Dominic Alapa V. The State (2016)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.
This appeal is against the judgment of the Katsina State High Court in Charge No KHT/20C/2004 delivered by Honorable Justice Abdullahi Yusuf on the 12th of March, 2007. The Appellant was charged with culpable homicide punishable with death under Section 221, of the Penal Code of Katsina State. The Appellant was alleged to have caused the death of one Yohanna Dyeri on the 3rd of April, 2004 in Matazu Local Government Area of Katsina State by shooting him in the abdomen with a rifle with the knowledge that death would be the probable consequence of his act.
The Appellant pleaded Not Guilty and the matter proceeded to trial and in the course of which the Respondent called seven witnesses and tendered six exhibits in proof its case against the Appellant. The Appellant called three witnesses, including himself, to testify in his defence. At the conclusion of trial and after the final addresses of Counsel, the lower Court found the Appellant guilty of culpable homicide punishable with death and sentenced him to death by hanging. The Appellant was dissatisfied with the
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judgment of the lower Court and he caused his Counsel to file a notice of appeal against it. The notice of appeal is dated the 5th of June, 2007 and it contained four grounds of appeal.
In canvassing the case of the Appellant in this appeal, his Counsel filed a brief of arguments dated the 25th of February, 2008 on the 27th of February, 2008. In response, Counsel to the Respondent filed a brief of arguments dated the 11th of October, 2010 on the 9th of June, 2014 and the brief of arguments was deemed properly filed on the 11th of November 2014. At the hearing of the appeal, Counsel to the parties relied on and adopted the arguments in their respective briefs as their oral submissions in this appeal.
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Counsel to the Appellant formulated two issues for determination in this appeal and these were:
i. Whether the trial, conviction and sentence passed on the Appellant were not a nullity in view of the failure of the trial Court to comply with the mandatory provision of Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 33 (6) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.
ii. Whether on the evidence before the Court the defence of insanity under
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Section 51 of the Penal Code was established and available to the Appellant.
In arguing the first issue for determination, Counsel referred to the provisions of Section 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code dealing with arraignment and of Section 33 (6) of the 1999 Constitution and stated that the combined effect of both provisions is that (i) an accused person must be present in Court unfettered unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary; (ii) the charge must be read over to the accused in the language he understands; (iii) the charge must be explained to the accused to the satisfaction of the Court; (iv) in the course of the explanation, technical language must be avoided; and (v) the accused will then be called upon to plead to the charge; he referred to the case of Offiom Vs State (2003) 3 ACLR 192. Counsel stated that these requirements were mandatory and not directory and they must be complied with and he referred to the cases of Ogunye Vs The State (1999) 4 SCNJ 44, Adeniji Vs The State (2001) 5 SCNJ 371.
Counsel referred to the records of the lower Court on the arraignment of the Appellant and stated that there was no record of the
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person who read the charge to the Appellant and neither was there a record that the charge was explained to the Appellant before his plea was taken and that as such there was non-compliance with the provisions of Section 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 33 (6) of the 1999 Constitution and that this nullified the entire proceedings before the lower Court and he referred to the case of State Vs Onagoruwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt 221) 33. Counsel stated that the fact that the Appellant spoke English language and that the language of the Court was English did not excuse the lower Court from explaining the charge to the Appellant and to reflect this fact in the records and that there was nothing on the record showing that the lower Court ordered that the charge be explained to the Appellant in the language he understood and this occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Counsel urged this Court to resolve this issue for determination in favour of the Appellant.
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On the second issue for determination, Counsel reproduced the provisions of Section 51 of the Penal Code dealing with the defence of insanity and stated that for an accused person to take benefit of
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the provisions, he must lead evidence to establish that he was insane at the time he committed the offence and that this meant that the Appellant had the onus of establishing that at the time of the killing of the deceased, he was in such unsound mind as to deprive him the capacity to know that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. Counsel stated that the Appellant led evidence showing that he had been behaving abnormally prior to the incident and that this was confirmed by his wife who testified as the second defence witness and she informed the lower Court of the illness of the husband in 1999 and which completely transformed him from being a normal person and that the abnormal behavior had continued since then.
Counsel stated that the means by which insanity can be proved include positive acts of the accused before and after the incident complained of, evidence of a relation who knew the accused person intimately relating to his behavior and the change that had come upon him, evidence of a medical doctor who examined him, and medical history of the family and he referred to the cases ofSanusi Vs The State (1984) 10 SC 160 and Nnabo Vs The
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State (1994) 9 SCNJ 144. Counsel stated that the medical report, Exhibit D, confirmed that the Appellant was suffering from a mental disorder and this was confirmed by the evidence of the second defence witness and by the evidence of the seventh prosecution witness on the behavior of the Appellant immediately after the incident and that these pieces of evidence showed that the Appellant did not know at the time of the incident that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law.
Counsel stated that the lower Court wrongly rejected these pieces of evidence and the defence of insanity on the ground that the Appellant signed the monthly report of his division and conducted Local Government Election on the 27th of March, 2004 and that these incidents were not conclusive proof that the Appellant was sane at the time of commission of the offence. Counsel urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant and to uphold the defence of insanity.
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Counsel concluded his arguments by urging this Court to allow the appeal and to set aside the judgment of the lower Court and the sentence passed therein on the Appellant and to discharge and acquit the
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Appellant or remit the case for retrial before another Judge.
?Counsel to the Respondent agreed with the issues for determination in the appeal distilled by the Counsel to the Appellant and he only reframed them differently. In arguing the first issue for determination, Counsel also reproduced the provisions of Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code dealing with arraignment and of Section 33 (6) of the 1999 Constitution and he conceded the requirements of a valid arraignment as itemized by the Counsel to the Appellant and he referred to other case law authorities on the point. Counsel reproduced the record of the proceedings of the arraignment of the Appellant in the lower Court and stated that the law is that where the charge is read to an accused person and he makes his plea and the Court records the plea and thereafter proceeds to trial, a rebuttable presumption is raised that the Court was satisfied that the charge was explained to the accused person and he understood same and that it is not a requirement of arraignment that the Court must record that the charge was explained to the accused to his satisfaction before he took his plea; he
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referred to the cases of Solola Vs State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt.937) 460 and Amala Vs State (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt 888) 520.
Counsel stated that it is also the position of the law that where an accused person speaks and understands the English language in which the charge is read to him, the requirement for it to be explained to him in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court becomes unnecessary and the failure to do so does not render the arraignment invalid, as the requirement is for the protection of a person who is not literate in the language the charge was read and he referred to the case of Okeke Vs State (2003) FWLR (Pt 159) 1381. Counsel stated that the record of the Court showed that the accused spoke English language, he testified in English language, he gave his statements made to the Police in English language, he was a Superintendent of Police and a Divisional Police Officer and that where an accused person is literate in English language and pleads to the charge against him in English language, the failure of the trial Court to record the language in which the charge was read and/or that the charge was explained to the satisfaction
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of the Court will not vitiate the trial and he referred to the case of Idemudia Vs State (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt.610) 202. Counsel urged this Court to resolve the first issue for determination in favour of the Respondent.
On the second issue for determination, Counsel reproduced the provisions of Section 51 of the Penal Code Law of Katsina State dealing with the defence of insanity and stated that the ingredients of the defence were (i) that the alleged act by the accused was done by reason of unsound mind which made him to be incapable of knowing the nature of the act he committed and (ii) that at the time of committing the alleged act he did not know that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law by reason of unsound mind. Counsel stated that it is not every form of mental disorder that can relieve an accused person from criminal responsibility and that for a mental disorder to do so, it must fall within the statutory definition and that it is the state of mind of the accused person at the time of the commission of the offence with which he is charged that is material and he referred to the cases of Guobadia Vs State (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt.869) 360 and
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Oladele Vs State (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt 269) 294. Counsel stated that it was not enough for an accused person to lead evidence of mental disorder, but he must go further to show that the disorder deprived him of the capacity to understand what he was doing and to know that he ought not to have done the act which is called in question, otherwise the defence of insanity will fail and he again referred to the case of Guobadia Vs State supra.
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Counsel thereafter traversed through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and of the defence witnesses as well as the relevant exhibits tendered by the parties and stated that the testimonies of the prosecution witness, particularly the second, third and fifth prosecution witnesses who were policemen serving under the Appellant, showed clearly that the Appellant behaved normally, issued clear instructions and was in full command of his mental faculties on the day of the incident. Counsel stated that the best that could be made of the testimony of the Appellant was that he was confused and he lost his memory on the day of the incident and that in the case ofNnanbo Vs State (1994) 9 SCNJ 144, the Supreme Court held
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that loss of memory, without more, was not sufficient mental infirmity to sustain the defence of insanity.
