Chief John Odigie Oyegun V. Lucky Nosa Igbinedion & Ors (1992)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
NASIR, P.C.A.
On the 14th day of December, 1991 elections were held throughout the Federation under the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transition Provisions) Decree, 1991 (No. 50 of 1991) (hereinafter called Decree 50) to elect the Governors and Members of the various Houses of Assembly for all the States. In Edo State the contest for the Governorship election was between Mr. Lucky Nosa Igbinedion who contested on the platform of the National Republican Convention on the one hand and Chief John Odigie Oyegun who contested on the platform of the Social Democratic Party. At the end of the election Chief Oyegun was successful and was so declared by the National Electoral Commission through the Returning Officer of the State, Alhaji Isa Mohammed who was the Resident Electoral Commissioner for Edo State.
Mr. Lucky Nosa Igbinedion being dissatisfied with the result filed an Election Petition ,before the Edo State Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal). This Tribunal was established under section 88 of Decree 50 and consisted of a Chairman and four members. In his Petition Mr. Igbinedion claimed against the successful candidate, Chief Oyegun, the National Electoral Commission and the State Resident Electoral Commissioner, Alhaji Isa Mohammed. The petitioner claimed in his amended Petition the following reliefs:-
“1. The governorship election conducted at (a) Oredo (b) Uhunmwonde (c) Orhionmwon (d) Ovia North East and (e) Ovia South West Local Government Areas of Edo State was invalid, null and void.
- That the election of the 1st Respondent as Governor of Edo State is invalid, null and void.
- That the 1st Respondent did not win the majority of lawful votes cast at the said election in Edo State.
- (a) That the Petitioner won the majority of lawful votes cast at the said election, was duly elected and ought to have been declared as duly elected and/or returned. Or
(b) That a bye governorship election be held in the whole of Edo State. Or
(c) That a bye governorship election be held only in (i) Oredo
(ii) Orhionmwon (iii) Uhunmwonde (iv) Ovia North East and (v) Ovia South West Local Government of Edo State.”
The petitioner, Mr. Igbinedion, relied in his paragraphs 6-9 of the Petition on the following grounds (shorn of all their particulars which may be referred to if and when necessary):
6 “(a) That the said election conducted in (i) Oredo (ii) Orhionmwon (iii) Uhunmwonde (iv) Ovia North East and (v) Ovia North West Local Government Areas of Edo State was invalid by reason of corrupt practices, illegal practices and offences perpetrated by the 1st Respondent by himself and/or through his agents contrary to the provisions of the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 50 of 1991 governing the conduct of the said election. And the aforesaid offences have substantially affected the result of the election.
(b) That the Respondent was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes at the said election.
7 . Your Petitioner avers that the practices mentioned in paragraph 6 above were duly brought to the attention of the 3rd Respondent, but that he unreasonably discountenanced the same and proceeded to declare the 1st Respondent as having been duly elected on 15/12/91. The Petitioner will found on the various petitions and eye witnesses written accounts made available to the 3rd Respondent in this respect.
- The 2nd Respondent has also there after ratified the result of the said election despite the numerous petitions by and on behalf of the Petitioner which said Petitions will be found upon at the trial.
- The Petitioner states that whilst (sic) the curse of the Oba of Benin still hangs in that air and taking into consideration his immense authority over his people, there cannot be a free and fair election in the aforesaid Local Government Areas as most of his supporters will still refrain from voting for fear of being afflicted by either temporal or spiritual injuries”.
The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents to the Petition joined issues with the Petitioner in their respective amended Replies (pages 56-60 and 65-69 of Record). These Replies may be referred to if necessary. At the trial of the petition the main contention relied upon rested on a radio broadcast (Exhibit 9) by one of the witnesses, Chief Nosakhare Isekhure (D.W.5) Even though the Petitioner gave a number of other acts of violation of the electoral rules the Tribunal found in his favour only on the ground of the offensive broadcast. The Tribunal in its judgment stated as follows:
“This certainly was too much. We believe that the Oba of Benin had nothing to do with it. We believe also the 1st Respondent had no knowledge of this broadcast. It was the affair of Chief Isekhure in his youthful exuberance, We absolve the 1st Respondent of any blame in this matter. Chief Isekhure was never his agent for any purpose in the election. But as a consequence of this offensive broadcast, we are unable to hold that the election was free and fair.
Perhaps we need to add that it is not necessary for the candidate himself to be guilty of corrupt practices in order to avoid an election, It is sufficient that the election be marred with corrupt practices or other recognised grounds (Section 98 of the Decree).
Of course, if a candidate is in addition guilty, he has his own consequences to suffer (see Section 102 of the Decree), What we have said so far is enough to nullify the election, and we so hold.
There were other grounds put forward by the Petitioner to question this election, such as personation, the 1st Respondent not winning the lawful votes. These grounds were not in any way substantiated.
We dismissed them.
We promised to give our reasons for being unable to grant the 1st Respondent’s application to further amend his amended reply in this judgment. The application came rather too late in the proceedings after the Petitioner had closed his case with about 20 witnesses and the Respondents had commenced. There would have been no opportunity for the Petitioner to meet the case in the amendment sought which was to introduce a new and different version of the public announcement which Chief Isekhure claimed to have paid for on Friday the 13th December, 1991. Again this amendment sought to effect a substantial alteration in the admission contained in the facts and grounds set out in the amended reply. The application was refused for these reasons.
In the result, we nullify the results of the Governorship Election held on the 14th December, 1991, and declare the election invalid.
We order that a bye-election be held in the whole of Edo State on a date convenient to the authorities as early as possible.”
The 1st Respondent to the Petition, Chief Oyegun, being dissatisfied with the decision appealed to this Court under Section 93 of Decree 50. Chief Oyegun (hereinafter called the Appellant) appealed against Mr. Lucky Igbinedion (1st Respondent) and the National Electoral Commission (2nd Respondent) and Alhaji Isa Mohammed (3rd Respondent). The Appellant filed two appeals and two Briefs of Argument dated 2nd March 1992 and 5th March. 1992. At the beginning of the hearing of this Appeal learned counsel for the Appellant asked for and was granted leave to withdraw the Notice of Appeal and the Brief dated 2nd March 1992. They were then struck out. The appeal was argued on the Notice of Appeal dated 5th March, 1992 and the Brief of Argument pled on the same date. The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and 8 grounds of Appeal. In the Brief of Argument five questions for determination were raised. At the hearing learned counsel for the Appellant Dr. D.D. Mowoe, SAN (led by Chief G.O.K. Ajayi, SAN) formulated only one main issue on which the Appeal was argued namely:
“Whether a candidate can have his election nullified on the ground of corrupt practice when the person found to have been guilty of the corrupt practice was expressly found by the Tribunal not to be an agent of the candidate and the conduct complained of was neither authorised prior to or subsequent to the conduct complained of, and the candidate did not have knowledge.”
The above seems to me to be a reasonable summary of the part of the decision complained of, that:-
“(i) The decision that Chief Nosakhare Isekhure did on 14.12.91 cause a paid announcement to be broadcast over the Edo Broadcasting Service, Benin City.
(ii) The decision that the election to the office of the Governor was not free and fair.
(iii) The decision to nullify the results of the election held on 14.12.91 and to declare the said election invalid.
(iv) All other determinations ancillary to or arising from the foregoing.”
The Eight Grounds of Appeal all complained in one way or the other against the activities of Chief Nosakhare Isekhure particularly his campaigns and his alleged broadcast of 14th December, 1991. Except Ground 8 which is the general ground against weight of evidence there is no challenge against the judgment of the Tribunal save as stated above. It seems to me that this appeal must stand or fall on the above issue raised by the learned counsel for the Appellant. I am not so much interested in the semantics of the language. My main concern is with the ordinary meaning and effect of the activities of Chief N. Isekhure during the election. I am of the opinion that in an election petition whether at the trial or on appeal the court must do its utmost best to understand exactly what happened in order to be able to decipher whether the electorate did agree with the rule of the game or whether certain circumstances happened which will make even the ordinary man say that the contest by the candidates was against the rules. In any event Dr. Mowoe argued forcefully that there was no corrupt practice committed by the Appellant or anybody else on his behalf to warrant presentation of a petition on the basis of corrupt practice under section 91(1)(b) of Decree 50. He drew our attention to section 102 in respect of undue influence.
