Chief M. A. Okupe v. Federal Board Of Inland Revenue (1974)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

G. B. A. COKER, J.S.C.

This appeal involves an application by one Chief Matthew Adekoya Okupe for the prerogative orders of Certiorari and Prohibition against the respondents, The Federal Board of Inland Revenue and the Chief Investigating Officer of the Board. In the High Court, Lagos, the applicant, now appellant, had moved the court for an order:

“(1) For leave to apply for an Order of Certiorari to remove into this Honourable Court for the purpose of being quashed the decisions made by or on behalf of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue and communicated to the applicant by letter. dated 8th July, 1970 whereby it was ordered that the applicant should pay additional assessment in respect of personal income tax for the years of assessments 1960/61, 1961/62, 1962/63, 1963/64, 1964/65, 1965/66, 1966/67 and 1967/68.

(2) An Order of Prohibition prohibiting the Federal Board of Inland Revenue from proceedings or further proceedings with any steps to enforce payment of the said additional assessment or (in the alternative) such of them as this Honourable Court finds to be illegal. And that all necessary and consequential directions be given.

(3) Directing the further proceedings on the assessments aforesaid to be stayed pending the final determination of this matter or until further order, and

(4) Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make.”

A statement pursuant to the relevant Rule of Court was duly attached to the application and the said statement shows the grounds upon which the application was based as follows:

“1. The additional assessments complained of were made without jurisdiction because:

(a) at the time of such assessments the Federal Board of Inland Revenue has no powers in law to make the assessments complained of;

and

(b) in the alternative to (a) the assessments aforesaid were not made on the basis of or as a result of any discovery of opinion such as the provisions of section 31 of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act, 1961 required.

2. The additional assessments aforesaid are illegal and null and void because they were not made by the Federal Board of Inland Revenue itself as required by law, but were made by or on behalf of the Chief Investigating Officer of the Board.
3. The additional assessments aforesaid are illegal and null and void because, contrary to law, the notices of assessments and the notices of refusal to amend the assessments aforesaid were served simultaneously on the applicant.
4. In the alternative to 1, 2 and 3 a period of six years having expired since the 1960/61, 1961/62, 1962/63, and 1963/64 and 1964/65 years assessment the additional assessments in respect of those years have been made in excess of the jurisdiction conferred by section 31 of the Federal Income Tax (Lagos) Act.”

The appellant also swore to an affidavit to accompany his application and paragraphs 2, 5, 6 and 7, which are directly relevant to the present decision, are as follows:

“2. That I have already duly paid tax for which i was assessed for the 1960/61, 1961/62, 1962/63, 1963/64, 1964/65, 1965/66, 1966/67 and 1967/68 years of assessment.

5. That finally, a letter dated 8th July, 1970 was addressed to me by the 2nd respondent and a true copy thereof is attached and marked Exhibit B.
6. That the documents said to be enclosed in Exhibit B are attached herewith and marked Exhibits 1 to 27.
7. That to the best of my knowledge information and belief all actions and decisions on this matter were taken either by or on behalf of the 2nd respondent who is a servant or agent of the first respondent.”

As indicated in paragraph 6 of the affidavit of the appellant, there were attached to the application eight copies of notices of assessment of income tax and nineteen copies of notices of refusal. All the notices of assessment of tax and notices of refusal were dated the same day, that is the 20th June, 1970 and were all apparently approved by the same functionary, who signed as such on the same day, i.e. the 20th June, 1970.

Pursuant to leave granted by the High Court for issuing the orders, the respondents appeared to show cause and an investigating officer of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue, by name Isaac Olajide Oni, and a certified accountant, swore to an affidavit in which he recounted the series of events that had happened including the willful and negligent failure of the appellant to disclose vital information to the respondents resulting “in the applicant being assessed at a less amount than that which ought to have been charged”, the meeting or meetings held by the parties to resolve the dispute and the general investigation of the affairs of the appellant.

Paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the affidavit of Mr. Oni read as follows:

“13. On or about 8the July, 1970 I sent a letter containing Notices of Additional Assessments for 1960/61, 1961/62, 1962/63, 1963/64, 1964/65, 1965/66, 1966/67 and 1967/68 to the applicant and on or about that date. I sent an endorsement of the letter to his agents. (i.e. his Accountants).

14. Those actions and decisions taken on this matter by me were duly authorised.
15. All actions taken in respect of this matter are in substance and effect in conformity with the relevant laws.
16. The right of the Board to make additional assessments has accrued for the periods in respect of which the additional assessments were made.”

At the hearing before the High Court (Adedipe, J.) the parties on both sides were represented by learned counsel and in particular the respondents were represented by the learned Solicitor-General of the Federation. Learned counsel for the appellant (then applicant) addressed legal arguments to the court in support of the grounds of his application and submitted, firstly, that since the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act, No. 23 of 1961 was, after the year 1968, amended by Edict No.7 of 1968, which came into effect on the 1st April, 1968 to apply to Lagos State, the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) act ensures only as a law at the instance of the Lagos State Government and the Board of Inland Revenue constituted by section 2 of that Edict.

Learned counsel for the appellant argued further that it must be shown that the powers of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue are properly delegated to whoever purported to act for that Board and that as that was not shown to have been done in this case, either in writing or by Notice in Gazette, the second respondent was not legally exercising such powers. Thirdly and lastly, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as the notices of assessment and notices of refusal of objection to the assessments were prepared, approved and sent to the appellant at the same time, there was clearly a breach of the right of the appellant as postulated by sections 31 and 34 of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act, 1961 under which the respondents had acted since the obvious implication is that any objection which the appellant may have had to the assessment had been rejected in advance.

The learned Solicitor-General countered these arguments and submitted that by they Personal Income Tax (Lagos) (Amendment) Edict, 1968, No.7 of 1968, the Lagos State only took over personal income tax of individuals in the State as from the 1st April, 1968 and that the Edict does not in any way inhibit the powers of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue to assess and collect taxes from individuals within the State in respect of the period during which the Edict No. 7 of 1968 had not applied. With respect to delegation of powers to the Chief Investigating Officer of the Board, the learned solicitor-General submitted that it was duly done. On the third leg of his argument, the learned Solicitor-General submitted that the service of the notices of refusal on the appellant on the same day and at the same time as the notices of assessment was only a mistake which was covered by section 35 of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act 1961 and that in and case the proceedings were not a matter for the prerogative order of Certiorari and Prohibition.

In a reserved judgment, the learned trial judge preferred and accepted the submissions on behalf of the respondents and dismissed the application. He found for the respondents on all points raised on the application and with respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue to assess individuals within Lagos State after the making of Edict No. 7 of 1968, the learned trial judge commented as follows:

“The Personal Income Tax Act 1961 has not been repealed and it is still applicable to Lagos. If the Federal Board of Inland Revenue was the only competent authority that could assess what tax should be paid by any individual resident in Lagos between 1960 and 1968, in my opinion, it is equally competent to assess in respect of additional tax for the same period, and it has jurisdiction to do so. Such taxes I am told are paid into the revenue of the Federal Government and not the revenue of the Lagos State Government.”

The learned trial judge held that the action of Mr. Ini, who is a servant of the Board, is the action of the Board. On the submission that the service of the notices of refusals on the appellant simultaneously with the notices of assessment was a travesty of justice, the learned trial judge observed as follows:

“On the ground that the additional assessments are illegal and null and void, because the notices of assessment and the notices of refusal to amend the assessments were served simultaneously on the applicant. This appears to me to be a mistake on the part of one of the Officers of the Board and such a mistake is covered by Section 35(1) of Act No. 23 of 1961 which deals with errors and defects in assessments and notice.”

The learned trial judge then discussed a number of cases in the light of the submissions made to him with respect to the availability to the appellant or otherwise of the prerogative orders for which he had applied. He then concluded his judgments as follows:

“Finally, I hold that Certiorari and Prohibition are not the appropriate remedies in this case and the application is therefore dismissed with 20 guineas costs.”