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Counsel stated further that the totality of the evidence of the second defence witness, the wife of the Appellant, was that the Appellant had a road accident in 1998 and that he fell ill in 1999 and has been behaving abnormally since then and that evidence of abnormal behavior without going on to show that it deprived the accused of the capacity to understand what he was doing and to know that he ought not to have done the act which is called in question, is not sufficient to sustain the defence of insanity and he again referred to the case of Guobadia Vs State supra. Counsel also engaged the evidence of the third defence witness, a medical doctor who attended to the Appellant in prison after his arrest and stated that the evidence was not helpful to the Appellant because the witness testified under cross-examination that he could not say the state of the mind of the Appellant at the time of the commission of the offence and that moreover, there was a distinction between medical insanity and legal insanity and that the two were not synonymous and he
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referred to the comments of the learned author S. S. Richardson in his book Notes on the Penal Code 4th Ed. Counsel urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Respondent.
Counsel concluded his arguments by urging this Court to dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit and to affirm the judgment of the lower Court and the sentence passed therein on the Appellant.
The first complaint of the Appellant in this appeal is that the lower Court failed to comply with the provisions of Section 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Section provides:
“When the High Court is ready to commence trial, the accused shall appear or be brought before it and the charges shall be read out in Court and explained to him and he shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charged or offences charged.”
This complaint of the Appellant touches on the question of whether or not there was a valid arraignment before he was tried by the lower Court. An arraignment involves the taking of the plea of an accused defendant. The plea is an accused defendant’s formal response of guilty or not guilty or no contest to a criminal charge. It is the means by
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which an accused defendant joins issues with the State on a criminal charge.
It is trite that one of the fundamental requirements of a valid trial in a criminal matter is a valid arraignment. InIdemudia Vs State (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt 610) 202 at 219 B-C, Karibi-Whyte, JSC stated that:
“A valid trial is posited on the fact of a valid arraignment. An arraignment as rationem ponere, that is calling the accused to reckoning for the allegations of the offences against him. The laws of this country have made adequate provisions for the protection of the interest of the accused and the citizens in the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, the Court before whom an accused person is required to appear for reckoning in respect of allegations of offences, is required to observe certain constitutional requirements in Section 36(5)(a) and the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law.”
?Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that ‘every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the
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offence.’ The Courts have, in the interpretation of the laws on criminal prosecution, laid down some essential requirements that must be satisfied for there to be a valid arraignment and these are (a) the defendant must be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order; (b) the charge or information must be read over and explained to the accused to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court; (c) it must be read and explained to him in the language he understands; (d) the accused must be called upon to plead thereto unless there exists any valid reason to do otherwise such as objection to want of service where the defendant is entitled by law to service of a copy of the information and the Court is satisfied that he has in fact not been duly served – Kajubo Vs State (1983) 1 NWLR (Pt 73) 721. Olabode Vs State (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt 1152) 254, Temitope Vs State (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt.1243) 289 and Olowoyo Vs State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt.1329) 346.
?These requirements are to ensure that an accused person gets a fair trial and he is not railroaded into jail. They are not merely cosmetic or mere
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semantics. They are provisions considered necessary to ensure that the accused defendant understands and appreciates what is being alleged against him, to which he is required to make a plea.
The requirements cannot be waived or ignored. They are very important and mandatory and there must be evidence on the records that they were fully or substantially complied with. Arraignment is not a matter of technicality and it is a very important initial step in the trial of a person on a criminal charge. It is very critical and foundational to the successful prosecution and possible conviction of an accused defendant. A criminal trial anchored on a faulty arraignment process is tantamount to erecting a house on a faulty and sandy foundation and it will invariably collapse no matter how well the trial was conducted. Thus, the Courts have held that failure to comply with the conditions for a valid arraignment renders the whole trial a nullity – Kajubo Vs State supra, Yahaya Vs State (2002) 3 NWLR (Pt 754) 289, Okeke Vs State (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 842) 25, Amala Vs State (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt.1038) 30, Solola Vs State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt 937) 460, Lufadeju Vs Johnson
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(2007) 8 NWLR (Pt 1037) 535 and Dada Vs State (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt.1337) 59.
