Elder Amadi Uchegbu & Ors V. The Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig. Ltd. (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
TIJJANI ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Justice, Port Harcourt Judicial Division, Coram E. N. Ogbuji (j) delivered on the 27th day of September, 2004. The learned trial Judge on ground of jurisdiction struck out the suit of the Plaintiffs now Appellants contending that he lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues in dispute between the parties.
The Appellants were the Plaintiffs in the Court below while the Respondent was the Defendant in that Court. By their statement of claim filed along with the writ of summons, the Plaintiffs/Appellants claimed as follows:
“WHEREOF the Plaintiffs claim possession of the piece/parcel of land measuring approximately 1.7 Hectares, situate, lying and being at Umuche, Omuordu, Egbeda in Emohua Local Government Area of Rivers State which was let by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant under a tenancy from year to year at the annual rental value as determined by the Defendant to be N800, and the sum of N10, 000,000 as general damages and an order of the Honourable Court restraining the Defendant by it’s self, servants, agents, assigns, successors-in-title, and/or legal representatives from further acts of trespass-viz: digging, drilling (vertically or horizontally) opening up the sub-soil with pipes either directly or from another piece/parcel of land and all acts inconsistent with a Tenancy and a further order compelling the Defendant to make good all acts of waste by restoring the land to it’s previous state and condition (as it was) at the commencement of the tenancy AND COST.”
The facts of the case that gave rise to the appeal under consideration are that: The Appellants as Plaintiffs in the Court below instituted the action claiming inter-alia possession of the piece/parcel of land measuring approximately 1.7 Hectares, situate, lying and being at Umuehe, Omuordu in Emohua Local Government Area of Rivers State. They also claimed for an order of injunction restraining the Defendant by its self, servants, agents, assigns, successor-in-title and/or legal representative from further acts of trespass-viz, drilling (vertically/or horizontally) opening up the sub-soil with pipes either directly or from another piece/parcel of land and all acts inconsistent with a Tenancy and a further order compelling the Defendants to make good all acts of waste by restoring the land to its previous state and condition (as it was) at the commencement of the tenancy.
The Appellants also filed a motion “Ex-Parte” praying for leave to sue in a representative capacity which was granted by the lower Court on 12th day of June, 2003. (See page 10 of the records). The Respondent was duly served with the writ of summons, the statement of claim and the said Order; the day it was made.
As can be gleaned from the records, Nelson W. Nworgu of Chika Chambers, No. 7 19bokwu Street, D/Line Port Harcourt entered appearance for the Respondent on 26th day June, 2003, served same on the Plaintiffs/Appellants, c/o their Solicitors and played no further role in the proceedings.
The Respondent did not file any statement of defence and therefore did not join issues with the Appellants nor did they call witnesses at the trial. After several adjournments without the appearance of the Respondent and its Counsel, the trial commenced on the 26th day of April, 2004.
The Appellants called two witnesses – PW1 and PW2. The 3rd Appellant testified as PW1 on 26/04/2004 and tendered Exhibit A and ID1 and ID2. PW2, a Bailiff attached to the Deputy Sheriff’s Office testified to the service of the (6 months) Notice to quit and Notice to tenant of owner’s intention to apply to recover possession, (i.e. 7 days Notice). It is to be noted that Exhibits “B” and “C” (formerly ID1 and ID2) were received in evidence through
PW2, who testified as to the service of those statutory Notices?
In a reserved judgment delivered on the 27th day of September, 2004, the learned trial Judge on page 21 of the records held thus:
“It is settled principle of law ‘that where there is a Court with jurisdiction to determine all the issues raised in a matter, including the principal issue, it is improper to approach a Court that is competent to determine only some of the issues’. See Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (1989) 9 SCNJ 221 and Military Administrator, Benue State v Abayilo (2001) FWLR (Pt. 45) 602 at paragraphs D – E.
In the circumstance, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Having reached the conclusion that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain all the reliefs sought, the proper order to make in the circumstance is striking out the suit. See NDIC v. CBN (2002) FWLR (Pt. 99) 1021 at 1041 paragraphs D – E. In the final result, I make an order striking out the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The suit is accordingly struck out.”
