fair hearing.
(b) The suit was brought under S. 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Cap IV 1999, against an individual, Barrister Kenneth Arinze and the Inspector General of Police.
(c) The decision of the learned trial Judge runs contrary to Order 1 rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedures) Rules.
(d) The ruling of the learned trial Judge is against the decisions of the superior courts on the issues of jurisdiction of Federal High Court.
(ii) ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial Judge erred in law by declining jurisdiction on the basis of his earlier decision in a different suit which facts and reliefs were totally dissimilar to the instant suit.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(a) The suit the trial Judge referred to in his ruling had among other reliefs the release of a murder suspect who had been arraigned and remanded in prison custody pending his trial. The applicant in the instant suit merely brought an exparte application for leave to enforce his threatened right to his human dignity and fair hearing.
(b) The facts giving rise to the applicant/appellant suit were materially different from the facts of the suit the learned trial Judge referred to.
(c) The instant suit has no nexus to the suit learned trial Judge referred to in his ruling.
(iii) ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he declined jurisdiction to try the suit and thereby failed to exercise his discretion judiciously and judicially.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(a) The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules empowers either the Federal High Court or High Court of a State to hear and determine issues bordering on infringement of fundamental human rights as enshrined in Cap IV of 1999 constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(b) The learned trial Judge has powers to hear and determine both the main claims and ancillary claims of the applicant/appellant as shown in the applicant/appellant’s statement.
(iv) ERROR IN LAW
The learned trial Judge erred in law in adopting a procedure unknown to law and rule of procedure when he said:
“For all the reasons I gave in my ruling of 1st April, 2004 in Suit No. FHC/EN/CS/26/2004 between PRICE KENNTH EMEAKANYI VS. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, I hereby hold that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter and same is hereby struck out.”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(a) The suit the learned trial Judge referred to was at no time agreed to be a test case with the instant suit.
(b) The suit the learned trial Judge referred to was unknown to the applicant/appellant herein.
(c) The applicant/appellant was not a party to the said suit.”
In accordance with the rules of this court the appellant filed his brief of argument. The respondents did not file any brief of argument. Hence the appellant by his application dated 20/12/2005 and filed on 21/12/2005 prayed this court to hear the appeal on the appellant’s brief of argument alone on the ground that the respondents have failed to show any interest in the appeal. On 21/2/2005, this court granted the application.
In his brief of argument Appellant formulated two issues for determination as follows:
“2.1. Did the learned trial Judge lack jurisdiction to try this suit as constitutted?
2.2: Was the learned trial Judge right to have based his decision on the reasons he adduced in a ruling he gave in another suit which facts, reliefs and parties are fundamentally and materially different from the instant suit?”
At the hearing of this appeal on 27/4/2006, learned counsel for the Appellant D.C. Maduechsi Esq., argued the appeal in the absence of the respondents and their counsel.
In the first issue the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in his exercise of discretion by declining jurisdiction to entertain the matter in that he had jurisdiction and inherent powers to hear and determine same. Reliance was placed on sections 6(6)(a) and 46 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Order 1 Rules 2 and (5) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. It is argued further that the applicant’s principal reliefs are enshrined in Sections 34(1) and 36 (2) of the 1999 Constitution. He referred to the case of FRN & ANOR V. LORD CHIEF UDENSI IFEGWU (2003) 12 NWLR (pt.842) 113 at 284.
The second issue is whether the learned trial judge in considering the instant application, was right to have referred and based his decision on the reasons he adduced in a ruling he gave in another suit which facts, reliefs and parties are fundamentally and materially different. It is submitted that the learned trial Judge did not deem it fit to consider the facts of this suit before reaching his decision.
It is my respectful view that those two issues formulated for determination by appellant are quite allied and they would be considered together.
It is well settled principle of law that jurisdiction is a radical and crucial question of competence. If a court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a particular case, the proceedings are for that reason, a nullity, no matter how well conducted and brilliantly decided the proceedings might otherwise have been. In other words, a court is only competent when the subject matter of a case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction. Competence therefore, is founded when a case comes before the court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.