It was further argued that even though the Tribunal found Chief Isekhure to be responsible for the broadcast but the Tribunal absolved both the Oba of Benin and the Appellant from any responsibility. On this basis Dr. Mowoe argued that the Tribunal was wrong to nullify the election of the Appellant as the Appellant did not commit or participate in committing the offence of undue influence. He did not also authorise nor was he aware of such acts. We were referred to Nuhu Musa and Anor v. N.E.C. and Ors (1989) 1 NEPLR 20 at 36; Gabriel Adediran v. Ganiyu Ladepo (1991) 1 L.R.E.C.N. III at 121 and to Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Ed.) Vol. 15 at page 375.
In his reply to the above arguments and submissions Mr. Onafowokan, SAN, for the 1st Respondent/Petitioner adopted the 1st Respondent’s Brief and the Brief for the Cross Appeal. The learned counsel did not accept the issue as raised by the learned Doctor for the Appellant. He stated that the issues for deterrnination were:
“(1) Whether having regard to the provisions of sections 91 (1) (b), 102(2) and 105 of Decree 50 of 1991, the Edo State Governorship Election of 14/12/91 was invalid by reason of corrupt practice;
(2) Whether the Tribunal was right in nullifying the said election
It seems to me that the issues as raised by both counsel have, to say the least, a lot in common. Indeed, the main difference if one can call it so, is that Mr. Onafowokan did not specifically mention the aspect of agency. Learned counsel emphasised the issue of corrupt practice as stated in the Petition under paragraph 6 – Grounds for questioning the election. He referred particularly to paragraph 6(a) (i), (iv), (v) and (vii). He submitted, rightly in my view, that an election can only be questioned on the grounds set out in section 91 of Decree 50.
The relevant provisions applicable in this Appeal, as submitted by learned counsel, was section 91(1 )(b) and that these provisions must be given their ordinary meaning. The main submission was that a petitioner need only to prove that there was corrupt practice and it did not matter who did it. The candidate or his agent need not necessarily be involved. All what need be was to show that there was corruption. In learned counsel’s submission the candidate i.e, the Appellant in this case, or his agent are material only when sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 102 of Decree 50 are involved. Learned counsel, not unnaturally, supported the finding of the Tribunal (on page 159 lines 30-45 of the Record) that:-
“This certainly was too much. We believe that the Oba of Benin had nothing to do with it. We believe also the 1st Respondent had no knowledge of this broadcast. It was the affair of Chief Isekhure in his youthful exuberance. We absolve the 1st Respondent of any blame in this matter, chief Isekhure was never his agent for any purpose in the election. But as a consequence of this offensive broadcast, we are unable to hold that the election was free and fair.
Perhaps we need to add that it is not necessary for the candidate himself to be guilty of corrupt practices in order to avoid an election. It is sufficient that the election be marred with corrupt practices or other recognised grounds (Section 98 of the Decree).
Of course, if a candidate is in addition guilty, he has his own consequences to suffer (See Section 102 of the Decree). What we have said so far is enough to nullify the election, and we so hold.”
The attention of Mr. Onafowokan was drawn to his address at the trial as to what he submitted to be the central issue, where he submitted (page 147 lines 6-12 of the Record) that:-
“Central issue in this petition is whether there is undue influence on the part of the respondent in this case. From this arises the question whether Isekhure is the agent of the 1st respondent. Submit on the evidence Isekhure was agent of the 1st Respondent – Agency in law – Hals Law 3rd Ed. Vol XIV Article 533, 301 at p. 170.”
In his submission before us learned counsel seemed to have shifted his ground that corrupt practice by anybody whether agent or not or even unknown to the Appellant would be sufficient to annul an election. Learned counsel also emphasised that it was not the magnitude of the corruption or the number of people involved. It would be sufficient if one person whoever he might be was influenced by the corruption.
He explained away the requirement of substantial compliance” with the Decree 50 and said that this was in Schedule 5 to the Decree and what is now being interpreted is section 91(1) (b) of Decree 50
Before considering the argument of the learned counsel it is important to make it clear that the Appeal of the Appellant is strictly on the issue of the role played by the Chief Nosakhare Isekhure (DW5) during the election period particularly between the 13th December, 1991 and the 14th December, 1991. It is on this basis that Dr. Mowoe, learned counsel for the Appellant condensed the five questions for determination, as stated on pages 3 and 4 of the Appellant’s written brief, into the one issue raised by him which has been produced earlier on in this judgment. There is, in my opinion, a lot of sense in this approach. It is not the number of issues raised which is important. The important consideration is the ability of learned counsel to raise the correct and the relevant issue or issues which if determined by the Court will decide the Appeal finally. Indeed the Court frowns at the listing of evidence of irrelevant legal points as issues or questions for determination.
On his part Mr. Onafowokan for the Respondent raised two questions for determination and abandoned the other two listed on pages 1 and 2 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument. Even though the issues by learned counsel are worded differently from that raised by, learned counsel for the Appellant. I am of the firm view that the Central Issue in both cases was the part played by Chief Nosakhare Isekhure (DW5). Indeed the judgment of the Tribunal in favour of the 1st Respondent in this appeal is limited to that issue.
I have already produced extensively the last portion of the judgment of the Tribunal. It is important to re-emphasise that this Appeal is limited to the role of DW5. The learned Tribunal in its decision found (as produced above) that part of the message complained of was that:
“The Oba of Benin hereby calls on all Binis to go out and vote en masse for John Odigie Oyegun as Governor of Edo State. Whoever fails (sic) to heed this call will be seen as enemy of the Oba and the curse of the land will be on his head.” (p.159 of the Record)
On this the Honourable Tribunal felt so strongly and stated (page 159 lines 30-37) that:
“This certainly was too much. We believe that the Oba of Benin had nothing to do with it. We believe also the 1st Respondent (i.e. the Appellant in this Appeal) had no knowledge of the broadcast. It was the affair of Chief Isekhure in his youthful exuberance. We absolve the 1st Respondent of any blame in this matter. Cruel Isekhure was never his agent for any purpose in the election. But as a consequence of this offensive broadcast we are unable to hold that the election was free and fair.”
It is a cardinal principle of our law that an appeal court will not lightly interfere with the finding of facts of the court of trial. See e.g. Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR 372 at 378 E & F Ogbechie v. Onochie (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.70) 370 at 390 G & H. In Paul O. Omoregbe v. Ehigiator Edo (1971) 1 All NLR 282 at 289 the Supreme Court held that:
“It is not the business of a court of appeal to substitute its views of fact for those of the judge of tribunal.”
The only time when such interference is permissible is when the finding of the facts are perverse or unsupported by evidence.
The arguments and submissions of learned counsel for both parties finally pivoted themselves as to whether Chief Isekhure (DW5) was agent of the Appellant. In addition learned counsel for the Respondent further argued that it was immaterial whether there was any agency relationship. He cited no authority for this bold proposition. On the other hand Dr. Mowoe referred us to the cases of Nuhu Musa and anor. v. National Electoral Commission and 5 ors (1989) 1 N.E.P.L.R. 20 at 36 and Gubriel Adediran v. Ganiyu Ladapo (1991) 1 L.R.E.C.N. 111 at 121 in support of his submission that the Appellant should not be held responsible or liable for the acts of persons who were not his agents or authorized by him.
I am not unmindful of the Cross Appeal which I shall deal with in due course but even if some of the reasoning or conclusion would in the end touch on the issues raised in the Cross Appeal I have to deal with them here in order to give a full and complete picture and conclusion on this Appeal. Indeed an appeal court has the power to touch even on matters that may be pending in a lower court if that is necessary for the efficient disposal of the appeal before it. See Akilu v. Fawehinmi (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.102) 122 at 175; Fawehinmi v. Akilu & Ors (19893 NWLR (Pt.112) 643 at 673.
Let me now consider generally the role played by Chief Nosakhare Isekhure (DW5) in this case. He was a member of the National Republican Convention but later decamped to the Social Democratic Party. He was an active member of the Social Democratic Party. As found by the Tribunal the said witness issued a radio broadcast on the election day i.e. 14th December, 1991. This is against the law under section 111 of the Decree 50. The Tribunal also found that D.W.5 was not an agent of either the Appellant or the Respondent or the Oba of Benin in whose name he was claiming to speak. In addition to the cases cited to us it is important to consider other cases. As far back as 1956 in the case of Webber G. Egbe v. Gabriel E. Etchie (1955-56) W.R.N.L.R. 134 at 135 a case much similar to the appeal before us there was accusation of corrupt practice on the part of the Olu of Warri and his Chief (but not against the respondent) as well as certain irregularities.
It was held by Onyeama, Ag. Judge after referring to the relevant section of the law stated:
“From these provisions of the law it follows that even if the Olu of Warri had threatened spiritual injury (Regulation 93) to the Itsekiri electors, the respondent would be guilty of undue influence only if he aided and abetted, counselled or procured the Olu of Warri to threaten the electors, or if the threats were made with his knowledge and consent, or if the Olu was acting under his general or special authority.”
In his contribution on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd Respondent Mrs. Ojo, learned Chief legal officer, adopted her brief and supported the submissions made by Dr. Mowoe.
She further tried to show that the 1st Respondent has not given the court sufficient data as to the voters affected either to vote or to refrain from voting because of the broadcast by D.W. 5. In short her stand was that the Tribunal was wrong to give judgment in favour of the 1st Respondent on the insufficient evidence available.
I agree with her.
In the case of Mallan Bala Keffi v. Alhaji Zakari Isa (1965) NNLR 17 at 25 there was evidence that one of the polling agents of the 1st Respondent has committed the electoral offence of corrupt practice of undue influence by threatening people in order to make them vote but not that he had so acted on behalf of the candidate, to the candidate’s knowledge, or consent. It was held by Hurley C.J. that:
“In threatening people in order to induce them to vote he was not acting under his special authority as a polling agent, and the first respondent is not to be deemed under section 78 to have committed the offence of undue influence as a result of what Galadima Pawa did.”
In Gabriel A. Adediran v. Ganiyua. Ladapo &.ors. (1991) 1 L.R.E.C.N. 110 at 121.
It was held by S.A. Kolade, J. that:
“A candidate cannot be held responsible for what other people did in the form of ‘unsolicited aid’ of which he or his election agent were ignorant.”
Finally on this point reference should be made to Nuhu Musa and anor. v. National Electoral Commission and 5 ors. (1989) I N.E.P.L.R. 20 at 36. It was a case of allegation of bribery made against the successful candidate. This Court, sitting at Jos held as follows:-
“I have, when I gave consideration to the question raised in issue (C) above, come to the conclusion that there was not credible or legal and admissible evidence that the said Alhaji Yakubu Idris and Yusufu Nadabo in doing what they allegedly did, were at all material times, agents of the 5th respondent nor was there any such evidence that they were acting for and on behalf of the 5th respondent. That is one reason why this court cannot hold that the 6th respondent offered the bribes or should be deemed to have offered the bribes or that the evidence of the 1st appellant and his witnesses, on the point, was not at variance with paragraph 3(a) (iv) of the petition. The result is that there was no proof, as held by the learned trial judge, that the 5th respondent offered bribes to voters so that they might vote for him. Clear and unequivocal proof is required before a petitioner can establish a case of bribery. Suspicion is not sufficient, and the mere fact that a witness confesses that he was bribed to vote for a particular candidate is not conclusive.
See paragraph 780. Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vo1.15, p.425, 4th ed. Further, it has to be shown that either the candidate who is alleged to have bribed voters or his acknowledged agent authorized what was done or subsequently ratified it. The fact that the candidate did not interfere with persons who, feeling interested in the candidate’s success, may act in support of his canvass is not sufficient to saddle the candidate with any unlawful acts of theirs of which the candidate and his election agent are ignorant. See para.698. Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vo1.15, p.375, 4th ed.”