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned trial Judge as set out above, the Appellants approached this Court with a Notice of Appeal containing three grounds of appeal. The said grounds bereft of their particulars read as follows:
“A. The learned Judge erred in law by not entering judgment for the trespass of the Plaintiffs’ land on the uncontroverted and uncontradicted claim and evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs.
B. The learned trial Judge erred in law by relying on facts not pleaded by the Plaintiffs and not given in evidence.
C. The Honourable Court erred in law by holding that it lacked jurisdiction in this suit based on some grounds for possession and some reliefs sought.
D. The judgment is against the weight of evidence.”
From the said grounds of appeal stated (supra) learned Counsel for the Appellants in a brief settled by Chief Ahunanya N. Ekwem distilled four issues for determination as follows:
“(a) Whether the trial Court was right in not entering judgment for the Appellants (whose main claim was for possession) based on the Appellants’ uncontroverted and uncontradicted claim and evidence for possession of land in a matter of tenancy between a landlord and tenant before the said Court – Ground 1.
(b) Whether in view of the fact that the trial Court relied on facts not pleaded, not canvassed and not given in evidence, the order striking out this suit (rather than judgment in favour of the Plaintiff) is flagrantly wrong and manifestly unsupportable – Ground 2.
(c) Whether the State High Court has jurisdiction to hear and entertain matters relating to landlords and tenants and/or recovery or possession of land and premises – Ground 3.
(d) Whether S.7 of the Federal High Court Act or any enactment in the Federal Republic of Nigeria operates to deny a landlord the right to eject his tenant and whether the said enactment(s) if any ousts the Court’s jurisdiction from hearing and determining matters relating to landlords and tenants – Ground 3.”
For his part, in a brief settled by Nelson W. Nworgu, Esq. formulated two issues for determination to wit:
“(a) Whether the State High Court had jurisdiction to determine the case before it in view of the decision in SPDC v. Abel Isaiah (2000) FWLR (Pt. 56) p. 608 at p. 613 ratio 3 and 8 and S. 251 (1) (N) of the 1999 Constitution.
(b) Did the learned trial Judge make a proper evaluation of the evidence of the parties in this case?” (Pt. 56) p. 608 at p. 613 ratio 3 and 8 and S. 251 (1) (N) of the 1999 Constitution.
(b) Did the learned trial Judge make a proper evaluation of the evidence of the parties in this case?”
On the 9th of February, 2009, when the appeal came before us for hearing, we were shown a letter seeking for an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal by the Appellants. Learned Counsel for the Respondent opposed the application on the ground that the said letter did not contain sufficient details to enable the Court exercise its discretion. We perused the letter seeking for adjournment and agreed with the learned Counsel that same did not contain sufficient details to enable us exercise our discretion in his favour. The application for adjournment was accordingly refused.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent Mr. Nworgu adopted his brief of argument dated and filed on the 6th day of July, 2007 and urged us to dismiss the application for being unmeritorious. Though the Appellants’ Counsel was not present to adopt his brief, since same has been filed, he was deemed to have argued it (brief) pursuant to the provisions of Order 17 Rule 9 (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2007.
It is instructive to state from the onset that it is now settled that grounds of appeal against a decision must relate to the decision and should be a challenge to the validity of the ratio of that decision. See A. G. Anambra State v. Onusegun Enterprises Ltd (1987) 4 NWLR, p. 547, Onioh v. Oniyia (1989) 1 NWLR 451 at 527, Osinupebi v. Saibu (1982) 7 SC, 104 at 110, Western Steel Workers Ltd v. Iron and Steel Workers Union of Nigeria (1987) 21 NWLR p.304, Ugo v Obiekwe (1989) 1 NWLR, 566 at 580 and Okpala v. Ibeme (1998) 2 NWLR 208 at 220.
Now, the question to be asked is whether the grounds of appeal as couched by the Appellants directly challenged the decision of the trial Court. In other words whether same flow from the decision of the trial Court. And that whether the issues have projected succinctly and clearly the substance of the complaints contained in the grounds of appeal requiring resolution.
It is noteworthy to observe that on page 20 of the judgment of the learned trial Judge after reviewing the case of the Appellants and the evidence adduced in support of it, his Lordship held thus:
“However, the question that needs to be answered is whether this Court has jurisdiction to have entertained or entertained the suit. In determining the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit, it is necessary to consider the statement of claim since it has been filed. This is because; it is trite law that it is the statement of claim that determines the jurisdiction.”
It is also to be observed from the printed records of the lower Court, that the trial Judge after thorough scrutiny of the statement of claim of the Appellants he stated thus;
“The said claims are in relation to matters arising from or in connection with or prospecting or mining which jurisdiction exclusive or otherwise have been bestowed on the Federal High Court in Section 7 of the Act establishing it.”
In the light of the foregoing, the learned trial Judge struck out the suit of the Appellants for want of jurisdiction. I am therefore of the considered view that for grounds of appeal to be valid and to be seen to have flowed from the decision of the learned trial Judge they must be a challenge to the validity of the ratio of the decision of the learned trial Judge.
Let me now examine the grounds of appeal as couched by the learned Counsel with a view to finding out whether or not they flow directly from the decision of the learned trail Judge as adumbrated above. The first ground of appeal reproduced earlier in this judgment complained or rather attacked the inability of the Judge to enter judgment in favour of the Appellants in view of the uncontroverted and uncontradicted claim and evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs.
It is obvious to say the least that the 1st ground of appeal filed by the Appellant did not flow from the decision of the learned trial Judge. The lower Court as can be gleaned from its decision copiously quoted in this judgment predicated its decision on lack of jurisdiction and no more. The Court below needless to say did not consider whether or not the evidence adduced by the Appellants was sufficient to establish their claim. This ground of appeal in the light of all that has been said cannot be a valid ground and same is therefore struck out accordingly.
I now proceed to consider ground No.2 which is to the effect that the learned trial Judge erred in law by relying on facts not pleaded by the Plaintiffs and not given in evidence. In the particulars in support of this ground, learned Counsel contended that there was no evidence before the trial Court that the Plaintiffs/Appellants asked for arrears of rent. I have held in this judgment that the learned trial Judge essentially relied on the statement of claim to arrive at his decision that he has no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Plaintiffs/Appellants.
This ground therefore did not flow from the judgment of the lower Court. This being the case, this ground too is invalid and same is accordingly struck out.
The 3rd ground of appeal is that the trial Court erred in law by holding that it lacked jurisdiction in this suit based on some grounds for possession and some reliefs sought. This ground of appeal in the light of the decision of the learned trial Judge as set out above is a valid ground of appeal. At this risk of being repetitive, the learned trial Judge refused to proceed with the hearing of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. This ground no doubt flows from the decision of the learned trial Judge.
The last ground of appeal is the omnibus ground, i.e. the judgment is against the weight of evidence. The learned trial Judge needless to say did not consider the evidence adduced by the Appellants but only the statement of claim as can be seen from the printed records. This being the case, the question of whether the judgment was against the weight of evidence is neither here nor there since no evidence was considered by the learned trial Judge. This ground therefore cannot be said to have flowed from the judgment of the Court. It is not a valid ground of appeal and same is struck out.
The surgical operation conducted on the grounds of appeal (Supra) saw the demise of three out of the four grounds of appeal. We are now left with one ground. I now examine the issues formulated by the Appellants but let me quickly say that, issue for determination in any appeal must have a direct bearing on the grounds of appeal. They are to project succinctly and clearly the substance of the complaints contained in the grounds of appeal requiring resolution.
Let me also say that the essence of the formulation of the issues is to narrow the relevant points in issue. Since the issues must arise from the grounds of appeal, they are meant to encompass all the grounds of appeal, thus a single issue should contain the points raised in one or more grounds of appeal. In other words, it is the grounds of appeal that should be contracted to form the issues for determination. The rule is that a number of grounds may raise a single issue for determination and not the reverse. See Bendel State v Aideya (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646; Ogunbuninya v. Okada (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 551 and Adelaja v. Fanoiki (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) p. 137.
I have in the course of this judgment, alluded to the two issues formulated by the Respondents’ Counsel. A cursory look at the said issues reveals the fact that this appeal can be disposed of by giving consideration to the 1st issue as formulated by the learned Counsel for the Respondent. The 2nd issue as formulated by the Appellants’ Counsel is of no moment as it does not relate to surviving ground of appeal. I am therefore of the view that the grievance of the parties in the instant appeal can be resolved by giving consideration to the 1st issue for determination as formulated by the learned Counsel for the Respondent.