In the instant case learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned trial judge was wrong in his exercise of discretion by declining jurisdiction to entertain this suit, in that he had jurisdiction and inherent powers to hear and determine the said suit. Learned counsel made lengthy submissions and cited a number of judicial authorities. I am of the respectful view that I need not yet go into the question of jurisdiction. I am greatly bothered about the second issue as to whether the learned trial Judge has at all deemed it necessary to consider the facts of this suit before reaching his decision. He assumed the facts of this suit No. FHC/EN/CS/312/2003, were on all fours with the facts of suit No. FHC/EN/CS/26/2004 between PRINCE KENNETH EMEAKANYI V. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE and held that his court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter. The learned trial judge has based his decision on the reasons he adduced in a ruling he gave in another suit which facts, reliefs and parties are fundamentally and materially different from the instant suit. A decision in every case must be based on the peculiar circumstances and facts surrounding it. A decision of the court is its judgment; the opinion is the reasons given for that judgment or the expression of the views of the trial judge. To underscore the importance of a decision of the court as defined in S. 277(1) of 1979 Constitution, which is pari materia with S. 318 (1) of 1999 Constitution, over a suit, the Supreme Court per UWAIFOR J.S.C. held in DIKE V. ADUBA (2002) 3 NWLR (pt. 647) 1 at page 10 that:
“Under section 277(1) of the 1979 Constitution then applicable, the term “decision” by definition, means in relation to a court, any determination of that Court and includes judgment, decrees, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation.”
In KALU V. ODILI (1992) 5 NWLR (pt. 240) 130 at 189, KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C. observed that a decision within the meaning of section 277(1) of the 1979 Constitution envisages any determination on an issue joined by or litigated by the parties before the court. This of course, does not exclude exparte interim decisions that may be made by the High Court under the relevant Rules of Court or the Fundamental Procedure Rules that may be applicable by virtue of Section 220(i)(g) (ii) or (iv) of the 1979 Constitution.
The decision of a court is ultimately based on the evidence before it, the learned trial judge should have looked into the totality of materials, including the affidavit evidence verifying the grounds upon which the appellant sought leave to enforce his fundamental rights. The decision of the learned trial judge was borne out of his intuition and conjecture. The decision which was hasty, snappy and terse was not totally based on the factual situation arising from the suit but on preconceived facts of the case he alluded to that in Suit No. FHC/EN/CS/26/2004 – EMEAKANYI V. I.G. & 3 ORS.
The Court reviewed the facts of that case (not the instant case) and then struck it out for want of jurisdiction. By juxtaposing the facts of the instant case with that suit, the learned trial judge concluded that he lacked jurisdiction. The facts, parties and circumstances of that case are diametrically different from the facts of the case at hand in the following facts and particulars:
- The parties in the suit were completely dissimilar.
2 That case originated from a murder trial already pending in the magistrate court of Anambra State. The appellant in the instant suit came to court purely to seek leave in order to enforce his fundamental rights. He was not arraigned for a criminal case.
- From the facts as reviewed by the learned trial judge in EMEAKANYI’s case the accused person had earlier applied for bail before the High Court and was remanded in prison custody pending his bail application, which was yet to be heard and he approached the lower court under the Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. The appellant in the instant suit approached the lower Court because he complained that his right to human dignity and fair hearing had been violated.
The courts cannot apply the same set of principles on cases having different factual situations unless such cases are on all fours with another. In other words, it is the fact of any particular case that will frame the issues for decision and the facts of two cases must be either the same or at least similar before the decision in one case can be used as a guide to the decision of another case. In CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI V. N.B.A. (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.105) 558 AT 650, OPUTA JSC had this to say:
“It is good to call the court’s attention to its pronouncements in a previous case. Under our system (which we inherited from England and from common law) the formulation of general principles had not preceded decisions. Our case law is the law of the practitioner rather than the law of the philosopher. Decisions have drawn their inspiration and their strength from the very facts which framed the issue for decision. Once made, these decisions control future judgments of courts in like or similar cases. The facts of two cases must be either the same or at least similar before the decision in one can be used and even there as a guide to the decision in another case. What the former decision establishes is only a principle not a rule. Rules operate in all or nothing dimension. Principles do not. They merely form a principium, a starting point. Where one ultimately lands will then depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand.”
With due respect I hold firmly that the decision of the learned trial judge to strike out the appellant’s suit for want of jurisdiction was short, snappy and terse. It is bereft of careful, examination and consideration of the merits of the case. It was made without due consideration of the facts of the instant suit. It is perverse.
In the final result and for the reason given above I allow the appeal and set aside the order of the learned trial Judge striking out the suit.
The suit is relisted and remitted to the Federal High Court Enugu to be tried de novo expeditiously by another Judge. I make no order as to costs.
Other Citations: (2006)LCN/1999(CA)
