Engr. Ayo Ijagbemi & Anor. V. Mr. Joel Oluwole Ige & Anor. (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
SOTONYE DENTON WEST J.C.A,
The 1st and 2nd Appellants being dissatisfied with the Ruling of the Ekiti State High Court of Justice delivered by Hon. Justice D. O. Jegede on 31st day of March, 2008 appealed to this Court to set aside the decision of the lower court on the basis that the lower court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the Respondents.
This assertion that the court lacks jurisdiction as contended by the Appellants who are the Defendants in the court below in the suit brought by the 1st Respondent as Plaintiff against the Appellants and 2nd Respondent pertaining to matters allegedly connected to internal affairs of the Peoples Democratic Party i. e. the 2nd Appellant on nomination and sponsorship of candidate for Chairman of Gbonyin Local Government in Ekiti State.
The Appellants responded to the writ of summons filed by the 1st Respondent by entering a memorandum of conditional appearance, they also filed a notice of preliminary objection accompanied by an affidavit contending that the Respondent being a member of the P.D.P did not exhaust the domestic for a open to him under the constitution of the party before institution of the action before the lower court and that the subject matter being of a political nature arising from internal dispute of a political party is not justiceable before any court of law.
The lower court did not hesitate to rule against this Preliminary objection and accordingly held in its Ruling of 31st day of March, 2008, that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit which led to this instant appeal before us.
When the appeal came up for hearing, the counsel to the Appellants, Owoseni Ajayi Esq. referred the court to the Appellants’ brief of argument which was dated and filed on 31st day of July, 2008. He adopted and relied on all the arguments in their brief and urged the court to allow the appeal in its entirety by quashing the decision of the lower court “Conferring jurisdiction on itself when the said court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit”.
Counsel for the 1st Respondent S. O. Funso. Esq. also called the attention of the court to the 1st Respondent’s brief dated the 20th day of August and filed on 21st day of August, 2008 which he adopted and relied on as the 1st Respondents’ arguments to the Appeal. He further urged the court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety and affirm the decision of the lower court.
The 2nd Respondent was represented by Ezekiel Agunbiade Esq. who referred the court to the 2nd Respondents’ brief of argument dated and filed on 17th day of February, 2009 but was deemed properly filed and served by order of this court on 26th day of February, 2009. Agunbiade Esq. submitted that he also filed an additional list of authorities dated the 29th day of April, 2009. He adopted and relied on their brief of arguments urging the court to allow the appeal, in terms of the prayers of the Appellants whom they are in alignment with, stressing that the court should allow the appeal.
The following three issues emanated from the Appellants brief for determination namely:
“(1) Whether the Respondent, a member of P.D.P. can abandon the domestic for available to him within the party constitution for resolving dispute that arose from the party primaries and sued the Appellants.
(2) Whether this action’s justifiable and actionable being of a political nature arising from the internal dispute of a political party.
(3) Whether the learned trial judge can make pronouncement on the merit of the case at the stage of the ruling on preliminary objection.”
The 1st Respondent in his Respondents’ brief of argument had decided with the leave of this court to adopt all the three issues formulated by the Appellants for determination which have been mentioned above whilst the 2nd Respondent identifies the following two issues for determination namely:
“(1) Whether the writ discloses reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Respondent.
(2) Whether the lower court has jurisdiction to determine whom a political party should or should not sponsor as a candidate for an election pertaining to Gbonyin Local Government Chairmanship Election.”
Although, I find the two issues formulated by the 2nd Respondent more apposite and elegantly framed, I would nevertheless proceed to determine this appeal on the issues raised by the Appellants and adopted by the 1st Respondent who are indeed the candidates seeking for election by their party. Furthermore, the 2nd Respondent who have formulated the apposite issues referred, to have actually by conduct adopted and are in alignment with Appellant’s argument and submissions on this appeal.
Therefore I proceed with Issue 1.
“Whether the Respondent, a member of P.D.P. can abandon the domestic fore available to him within the party constitution for resolving dispute that arose from the party primaries and sued the Appellants.”
On this issue, the Appellant submitted that the first Respondent had subscribed to the constitution of the party as a voluntary member and he is therefore bound by the provisions of the said constitution. He argued that since article 17(1) of Exhibit “A” that is the P.D.P. Constitution provides that the National Executive Committee shall formulate guidelines and regulations for the nomination of candidates for election into public offices at all levels, including Local Governments and shall be the final authority for resolving all disputes relating to the choice of candidates for the party for any election and for confirming the list of names of candidates for the party for any elective public office in the federation, Ekiti State inclusive.
