Eguabor Andrew Omonbude & Anor V. Felix Omi Imoisili & Ors (1999)
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BA’ABA, J.C.A.
The 1st and 2nd appellants contested for the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for Igueben Local Government Council Area of Edo State, in the Local Government Election held on the 5th of December. 1998 on the platform of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP). The 1st and 2nd respondents contested the same election for the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively on the platform of All Peoples Party (APP). On the conclusion of the election, the 1st respondent having scored the highest number of votes was declared the winner of the election by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The 1st and 2nd appellants were unhappy with the result of the election so they filed a petition before the Edo State Local Government Election Petition Tribunal on the 18/12/98 challenging the validity of the election as well as the return of 1st and 2nd respondents by INEC as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively on grounds contained in the petition at pages 1-4 of the record. After entering a conditional appearance on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents on the 6/1/99, counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, filed a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal to entertain the petition. The motion was argued and the tribunal on the 20/1/99 delivered its reserved and considered ruling but proceeded to hear the petition for reasons given in the ruling at pages 52-67 of the record.
At the conclusion of the case, the tribunal delivered its judgment on the 8/2/99, and affirmed the election of the 1st and 2nd respondents as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment, notice of appeal was filed on behalf of the petitioners/appellants containing 4 grounds of appeal. The appellants’ brief of argument dated the 23/2/99 was filed on the 24/2/99. The respondents, were granted an extension of time by this Court to file their brief of argument which was deemed duly filed and served on the 10/3/99.
When the appeal came up for hearing on the 10/3/99 both counsel adopted their respective briefs of argument. In addition, each counsel elaborated on his brief of argument. Learned counsel for the appellants formulated four issues for determination from his four grounds of appeal, as follows:-
- Whether the Election Tribunal was right in failing to consider and/or consider adequately and evaluate the evidence marshalled before it by the petitioners witnesses.
- Whether the Election Tribunal was right in descending into the arena of conflict between the parties by finding evidence of 2nd respondent’s educational qualification to contest the election outside Exhibit “A”?
- Whether the Election Tribunal was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to try the case of forgery made against the 2nd respondent?
- Whether the Election Tribunal was right in declaring the 1st and 2nd respondent as validly nominated and duly elected having regard to the extant provisions of Decree No. 36 of 1998.
Arguing the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants, M. E. Egbadon, submitted that the 2nd respondent was not educationally qualified to contest the election and that the clearance obtained by the 2nd respondent on the face value of a document submitted to INEC, is not a bar to challenging the qualification of a candidate. Learned counsel urged the court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Election Tribunal and enter judgment for the appellants in terms of paragraph 13(a) (b) and (d) of the petition. The learned counsel for the respondents, Fred Orbih, did not formulate issues for determination in his brief but advanced argument in opposition, justifying the decision or the Election Tribunal. Learned counsel relies on paragraph 6(2)(2) of Schedule 4 of Decree 36 of 1998.
In my view, the real issue for determination in this appeal is – whether the Election Tribunal was right in holding that it has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of nomination having regards to the provisions of Decree 36 of 1998.
Section 56 of the Decree, provides the rules of procedure to be followed in the conduct of election, it reads:-
“56. The rules of procedure to be followed in the conduct of election under this Decree shall be in accordance with the provisions set out in Schedule 4 to this Decree or as may be determined by the Commission from time to time.”
Paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 of the Decree, provides for the validity of nominations, particularly paragraphs 6(3) which reads:
“6.3 Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Decree or any other law, the decision of the Electoral Officer, that a candidate has been validly nominated under sub-paragraph 2 of this paragraph shall not be a ground of an election petition under this Decree.”
In view of the clear wordings of paragraph 6(3) reproduced above. I am in complete agreement with the learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondents that the Election Tribunal was right when it held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the issue of nomination in this case. I am not unmindful of the provision of section 84 of the Decree. It seems to me that in the Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 1998, some officers and institutions have been specifically vested with certain responsibilities and safeguard from interference by any other officer or institution in the discharge of the responsibilities.
At pages 15 of the record, the Local Government Election Tribunal, dealing with the issue of jurisdiction, held as follows:-
“Besides, this tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to question the discretion exercised by the Commission based on Exhibit “B” and such a clearance made by the Commission is final, section 99(d) is quite clear, it says,
“(d) any other qualification acceptable to the Commission.”
As earlier stated in this judgment, the only real issue for determination is the issue of the validity of the nomination of the 2nd respondent. In the circumstance, having regards to the provision of paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 of Decree 36 of 1998, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Cost assessed at N2,000.00 is hereby awarded in favour of the 1st and 2nd respondents against the appellants.
Other Citations: (1999)LCN/0516(CA)
