Chief Tamunoemi Idoniboye-obu V.nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2003)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

O. UWAIFO, J.S.C.

In this appeal, the appellant has set down three issues for determination. In the course of arguing issue 2, the appellant in his brief of argument has by virtue of Order 6, rule 4(4) of the Supreme Court Rules (as amended in 1999) invited this court to depart from some of its decisions to which I shall make reference later. The respondent is a creation of a statute deemed enacted by the National Assembly having been promulgated by Decree No. 33 of 1977. It is the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1977 now to be found in Cap. 320, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. It is therefore a Federal Government Corporation which is known to perform a central role in the petroleum industry in Nigeria. Would the fact that the respondent was created by a statute and enjoys commanding relationship with the Federal Government give the employment of its servants statutory flavours The appellant claims that the respondent being a statutory creation and a Federal Government parastatal, his employment with it has that status. He has pursued that argument right to this court. The respondent says no; it is the contract of service that reflects the type of employment. Who between them has the backing of the authorities as they stand In the meantime, I will state the short facts of the case.

The appellant was appointed by the respondent with effect from September 1, 1980. Five years later his appointment was terminated with effect from 30 August, 1985. He then brought action against the respondent claiming for

“(i) A declaration that the purported termination of his appointment by a letter AD/Per/C.661O dated 30th August, 1985 is unlawful, ineffective, null and void.

(ii) An injunction restraining the defendant, its servants or agents from ejecting the plaintiff from his No. 18 Wogu Street, D/Line, Port Harcourt official quarters or in any manner interfering with the plaintiff’s legal service entitlements until the lawful determination of his contract of service with the defendant.”

The appellant relied on and pleaded in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the statement of claim that the terms of the letter of appointment, which he accepted, governed his appointment. He also relied on the conditions of service of the respondent as stated in a document which was admitted as exhibit B at the trial, and also the Act which set up the respondent and “other policy circulars.” The respondent admitted this in paragraph 3 of the statement of defence.

The termination of the appellant’s employment was by a letter dated 30 August, 1985, (exhibit H) whose body captioned “Termination of Appointment” reads:

“Management has decided to terminate your appointment with effect from today 30th August, 1985.

You are hereby terminated immediately. You should please handover all Corporation’s properties in your care and pay up the balance of any loan owed by you to the Corporation immediately.

The General Manager, Finance and Accounts is by this memo being advised, to pay you a month (sic) salary in lieu of notice.”

Although the appellant was initially appointed as a Senior Accounts Supervisor on a salary of N6,420.00 per annum, he had by promotion on 21 June, 1985 become an Assistant Chief Accounts Supervisor on a salary of N8,664.00 per annum. As pleaded by the appellant in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim, it was soon after that promotion that certain allegations of fraud against him were made. This development led to his suspension from duty and eventually to the termination of his appointment by the said letter which made no reference to any allegations of fraud.

The question of allegations of fraud made after the letter of promotion reference No. AD/Per/C.6610 of 30 August, 1985 and the issue of retrospective termination of his appointment were further pleaded in paragraph 11 of the statement of claim. These were denied in paragraph 8 of the statement of defence thus:

“Save as to admitting that the defendant by letter No. AD/Per/C6610 of 30-8-85 lawfully and according to her conditions of service terminated the services of the, plaintiff, the defendant denies all other allegations contained in that paragraph and in particular as concerns fraud and retrospective termination.”

It would appear the respondent made it clear that it relied only on the conditions of service to terminate the appellant’s appointment. Exhibit H was in pursuance of that. But the learned trial Judge (K. S. Sagbe, J.), after considering the terms of the conditions of service, particularly those dealing with termination of staff for inefficiency or for fraud, and had reasoned that the appellant’s appointment was terminated because of the alleged fraud, observed and found inter alia as follows: