Chief Joseph Olagunju Olaniyan & Anor. V. Oba Gabriel Oyekanmi Adeniyi & Anor. (2006)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
JOHN AFOLABI FABIYI, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the judgment delivered by Falade, J while sitting at the High Court of Justice, Ilesa in Osun State of Nigeria on 4th July, 1995.
The 1st Respondent herein, as plaintiff at the lower court filed his suit against the 2nd Respondent and the appellants as defendants thereat. The claims of the 1st respondent as plaintiff can be found in paragraph 35 of the statement of claim. At page 6 of the transcript record of appeal, the said claims read as follows:
“35. Whereas the plaintiff claims:
(i) DECLARATION that Ase and Ipetu-Ile (Both in Obokun Local Government) are two distinct (sic) distinct communities from time immemorial and that Alase is the paramount Chief of Ase and not a quarter chief of Ipetu-Ile.
(ii) INJUNCTION restraining the Osun State Government from acting on Letter No. CB.141/125/1/VOL.1/256 of June 1991 copied the plaintiff by which letter the plaintiff is being regarded as a section chief of Ipetu-Ile and also from deposing the plaintiff OR doing anything to reduce the status of the plaintiff to a quarter chief of Ipetu-Ile where the 2nd and 3rd defendants are chiefs.”
The appellants herein, as defendants/counter-claimants at the lower court, counter-claimed against the plaintiff thereat and Respondent herein as discernible in paragraph 51 of the amended counter-claim, thus:
“51. WHEREOF the 2nd and 3rd defendants counter-claim against the plaintiff as follows:
(1) A declaration that the plaintiff’s correct title is ‘Lomo-ase of Ipetu-Ile’ and not ‘Alase of Ase’ under the applicable customary law and usage.
(2) A declaration that the alteration of the title of ‘Lomo-Ase of Ipetu-Ile’ to ‘Alase of Ase’ was contrary to the applicable customary law and usage and the registered declaration of the Apetu chieftaincy of 1960 and therefore erroneous, ultra void, illegal, null and void.
(3) A declaration that the plaintiff is not a traditional ruler or Loja in Ipetu-lle but a quarter chief in Ipetu-lle and as such has no right to parade himself as an Oba or Loja in Ipetu-lle.
(4) A declaration that the Ase community of the plaintiff were (sic) presently settled on land within the territory of the Apetu of lpetu-Ile and as such has no separate or independent territory of its own where he could proclaim himself as an Oba.
(5) A declaration that the claim of the plaintiff as a traditional Oba, the Alase of Ase, is contrary to the customary law and tradition of the people and is, therefore, null and void.
(6) Injunction restraining the plaintiff from parading himself as a traditional Oba and Alase of Ase.
(7) Or alternatively, injunction restraining the plaintiff, his agents, servants or privies from acting in any manner whatsoever independently of or undermining the authority of the Apetu.”
Put briefly, the plaintiff’s suit was precipitated by the government’s letter No. CB.141/125/1/Vo1.1/256 of June 1991. (No day of the month stated). In the letter which is exhibit P5, the plaintiff was referred to as a quarter chief in Ipetu-Ile. The writer maintained that ‘as the Alase of Ase, Chief Adeniyi is only a chief in a section of Ipetu-Ile and not another traditional ruler in the town’. The plaintiff maintained that Ase and lpetu-Ile are two distinct communities.
Viewed succinctly, the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ counter-claim queried the title of the plaintiff as Oba ‘Alase of Ase’ which they seriously contend that it is contrary to native law and custom and the registered declaration of Apetu Chieftaincy of 1960. They maintained that Ase community was settled on Ipetu land.
Upon completion of pleadings, each side of the divide testified and called witnesses at the lower court. Exhibits were tendered galore. The learned trial judge was duly addressed by counsel on both sides. In his considered judgment delivered on 4th July, 1995, the learned trial judge applied the law to the facts garnered by him to the best of his ability. He thereafter found in favour of the 1st respondent herein and entered judgment for him in terms of his claim He found all the heads in the counter-claim incompetent and dismissed them.