The crux of the complaint of the Appellant in this appeal is not that the charge against the Appellant was not read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by an officer of the Court and/or that it was not read and explained to him in the language he understood, but that the trial Court did not reflect in the record that these acts were done. The position of the law on making such record is that while it is good practice, as advised by the Supreme Court in Kajubo Vs State supra, for trial Courts to specifically record that “the charge was read and fully explained to the accused defendant to the satisfaction of the Court” before then recording his plea thereto where an accused does not understand the English language, the language of the Court, it is not so essential where the accused person understands the English language. This point was succinctly made by the Supreme Court in Idemudia Vs The State (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt 610) 202 where Katsina-Alu, JSC (as he then was) stated thus:
“It is not disputed that it is perfectly useful and necessary for the Court
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to record the fact of arraignment and that the charge was read to the accused in the language he understands where this is different from the language of the Court, which is English language. Where the accused person understands the language with which the charge was read it becomes unnecessary to record that fact specifically. It seems to me not possible for the Court to know whether the accused understood the charge read and explained to him. Even though he may appear to do so, it is good practice to ask the accused the question whether he understood the charge as read and explained, and to record the answer. It does not seem to me that the omission to do so by itself merely could constitute a non-compliance with the constitutional and procedural requirements, unless it is lack of understanding of the charge that is apparent from the record of the trial. Finally, the satisfaction of the Court on the compliance with the procedure on arraignment is not to me a requirement which need be expressed on the record. It is a requirement for the guidance of the trial Court, which should feel satisfied that the procedure has been complied with.?
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position of the law has been restated and reiterated by the Supreme Court in several cases, for example Okoro Vs State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt 584) 181, Ogunye Vs State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt 604) 548, Dibie Vs The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1033) 30, Olabode Vs State (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt.1152) 254, Madu Vs The State (2012) LPELR-SC.12/2009, Ibrahim Vs The State (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt 1394) 305, Blessing Vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) LPELR-SC.503/2012.
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In the instant case, the Appellant was a high ranking Police Officer, a Superintendent of Police and a Divisional Police Officer, and there was abundant evidence on the record that he spoke, wrote and understood the English language well and being a Police Officer, he is presumed to transact his official business in the English Language. The record of proceedings on his arraignment showed that he was represented by a Counsel in Court on the day and that the charge was read to him and the trial Court asked him if he understood the charge against him and he confirmed that he did, before being asked to enter his plea and he pleaded Not Guilty. It was not necessary in the circumstances for the lower Court to have recorded
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that the charge was read and fully explained to the accused defendant to the satisfaction of the Court.
These records of the proceedings of the arraignment show that the lower Court complied fully with the requirements for a valid arraignment. The complaint of the Appellant on the arraignment was not well founded. The first issue for determination is thus resolved against the Appellant.
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The second complaint of the Appellant was that the lower Court was wrong when it turned down his defence of insanity. Insanity is defined as any mental disorder sever enough that it prevents a person from having legal capacity and excuses the person from criminal or civil responsibility. It is a legal, not a medical standard and thus the defence of insanity is an affirmative defence alleging that a mental disorder caused the accused to commit the crime. In law, everyone is presumed to be sane and of sound mind and accountable for his actions, unless the contrary is proved. But, where there is a defect or incapacity of understanding as there can be no consent of the will, the act is not punishable as a crime. In the legal sense, whether the accused was sane or insane
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at the time when the act was committed is a question of fact to be decided by the trial Judge, and not by medical men however eminent and knowledgeable, and is dependent upon previous and contemporaneous acts of the accused.
Where the defence of an accused person is unsoundness of mind or insanity, the onus is on him to plead same and produce credible evidence of insanity or unsoundness of mind at the time the alleged act was committed. This can be done by (i) evidence as to the past history of the accused; (ii) evidence as to his conduct immediately preceding the killing of the deceased; (iii) evidence from prison warders who had custody of the accused and looked after him during his trial; (iv) evidence of medical officers and/or psychiatrists who examined the accused; (v) evidence of relatives about the general behavior of the accused and the reputation he enjoyed of sanity or insanity in the neighbourhood; and (vi) evidence showing that insanity appears in the duly history of the accused. The absence of motive is not sufficient as it is not the duty of the Court to go on a voyage looking for motive.