Before us on appeal the only points canvassed for the appellant were the propriety of the orders sought and what learned counsel for the appellant portrayed as a manifest exhibition of lack of impartiality on the part of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue and its functionaries. We were concerned at the submissions made by the learned counsel on this aspect of the case and as we were perfectly satisfied that if the points were validly made it was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, we stopped learned counsel for the appellant at this point and called upon the learned Senior State Counsel, who represented the respondents, to reply to the arguments already addressed to us.

Learned counsel for the appellant had referred to sections 31, 34 and 41 of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act 1961 and analyses with meticulous care the provisions of those sections which deal with notices of assessment, the right to object and the time within which this could be done, notices of refusal of objection and finality of assessments. In short, learned counsel for the appellant argued, rightly in our view, that the effect of section 31 and section 34 is that after the service of a notice of assessment on an individual in pursuance of section 31 is effected that individual has, by section 34 of the Act, a period of thirty days within which to object to the assessment and after the expiration of the time limited for objection to be made or after the receipt of an objection made earlier than this, the Board does not accede to the objection, then and only then can the Board issue a notice of refusal as envisaged by section 34(3) of the Act.

In the case in hand, a number of notices of assessment were prepared against the appellant and dated the 20th June, 1970 and at the same time a corresponding number of notices of refusal of objection to these notices of assessment were also prepared, approved on behalf of the respondents and served on the appellant simultaneously with the notices of assessment. Although the notices of assessment were dated the 20th June, 1970, the affidavit of Mr. Oni reveals that they were not dispatched to the appellant until the 8th July, 1970, some seventeen days after their preparation. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted therefore that the only inference from the action of the respondents is that the appellant was being told that he might not object to the assessments as any such objection not only would be, but also had in fact been, refused.

The learned Senior State Counsel in his reply to the argument invoked a large variety of points which are either out of direct bearing on the point or are not of any real assistance to the issues raised by the appeal. Learned Senior State Counsel however conceded that the preparation and service of the notices of refusal are wrong and that this could have grounded an application for the prerogative order of Certiorari but maintained that in this case the service of the notices of refusal was a mistake “amounting to an irregularity” for which section 35 of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act provides a complete answer. He finally submitted that the notices of assessment were valid but that the notices of refusal did not comply with legal procedure.

Dealing first with the last point made by the learned Senior State Counsel, we observe that section 35 of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act provides as follows:

“35 (1) No assessment, warrant or other proceeding purporting to be made in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the principal Act shall be quashed, or deemed to be void or voidable, for want of form, or be affected by reason of a mistake, defect or omission therein, if the same is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and meaning of this Act or the principal Act of any Act amending the same, and if the person assessed or intended to be assessed or affected thereby is designated therein according to common intent and understanding.

(2) An assessment shall be impeached or affected:

(a) by reason of a mistake therein as to

(i) the name of a taxable person or of a person in whose name a taxable person is chargeable; or

(ii) the description of any income; or

(iii) the amount of any income tax charged or shown to be payable;

(b) by reason of any variance between the assessment and the notice thereof:

Provided that in cases of assessment the notice thereof shall be duly served upon the taxable person intended to be charged or the person in whose name such taxable person is chargeable and such notice shall contain, in substance and effect, the particulars on which the assessment is made.”

Clearly, section 35 saves such processes of the respondents as are affected by mistakes in form or defects or omissions in such processes and then only “if the same is in substance and effect in conformity with the according to the intent and meaning of this Act.” We are unable to see any grounds for supporting the judge’s association of the case of the respondents and the complaints of the appellant herein with the provisions of section 35 and we are in no doubt that such association is erroneous. Section 35 of the Act has no bearing whatsoever on the acts of the respondents complained of in these proceedings and clearly affords no protection to the type of action herein being dealt with.