The appellants felt unhappy with the stance posed by the learned trial judge. They have appealed to this Court vide their Notice of Appeal filed on 18th July, 1995. Ten (10) grounds of appeal accompanied the said Notice of Appeal. I need not reproduce them since I shall reproduce the issues couched on behalf of the appellants. The eight (8) issues formulated for determination by them read as follows:
“(a) Whether the plaintiff has locus standi in instituting this action in his personal capacity as opposed to representative action as adjudged by the trial judge.
(b) Who owns Ogbon Arin where the Ase people and other strangers settled? Is it the Ipetu-Ile people or the Ase people. Similarly who owns Oke-Ita?
(c) Whether having regards to all the circumstances of this case, the trial judge properly and adequately evaluated the cases as presented by the parties before dismissing the defendants’ counter-claim and award (sic) judgment to the plaintiff.
(d) Whether having regards to his own action and writings, the plaintiff is not estopped from now claiming to be the head of a separate town different from Ipetu-Ile in Obokun Local Government Area.
(e) Who is the Prescribed Authority for the area where Ase and Ipetu-Ile is located and who has the right to approve the candidature of the plaintiff before his installation having regards to the Chiefs Law.
(f) Whether having regard to the present location of Ase vis-a-vis Ipetu-Ile, Ase can now claim to have a separate existence as a town different from being part of Ipetu- Ile.
(g) Whether the certificate awarded by the Owa Obokun of Ileshaland (sic) Ijesaland to the plaintiff confers paramountcy on him as an Oba and whether such certificate has now created a separate domain distinct from being part and parcel of Ipetu-lle for the Ase people.
(h) Whether on the preponderance of evidence the respondent proved his case before the trial judge to entitled (sic) entitle him to judgment in both his claim and on the counter-claim.”
On behalf of the 1st respondent, five issues were distilled for determination of the appeal. They read as follows:
“3.0.1 Has the plaintiff locus standi to institute the action?
3.02 Was the plaintiff entitled to judgment having regard to the evidence before the trial court.
3.03 Was the learned trial judge perversed (sic) in his judgment and failed to properly evaluate the evidence before him.
3.04 Is Ase not a separate and distinct community?
3.05 Who is the prescribed authority for the appointment and installation of the plaintiff/respondent as Oba ‘Alase of Ase’.”
The 2nd respondent who did not appeal against the judgment under fire adopted the eight issues formulated by the appellants. Indeed, the 2nd respondent’s counsel in the brief filed by him made frantic effort to launch vitriolic attacks on the judgment of the learned trial judge. Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent raised objection to such a stance and cited the case of Ajomale v. Yaduat (1991) 5 SCNJ 178 at p. 187; (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.191) 257. The 2nd respondent’s counsel feebly maintained that he only desired to depict, in its real essence, why the judgment should not stand as the Hon. Attorney-General was a co-defendant at the trial court. He referred to Order 6 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2002.
In Ajomale v. Yaduat (No.2) (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 191) 266 at p.285, Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC maintained that a respondent’s brief has two broad functions. It is refutatory as it answers specific points that the appellant’s brief is attacking. It is supportive in that it advances arguments in support of the reasoning in the judgment appealed from. The 2nd respondent’s brief herein is a frontal attack on the judgment of the lower court. It is not refutatory. As well, it is not supportive of the judgment. I have my reservation about the stance of the 2nd respondent. However, points raised in this appeal shall be considered on their merits.
The next point which was raised by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent is that since the 2nd defendant at the lower court who is 1st appellant herein testified that the 3rd defendant is dead, he should not be a party in this appeal. It was submitted that the Notice of Appeal bearing the name of a dead person as an appellant is incompetent and that the appeal is not properly before the court and ought to be struck out or dismissed.
On the point, learned counsel for the Appellant(s) merely said that the appeal remains afloat with the existence of the 1st appellant and that it is the name of the deceased 2nd appellant that should be struck out. He failed to appreciate the fact that it is his duty to notify the Court Registrar and the other parties of the death of the 2nd appellant vide Order 1 rule 30(1) Court of Appeal Rules, 2002. Such a stance was clearly wrong. However, I agree that the appeal remains afloat since the 1st appellant is still in existence and he is desirous to pursue this appeal. To that extent, the notice of appeal is not incompetent. The name of the 2nd appellant should have been struck out on application by counsel before now. I now so order accordingly.