The 1st issue formulated by the Respondent’s Counsel at the risk of repeating myself is whether the State High Court had jurisdiction to determine the case before it in view of the decision in SPDC v. Abel Isaiah (2001) FWLR (Pt. 56) p. 608 at p. 613 ratio 3 and 8 and Section 251 (1) (N) of the 1999 Constitution.
In arguing this issue, leaned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that jurisdiction is conferred on the trial Court to try the matter in contention by Section 272 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He referred us to the case of Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 587 and further submitted that a Court is competent when it is properly constituted as regards members and qualifications of members of the Bench, the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
It is the submission of the learned Counsel that the judgment of the trial Court (striking out the Appellants’ suit) is fundamentally defective and was predicated on the wrong reasons and conclusions which he listed as follows:
“(a) The trial Court mixing up the grounds for possession and the claim for possession, trespass and general damages with arrears or (sic) rent.
(b) The trial Court’s inability to distinguish facts pleaded and the evidence in proof of same.
(c) The extent of the provisions of S.7 of the Federal High Court Act.
(d) The duty imposed on a Court of law when the evidence of a party is uncontradicted and/or uncontroverted.
(2) The trial Court failed to make a distinction between the main claim and auxiliary or consequential claims.
(3) The trial Court did not advert it’s mind to the Recovery of Premises Law and the landlord and tenants law”
Learned Counsel urged us to reverse the judgment of the trial Court and enter judgment in favour of the Appellants as per the writ of summons.
For his part, learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that by virtue of the Decrees, which have now been incorporated into 1999 Constitution, the cause of action canvassed in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the statement of claim connect with or arose from the circumstances exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
It is the submission of the learned Counsel that this is because the Defendant company who leases of the land is an oil prospecting company that uses the land subject matter of litigation in the State High Court for purposes of oil prospecting, like digging, excavating and other sundry matters. He cited and relied on SPDC V. Abel Isaiah (supra) at page 608 p. 613 ratio 3; C99 (Nig) Ltd V. Luke Asagbara (2000) FWLR (Pt. 17) p. 110 at 112 ratio 3; Section 2 in relation to the new Section 7 (1) M (P) U and (2) of the Federal High Court Amendment Decree No. 60 of 1991 and Section 230 (1) (1) (O) of Decree No. 107 of 1993.
Learned Counsel submitted that in the circumstances, the Court is left with no option but to strike out the suit. Reliance is placed on Okoye v. Nigeria Construction & Aluminium Company Ltd. (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.) 199, p. 501. Aluminium Manufacturing Company (Nig) Ltd V. NPA (1987) 2 SC 254; Awoleye V. Board of Customs & Exercise & Anor (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 133) 490 at 493 and F.R.A. Williams v Emeka Nwosu (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 331) p. 156 at p. 177. Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd. V. Abel Isaiah (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. (508) 236 at p.244 – 247.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the case of Appellants as filed and prosecuted in the trial High Court was incompetent and unmeritorious. The case, learned Counsel went on, was predicted on a claim for possession of land, which is used for oil prospecting by the Respondent. It is his further submission that there was evidence that Respondent used the land for oil prospecting. We were urged to dismiss the appeal in its entirety and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
It is now settled law that the competence of a Court to adjudicate over a matter depends on the followings:
“(1) It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
(2) The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(3) The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See the cases of Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd. v. Abel Isaiah (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. (508) 236 at p.244 – 247 per Katsina-Alu, JCA (as he then was); PDP v. INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) 2000 at p. 241 and Madukolu & Ors v Nkemdilim (1962) All NLR (Reprint) 581 at pp. 589 – 590.”
It has also been held in a plethora of decided cases that issues bordering on jurisdiction are threshold issues which ought to be determined first and could be raised for the first time before an appellate Court. It could also be raised by any party; the trial Court inclusive. See Saude v Abdullahi (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) p. 387; Obiakor & Anor v The State (2003) 10 NWLR (776) 612 at 626; Gaji v. Paye (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 823) 583 and Oyakhire v. The State (2006) 7 SCNJ 319 at 327.
The question that must be asked and answered at this stage is whether the trial Court was right to have held that it lacked jurisdiction to try the case of the Appellants in view of the claims as contained in the statement of claim filed by them. To answer this question, recourse had to be made to the claims of the Appellants and the case law on the subject matter in contention.