When considering the evidence available to or
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adduced by an accused person in his defence of insanity, the Courts have held the following radical and fundamental points to be important to be borne in mind and kept in view (i) the law presumes every person, including the person accused of crime, sane until the contrary is proved; (ii) the prosecution does not set out to prove what the law presumes in its favour; (iii) an accused person who raises insanity as his defence has the onus of proving such insanity cast on him and the standard of such proof is not as high as that cast on the prosecution; it is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but it is proof of reasonable probability, proof sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of a fair minded jury as to sanity of the accused; (iv) insanity is a blanket term embracing a considerable variety of mental abnormalities, mental infirmities, neurosis and psychosis; (v) to constitute a defence, the mental condition relied on should be such that could and did deprive the accused of capacity (a) to understand what he was doing, or (b) to control his actions, or (c) to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission complained of as constituting the
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actus reus of the offence charged
– Arum Vs The State (1979) 11 SC 91, Sanusi Vs The State (1984) 10 SC 166, Onyeliwe Vs The State (1938) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 565, Ejinima Vs The State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt 200) 627, Ogbu Vs The State (1992) 10 SCNJ 88, Ani Vs The State (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.776) 644, Popoola Vs The State (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt 1382) 96, State Vs John (2013) 12 NWLR (P 1368) 337, Adamu Vs The State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt.1416) 441.
In dealing with the defence of insanity, the lower Court stated in the judgment thus:
“The main issue is, has the defence succeeded in proving that when the accused used an AK47 Rifle and shot at the deceased he did not know what he was doing by reason of unsoundness of the mind or incapable of knowing what he was doing? This is what the defence started to do by calling the accused himself. I will not dwell much on what he said during his evidence in chief as it has been held that the evidence of the accused in an offence where he pleaded insanity is not usually taken seriously – see Guobadia Vs State … It will suffice to say that he claimed to have total amnesia from the day of the fire incident at Karaduwa in
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Matazu Local Government where he was DPO but that is not a defence that can ground the defence of insanity. On this I refer to Nnabo Vs State? It is also not a defence to state as he did ‘there is no reason whatsoever that I could have killed him. He has not disregarded me he has high regards for me.’
On the testimony of DW2 the wife of the accused in her testimony wherein she narrated the length of time they have been married about 30 years and have 7 children from the said relationship and there had been no problems until the year 1988 when the accused had a road accident and since then he had not been normal. Then an illness in 1999 so serious that it completely transformed him and nearly claimed his life. She went on to state the type of irrational behavior which hitherto was not associated with him.
I have seriously considered this but has this testimony succeeded in proving that the accused was in a state of unsoundness of mind as defined in Section 51 of the Penal Code at the time of the offence? I answer in the negative. This is not to say I am not aware of the superior Court case which says ‘where relations of an accused person testify
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with regards to his birth and that later in life he developed certain illness which one of his parents once suffered he could not be said to have control over his mental power. This was held in R v Inyang …
In the case before this Court, I hold that the situation is entirely different as only the wife of the accused testified and her testimony touched on a problem he had when he had an accident in 1998, and later the illness of 1999…
Though she added that since after the accident matters which they usually joke over, now they cause problems, and when he sends for her they end up quarrelling. He will sometimes tell her that he is normal but some people are pursuing him, sometimes while they are asleep he would wake up suddenly and start shouting now they want to kill me.” (see pages 103 to 104 of the records)
The lower Court continued its deliberations thus:
“On the testimony of DW3 the Deputy Controller of Prison Services in Katsina State, a medical doctor with MBBS from University of Jos 1986 and had been in practice for 20 years. He undertakes medical consultations, health and security services administration as well as Medical
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Legal Reporting. He had been in Katsina Central Prisons since 1994. He narrated how he examined the accused and the state of health of the accused. He described him as one with depressed mood, not interested in his environment and his appearance was shabby and very- unkept. He could not elicit any sign of a particular disease pain or fever with other systems okay. He finally said that he made an impression or suspicion of mental disorder or illness until Proven otherwise by a specialist. That was why he was referred to Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital Kano. He further added that the police took him to Kano and he was treated and he came back with medication known as anti psychotic drugs. At the moment his mental health has improved seriously. I am not unaware that DW3 falls under the category of expert witness … However as the witness is not a specialist in the field of psychiatric medicine he recommended the referral of the accused to Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital where as stated earlier Exh. D is the result. The said forensic psychiatric assessment has not for all intents and purposes disclosed the state of mind or the mental condition of the accused at the
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time of the commission of the alleged crime to avail him the defence of insanity.
