Chief S. Owoola Lanlehin Vs Kola James (1985)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
G. KARIBI- WHYTE, J.S.C.
The only issue for determination in this appeal, is whether a registered registrable instrument to which a plan is attached, is inadmissible in evidence merely because the attached plan is both unsigned and uncountersigned.
On the 26th March, 1984, the Court of Appeal Division, sitting in Lagos, allowed the appeal, of the defendant, and set aside the ruling of the trial judge A.L.A.L. Balogun, J. of the High Court of Lagos State.
The learned judge had ruled partially sustaining the objection of the defendant against the admission in evidence both of the registered conveyance and the plan attached thereto. In his ruling the learned judge had admitted only the conveyance, but rejected the plan as inadmissible. His reason for so holding was that there were before him, as he thought, and held, two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Lydia Erinosho v. Owokoniran (1975) NMLR. 479 and Awomuti v. Salami & ors. (1978) 3 SC. 105 governing the issue.
The learned judge after a scholarly analysis of somewhat inordinate length of the binding nature of judicial precedents in lower Courts, came to the conclusion that Lydia Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra), had been impliedly overruled by the subsequent decision of this Court of Awomuti v. Salami & ors. (supra) and that he was bound by the latter. Plaintiff appealed against this ruling to the Court of Appeal on the grounds
(1) That the trial judge erred in law in admitting the conveyance which was duly executed and registered without the attached survey plan.
(2) That the attached survey plan was inadmissible in evidence and
(3) The decision is against the weight of evidence ..
In the judgment reversing the ruling of the learned judge in the Court of Appeal after reprimanding him for impertinence in his views on his right to choose between two conflicting judgments of a superior court, and his observations on the correctness vel non of the decision of a higher court, held that the learned judge was wrong to hold, as he did, that the Supreme Court had impliedly overruled Erinosho’s case in Awomuti’s case. The Court of Appeal in a judgment concurred in by B.O. Kazeem and P. Nnaemeka-Agu, JJ.C.A., delivered by Ademola, J.C.A. cited and relied on the passage in Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra) at p. 484 to the effect “That once the instrument is registered under Cap. 56, it should be admitted, as registered instrument in evidence (see S.16 Cap 56); if however the plan annexed thereto, is in fact defective in any way a different question will arise as to its evidential. The defendant has now appealed against the judgment of the Court of Appeal on two grounds as follows –
“(1) The learned Judges of the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the plan attached to the certified true copy of the deed of conveyance should be admitted in evidence when the plan is rendered inadmissible in evidence by the provisions of the Survey Act particularly section 23 of the Survey Act.
(2) The decision is against the weight of evidence.”
The appellant in this Court in seeking a restoration of the ruling of the learned trial judge which held admissible in evidence the deed of conveyance but rejected as inadmissible the plan filed along with him, seems to have modified the objection in the Court of trial which is a rejection of the admissibility of both the registered instrument and the defective plan attached thereto. It should be noted that the effect of the Court of Appeal judgment was to admit in evidence both the instrument and the plan attached. Counsel in this appeal have filed their briefs of argument, and in oral argument before us elaborated on their briefs. There is very little that can be gathered from the briefs filed because no arguments of any substance were advanced therein. There is no dispute on the facts which quite simply stated are as follows. At the trial of the action, indeed during evidence in chief of P.W.1, counsel to the plaintiff sought to tender in evidence the deed of conveyance dated 26th October, 1920 which was registered as No. 103 page 346 in Vol. 140 in the Lagos Land Registry dated 26th October, 1920. This deed of conveyance has attached to it a plan which does not bear any date, and neither the signature of any surveyor nor the counter signature of the Director of Surveys. Counsel for the defendants promptly raised the objection that the document, that is, the conveyance and the plan attached are inadmissible in evidence on account of the defect in the plan which are unsigned, thereby contravening the provisions of S.3 of the Survey Law of Western Nigeria, applicable to the land in dispute. He relied on the judgment of Alashe v. Olori-Ilu (1965) NMLR. 66. The land subject matter of this action are Plots 13 and 13A shown on Plan No. OA 1562 and situate off Isheri Road, Ikeja. The question which the learned judge was asked to consider and rule upon was, concisely stated, whether the defect in the plan attached, would render the conveyance and the plan already registered inadmissible in evidence. The subsidiary question about the position since the amendment of the law removing the requirement for countersignature by the Surveyor-General is not relevant since the law applicable is that prior to the amendment. There is no doubt that the issue is the simple one of the admissibility in evidence of a deed of conveyance registered under the Land Instrument Registration Law, Cap 64 of Lagos State with a plan which is not counter-signed as required by S.3(1) of the Survey Law, Cap 132, Vol. VII, Laws of Lagos G State. It is not contested that the deed of conveyance alone without the accompanying defective plan, since registered is inadmissible in evidence. Section 15 of the Land Instruments Registration Law, Cap 64 is unambiguous as to that.