He consequently supported this arguments with the cases of OGOLOGO -VS- UCHE (2005) NSLR PAGE 131 AT 151; ARIBISALA -VS- OGUNYEMI (2005) 6 NWLR PT. 921 PAGE 212 AT 231 – 232 PARAG- B.
In response to this issue, the 1st Respondent argued that there were overwhelming evidence to show that he did not rush to court but exhausted all domestic remedies available before institution of the suit before the High Court. He submitted that the provisions of article 17(1) are very vague, ambiguous and are open to manipulations especially by persons who are out to do mischief. I would articulate his submissions herein by expressing same in this words thus “Article 17(1) failed to reveal or itemize any specific procedure to be followed by an aggrieved party. The procedure and method of settling disputes are however absent from the PDP Election Guidelines contained on pages 48-57 of the Record of Appeal.
Since both the PDP constitution and the PDP Election Guidelines fail to disclose any specific procedure to be adopted by aggrieved party for settling dispute and the kind of representation an aggrieved party must make is not spelt out and equally, the mode of communicating the settlement reached after the representation is equally not spelt out then the 1st Respondent took reasonable step so far.
The 1st Respondent never rushed to court to institute this present action. Paragraphs 27 – 37 of the statement of claim contains full account of all domestic for a exploited and exhausted by the plaintiff before finally resorting to court rather than self-help which could result to anarchy.
He submitted further that the provisions of Article 17(1) of PDP Constitution cannot override or supersede section 6(6)(b), and 36(1) and 46(1) and 272 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and that that is why the courts were able to entertain the locos classics cases of UGWU -VS- ARARUME (2007) 31 WRN AT 22 – 23 RATIO 1 AND AMAECHI -VS- INEC (2008) 10 WRN 1, both of which bothered on disputes relating to choice (which include substitution) of candidates for election. He argued further that the Constitution is the ground norm and that it is superior to the Constitution of the PDP, and that the Federal Republic of Nigerian Constitution of 1999 superceeds the provisions of Article 2 of PDP Constitution which also provides that it is subject to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
He contended that even Article 2 of PDP Constitution provides that “subject to the provision of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, this Constitution shall be supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all member and organs of the party.”
Thereafter, he referred the court to the cases of FRN V SOSAHON (2006) 24 WRN AT 24 RATIO 16 S.C.; OSEYOMON VS OJO (1993) 6 NWLR PT.299, P. 344 AT 355; OKAROH -VS- THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 81) 214 AT 220; F.G.N. -VS- OSHIOMOLE (2004) 14 NWLR 110 AT 114.
Placing emphasis on all the cases especially OKAROH-VS- THE STATE wherein it was held inter-alia that:
“Justice is never defeated by technical rules of procedure. These rules should be seen as subservient handmaid to justice, not as omnipotent mastery at war with Justice.”
He urged the court to resolve the 1st issue in favour of the 1st Respondent.
Before embarking on the treatment of the issues by the parties, I want to touch on the kernel of this appeal. The fundamental issue that calls for concern in this appeal had to do with the competency of the court to hear the suit in view of the PDP Constitution as regards article 17(1) of Exhibit A which states as follows “The National Executive Committee shall formulate guidelines and regulations for the nomination of candidates for election into public offices at all levels, including Local Governments and shall be final authority for resolving all disputes relating to the choice of candidates for the party for any election and for confirming the list of names of candidates for the party for any elective public office in the federation” It is because of this provision that there was the contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case hence the preliminary objection filed by the Appellants as Defendants to the writ of summons filed by the 1st Respondent who was challenging the nomination of 1st Appellant by the 2nd Appellant as the party’s flag before or candidate for the Chairmanship of Gbonyin Local Government of Ekiti State in the forthcoming Local Government Election. Thereafter the 1st Appellant having been screened by the Ekiti State Independent Electoral Commission was now ready for the contest when the 1st Respondent challenged his nomination.
In court and the Appellants in turn challenged the jurisdiction of the court to try the action by way of preliminary objection.
That is why the issue of jurisdiction which can be raised at any time even in the Apex court becomes salient for determination. It has been laid down in a plethora of cases that a court is competent to determine or hear an action brought before it, on the following conditions:
- If it is properly constituted with respect to the number and qualification of its members.
- The action is initiated by due process of law.
