Home » Nigerian Cases » Court of Appeal » Federal College of Education & Ors V. Mrs. Irene Adana Ogbonna & Ors (2007) LLJR-CA

Federal College of Education & Ors V. Mrs. Irene Adana Ogbonna & Ors (2007) LLJR-CA

Federal College of Education & Ors V. Mrs. Irene Adana Ogbonna & Ors (2007)

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ABDU ABOKI. J. C. A.

This is an Appeal against the decision of Honourable Justice Richard O. Olorunfemi of Kogi State High Court sitting at Obangede delivered on 28th February 2005, in which Judgment was entered for the Plaintiffs.

The claim of the Plaintiffs as contained in paragraph 44 of the Statement of claim reads thus:

“44. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Plaintiffs claim jointly and severally against the Defendants:

1. An order of the Honourable Court that the Plaintiffs who are staff of the Federal College of Education, Okene were employed under the Harmonized Tertiary Institution Salary Structure (HATISS) since their absorption in 1994 of appointment at various times after September 1994 and should remain in their schedules as directed by the Honourable Minister of Education on the 28th day of October 2002.

2. A declaration that the purported termination of the Plaintiffs’ employment on the 8th of April 2003 vide letters issued to the Plaintiffs in a retroactive manner and for confirmed staff of the Federal Colleges of Education Okene is illegal, wrongful and ultra vires.

3. A declaration that the Plaintiffs have not committed any offence(s), misconduct or general inefficiency to warrant the sudden termination of the employment of the Plaintiffs by the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

4. A declaration that the Plaintiffs are still employees of the Federal College of Education, Okene and they should be re-instated to their position in the Federal College of Education Okene Staff Primary School.

5. An order of Permanent Injunction retraining the Defendants from filling the position of the Plaintiffs in the Federal College of Education Staff Primary School Okene or taking further steps on the direction until the final determination of the Suit.

6. An order that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have short-paid the Plaintiffs various 22%, 20% and 15% allowances for 20, 12 and 19 months respectively totaling N1,464,457:00k.

7. An order to award N1, 464,457:00K to the Plaintiffs.”

The facts of the case is briefly stated as follows: In 1994 the Federal College of Education 1st defendant took over the Nursery and Primary School of the College along with the Staff of the School the number of years put in service by the Staff was retained for purposes of pension and gratuities. All the Staff of the Nursery and Primary School were absorbed by the 1st Defendant on the Elongated University Salary Structure EUSS then in operation. Letters of absorption were issued to each of the Staff of the Nursery and Primary School.

The Plaintiffs claimed that they diligently, efficiently and effectively served the 1st Defendant without any complaint. They variously received promotions and commendations in the course of their Service to the 1st Defendant. On 18th April 2003, the 1st Defendant terminated the Plaintiffs’ appointments without any cause. They contended that their appointments could not be terminated by the 1st Defendant, being in a permanent and pensionable employment of the 1st Defendant.

The Defendants contended that being agents of the Federal Government the Kogi State High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ case against them. The Defendants further contended that by the conditions of service regulating the relationship of the Plaintiffs with the 1st Defendant, it has the right to terminate the Plaintiffs’ appointments upon payment of three months salary in lieu of Notice and same was offered to them in the letter terminating their appointments.

Pleadings were filed and exchanged, the objection to the jurisdiction of the trial Court was raised in limine and the learned trial Judge overruled the objection. The Plaintiffs called two witnesses and tendered some documents while the Defendants called only one witness.

After addresses of Counsel, the Court delivered a considered Judgment granting all the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs. It is this decision that gave rise to this Appeal filed by the Defendants.

The Defendants are now the Appellants before this Court. They filed their brief of argument on 6/3/2006 and a reply brief on 28/4/2006. When this Appeal came up for hearing on 19/3/2007 they adopted both.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants A.M. Aliyu informed the Court that they filed three Notices of Appeal. He asked that the 1st Notice of Appeal on pages 312 – 316 of the Record of Appeal be struck out.

Learned Counsel said that leave was granted to appeal on an interlocutory Appeal on 23/2/2006 and time was extended by Seven days. He stated that on 9/11/2006 this Court ordered consolidation of the Appeals.

He said that the two Appeals have been argued together in the same brief and that two issues have been identified for the determination of this Appeal.

He gave the case of Buhari v. Yabo (2006) 17 NWLR Pt. 1007 page 162 at 179 – 180 as an additional authority to the Reply brief on the submission of the Respondents that the Notice of Appeal signed by a Legal Practitioner in his business name is valid, He also cited the case of NNPC v. Tijjani (2006) 17 NWLR Pt. 1009 Page 29 at 42 and prayed the Court to allow the Appeal.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents stated that their brief of argument dated 13/4/2006 was filed on 15/4/2006, Learned Counsel said that the Respondents gave notice to reply on Notice of Preliminary objection in compliance with Order 3 rule 15(1) of the Rules of this Court.