In his submission before us, Mr. Shomade for the appellants has urged that Section 9 of the Land Instruments Registration Law should be read together with the provisions of section 3 of the Survey Law. In his view, since section 3 of the Survey Law deals with evidence, any plan attached to any instrument not conforming to its provisions should not be admitted in evidence. Counsel submitted that Awomuti v. Salami & ors. (1978) 3 SC. 105 and Alase v. Olori-Ilu (1965) NMLR. 66 represent the correct legal position. Counsel adopted the reasoning of the learned judge of the High Court that Erinosho v. Owokoniran (1965) NMLR. 479 had been impliedly overruled by Awornuti v. Salami & ors. (supra). Mr. Lanlehin supporting the judgment of the Court of Appeal submitted that the issue is entirely one of the admissibility in evidence of a registered instrument and is governed by S.15 of the Land Instruments Registration Law. To him, section 13 of the Survey Law is not applicable. Counsel relied entirely on Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra), as the case applicable. In his view Alase & ors. v. Olori-Ilu & ors. (supra) 5 and Awomuti v. Salami (supra) are not applicable. He submitted that Awomuti v. Salami (supra) was concerned with the evidential value of a document admitted in evidence, whereas, Alase v. Olori-Ilu (supra) was concerned with the admissibility of a survey plan per se.
The issue contested in my opinion is concerned with the proper construction of the enabling statutory provisions, together with a careful examination and analysis of the judicial decisions on the sections. The following provisions of the relevant Laws are pertinent to the proper determination of this Appeal.
- Land Instruments Registration Law, Cap. 64, Sections 9(1)(2), 15 and 34
- Survey Act, Cap 194, Vol. VII Laws of the Federation 1958. S.23, which is in pari materia
- with Survey Law, Cap. 132 Vol. VIII Laws of Lagos State and S.3.
- Land Instruments Registration, Regulations made under S.32 & 34, Regulation 2(b)
I reproduce the relevant provisions for ease of reference.
(i) Land Instruments Registration Law, Cap. 64. “Section 9(1) No instrument executed after the commencement of this Law, other than a power of attorney, shall be registered unless it contains a proper and sufficient description, and, subject to the regulations, a plan, of the land affected by such instrument.
The decision of the Registrar as to the adequacy of the description and plan of any land in any instrument for the purpose of identification shall be final, subject to any order of the High Court.
(2) No State or former Crown grant executed after the 1st day of June, 1918, and no instrument executed after the said date affecting land the subject of such a grant executed after the said date shall be registered unless the plan of the land affected by such a grant or instrument is signed by a surveyor and is countersigned by the Director of Surveys or is a copy of a plan so signed and countersigned.
(3) No instrument executed after the 1st day of June, 1918, having thereon or attached thereto a plan of the land affected shall be registered unless the plan is signed by a surveyor or is a copy of a plan which has been signed by a surveyor.”
“Section 15. No instrument shall be pleaded or given in evidence in any court as affecting any land unless the same shall have been registered:
Provided that a memorandum given in respect of an equitable mortgage executed before the 1st day of July, 1944, and not registered under this Law may be pleaded and shall not be inadmissible in evidence by reason only of not being so registered.