Learned counsel for the 1st respondent further maintained that issues (b), (d), (e), (t), and (g), as formulated by the appellants, do not flow from any of the grounds of appeal. He referred to Jallco Ltd. & Anor v. Owoniboys Technical Services Ltd. (1995) 4 SCNJ 156; (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.391) 534; Onyebuchi Iroegbu v. Richard Okwordi & Anor. (1995) 4 SCNJ 7; 4 NWLR (Pt.389) 270; Ogunjumo & Ors v. Ademola (1995) 4 SCNJ 45; (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 389) 254 and Idire & Ors v. Williams International Ltd. (1995) 1 SCNJ 120; (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.370) 142.
Learned counsel for the appellant had a contrary view as he maintained that grounds 8, 9 and 10 adequately cover issues c, d, e, f and g.
Let me say it here that an issue for determination can only flow out of a valid ground of appeal. This is not a moot point. Any issue that does not arise from a valid ground of appeal is liable to be discountenanced. A valid ground of appeal is, no doubt, the launching pad for an issue for consideration in an appeal. And issues need not be proliferated. See Jallco Ltd. & Anor. v. Owoniboys Tech. Services Ltd. (supra) cited by 1st Respondent’s counsel.
I have given a careful look at the ten (10) grounds of appeal and the eight (8) issues couched by the appellant’s counsel. I note that ground I touched on locus standi of the plaintiff. Issue (a) emanates from same. Grounds 6 & 7 relate to Ase Community’s staying at Ogbo Arin, Ipetu-Ile and who owns same. Issue (b) is an off-shoot from these grounds. Issue (c) is basically the same as issue (h). They emanate from grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the grounds of appeal which deal with appraisal of evidence and ascription of probative value thereto by the learned trial judge. Ground 10 of the grounds of appeal relates to who is the prescribed Authority for the area. I am of the considered view that issue (e) emanates from it.
I am unable to see the grounds from which issues (d) and (f) can stand. I see no ground of appeal which touched on conduct of the plaintiff on which estoppel can be of moment. In short, the two issues appear to have emerged from the blues and should be put in the cooler. Indeed, no argument was proffered on issue (d) by the appellant. They do not deserve any consideration.
Arguing issue (a), learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the 1st respondent herein as plaintiff at the lower court cannot sue to represent the Ase Community without complying with the rules of court. He felt that the action should have been filed in a representative capacity. He cited the cases of Senator Abraham Adesanya v. The President of Federal Republic of Nigeria (1986) 2 NCLR 358 at pp. 380-386; Ekundare v. Governor-in-Council & Ors (1961) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 149 at 155-157. Learned counsel observed that where the plaintiff lacks locus standi, the court will also lack jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He referred to Otitoju v. Attorney-General of Ondo State & Ors (1994) 4 SCNJ 224; (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt.340) 518.
Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent who did not file any appeal maintained the same stance.
Learned counsel for the 1st respondent observed that the plea of locus standi is very fundamental. He felt that since same was not pleaded, the 1st respondent, as plaintiff at the lower court, had no opportunity to react to it. He referred to Olugbusi v. Tunolase (1973) 12 SC 51.
Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff has locus standi to institute the action for himself as the genesis of the case is based on the letter addressed to him and admitted as exhibit P5. He felt that what is paramount in the plaintiff’s claim is his position as the Oba of his Ase Community which he seeks to protect. He felt that the other issues raised in the pleadings are secondary and that his right as Oba was primarily being threatened. He felt that the plaintiff is competent to institute the action without suing in a representative capacity.
Locus standi is defined as the right to appear and be heard on the question before any court or tribunal. See Abraham Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 2 NCLR 358 at p. 380. In Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of CCC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 315 at p. 338, Ogundare, JSC pronounced without any equivocation that ‘the term locus standi denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. Standing to sue is not dependent on the success or merit of the case; it is a condition precedent to a determination on the merits’. It literally means that the plaintiff has shown sufficient interest in the matter and is entitled to be heard. The plaintiff has to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. See Ajagungbade III v. Laniyi (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt. 633) 97 at p. 112. And where a plaintiff’s locus standi is challenged, as herein, he has the onus to establish that he has sufficient interest in the matter.
I agree with the 1st respondent’s counsel that the genesis of the case is rooted in the letter – exhibit P5 which was copied to him by the State Government. He was the Alase of Ase at the material time. By the letter, the State Government desired to reduce his status by obliterating his title as Alase of Ase and reducing him to quarter chief of Ipetu-IIe. There is no doubt in my mind that he had a particular interest in the matter which he sought to protect by filing his suit, ex debito justitiae, The 1st respondent initiated the suit as of right. I cannot, by any stretch of imagination, surmise any impediment in his way to sue personally to sustain an office held by him which was being trampled upon with relish. To my mind, he needs not sue in a representative capacity. I know of no other person who has personal and particular interest in the title of Alase of Ase more than the 1st respondent who occupied the stool that was being radically threatened vide Exhibit P5. In my considered view, to find that he has no locus standi to personally challenge the letter served on him which erodes his status will be tantamount to an eye wash, He had the abiding duty to protect the position of Alase of Ase held by him. He was right when he sued to protect his particular interest. I am unable to fault his stance, I am of the considered view that the learned trial judge’s stand was well taken. The decision in Otitoju v. Attorney General, Ondo State (supra) did not touch on locus standi. It is not of moment here. I resolve issue (a) against the appellant without any equivocation.
Issues (c) and (h) relate to appraisal of evidence by the learned trial judge. Let me state it here that generally, an appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact of a trial court except where same is wrongly applied to the circumstance of the case or the conclusion reached was perverse or wrong. See Nwosu v. Board of Customs & Excise (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 93) 225; Nneji v. Chukwu (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 265.
Certainly, ascription of probative value to the evidence of witnesses is pre-eminently the business of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses. An appellate court will not lightly interfere with same unless for compelling reasons. See Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) I SCNLR 372; Ogbechie v. Onochie (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 70) 370. An appellate court should not ordinarily substitute its own views on facts for those of the trial court. See Balogun v. Agboola (1974) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 66.
The 1st respondent pleaded and testified that his great ancestor by name Adidi founded Ase. It was agreed that he was a beaded crown oba who led out his people from Ife. He said Obasun, the appellant’s ancestor migrated from Ibariba land and was hosted by Adidi who settled him at his boundaries. P. W.I, Prince Sajuyigbe testified that it was Ase that granted Ada community land. He stated that three towns after Ibokun are Ipetu, Ase and Ada. P. W.2, Chief Abiola Ojo also stated that Ada Owode was granted land by Ase and that Alase and Apetu are princes of Owa Obokun. He maintained that it was Ase that granted land to Ipetu and that it is not true that Ipetu settled Ase community.
On his own part, the 2nd defendant before the trial court and the existing appellant herein testified that Obasun, their ancestor came from ‘Ibariba country’ and found Ipetu. Later some five Ase people and one dog came as a result of war and were settled at Ogbon Arin in Ipetu Ile. He maintained that Ase people have no land. The Appellant called D.W.2, Chief Israel Ogunwale who maintained that Owa Obokun tried to settle land dispute between Ada-Owode and Ase. At page 70 lines 17-19 of the record of appeal, D.W.2 said ‘it is true that our Oba elect, Israel Ilufoye Adesola agreed with Ase community and signed a document with them that he would not go beyond the land granted to them by Ase community. There has not been a land dispute between us and Ipetu community.’ To the appellant’s consternation, this piece of evidence from his own witness debunked the claim that Ase has no land.
Parties are ad idem on the point that during inter-tribal wars both Ase and Ipetu communities, each requested for a prince from Owa Obokun for protection. The Owa Obokun recognized the two communities and sent a prince to each of them. And when the princes could not deliver, both communities fled to Ibala and later returned to their respective locations. There appears to be a ‘union’ accord between the two communities. There can only be a ‘union’ between two communities. The appellant agreed that it was Owa Obokun who installed both the Lomoase, head of Ase people and Apetu – head of Ipetu people. I am of the considered view that the learned trial judge was on firma terra when he found that the two heads derive their authorities from the same obvious source of the paramount Oba of Ijesaland. He opined that one cannot override the other.
The 2nd defendant who is the surviving appellant herein confirmed that each of the two communities has its own traditional head. Alase for Ase and Apetu for Jpetu, different second in command- Risa Ase and Risapetu; different head of women – Yeyewi at Ase and Yeye Ore at Ipetu; different youth leaders – Lorimode-ile Ase and Lorimode-Petu and different hunter leaders – Oluode at Ase and Tirimi at Ipetu. I agree with the learned trial judge’s conclusion that this points to the fact that Ase and Ipetu are two distinct communities; who at a time formed an accord but each maintained its identity.