The appellant has asked for orders of Certiorari and Prohibition on the grounds that the present assessments were not made in accordance with the Act. Section 31 of the Act provides as follows:

“31 (1) If the Board discovers of is of opinion at any time that any taxable person liable to income tax has not been assessed or has been assessed at a less amount that that which ought to have been charged, the Board may, within the year of assessment or within six years after the expiration thereof and as often as may be necessary; assess such taxable person at such amount or additional amount as ought to have been charged, and the provisions of this Act as to notice of assessment, appeal and other proceedings shall apply to such assessment or additional assessment and to the tax charged thereunder. Provided that where any form of fraud, willful default or neglect has been committed by or on behalf of any taxable person in connection with any tax imposed under this act or under the Income Tax Act, the Board may at any time and as often as may be necessary assess such taxable person at such amount or additional amount as may be necessary for the purpose of making good any loss of tax attributable to the fraud, willful default or neglect.

(2) For the purpose of computing under subsection (1) of this section the amount or the additional amount which ought to have been charged, all relevant facts consistent with proviso (b) to subsection (2) of section 41 of this Act shall be taken into account even though not known when any previous assessment or additional assessment on the same taxable person for the same year was being made or could have been made.”

There was some argument in the court below as to whether or not the powers of the respondents to reassess an individual could take them back to upwards of six years. That argument was not pursued before us and we express no views on the soundness or otherwise of the point. It is to be observed however that section 31, which gives to the respondents the power to reassess a citizen, prescribes therein that in such cases “the provision of this Act as to notice of assessment, appeal and other proceedings shall apply to such assessment or additional assessment and to the tax charged thereunder”. We propose therefore to examine these provisions.

Section 33 and section 34 (1), (2) and (3) of the Act provide as follows:

“33. The Board shall cause to be served on or sent by registered post to each taxable person, or person in whose name a taxable person is chargeable, whose name appears in the assessment lists a notice stating the amount of any assessable, total or chargeable income, the tax charged, the place at which payment should be made, and setting out the rights of that person under the next following section.

34. (1) If any person disputes an assessment he may apply to the Board, by notice of objection in writing, to review and to revise the assessment, and such application shall state precisely the grounds of objection to the assessment and shall be made within thirty days from the date of service and of the notice of the assessment.

(2) On receipt of a notice of objection, the Board may require the person giving that notice to furnish such particulars and to produce such books or other documents as the Board may deem necessary, and may summon any person who may be able to give information which is material to the determination of the objection to attend for examination by an officer of the Internal Division on oath or otherwise.

(3) In the event of any person who has objected to an assessment agreeing with the board as to the correct amount of the tax chargeable, the assessment shall be amended accordingly and notice of the tax chargeable shall be served upon such person:

Provided that, if an applicant for revision under the provisions of this section fails to agree with the Board the amount of the tax chargeable, the Board shall give notice of refusal to amend the assessment as desired by such person and may revise the assessment to such amount as the Board may, according to the best of its judgment, determine and give notice of the revised assessment and of the tax payable together with notice of refusal to amend the revised assessment and, wherever requisite, any reference in this Act to an assessment or to an additional assessment shall be treated as a reference to an assessment or to an additional assessment as revised under the provisions of this proviso.”

Thus, section 33 and section 34 (1) prescribe that the tax-payer concerned shall be served with a notice of assessment “which should set out the rights of that person” under section 34, and sub-section (1) of section 34 gives such tax-payer the right to make an objection to the assessment within “30 days from the day of service of the notice of assessment”. Sub-section (2) of section 34 describes the procedure which the respondents may adopt in dealing with the objection of the tax-payer and sub-section (3) deals with cases in which some agreement was reached between the tax-payer and the respondents. The proviso to sub-section (3) is very important as it enjoins on the respondents the duty of serving the tax-payer “for revision under the provisions of the section” has failed. Clearly, what the proviso states is that the respondents shall give to the tax-payer a notice of refusal where, firstly, the tax-payer has made an objection and, secondly, the respondents had dealt with that objection in accordance with the provisions of the section. The Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act, 1961 makes elaborate provisions for what follows after the issue and service on the tax-payer of a notice of refusal, for section 36 of the Act provides in part as follows:

“36. Any taxable person being aggrieved by an assessment to income tax made upon him, and having failed to agree with the Board in the manner provided in Section (3) of section 34 of this Act, may appeal against the assessment upon giving notice as hereinafter provided within thirty days after the date of service of notice of the refusal of the Board to amend the assessment as desired:”

and section 41 provides as follows:

“41 (1) Where no valid objection or appeal has been lodged with in the time limited by section 34 or 36 of this Act, or where due notice has not been given of any further appeal against a decision of the appeal Commissioners or a judge, as the case may be, an assessment as made, or agreed to under the provisions of subsection (3) of section 34, or determined under the proviso to that subsection or on appeal, as the case may be, shall be final and conclusive for all purposes of this Act as regards the amounts of the assessable, total or chargeable income and the tax charged thereby.

(2) If the full amount of the tax charged by any such final and conclusive assessment is not paid within the appropriate period or periods prescribed by this Act, the provisions, thereof relating to the recovery of tax, and to any penalty under section 45, shall apply to the collection and recovery of such tax or penalty subject only to the set-off of the amount of any tax repayable under any claim, made under a provision of this Act or of the principal Act, which has been agreed to by the Board or determined on any appeal against a refusal to admit such claim;”

We have omitted the Proviso to section 41 as it has no relevance to our present consideration. It will be seen from the provisions of section 41 (1) that where no valid objection has been lodged against an assessment in accordance with section 34, the assessment becomes final and conclusive for all purposes of the Act. Indeed, a valid objection must and does mean an objection which is sustained and an objection in respect of which a notice of refusal has been served cannot be and it is not a valid objection.

In the present proceedings, the applicant was served at the same time with both the notices of assessment under section 33 and the notices of refusal of any objection he could make thereto. Section 33 gives the appellant the right to make an objection to the assessment within thirty days of the service on him of that notice and the assessment notices served on the applicant in this case carry on their faces statements to the effect that the appellant had thirty days from the dates of service of them within which to object to the assessments. All the assessment notices served on the appellant were signed on the face of them by an officer who stated that the assessments were “approved” by him.

Simultaneously with the assessment notices, notices of refusal of any objection to each and every one of the served notices of assessment were served on the applicant. Thus, Exhibit 9, notice of refusal, applies to Exhibit 1, notice of assessment; Exhibit 12, notice of refusal, applies to Exhibit 2, notice of assessment; Exhibit 15, notice of refusal, applies to Exhibit 3, notice of assessment; Exhibit 18, notice of refusal, applies to Exhibit 4, notice of assessment; Exhibit 20, notice of refusal, applies to Exhibit 5, notice of assessment; Exhibit 22, notice of refusal, applies to Exhibit 6, notice of assessment and so on.

The notices of refusal were all dated the 20th June, 1970 as the corresponding notices of assessment and are all expressed to be approved by the same official who had approved the corresponding notices of assessment. In other words, notices of refusal were prepared, signed and approved. Manifestly, this is an outrageous breach of the provisions of section 34 of the Act for whilst the notices of assessment set out the rights of the appellant under section 33 of the Act, the corresponding notices of refusal tell him clearly that any objection he might make to the assessment was already refused on that same date. The applicant was not even given the period of thirty days within which he was entitled under section 34 (1) to make an objection to the assessment.

The powers which the respondents can exercise in this matter are clearly set out in section 31 of the Act and that section makes it mandatory that the other provisions of the Act as to notices of assessment, appeal and other proceedings, shall apply to the assessments postulated by the section. In the same way, the provisions of section 31 are mandatory and unless there be some legal justification for the respondents to opt thereout, any exercise by them of powers purportedly under that section but not in accordance with the section would be ultra vires and illegal. Statutes which impose taxes and penalties are by the tradition of lawyers interpreted strictly and it is clear in this appeal that the plain and manifest meaning and intention of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act, 1961 has been completely, to say the least, ignored by the respondents.