From the above authorities it is clear that for the Appellant to be held responsible in this Appeal for the acts of Chief Isekhure it has to be proved by credible evidence that the Chief was an agent of the Appellant or that the Chief (D.W.5) was acting on special or general authority of the Appellant or those of somebody who was agent of the Appellant. The Tribunal found as a matter of fact that the Chief was not an agent of the Appellant and that the Appellant was not aware of what the Chief was doing in support of the Appellant’s campaign. It was also found by the Tribunal that the Oba of Benin had not authorised the action of the Chief. It seems to me that even if the Oba and all his Chiefs solicited gratis, for votes in support of the Appellant, the Appellant ought not be held liable or accountable for any illegality committed in the process unless clear element of authorisation or request can be proved. In any event, the accusation is for a criminal offence created under section 102(2) and punishable under section 107 of Decree 50. Whoever alleges such offences must prove them beyond reasonable doubt: Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1 at 17; (1984) 1 S.C. 1 at 13& 39.
There is no doubt that undue influence forms part of corrupt practice under section 102(2) of Decree 50. What is in issue is not that undue influence is or is not corrupt practice. The issue is whether the Appellant was liable for any corrupt practice. We have not been directed to any evidence of undue influence by the Appellant himself. What Mr. Onofowokan tried to do with brilliance and industry was to link the action of Chief Isekhure (D.W.5) with the Appellant. Alternatively he proffered an argument that once there was corrupt practice it did not matter how it came about or by who it was made. On both points I find it impossible to agree with learned counsel particularly in the light of the authorities cited above. I now deal with the cross-appeal. The cross-appeal was argued on two main grounds, namely:
(i) Whether the Tribunal was right in absolving the 1st Respondent in the cross-appeal, and
(ii) Whether Chief Isekhure was never the agent for any purpose in the election.
Learned counsel argued that in Exhibii 10(5) Chief Isekhure signed as agent of Chief Oyegun at the collation centre. It was further argued that this fact was specifically pleaded in the petition. It was further stated that Chief Oyegun knew that Chief Isekhure was campaigning for him in Ward 8. It was further argued that Exhibit 10(5) was admitted in evidence without objection. It was further argued that Chief Isekhure campaigned for the Appellant all over including the broadcast and meeting of voters in various places. It was finally submitted that the Tribunal was wrong to hold that Chief Oyegun was blameless.
In her answer to the above, Mrs. Ojo submitted that the findings of the Tribunal on the available evidence was that Chief Isekhure was acting on his own. Dr. Mowoe in his reply pointed out that section 102(2) and (3) clearly required an authorisation from the candidate before he can be liable. In respect of Exhibit 10(5) learned counsel pointed out that the Exhibit (as stated on page 110 lines 28 to 30) was tendered “relating to the votes as excess of accreditation” and not for the signature of Chief Isekhure.
We have already dealt with a lot of the points raised in his cross-appeal. It is settled from the authorities referred to above that a person can be an agent for a particular purpose and not for other purposes.
So even if Exhibit 10(5) has been put in evidence to show Chief Isekhure as agent at a Collation Centre that does not authorise him to be an agent for all purposes, particularly in an illegal broadcast. In any event, Exhibit 10(5) was not shown to any witness in respect of the signature of Chief Isekhure. I am in agreement with Dr. Mowoe that it cannot be used without reference to the reasons why it was put in particularly as there was no examination or cross-examination on the particular point. The duty of any court is to decide between the parties on the basis on what has been demonstrated, tested, canvassed and argued in court. It is not the duty of the court to do cloistered justice by making an enquiry into the case outside the court even if such enquiry is limited to the examination of documents which were in evidence: Alhaji Onihudo & ors. v. Alhaji Akibu (1982) 7 S.C. 60 at 62. Taking all the evidence into consideration I do not feel justified to deviate form the finding of facts made on this point by the Tribunal.
Having considered the Appeal and the Cross-Appeal in the light of the evidence on the record of appeal and the arguments and submissions by the learned Senior Advocates I am convinced that the Appeal has merit and it succeeds. The Cross-Appeal in my opinion added nothing to what was argued in the main appeal.
It lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
In conclusion, I accept and uphold the Appeal.
The decision of the Tribunal is hereby set aside together with all orders made by the Tribunal. The Governor, Chief John Odigie Oyegun, elected at the Election held on the 14th December, 1991 is affirmed as the Governor of Edo State.
I award costs of N500.00 in favour of the Appellant against the 1st Respondent. I make no order as to costs in favour of 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
Other Citations: (1992)LCN/0131(CA)