It appears that before exhibit P5 which is the bed-rock of the action was written and copied to the 1st respondent, the government did not investigate the matter. DW4, a senior civil servant with the Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs in Osun State attempted to justify same vide exhibit D4 wherein he said that Government cannot condone two kingdoms within the same town. He maintained that the letter resulted from an investigation he conducted in company of his colleagues. Cross-examined, he maintained that they went to Ipetu-Ile surreptitiously and went round the town quietly and did not interview anybody. The learned trial judge expressed his displeasure for the action of DW4. I am at one with him. In Otitoju v. Attorney General of Ondo State & ors (supra) the Government set up a Judicial Panel of Inquiry where the parties were heard. In this matter, DW4 and his ilk flouted the dictates of section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution which provided for fair hearing as encapsulated in the doctrine of audi alteram partem. No doubt, before exhibits P5 and D4 were issued and distilled out, the 1st respondent was entitled to have a fair hearing. See Oyeyemi v. Commissioner for Local Government, Kwara State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 226) 661. The Supreme Court has laid it down in clear terms that to satisfy this aspect of fair hearing there must be investigation by an identifiable person or body of persons empowered and capable of going into the issues in disputation. The person who is affected by such an administrative decision, act or proceeding must be given adequate notice of what is proposed and any allegation against him. He must be afforded the opportunity to know the case against him; make representation by himself or through someone else on his behalf; be represented at the hearing or inquiry; if he likes and effectively prepare his defence and answer to the case against him.
The mundane action of D.W.4 and his co-horts was a complete sham. Breach of fair hearing by not hearing the 1st respondent at all renders the steps taken by the government null and void. And, I so hold. See Adebayo v. Okonkwo (2001) FWLR (Pt. 75) 465 at P. 478-9; (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt.768) 1; Saliu v. Egeibon (1994) 6 SCNJ 223; (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt.348) 23.
DW4 attempted to hide behind one finger when he said in exhibit D4 that government cannot condone two kingdoms in one town. He was aware that in Epe, there are two recognized Obas: viz Akire and Olowu. The appellant himself, on oath confirmed the point. There is nothing esoteric about the notion that a town must have only one Oba. Each case must be determined on its peculiar facts as rooted in traditional history.
The next issue is whether Ase is a distinct community or not. The learned trial judge was right, in my considered view, when he maintained that the issue is not whether two kingdoms are being set up in a town; it is whether or not Ase community exist and whether or not they are a separate independent entity.
It is extant in the statement of defence and counter claim as well as the evidence proffered by the appellant that the existence of Ase as a community with Alase of Ase was recognized.
I stated it before and I think it should be restated that DW2 in his evidence on page 70 lines 18-20 of the record of appeal stated as follows:
“It is true that our Oba elect Israel Ilufoye Adesola agreed with Ase community and signed a document with them that he would not go beyond the land granted to them by Ase community. There has not been a land dispute between us and Ipetu community.”
The above emanated during the cross-examination of DW2. From the above, can the appellant be heard to still say that Ase community does not exist or that they have no land? I doubt same. No doubt, cross-examination, where properly employed, is a potent tool for perforating falsehood.
Even DW4, that Government officer who performed a shoddy investigation confirmed that they saw Ase Community along the road as well as Apetu Quarters.
It is extant in the record of appeal that the appellant herein confirmed that the Alase is a beaded crown wearing Oba and that Ase and Ibokun are ruled by princes of Owa Obokun which gives the inference that they are two separate communities. He agreed that the two communities have their different chiefs. The evidence of the appellant and his above stated witnesses support the evidence of the 1st respondent. The learned trial judge was right when he made use of same in favour of the 1st respondent.
Refer to Akinola v. Oluwo (1962) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 224; Akpapuna v. Nzeka (1983) SCNLR 1. I resolve this issue in favour of the 1st respondent.
The next issue which deserves to be considered is whether the learned trial judge was perverse in his consideration of certain vital exhibits. The learned trial judge considered exhibit P14. Therein Chiefs from both Ase and Ipetu recommended the 1st respondent to fill the vacant stool of Ajase of Ase in Ipetu. They urged for the Council’s approval and ratification.