It was contended before us by the learned Senior State Counsel for the respondents that the notices of assessment were validly prepared and issued and that only the notices of refusal offended against the rules of procedure. We are not impressed by this argument. The sting of the matter, indeed the sting of the injustice in the action of the respondents, does not lie in the service on the appellant of the notices of refusal but in the preparation and approval of those notices on the same day as the notices of assessment. Even if the notices of refusal were only prepared in the way and manner “approved” in this case but are not sent to the appellant, still the outrage on the law is committed for those notices of refusal were expressed on their face to have been approved by the respondents or their functionaries. The law gives to the tax-payer the right to object to a proper assessment within a period of thirty days of the service on him of the notice of assessment. In the present case, the respondents demonstrated by their action that they were unwilling to give the appellant any such period of thirty days to make any such objection and also that even if he was to make any such objection it had certainly been refused by the respondents. Surely this is a fundamental breach of at least the provisions of section 31, 33, 34, 36 and 41 of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act to say the least and we are satisfied that the action of the respondents in this case flatly contravenes and offends against the peremptory and mandatory provisions of section 31 of the Act under which section alone they could have levied any assessment against the appellant.

The legislature of this country wisely entrusts to the respondents the duty to operate the tax laws of the country but in doing so, the legislature provides safeguards for the liberty of the tax-payer and in particular safeguards from arbitrary and capricious assessment and/or assessments which are not made bona fides or which are perverse. Whichever way one looks at the matter, an assessment like the present one which, in defiance of the mandatory provisions of the Personal Income Tax (Lagos) Act, denies to the tax-payer his statutory rights of objection and, as if that was not enough, demonstrates clearly and unequivocally to him that any objection he may attempt to make against such assessment has already been refused, cannot be otherwise than perverse.

We cannot allow such assessment to stand and an order of Certiorari must issue to quash such assessment. We are equally clear in our minds that in these circumstances an order of Prohibition should be made.

We have given anxious consideration to the question of the availability to the appellant of the prerogative orders for which he has now applied. The order of Certiorari lies to remove proceedings from inferior tribunals to the High Court for a variety of purposes, sometimes at common law, sometimes by statute, sometimes in virtue of both. An order of Prohibition lies to restrain an inferior tribunal or any body of persons which has a legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects from exceeding its jurisdiction. We are of course not oblivious of the law that excess of jurisdiction is not shown merely because the tribunal concerned had decided contrary to the facts or without evidence to justify its findings or judgment. But it cannot be gainsaid that excess of jurisdiction is manifested where there has been a complete disregard of the fundamental conditions of the administration of justice and where there has been shown a real likelihood of bias or prejudice in the tribunal, the courts have always held that there has been an excess of jurisdiction. See King v. Wandsworth Justices Ex parte Road (1942) 1 K.B. 281; also R. v. Camborne Justices Ex parte Pearce (1955) 1 Q.B.41. Apart from all these however an error of law appearing on the face of the records is a proper subject for an order of Certiorari. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 W.LR. 163, Lord Pearce at p. 102 of the report observes concerning the occasions when the High Court would exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals thus:

“Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunals having any jurisdiction to embark on an inquiry. Or the tribunal may at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening state, while engaged on a proper inquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its inquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the inquiry which Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity.”

If this was a case in court, we might think of remitting same back for trial or retrial before another tribunal. In the present case there is no other functionary besides the respondents to whom this case can go back. The appellant is entitled to the justice of this Court and this country and so justice must not only be done but it must be manifest that it is done. The respondents may not proceed to assess the appellant for income tax in respect of the same period covered by this appeal and an order of Prohibition will also issued from this Court.

In the event, the appeal succeeds and it is allowed. The judgment of the High Court, Lagos, in Suit No. M/136/70, including the order for costs, is set aside. We order that:

(i) an order of Certiorari do issue forthwith to the respondents bringing the relevant assessments against the appellant to this Court for the purpose of being quashed and those assessments are hereby quashed;

(ii) an order of Prohibition against the respondents that they might not proceed hereafter to assess or reassess the appellant for income tax in respect of the period or matters covered by this appeal; .

(iii) these orders shall be the judgment of the Court;

(iv) we direct that the respondents shall pay to the appellant the costs of these proceedings fixed in the court below at N60 and in this Court at N150.

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Other Citation: (1974) LCN/1922(SC)