Provided further that this section shall not apply in the case of any document which is exempted from registration under this Law by virtue of section 86 of the Registration of Titles Law or the Registered Lands Law and which is registered under either of those Laws.”
(ii) Survey Law, Cap. 132
“Section 3(1) No map, plan or diagram of land-
(a) if prepared after the 1st day of June, 1918, shall be accepted for registration with any registrable instrument which is required by any written law to contain a map, plan or diagram; and
(b) if prepared after the 20th day of October, 1897 shall, save for good cause shown to the court, be admitted in evidence in any court, unless the map, plan or diagram –
(i) has been prepared and signed by a surveyor or is a copy of a map, plan or diagram so prepared and signed and is certified by a surveyor as being a true copy; and
(ii) has been examined by the Survey Department and bears the countersignature of the Surveyor-General.
(2) The countersignature of the Surveyor-General shall be conclusive proof that the map, plan or diagram to which it is affixed has been examined by the Survey Department, but shall not for any purpose be deemed to amount to a representation by the Surveyor-General as to the accuracy of such map, plan or diagram.”
(iii) Land Instruments Registration Regulations.
“Regulation 2(b) – instruments affecting land the boundaries of which are defined in a plan attached to an instrument registered after the 1st day of June, 1918, and referred to in the instruments presented for registration.”
I now turn to analyse the relevant statutory provisions with a view to demonstrating whether they are applicable to the facts of this case. Under Section 9(1), all instruments executed after the commencement of this law other than a power of attorney, shall be registered only if I contains a proper and sufficient description, and a plan of the land affected by the description.
Thus, wherever a plan is required for the proper and sufficient description of the land affected by the instrument, meant for registration, such plan must be executed with the instrument. The section however gives a discretion to the Registrar to decide, subject to any order of the High Court, the adequacy of the description and plan of any land in any instrument for the purposes of its identification. Section 34 of the Land Instruments Registration Law enables regulations to be made excepting from the provisions of Section 9 or of the Law as a whole the requirement for the filing of plan or any class of instrument. With respect to Crown or State land the requirement of the signature of a surveyor and counter signature of the Director of Surveys to the plan of the land affected by the instrument sought to be registered is made mandatory by S.9(2), as from June 1, 1918. It seems to me that there is here a distinction in the requirement of the section between lands which are State or former Crown Grant executed before June 1, 1918, and other lands, with respect to the filing of plans. Whereas the signature of (the Surveyor and counter signature by the Director of Surveys is essential in State Lands or Crown Grants, under s.9(2) this requirement appears to be omitted in, s.9(1) appliable in all other cases. It is also pertinent to observe that by regulations made under sections 32 and 34 of the Land Instruments Registration Law, regulation 2(b) excludes from the provisions of section 9 requiring instrument to be registered with a plan of the land affected, “instruments affecting land the boundaries of which are defined in a plan attached to an instrument registered after the 1st day of June, 1918 and referred to in the instrument presented for registration:” it follows from the provisions of section 9 and the Regulations referred to, that with respect to acceptance for registration the mandatory requirement of the signature of the Surveyor and countersigned by the Director of Surveys on a plan attached to an instrument in respect of any other land executed after June 1, 1918.
This construction follows from the unambiguous provisions of section 9 of the Land Instruments Registration Law, and section 3(1)(a) of the Survey Law, both of which deal with the registration of instruments. Section 15, renders inadmissible in evidence instruments which are not registered.
The construction of s.15 of the Land Instruments Registration Law is clear and unambiguous. It provides generally that all registered registrable instruments, are admissible in evidence. Section 3 of the Survey Law is not so clear. The section relates to plans, maps and diagrams, attached to a registrable instrument. It also applies to maps, plans or diagrams tendered in evidence. It seems to me therefore that what section 3(1) contemplates in subparagraph (b) where it speaks of, “shall for good cause shown to the court, be admitted in any court” is not that the “plan, map or diagram” alone without the instrument is inadmissible; but-it is admissible if the conditions prescribed in S.3(1)(b)(i)(ii) are satisfied. In Dr. P.O. Rosanwo v. A. O. Rewane (1962) WNLR. 25, Mandarikan, J. had held that only the registered instrument was admissible in evidence.