They even stated therein that the Alase elect had been presented to Owa Obokun of Ijesaland on 21st April, 1979 and he agreed to his candidature.
The learned trial judge found that the contents of exhibit P14 debunks the defendants’ claim in paragraph 38 of their Statement of Defence that the appointment of the Lomase and any other Chief from Ase group must be approved by the Apetu who is the prescribed authority in the area. I completely agree with the view of the learned trial judge. The Appellant should not be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time.
Exhibit P3 is a letter written by Owa Obokun to Obokun Local Government Council informing the Council of the 1st respondents’ installation as Alase of Ase. The learned trial judge found that consequent upon exhibit P3, the Council included the 1st respondent – the Alase of Ase on the list of Obas in its area of jurisdiction. The list of the Obas is exhibit P4. I see no valid reason for any complaint on this finding by the trial court.
Exhibit P11 was the appellant’s letter of appreciation written to the 1st respondent to eulogise him as Oba Alase. He ended the letter by saying
“May you live long to rule us. Amen ….. “. The learned trial judge found that the appellant cannot renege on his stance without substantial and convincing reason; and none was forthcoming. It is a pragmatic finding of fact. I agree with same.
Learned Counsel felt that exhibit P1, a certificate issued to the 1st respondent after his installation as Alase of Ase is an award. He maintained that the address on it is No.6 Ogbon Ase, Ipetu. He felt that Ase is part of Ipetu. There is no big deal in this observation. It has been shown that Ase is a distinct and separate community from Ipetu. Exhibit D13 is a letter written in September, 1970 in which one Chief Luke Oyewole was Risa Ase of Ipetu Ibokun. He felt that the petition would not have been jointly signed if Ase was a separate town. I have discussed the issue of ‘Union’ accord by the two communities before. In exhibit D6, Lomo Ase, Risa-Ase and Lorimode Ke-ase are listed as Kingmakers. And when the 1st respondent was to be appointed, Chiefs of Ipetu took part in recommending him to Owa Obokun. It is a rather peculiar union but it is clear to me that each community maintained its identity as a separate community.
In my considered opinion, basically, the learned trial judge was not perverse in his consideration of the documents tendered before him. When the documentary evidence is juxtaposed with the available viva-voce evidence, the conclusion reached by the learned trial judge cannot be faulted.
The last serious issue is who is the prescribed authority for the appointment and installation of the Alase of Ase and Apetu of Ipetu. He said both Alase and Apetu are princes of Owa Obokun of Ijesaland. The appellant, on page 87 lines 14 – 15 of the record stated that-
“Oba Agunlejika was the prescribed authority for Lomase now Alase Chieftaincy”.
Contradicting the stand of the appellant, his counsel in the brief stated that Oba Agunlejika, the Owa Obokun is not the prescribed authority for the Alase chieftaincy. He felt it is the Apetu who is the prescribed authority.
Again, the appellant tried to blow hot and cold and should not be taken seriously. The duty of counsel is to make his submissions in line with his client’s evidence. Addresses are designed to assist the court. No amount of ‘brilliance’ in a fine speech can make up for lack of evidence to prove or establish or else disprove and demolish points in issue. See Obodo v. Olumo & Anor (1987) 3 NWLR 111 at 123. No doubt, the prescribed authority for the Lomase or Alase is the Owa Obokun of Ijesaland. I resolve this issue against the appellant and in favour of the 1st respondent. Candidly speaking, when all the evidence on both sides, both documentary and oral is put on the imaginary scale the 1st respondent’s side of the balance will have an upper hand. The learned trial judge was right when he found as such. His stance remains intact. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91 at 93 – 94; Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101.
I come to the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed. The appeal is hereby dismissed. It is hereby declared that Ase and Ipetu-Ile (both in Obokun Local Government) are two distinct communities from time immemorial and that Alase is the Chief of Ase and not a quarter chief of lpetu-Ile.
Osun State Government is restrained from acting on its letter of June 1991 – Exhibit P5 copied to the 1st respondent by which he is being regarded as a section chief of lpetu-Ile and also from deposing him or doing anything to reduce his status to a quarter chief of Ipetu-Ile where the appellant is a chief.
The Appellant shall pay N5,000 costs to the 1st Respondent.
Other Citations: (2006)LCN/2086(CA)