On this I am in support of the submission of the counsel to the prosecution where he said ‘the position of the law is to the effect that the fact that an accused has been treated for a mental illness or insanity in the past may not be relevant for the purpose of determining whether the defence of insanity is available to him.’ It may not be relevant if the treatment was given a long time before the commission of the offence … It is the counsel’s further that the fact that the accused between 2002 to 3rd April 2004 had been Divisional Police Officer at four Police Divisions, namely Matazu, Bindawa, Kafur and Kankia, it is counsel’s argument that had he not been sane he will not have occupied such sensitive positions. The witnesses who testified for the prosecution did not state that there was any abnormal behavior which could term the accused insane prior, during or after the commission of the offence. The position of the law is that in cases of insanity the behavior of the accused before, during and after the incident are all to be considered…” (see pages 104 to 105 of
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the records)
The lower Court thereafter considered the evidence of the prosecution witnesses some of whom were Police Officers who worked directly with the Appellant and interacted with the Appellant on the day of the commission of the crime and it stated that their evidence of the activities of the Appellant prior to and on the day of the commission of the crime were unshaken and did not suggest any abnormalities or the presence of mental infirmness in the behaviour of the Appellant. The lower Court concluded its deliberations with a finding that the Appellant did not lead cogent evidence to establish the defence of insanity.
This Court has gone to this length to reproduce the deliberations of the lower Court on the defence of insanity pleaded by the Appellant to show that the lower Court carried out a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence led by the parties on the point. Now, it is elementary that it is the primary responsibility of a trial Court to evaluate the evidence presented by parties before it, ascribe probative value to the evidence and then come up with a decision. Evaluation of evidence entails the assessment of evidence so as to give
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value and quality to it. It involves a reasoned belief of the evidence of one of the contending parties and disbelief of the other or a reasoned preference of one version to the other – Idakwo Vs Nigerian Army (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt 857) 249, Oyekola vs Ajibade (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt 902) 356, Imoh vs Onanuga (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt 1376) 139 and Al-Mustapha vs State (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt 1383) 350.
The law is that where the records of proceedings show that a trial Court assessed the evidence produced before it and accorded probative value to them and placed them side by side on an imaginary weighing scale before coming to a conclusion and making a finding of fact on the side of the evidence that tilts the scale, such a finding must be accorded due weight so long as it is not unreasonable and not perverse. In other words, an appellate Court will not interfere with the evaluation of evidence carried out by a trial Court and will not substitute its own views for that of the trial Court unless the conclusion reached from the facts is perverse – Ajibulu Vs Ajayi (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1392) 483, Ikumonihan Vs State (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1392) 564.
A decision of a Court is
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said to be perverse (a) when it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings; or (b) where it has been shown that the trial Court took account of matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shut its eyes to the obvious; or (c) when such a decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice; or (d) when the circumstance of the finding of facts in the decision are most unreasonable – Onu Vs Idu (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt 995) 657, Momoh Vs Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt.1270) 217.
In the instant appeal, Counsel to the Appellant merely invited this Court to consider the defence of insanity pleaded by the Appellant on the evidence led before the lower Court without making any attempt to fault the reasoning of the lower Court contained in the above excerpts of the judgment. This Court does not share the jurisdiction of evaluation of evidence with the lower Court and it cannot interfere once it is clear that the evaluation of evidence carried out by the trial Court is borne out from the evidence on record, and this is so even if this Court is of the view that the lower Court should have evaluated the evidence of the witnesses differently -Gundiri Vs Nyako (2014) 2
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NWLR (Pt 1391) 211, Nguma Vs Attorney General, Imo State (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt 1405) 119, Adebesin Vs State (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt.1413) 609. It is evident from a read through the records of appeal that the evaluation of evidence carried out by the lower Court was borne out from the evidence led on record. More importantly, the lower Court clearly and properly applied the legal principles governing the defence of insanity to the case made out by the parties in its evaluation of the evidence. This Court cannot fault the decision of the lower Court that the Appellant did not lead preponderating evidence to establish his defence of insanity.
The complaint of the Appellant on the point was misconceived and the second issue for determination is also resolved against the Appellant.
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In conclusion, this Court finds that the Appellant has not given it any reason to tamper with the judgment of the lower Court. This appeal thus fails and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Katsina State High Court in Charge No KHT/20C/2004 delivered by Honorable Justice Abdullahi Yusuf on the 12th of March, 2007 is hereby affirmed along with the sentence passed therein on the
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Appellant. These shall be the orders of this Court.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8717(CA)