He held that the plan which was neither signed by the Surveyor nor countersigned by the Surveyor-General was inadmissible. The learned Judge was in this case construing and applying the provisions of S.10 of Land Instruments Registration Law (Cap. 56) and S.3 of the Survey Law (Cap. 121). The marginal note to section 3 of the Survey Law, speaks of plans attached to registrable instruments or tendered in evidence to be signed by Surveyor and countersigned by the Surveyor-General. This would seem to suggest two different situations. First, plan, map or diagram attached to registrable instruments. Secondly, plan, map or design tendered in evidence. Whereas in the first case another document which is not concerned with the conditions prescribed for its validity in section 3 is in issue, the second case is concerned entirely with section 3(1)(b) and was the situation of Alase v. Olori-Ilu (1965) NMLR. 66 relied upon by counsel for the appellant. A construction of section 3 would seem to me to be this, any plan, map or diagram,
(i) if prepared after the 1st June, 1918, shall be accepted for registration with any registrable instrument which is required by a written law to contain plan, map or diagram, and
(ii) if prepared after 20th October, 1897, shall for good cause shown be admitted in evidence. It is a precondition that the map, plan or diagram, must be shown to
(a) have been prepared and signed by Surveyor or is a copy of a map, plan, or diagram so prepared and signed and is certified by a Surveyor as being a true copy; and
(b) have been examined by the Survey Department and bears the countersignature of the Surveyor-General.
There seems to be no doubt that the section applies to “maps, plans or diagrams” prepared after 20th October, 1897, and also after June 1, 1918. It seems that the requirement for attaching such maps to registrable instruments applies only to maps, plans or diagrams prepared after June 1, 1918. It is clear that the section provides for the cases where a map, plan or diagram is prepared after 1st June, 1918 and is attached for registration with any registrable instrument which is required by any written law to contain a map, plan or diagram.
It also provides for where the map, plan or diagram is prepared after the 20th October, 1897, and is tendered in evidence in court. In this second case if good cause is shown to the court, it shall be admitted in evidence. Thus whether the map, plan or diagram is required to be attached to an instrument for registration or to be tendered solus in evidence, the precondition of signature and counter-signature will seem to be required.
The fact that the section is worded in the negative does not render the map, plan or diagram invalid for any purpose. Indeed the expression “save for good cause shown to the court” clearly conveys that the map, plan or diagram, is not by the mere fact of the defect therein rendered inadmissible, and would seem to be admissible in evidence in any court if good cause is shown. – See Alamba v. Marizu & six ors. (1972) 2 ECSLR. part ii, p. 442; Ojiako v. Ogueze (1962) 1 All NLR. 58. It seems to me clear that the requirement of attaching a map, plan or diagram prepared after June 1, 1918 is confined to registrable instruments required by any written law to contain a map, plan or diagram. In my view it does not apply to instruments prepared after 1897, 20th October. This is notwithstanding the use of the word ‘and’, instead of ‘or’ to link, paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3. The word “and” should be construed as “or” in this section. It was intended to make similar provisions for the two governing dates, it would not have been necessary to separate them in two distinct paragraphs.
I am fortified in this view because it has been held by this Court that s.3(1)(a) deals entirely and only with acceptance of the map, plan or diagram for registration and does not concern the question of admissibility in evidence in court. This seems to me logical from the express words of the provision. This is the view held by the court in Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra) at p.484 and I accept it as the correct view.
Section 3(1)(b), which deals with maps, plans or diagrams prepared after 1897 does not contemplate registration of such map, plan or diagram with any registrable instruments, but is concerned with the admission in evidence in court of such map, plan or diagram if good cause is shown to the Court. This Court 80 held in Alase v. Olori-Ilu (1965) NMLR. 66. In Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra) at p. 484 this Court observed:
“When a plan is tendered in evidence as a plan, issues as to its admissibility will be governed by section 3 of Cap. 121, aforesaid, if that plan was prepared after 1897.”
However, where the registered instrument sought to be admitted in evidence, is one excluded by a written law from the requirement of a plan, map or diagram, in section 9, that requirement of section 3 of the Survey Law being the provision of a written law does not apply.
There is no dearth of judicial authority in the construction of the provisions of the applicable sections. In ldowu Alase & ors. v. Sanya Olori-Ilu & ors. (1965) NMLR. 66, the construction of s.23(1)(b)(ii) of the Survey Act, in pari materia with S.3(1)(b)(ii) of the Survey Law of Lagos State was in issue. It would appear from the report of the case that what was in issue was the plan “Exhibit A.” There was no evidence that the plan “Exhibit A” was tendered in evidence with a conveyance to which it was attached. As in the instant case, the plan was not countersigned by the Regional Director of Surveys.
It was accordingly held inadmissible in evidence. Onyeama, J.S.C. who read the lead judgment with which Bairamian and Ajaegbo, JJ.S.C. concurred, said, at p. 71
“The prohibition against the admission of the plan in evidence is a statutory one, the plan was not countersigned by the Regional Director of Surveys and so is caught by section 23(1)(b) of the Survey Act. It is the duty of all courts to give effect to legislation and parties cannot by consent or acquiescence or failure to object nullify the effect of a statute.”
The dictum is self-explanatory and requires no annotation. It was also held that the Court can suo motu take the point of the non-compliance with the statute and reject the plan sought to be admitted.
In Lydia Erinosho v. Owokoniran (1965) NMLR. 479, as in the instant appeal, there was a plan annexed to the conveyance. Also like the instant appeal, the plan annexed was not signed by a licensed Surveyor and was not countersigned by the Surveyor-General. The facts of the case clearly show that the construction of S.3(1)(a) of the Survey Law, Cap. 132 which is in pari materia with S.3(1)(a) of the Survey Law, Cap. 121 of Laws of Western Nigeria, was in issue. The trial judge refused to admit the conveyance and marked it as “Exhibit 6 rejected” on these grounds. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Idigbe, J.S.C. with whom Ademola, C.J.N. and Coker, J.S.C. agreed, pointed out that Section 16 of Cap. 56, (like S.15 of Cap. 64 in this case), and, section 3 of Cap 121(like S. 3 of Cap. 132 in this case) are clearly intended for different purposes. His Lordship continued.
“Section 3 of Cap.121 is intended to control the admission in evidence of all plans, maps or diagrams of land prepared after 1897; Cap. 56 is clearly intended, among other things, to control the admission in evidence of “instruments” – defined in section 2 of that law – which were registered after 1925, the commencement date of that law (see sections 10 and 16 of Cap. 56, (like sections 9 and 15 of Cap. 64).” The document in question (Exh. 6 rejected) comes within the definition of the term “instrument” in section 2 of Cap 56 aforesaid. Even if Cap. 56 applied to it, all questions relating to the adequacy or sufficiency of the plan annexed to that instrument are matters within the competence of the Registrar appointed by the Governor under section 4 of that law subject, of course, to any order of the High Court. (section 10(1) Cap. 56 refers.)” His Lordship then concluded, as follows-
“…..it would appear that once the instrument is registered under cap. 56 it should be admitted, as a registered instrument, in evidence (see s. 16 cap. 56); if however the plan annexed thereto is defective in any way a different question will arise as to its evidential value.”
What His Lordship would appear to be saying here is that the instrument and the plan annexed were tendered as an instrument within the meaning of section 2 of cap 56 and were therefore admissible in evidence. The defect in the plan annexed goes to its evidential value and not admissibility.