- The subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction.
- Any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled.
See MADUKOLU AND ORS -VS- NKEMDILIM (1962) ANLR, 587; BRONIK MOTORS -VS- WEMA BANK (1983) 6 S. C. 158; CHIEF DANIEL OLOBA -VS- ISAAC OLUBODUN AKEREJA (1988) 3 NWLR (PART. 84) PAGE 508 AT PAGES 511-512; KALANGO -VS-GOV. BAYELSA STATE (2009) 7 NWLR (PART 1139 PAGE 17 AT 31; DREXEL ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOUECES LTD & 2 ORS -VS- TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD & 2 ORS (2008) 18 NWLR PART 1119, PAGE 388; SEE PAGES 467 – 475 OF LAW AND PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NIGERIA BY CHIEF V. A. ODUNAIYA. A-G, ANAM.
In KALANGO’S case, the Supreme court, in unanimous decision, dismissed the appeal of the Appellant and thus upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal which upheld the decision of the trial court on a preliminary objection by the Respondents on the basis that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Appellants’ claim on the ground that its jurisdiction was ousted by express provision of statute. The statute involved is the Public Officer’s (Special Provisions) Act which the Supreme Court styled as a very drastic legistion. MUSDAPHER, JSC observed.
Now where it applies, the tenor of the provisions of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act is a very drastic legislation. It enables the appropriate authority to dismiss, terminate or retire, a public officer and went further to oust the jurisdiction of the court from adjudicating on a suit filed by the public officer. Section 3 of the Act provided:
“No civil proceedings shall lie or be instituted in any court for or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or purported to be done by any person under this act and if any such proceedings have been or are instituted before or after the making of this Act, the proceedings shall abate, be discharged and void.”
It is as mentioned above a rather harsh provision but the courts, even if they did not like it, were duty bound to give effect to it if there is no escape route. Accordingly, the Apex Court affirmed the decision of the lower Court that had actually upheld the decision of the trial Court who gave judgment in favour of the Respondents on the basis that it had no jurisdiction in view of the provision of the Public Officers Special Provisions Act. However the facts in this case is not apposite to this appeal.
Now has the lower got the competence to try this action filed by the Appellant in view of the PDP constitution? I am further perturbed by the reaction of the lower court in pronouncing on the substantive matter before it when the parties are yet to be heard. The appeal is on the Ruling of the lower court delivered on the 31st day of March, 2008, wherein the trial court held inter-alia thus:
“That sort of argument no longer holds any water. Any judge of the lower bench that turns his face to the other side pretending not to know what the position now is or pretending as if not bound by the decision in those two cases, will only be doing so at his own peril. Even the pepper sellers in our markets now know that courts have put their feet down on the on side of justice, strongly and firmly too.
I will do so here and I will refuse to be persuaded by the decisions of my learned brothers Akintayo J. and Akeju J. who Mr. Ajayi said I should follow. It seems their decision where made per incuriam of the decisions in Ugwu -vs- Ararume and Amaechi vs PDP the case that are on all fours with the present case under consideration, notwithstanding where the alleged substitution took place.
Perhaps, I should say this that the fact that Mr. Ajayi in his own address has said on the one hand that the case of the Plaintiff is not justifiable, but on the other, has also told this court that the 1st defendant won the election, a dispute has arisen and since the party did not resolve the dispute it is not improper that the Plaintiff has resorted to a court of law for the settlement of the matter.
I have carefully examined the claims of the Plaintiff and I have found his case justifiable.
Thus, in this case this court will not shy away from looking into whether or not the PDP followed its own constitution and the rules and regulations it laid down for choosing a candidate it will sponsor for the council election. This court will also find out whether or not the right of the plaintiff was violated by the party, substituting another for him.”
The trial court is of the view that despite the contention to the proponents of the preliminary objection as regards its jurisdiction to hear the action filed before it, it holds the view that it is competent to hear the matter in view of the decision of the Apex court in AMAECHI -VS- INEC Supra, and a host of other cases.
In recent times, there had been instituted in our Courts actions challenging the in house nomination and selection by political parties of candidates for various elective positions. In the past, there is hardly such actions as candidates involved in such selection usually would not dare challenge the decisions of the political parties no matter how absurd. Moreover too the views of the court too erstwhile was to refrain from dabbling into any form of involvement with what is usually referred to as the domestic issue of the political parties. This is good and proper, but it has resulted in a lot of injustice which the Apex Court was foist to correct.
But as it is lately candidates affected by such selections and nominations are now boldly challenging such selection where they perceived that there had been injustice by institution of actions in the courts of justice. See AMAECHI -VS- I.N.E.C. (SUPRA) AND UGWU -VS-ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR (PT. 1048) 367.
However, it is the contention of the Respondents especially the 2nd Respondent that the facts of UGWU -VS- ARARUME (SUPRA) AND AMAECHI -VS- INEC (SUPRA) are not similar to this particular action.
Citing portions of the decision in both Ararume’s and Amaechi’s case, counsel to the 2nd Respondent Agunbiade Esq argued that the law relating to election into Local Government Council of Ekiti State is the Ekiti State Electoral Law No.5 of 2001. Whilst the law does not contain any provision similar to section 34 of the Electoral Act, 2006 and that therefore the two locos classicus cases of UGWU -VS- ARARUME (SUPRA),AND AMAECHI -VS- INEC (SUPRA) are not relevant to the instant Appeal.
The Ekiti State Electoral Law No.5 of 2001 did not forbid any court of law to entertain any suit relating to nomination of a candidate by a political party, neither did the Electoral Act 2006 with particular reference to section 34 of the said Act forbide the entertainment of pre election or post election suits relating to selection, nomination e.t.c by the political parties. Indeed the Apex court has had cause to entertain and liberally confirmed that our courts could and indeed can entertain such actions. In UDEH -VS- OKOLI, (2009) 7 NWLR PART 1141, PAGE 571. The Apex Court unequivocally held that in a substitution of a party’s candidate, there is need to give cogent and verifiable reason as required by Section 34 of the Electoral Act 2006. This was not the position when the 1st Respondent was substituted in favour of the first Appellant in the instant appeal.
Infact, this instant appeal is on all fours with the facts of UDEH -VS- OKOLI Supra where the sole issue for determination by the number one Court was ” Whether the substitution of the Appellant with the 1st Respondent as the 3rd Respondent’s candidate for the April 21st 2007 Election was in compliance with section 34 of the Electoral Act, 2006″
The facts in UDEH’s case were similar to that of this appeal except for the fact that at the Court of Appeal stage, there was a cross appeal by the Respondent. However irrespective of the cross appeal the unanimous decision of the apex court is apposite to this appeal on all fours. In an unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, the court inter-alia per Onnoghen JSC who read the lead judgment observed that a judgment or ruling of a court remains valid and cogently binding on all the parties until set aside by court of competent jurisdiction.
Therefore the Ruling of the lower court given by the Hon. Justice D.O Jegede on 31st day of march, 2008 should subsist unless set aside by a competent court in view of the decision of their Lordships in Udeh’s case supra. Infact what their Lordships are emphatically saying is that irrespective of whatever a party’s guidelines may provide particularly when what it provides in relation to substitution of a party’s candidate must be in accord with the provisions of section 34 of the Electoral Act 2006 and that the guidelines of a political party cannot and would not override the provisions of the Act.
See further EHINLANWO -VS- OKE (2008) ALL FWLR PART 442 PAGE 1007; UGWU -VS- ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR (PT.1048) 367; AGBAKOBA-VS- INEC (2008) 18, NWLR PART 1119 PAGE 489.
Infact despite the hard stance taken by the Apex Court in KALANGO -VS- GOVERNOR BAYELSA STATE (SUPRA), MUSDAPHER, J.S.C who delivered the lead Judgment concurred to by the Honourable Justice Oguntade J.S.C.; Ogbuagu, J.S.C, Aderemi, J.S.C. who declared that:
“It is also settled law that statutes which over reach the citizen’s right or access to court are subject to very strict interpretation. Aniagolu, JSC said in the case of Afolabi -vs Governor of Oyo State (1985) 2 NWLR (pt, 9) 734 at 753:
“Again, the courts have adopted the principle that statutes which encroach on the rights of the subjects, whether as regards person or property are subject to a strict construction in the same way as Penal Acts. Therefore it is recognized that such statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights and that if there is any ambiguity, the construction which is in favour of the freedom of the individual should be adopted. See David -vs- Da Silva (1934) AC 106.”
See also Rabiu -vs- the State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 130 at 149, Anisminic -vs- Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147, at 170; Nwosu -vs- Imo State Environment Sanitation Authority and Ords. (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 688; Attorney General of Bendel State -vs- Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646 at 674.”