Learned Counsel adopted the Respondents’ brief of argument and said that three issues have been formulated for the determination of this Appeal. He argued that the original Notice of Appeal is a nullity, while the second Notice of Appeal is over reaching and adverse to the Respondents. He argued that one cannot build something on nothing, He said that they raised the issue of the Appellants filing their brief before consolidation. He argued that the Notice of withdrawal of Notice of Appeal was incompetent. He referred the Court to the case of Orede v. Adedokun (2001) 15 NWLR Pt. 736 page 483 at 496. He argued that the action taken by the Appellants makes their brief incompetent. He urged the Court to dismiss the Appeal and the Judgment of the trial Court restored.

This Court on 23/2/06 granted leave to Applicants/Appellants to appeal against an interlocutory ruling by the trial Court dated 20/6/2003.

The Appellants submitted three issues as arising for determination in this Appeal, as follows:

“1. Whether, having found that the Defendants were agents of the Federal Government, learned trial Judge was right to assume jurisdiction to try this case,

2. Whether the termination of the Plaintiffs’ appointments by the 1st defendant was proper in the circumstance of this case.

3. Whether the Plaintiffs had proved their claim of N1, 464,457:00K. ”

The Respondents also formulated three issues for the determination of this Appeal as follows:

“1. Whether having regard to the/acts of this case the trial Court was right to have assumed jurisdiction to determine this case and can this Appeal he sustained on the face of a defective Notice of Appeal.

2. Whether the Respondents’ employment with the 1st Appellant had statutory flavour to sustain the reliefs granted by the trial Court.

3. Whether the trial Court was right in awarding special damages to the tune of N1, 464,457:00K to the Plaintiffs/Respondents. ”

A Respondent has no business, unless he cross-appeals or at least serves a Respondent’s Notice, framing issues for determination outside the grounds of Appeal filed by the Appellant. See ldika v. Erisi (1988) 2 NWLR Pt. 78 page 563. The Respondent must not formulate an issue, which is extraneous to the grounds contained in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal except where he has filed his own Notice of Appeal otherwise properly called Cross-appeal. See Nzekwu v. Nzekwu (1989) 2 NWLLR Pt. 104 page 373; Edokpolo & Co. Ltd. v. Sem-Edo Wire Ltd. (1989) 4 NWLR Pt. 116 pages 473: Jatau v. Ahmed (2003) FWLR Pt. 151 page 1887.

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The issues for determination do not only focus on the relevant areas of conflict in the Appeal but also serve as spring board for arguments. They are not intended to consitute arguments by themselves. See Kalu v. Odili (1992) 6 SCNJ 76 at 93. A proper issue for determination is not one that queries the grounds of Appeal or is merely a running commentary on the grounds.

The issues for determination should not be couched in abstract terms without concrete reference to the facts of the case on Appeal See Agu v. Ikewibe (1991) 3 NWLR Pt. 180 page 385 at 416. Issues for determination must be stated correctly on the facts as found by the trial Court and parties must not misstate or mutilate facts in stating issues. See: Commerce Assurance Ltd. v. Ali (1992) 4 SCNJ 145; Alakija v. Abdullahi (1998) 5 SCNJ 1 at 18.

Issues foist on incompetent grounds of Appeal are equally incompetent and should be struck out. See Shuaibu v. N.A.H. (1998) 4 SCNJ 120 at 128. Although it is the duty of parties to an Appeal to formulate the issues for determination of the Appeal, this Court is however at liberty to amend or reject all the issues formulated by the parties and to formulate its own, where the issues as formulated by the parties will not lead to a proper hearing of the Appeal or would not serve the interest of justice. See Bankole v. Pelu (1991) 11 SCNJ 108 at 120; Sha v. Kwan (200) 5 SCNJ 101 at 115: Ogunbiyi v. Ishola (1996) 5 SCNJ 143 at 154.

I had earlier said in this Judgment that the Respondents formulated three issues for determination in this Appeal, even though they had not filed any Cross-appeal. The first issue formulated by the Respondents consists of two issues cleverly made a single issue. The two issues fused into one though on jurisdiction, confront two aspects of the case. The first pertains to the competency of the trial Court to entertain the Appeal while the second attacks .the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Appeal based on what the Respondents described as a defective Notice of Appeal. The Respondents had given notice of objection and had argued same in their brief of argument separate from the issues they formulated for sdetermination.

