Cleopatra Rebecca Danner V. Attorney-general To The Government Of The Gambia (1953)
Table of Contents
ToggleLawGlobal Hub Judgment Report – West Africa Court of Appeal
Protectorate Lands Ordinance, sections 6 and 15—Land occupied by nonindigene without lease or registration of terms but with requisite approval—Dispossession—Compensation.
Facts
The Ordinance provides that occupation of land in the Protectorate by indigenes (as defined) shall be governed by customary law; that a non-indigene cannot occupy such land without previous approval; if he does, he is deemed to be a tenant-at-will, and then under section 15 the reversion to all fixtures, fences and economic trees shall be in the Authority of the District. Where a nonindigene occupies land with the requisite approval but without a lease, a memorandum of the terms shall be entered in the Division Land Register (section 6).
The appellant sued for a declaration that she was entitled to occupy certain land in the Protectorate of which she had been wrongfully dispossessed, and for compensation for clearing it, claiming that she was an indigene who had occupied the land with the requisite approval.
Her parents were not indigenous, nor had she a certificate under the second
part of the definition of “indigene”. The trial Judge found that she had had the requisite consent and approval to occupy the land; but there was admittedly no registration of the terms.
The Judge thought that the plaintiff (appellant above) not being an indigene, could not hold under terms of customary tenure but was a tenant-at-will, with the result that her tenancy could be terminated without compensation in view of section 15.
A witness for the defendants testified that when the District Authority allowed anyone to occupy land, it was the custom to refund his expenses on asking him to go away.
Held
The Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff was not an indigene, but wrong in holding that she was a tenant-at-will under the Ordinance seeing that she had had the requisite approval; and though her occupation had been properly terminated, she was entitled to compensation according to custom.
Judgment varied: compensation allowed.