Ehinlanwo’s case supra is in pari materia with the facts of this instant appeal and the decision of the Supreme Court therein is apposite herein.
Even the Appellants who are objecting to the Jurisdiction of the court by filing a preliminary objection appreciated the fact that there is possibility of an action being instituted where the aggrieved parties had fully exhausted the domestic open to him. For this reason, it would serve some useful purpose to produce the notice of preliminary objection which states thus:
“NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
TAKE NOTE that the 1st and 2nd Defendants herein shall raise a preliminary objection-in-limine to the hearing of this suit as the court lack jurisdiction to entertain the action and hence urge the Honourable Court to dismiss the entire suit.
GROUNDS OF THE OBJECTION
- The Plaintiff as a member of the 2nd Defendant party did not exhaust the domestic for a open to him under the constitution of the party before instituting action.
- The subject matter being of a political nature arising from internal dispute of a political party is not justiciable before any court of law.”
Therefore from ground one of the grounds of objection in the preliminary objection, it could be seen that the Appellant are stressing that it is only if the 1st Respondent has fully exhausted the domestic for a open to him under the constitution of the party that he could ever institute an action and that having not so exhausted same, and the matter being of apolitical nature which arises from an internal dispute within a party is not justiceable before any court of law. The issue of disqualification, nomination, substitution and sponsorship of candidate for an Election Petition had been held by the Apex, Court to be justiceable in AMAECHI -VS- INEC supra when Katsina – Alu, I.S.C said “having heard all the arguments of learned counsel on all sides, I hold that the Court of Appeal was in error in decline jurisdiction to hear the Appeal and the cross-appeal on the merit. It is now ordered that the matter be remitted to the Court of Appeal, Abuja to hear the two appeals.”
From the foregoing decision, how then can the Appellants and the 2nd Respondent contend that the Court below even this Court has no jurisdiction as they contend that the issue of nomination, substitution, selection or sponsorship by political party is not justiceable. The issue has been laid to rest positively by the Supreme Court in its numerous decision without mincing word as reflected in their plethora of decisions and more recently in ACTION CONGRESS AND ANOR -VS- INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (PT.1048) 220; ODEDO -VS- INEC (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 554 AT 5, AMAECH -VS- INEC supra UGWU -VS- ARARUME (SUPRA), UDEH -VS- OKOLI supra, AGBAKOBA -VS- INEC supra.
In view of the foregoing, I am obliged to hold that the lower Court had jurisdiction to try this action and that preliminary objection by the Appellants that the subject matter of the action being of a political party is not justiceable before any Court of law, cannot be true since a host of such actions have continuously been heard and ventilated in the law courts up to the highest hierarchy of our courts.
From the foregoing issue one, is also accordingly resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent against the Appellants and the 2nd Respondent who anchored its issue more or less on jurisdiction. The issue on jurisdiction raised by 2nd Respondent and treated first by the court is hereby also resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent as the lower court is not lacking in jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
ISSUE TWO:
“Whether this action is justiceable and actionable being of a political nature arising from the internal dispute of a political party.” This issue has been adequately reflected upon and indeed resolved in the foregoing issues and the jurisdictional issue dealt with earlier on and it would therefore amount to tautology to repeat the arguments and then eventually arrive at same conclusion. Therefore this court reaffirms its decision in issue 1 and the jurisdictional issue and accordingly resolve issue II in favour of the 1st Respondent. See again AGBAKOBA -VS- INEC (2008) 18 NWLR PART 1119, PAGE 489; UDEH -VS- OKOLI (2009) 7 NWLR PART 1141, PAGE 571 AT 587, 593-594, 589 PARAGRAPH D – E where ONNOGHEN, JSC opined that:
“It is therefore clear that from whether angle one looks at the issue, the competent courts of law have found/held that appellant is qualified to contest the election in question and therefore any reason of disqualification of the appellant to contest the election as constituting the ground for substitution of the appellant with the 1st respondent cannot be cogent and verifiable particularly as the appellant’s qualification to contest the said election has been positively and manifestly demonstrated by the judgments of the courts; i.e the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, holden at the Zuba and the lower court on the cross appeal.
It is also crucial to point out that from the records it was the appellant who won the primary election of the party which made it possible for the party to forward his name as its candidates to INEC for the election in question. The 1st respondent was second in the election. It is not that the appellant did not win the primary election though that would not have had any impact if no cogent and verifiable reasons were given for the substitution. However, the appellant having won the primary election as a result of which the 3rd respondent decided to sponsor him as its candidate for the election and the substitution of the 1st respondent for the appellant have been found to be contrary to the provision of section 34 of the Electoral Act, 2006, the issue under consideration is therefore resolved in favour of the appellant and the appeal allowed for being meritorious.