I have examined the issues formulated by both parties to this Appeal. I am of the opinion that the issues for determination as couched by the Appellants best lead to a proper hearing of this Appeal as well as serve the interest of justice. The issues for determination formulated by the Appellants are therefore adopted for the determination of this Appeal.

On the first issue for determination, learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the Kogi State High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action. He maintained that the jurisdiction of a State High

Court is contained in Section 272(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 while the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is contained in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. He contended that a careful reading of the two Sections will reveal that the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all civil causes and matters for declarations and injunctions affecting the validity of any Administrative decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. Learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that it follows therefore that once an action seeks to challenge the validity of any Administrative action or decision taken by an agency of the Federal Government, a State High Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the action.

Abdullahi M. Aliyu learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the 1st – 4th Defendants in the case before the trial Court arc agents of the Federal Government. He argued that the phrase “Agencies of the federal Government” is defined to cover all organs established by law through which the Federal Government carries out its function. He referred the Court to the cases of- UniAbuja v. Ologe (1996) 4 NWLR Pt. 445 pages 700: NNPC v. Ojo (2005) 22 WRN 77 at 101: Abdulrahaman v. Oduleye (2005) 8 NWLR Pt. 926 page 144.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants maintained that it is clear from paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Joint Statement of Claim that the 1th_ 4th Defendants are organs of the Federal Government, established for the purpose of attaining the educational objectives of the Federal Government. He argued that they are therefore agencies of the Federal Government. Learned Counsel contended that the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs are contained in paragraph 44 of the Joint Statement of Claim, essentially seeking for declarations and injunctions challenging the validity of the decision of the Defendants to terminate the Plaintiffs’ appointments. He submitted therefore that the Plaintiffs’ claim fall within the ambit of Section 251(l), (q), (r), and (s) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. He contended that the State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ claim.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants referred to the ruling of the learned trial Judge challenging the jurisdiction of the Court, in which the learned trial Judge held inter alia) thus:

“The Plaintiffs are not challenging the administrative or the management control of the 1st – 4th Defendants but rather they are challenging the wrongful termination of there employment by the 1st – 2nd, Defendants.”

Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong and in support he cited the case of NEPA v. Edegbero & Ors (2002) SCNJ 173 where he said the Supreme court held that actions which relate to breach of contract of employment will come within the terms “administration and management” as defined by Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that a decision to terminate the appointment of an employee is an executive and administrative decision which falls within the provisions of Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution and therefore robs the Slate High Court of jurisdiction.

He contended that the learned trial Judge relied on the proviso to Section 251 of the 1999, Constitution to hold that he had jurisdiction to entertain the action. Learned Counsel submitted that the proviso to Section 251 does not operate to confer jurisdiction on the State High Courts in matters covered by that Section.

He submitted that the law is now settled that where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to a suit, only the Federal High Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the action notwithstanding the nature of the claim. He cited the cases of Nwude v. Chairman, EFCC (2005) 36 WRN 141 at 163;

F.H.A. v. Shoy International Ltd. (2005) 1 NWLR Pt. 908 page 637 at 651.

Abdullahi M. Aliyu learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that Kogi State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ claim. He further submitted that jurisdiction is the bedrock of a Court accepting the trial of a case, He argued that if a Court has no jurisdiction to try a matter and tries it, that is an exercise in futility as the trial is void ab-initio and a decision based on such trial is of no effect. He referred the Court to the case of Kasikwu Farms Ltd. v. A.G. Benue State (1986) 1 NWLR Pt. 19 page 695 at 703. Learned Counsel maintained that since the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try this case, the entire proceedings will be null and void.

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He argued that where the trial Court is held to have no jurisdiction to try a case on appeal, the proper order to be made is one of striking out the case. He contended that although this Court has jurisdiction to transfer a case under Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act, this power can only be exercised where the trial Court had jurisdiction in the first place. In support of this argument, Learned Counsel referred the Court to the case of Olutola v. Unilorin (2004) 18 NWLR Pt. 905 page 416 at 459 and 469. He contended that since the trial Court lacked jurisdiction ab-initio, the Appellants urged the court to make a consequential order striking out the Plaintiffs’ action.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents in his reply to the arguments of learned Counsel for the Appellants on the first issue for determination of this Appeal referred the Court to paragraphs 11, 12, 13,14,15,24,25,26,35 and 36 of the Joint Statement of Claim and submitted that in determining whether a Court has jurisdiction in a matter or not, the Court will examine the nature of the Plaintiffs claim as disclosed in his Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim. He referred the Court to the case of Adevemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31 at 49,

Learned Counsel for the, Respondents argued that the claim of the Plaintiffs/Respondents is principally based on the wrongful termination of the Plaintiffs/Respondents’ employments, He contended that for the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction the matter must arise from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents conceded that the 1st to 4th Defendants/Appellants are agencies of the Federal Government. He posed the question whether the termination of the Plaintiffs/Respondents’ employment arose from the administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies?