Surely it cannot be contested that a registrable instrument validly registered is not rendered inadmissible in evidence merely because a defective plan was annexed to it. The converse seems to be the contention of counsel for the appellants who relies on Awomuti v. Salami & ors. (1978) 3 SC.105 for his submission. On a careful reading and analysis of the judgment in Awomuti v. Salami (Supra), that case decided no such principle of law. It was obvious in that case that their Lordships where not questioning the admissibility of the conveyance, “Exhibit E”, in respect of which there seemed to be no doubt being a registered registrable instrument. What the opinion expressed amounted to was the weight to be attached to the conveyance which was described as worthless by Kayode Eso, J.S.C. at p.110. In Awomuti v. Salami & ors. (supra) the conveyance was registered and was admitted in evidence. There was no reference to any feature on the land by means of which the land would have been identified by means of the conveyance. The conveyance merely referred to the plan. The plan which was conceded by Counsel as having not been countersigned by the Director of Surveys at the time of the registration of the deed of conveyance was held to be inadmissible. The deed of conveyance was described as worthless because –
“Apart from referring to the inadmissible plan, there is no reference to any feature on the land by means of which the land would have been identified with the deed of conveyance.” (See p. 110).
It is important to state that their Lordships considered “Exhibit E”, the deed of conveyance and actually admitted it in evidence. But with respect to the plan annexed, it was observed that the plan was countersigned by the Director of Surveys on 13th July, 1956, whereas the deed of conveyance was executed on the 15th March, 1956. The Court then agreed with Counsel for the appellant that “this shows clearly that the time of the execution of Exhibit E, the plan (if any) attached to it cannot be the plan now attached to the certified true copy of the deed.” (See p. 109). Concisely stated the true reason for rejecting the plan was that the plan now attached to the deed of conveyance was not the plan attached to it at the execution.
The case is therefore different from the case of Alase v. Ilu (supra) where only the plan was in issue, or the instant case where the only issue is that the plan attached was not signed and countersigned as required by s.3 of the Survey Law, Cap. 132. It is also different from Lydia Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra) where the instrument was executed together with the plan attached. There is therefore no conflict between Awomuti v. Salami (supra) and Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra). I think the observation of the Court of Appeal on the Awomuti case was correct when it said, at p.150
“It is clear that what the Court was dealing with there is not the admissibility of the document of conveyance there (Exh. E) but the worthlessness of the Exh. E so admitted. It was a matter of weight to be attached to Exhibit E there as admitted. Worthlessness presupposes the recognition of the existence of a thing. You cannot talk of an inadmissible document being worthy or worthless.” Awomuti v. Salami (supra) cannot be read to mean that a registered instrument will be rendered inadmissible in evidence merely because there is annexed to it a plan which at the time of its execution did not comply with the mandatory statutory requirements for its admissibility in evidence. Alase v. Olori-Ilu (supra) relied upon by Counsel for the appellant did not so decide.
The issue did not in fact arise. It is however important though strictly not relevant, to this case to consider the effect of the provisions of S.3(1)(b). This is because although it says that the plan, map or diagram is not to be admitted in evidence in any Court, it however puts in an escape clause there providing a discretion, namely, for good cause shown to the Court. Accordingly there is judicial authority for the propositions, namely,
(i) That a plan not countersigned as prescribed may “for good cause shown to the Court” be admitted in evidence in Court, thereby rendering it not inadmissible.
(ii) That a requirement of countersignature etc. is a matter of evidence
(iii) That the plan, though not in compliance with s.3(1))b) is not inadmissible, is also not void by reason of the want of the prescribed signatures.
In Ojiako & ors. v. Ogueze & ors. (1962) 1 All NLR. 58, the Federal Supreme Court allowed an unsigned plan to be signed and subsequently reintroduced into the appeal by way of motion for additional evidence. This clearly shows that the want of signature merely rendered the plan defective and not void.
Again in Akano Fashina Agboola v. Angelina Abimbola SC. 336/67 of 4th July, 1969, a plan attached to a conveyance was not countersigned at the time of its execution but four months afterwards. Application for registration of the conveyance was made to the Registrar of Titles and this was objected to. In dismissing the objection, Coker, Ag. J.S.C. said, “The conveyance was executed on the 9th July, 1963, so that when Exhibit D was executed the plan was already in existence, although not yet countersigned. The requirements for countersignature relate to matters of evidence and the production of the document in evidence and a non-compliance at any rate, with the Survey Act does not render the plan void or useless.”