The judgment of the lower court as it concerns the main appeal is hereby set aside and the decision of the trial court restored except the aspect relating to the counter claim which was set aside by the lower court.”
In view of the foregoing, I am therefore constrained to consider issue 2 in favour of the 1st Respondent as his action in court is justiceable and actionable despite the fact that it arises from an internal dispute of a political party.
ISSUE THREE:
“Whether the learned trial Judge can make pronouncement on the merit of the case at the stage of the Ruling on preliminary objection.” The Appellants amongst other points argued that the learned trial Judge made pronouncements into the substance of the case and took decision on the main issue and thus misconstrued the facts of the case. He quoted copiously from page 185 of the record of proceeding especially from the Ruling thus:
“Let me re-emphasized that the plaintiff herein in this case is complaining the manner the party has decided to substitute him with the 1st Defendant in utter disrespect to the constitution of the party and its laid down procedures of the method it voluntarily chose to make its choice of candidate for council election.” He argued that the lower court ought not to have come to such conclusion and referred this court to the cases of CITY EXP. BANK LTD -VS- LAGOS STATE GOVERNOR (2004) 7 NWLR (PT. 872) PAGE 258 AT PAGE 286 PARAGRAPHS A – C where it was held thus:
“In dealing with interlocutory appeal, an Appellate court must take care not to unwittingly decide the substantive issue to be decided on appeal. Consequently, it is the duty of the Court of Appeal when dealing with interlocutory matters as in the instant case to avoid making statements which give the impression that it has made up its mind on the substantive issue before it as justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. ”
He further also cited the cases of:
- EGBE -VS- ONOGUN (1972) 2 ALL NLR (PT.1) PAGE 95.
- ORJI -VS- ZARCAND LTD (1992) 1 NNLR (PT. 216) PAGE 24.
A further declaration of the lower court is hereby stated as follows:
“Perhaps I should say this that the fact that Mr. Ajayi in his address has said on the one hand that the case of the Plaintiff is not justiceable, but on the other hand also told this court that the 1st Defendant won the election, a dispute has arisen and since the party did not resolve the dispute it is not improper that the plaintiff has resorted to a court of law for the settlement of the matter. ”
This Counsel submitted is very perverse of the learned trial judge to have on his own invented such a remark which eventually led him to a wrong decision. In response the 1st Respondent submitted inter-alia that the learned trial judge never went to the substance of the case at the interlocutory stage but only reviewed the uncontroverted facts of the case as pleaded by the parties. He referred the court to case of ABDULRAHRAM -VS- OLORUNTOBA OJU (2007) WRN (SIC). He submitted further that “what seem in contest is the way and manner the party after deciding the method of electing a candidate for the PDP does not respect its own rules and procedures by substituting a loser for a winner and giving nomination papers to the loser?”
Note the use of the word “what seems.”
He therefore urged the court to dismiss the appeal and uphold the decision of the lower court.
I have studied the writ of summons and the statement of claim of the Plaintiff/Respondent. I have seen the Ruling of the lower court in its ramification and could not see anything offensive in the remarks made in the Ruling of the learned trial Judge to justify the raising of this issue by the Appellant.
What I believe in is that the learned trial Judge has been thorough in the handling of the facts at his disposal which he used profusely and came to his conclusion. Indeed in my humble view, the Hon. Justice Jegede in his ruling had only fully dwelt on the position of judicial pronouncements of the apex court as regards dispute over change of candidate by political party. The learned trial Judge is therefore only stating the position of the law in the cases referred to by him to show why the preliminary objection raised by the appellants as defendants in the lower court should fail and not that he was on his own inventing the remarks made in the ruling. See DREXEL ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURSES LTD & OTHERS -VS- TRANS INTERNATIONAL LTD & ORS (2008) 18 NWLR PART 1119 PAGE 388; AGBAKOBA -VS- INEC (2008) NWLR PART 1119 PAGE 489.
I therefore resolve to find in favour of the 1st Respondent on issue 3.
Finally, I find the Appeal lacking in merit and it is therefore dismissed with substantial cost of N30,000.00 against the Appellants and 2nd Respondent jointly, in favour of the 1st Respondent.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3342(CA)