As has been copiously reproduced in this judgment, the case of the Appellants was predicated on a claim for possession of land, which is used for oil prospecting by the Respondent. In the case of
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC Ltd) v. Abel Isaiah (supra), the Plaintiffs (now Respondents) instituted an action in the High Court off Rivers State, sitting at Isiokpo, and sought the following reliefs:
“(a) The sum of N22 million being fair and reasonable compensation due and payable to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant for the permanent damage and loss to the Plaintiffs’ plant, marine and domestic life which was caused by the Defendant’s oil exploration activities whereby the Defendant’s’ oil pipes were caused by the Defendant to, open up in 1988 and caused extensive oil spillage and pollution which said pollution has remained continuous at the Plaintiffs’ ‘Miniabia’ land and water forest swampland at Omuoda, Aluu, within the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court or in the alternative,
(b) The sum of N22 million being damages for negligence committed by the Defendant through its servants or agents when they negligently allowed crude oil to spill and pollute extensively the Plaintiffs’ ‘Miniabia’ land and swampland at Omuoda, Aluu aforesaid OR in the alternative,
(c) The sum of N22 million being damages sustained by the Plaintiffs through the acts or omissions of the Defendant under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.”
Pleading were filed and delivered. Evidence was given by both sides and at the end of hearing the learned trial Judge in a considered judgment awarded N22 million being the Respondents’ claim for damages and loss caused to the Respondents by the Appellant’s oil exploration activities.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, the Appellant appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court, the apex Court allowed the appeal and struck out the main suit and held thus:
“The question which should be answered in this appeal is whether the facts of this case fall within the definition of matter connected with or pertaining to mines and mineral, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas. The State High Court would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter. The picture of what happened which led to the institution of this case has been given by the Respondents in their statement of claim. (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
Again, in the case of CGG (Nigeria) Ltd v Luke Asaagbara (2000) FWLR (Pt. 17) p. 110 at 112, this Court per Pat-Acholonu JCA (as he then was) (of blessed memory) held thus:
“The jury alleged to have given rise to the action in the Court below and subsequently in this Court sprang from the performance of the Respondent’s duty as an employee of the Appellant in drilling operation in respect of oil. If the drilling exercise is in respect of water prospecting, any alleged act of negligence will be dealt with in a State High Court. In interpretation of statutes, any word used must be so construed to give proper meaning to the expression, as appearing in Section 7 of Decree 60 of 1991 or Section 230 of Decree No. 107 of 1993, shall be construed in such a way as to understand the purport of that provision. It would in such interpretation show that what is being complained about is connected with and pertaining or relating to activities which have direct bearing to the operation of oil prospecting, seismic survey, and such like activities as equally applying to gas. In a matter arising out of the drilling operations or activities to effectuate an end, causes of actions arising from them would have to be determined in a Federal High Court not in the State High Court.”
Assuming but not conceding the point hat the State High Court has jurisdiction to try some of the claims in the instant appeal, it has been held by the apex Court that where there is a Court with jurisdiction to determine all the issues raised in a matter, including the principal issues, it is improper to approach a Court that is competent to determine only some of the issues. See Tukur v Government of Gongola State (1989) 9 SCNJ 221 and Military Administrator Benue State v Abayilo (2001) FWLR (Pt. 45) 602 at 618 paragraph D – E.
Now, having discussed the case law as it relates to the instant appeal, it is appropriate to pause at this stage and consider the constitutional provisions dealing with the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as enshrined in Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. In this regard, our first and perhaps the only port of call is Section 251 (1) (n) which provides thus:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters:-
Mines and mineral (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas)” Underlining mine for emphasis).
The provisions of Section 251 (1) (n) reproduced (supra) are self-explanatory and require no aid for their interpretation. In the light of the foregoing, I hold without any hesitation that it is the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court to entertain the case of the Appellants as was rightly decided by the lower Court.
I am also of the further view that the Appellants’ argument that their claim is purely for possession is not tenable as the purpose for which the land was leased is paramount which removes the matter from the realm of purely landlord and tenancy matter.
In view of the foregoing, the lone issue for determination is revolved in favour of the Respondent.
In conclusion, in the light of all that has been said, this appeal fails, it is completely devoid of any merit and ought to be dismissed. I dismiss it with N40, 000.00 costs to the Respondent.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3186(CA)