It is therefore clear from the provisions of section 3(1) of the Survey Law, that an unsigned or uncountersigned plan is not merely by that fact rendered inadmissible in evidence. This is because if good cause is shown it can be admitted in evidence in court – See S.3(1)(b). In Alase v. Olori-Ilu (supra), the question whether good cause was shown for its admissibility was not discussed. The decision is not therefore authority that good cause cannot be shown. The instant appeal is in all respects identical with the earlier decision of this Court in Lydia Erinosho v. Owokoniran. In both cases, plans not complying with the provisions of the Survey Law are sought to be tendered with registered instruments to which they are annexed. In the instant appeal, although not cited to us, regulations made under s.34 would seem to have excluded from the provisions of section 9, “instruments affecting land the boundaries of which are defined in a plan attached to an instrument registered after June 1, 1918 and referred in the instrument for registration.” The conveyance in this appeal is such instrument, and is excluded from the requirements of s.9. As I have already stated in this judgment, s.9(2) applies to State or former Crown Grants, which the plots in this appeal are not, and consequently are not affected by the provisions.
Although the marginal note to section 3 suggests that the plan attached to a registered instrument should be signed by Surveyor and countersigned by the Surveyor-General, the words of s.3(1)(a) applies to plans, maps or diagrams attached to any registrable instrument for registration, and does not govern the fact of registration. Acceptance of such instrument for registration is governed by the provisions of s.9(1) and regulations made under s.34 and not by the provisions of the Survey Law.
Admissibility of registered instrument in evidence which is here in issue is governed by s.15. The objection which is the subject matter of this appeal is the admissibility of Exhibit E, which is a conveyance of 1920, and is registered and pleaded. There is no doubt that the admissibility of Exhibit E falls under sections 9 and 15 of the Lands Instruments Registration Law, and section 3(1)(a) of the Survey Law. Since section 3(1)(a) is not concerned with admissibility in evidence in Court, but with registration of a registrable instrument, it is clear that once the instrument is registered under s.9(1) of Cap. 64, the provision of section 3(1)(a) has been satisfied. This Court has held in Erinosho v. Owokoniran (supra) that where a plan admitted with a registered instrument is in evidence and is under consideration for any purpose, if defective, the weight to be attached to it will be determined by the provisions of s.3(1)(b)(ii) of the Survey Law.
The instant appeal is governed by section 3(1)(a) of the Survey Law Cap. 132 of Laws of Lagos State and sections 9 and 15 of the Lands Instrument Registration Law Cap. 64 of Laws of Lagos State. The Conveyance registered in 1920 at the Lands Registry, Lagos and pleaded in paragraph 7 of the further amended statement of claim filed by the plaintiff/respondent is admissible in evidence together with the plan attached to it. The question of whether the plan attached is admissible is not here under consideration in s.3(1)(a). These are my reasons for affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal and dismissing the Appeal of the Appellant with N300 as costs to the respondent.
M. BELLO, J.S.C.: We dismissed this appeal on 30th April, 1985, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal on the admissibility of the plan attached to the registered conveyance and remitted the case to the High Court for continuation of the hearing. We reserved our reasons to be given today.
The appeal was canvassed on one point only i.e. whether the plan, which did not comply with section 23(1) of the Survey Act, Cap 194 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria to wit that it was not signed and countersigned by a surveyor and Surveyor-General respectively but which was attached to a conveyance registered under the Land Instrument Registration Law Cap. 64 Laws of Lagos State, is admissible in evidence.
The Court of Appeal held it to be admissible. In my view, the decision of the Court of Appeal is in accord with the judgment of this Court in Erinosho v. Owokoniran (1965) NMLR. 479 wherein it was held that non-compliance with the requirements of the Survey Act did not render a plan annexed to a registered instrument inadmissible in evidence.
My learned brother, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. has stated fully his reasons for holding that the plan attached to the registered conveyance in the case on appeal before us is admissible. I adopt his reasons on the issue of the admissibility.
Other Citation: (1985) LCN/2254(SC)