Learned Counsel referred the Court to paragraph 35 of the Joint Statement of claim. He contended that the Honourable Minister of Education is the head (Boss) of the Federal Ministry of Education, He maintained that all his orders handed down the ladder ought to be carried out by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Defendants. He referred the Court to the evidence of DW1. Learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Appellants acted contrary to the order of the Honourable Minister of Education by terminating the employment of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. He submitted that the decision as taken by the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Appellants is not for the purpose of carrying out Government function assigned to an agency of the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Appellants and cannot be classified as an administrative decision for the purpose of Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Learned Counsel maintained that the proceedings taken up by the Plaintiffs/Respondents in the circumstances cannot be taken as affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision of the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Appellants. He urged the Court to resolve the 1st issue in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents.

The issue before the trial Court concerns the termination of Appointment of the Plaintiffs/Respondents with 1st Defendant/Appellant.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent conceded that the 1st and 4th Defendants/Appellants are agencies of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

In this Appeal, the Appellants are contesting the jurisdiction of the Kogi State High Court of Justice sitting at Obangede which entertained the dispute.

In order to determine whether a Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the claim laid before it, the Court has to carefully look at the Writ of Summons and the Statement of claim. See Adeyemi v. Opayori (1976) 9-10 SC 31:

Tukur Y. Government of Gongora State (1989) 4 NWLR Pt. 117 page 517; FHA v. John Shoy Int’l Ltd. (2005) 1 NWLR Pt. 908 page 637 at 647.

Jurisdiction of a Court or Tribunal is likened to the power house, without it, an adjudicating authority is powerless and any proceedings in exercise of the power will be a fruitless exercise and complete nullity

however well conducted. See Nigerian Air force V. James (2002) 18 NWLR Pt. 798 page 295 at 329: Onveanusi v. Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal (2002) 12 NWLR Pt. 781 page 227; AG. Federation v. Sode (1989) 1 NWLR Pt. 128 page 500; F.H.A. V. John Shoy Int’l Ltd. (supra) at page 651.

Both the Federal and State High Courts are a creation of the Constitution. Where the jurisdiction of these Courts is in issue the first point of call to discover their jurisdiction should be the Provisions of the Constitution.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 spells out the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in Section 251(1), while Sections 2S7(1) &-(2) and Sections 272(1) & (2) provides for the Jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and the High Court of a State respectively.

The issue in this Appeal concerns the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

It will be pertinent to reproduce the provisions of Section 251(1) of the Constitution for ease of reference.

“Section 251 – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters-

(a) …

(b) …

(c) …

(d) …

(e) …

(f) …

(g) …

(h) …

(i) …

(j) …

(k) …

(l) …

(m) …

(n) …

(o) …

(p) the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies;

(a) subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies;

(r) any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies; and

(s) such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.

Provided that nothing in the provisions of para-graphs (p),(q), and (r) Of this subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.”

The proper approach to the interpretation of the Constitution is that of liberalism. This implies not only that words of the Constitution should be given their broad meaning, it also means that where alternative constructions are equally open, the Court should proffer a broader construction which would bring about an effective result and is consistent With the intention of the Legislature. See: Ayeni v. University of Ilorin (2000) 2 NWLR Pt. 644 page 290 at 303;

Abdulkarirn v. Incar (Nig.) Ltd. (1992) 7 NWLR Pt. 251 page I at 17.

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A careful reading of Section 251(l),(p),(q),(r) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution and the proviso thereto reveal that the intention of the Lawmakers is to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party, A State High Court or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja has no jurisdiction in such matters notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action. See:

NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR Pt. 798, page 79; Ali v. CBN (1997) 4 NWLR Pt. 498 192: Adebileje v. NEPA (1998) 12 NWLR Pt. 577 page 219: Ayeni v. University of Ilorin (2000) 2 NWLR Pt. 644 page 290; Oyegoke v. Iriguma (2002) 5 NWLR Pt. 760 page 417; Abdulraheem v. Oduleve (2005) 8 NWLR Pt. 926 page 144 at 165:

University of Abuja v. Oloye (1996) 4 NWLR Pt. 445 page 706 at 709: F.H.A. v, John Shoy Int’I Ltd. (2005) 1 NWLR Pt. 908 page 637 at 651.

I am of the opinion that the expression “any of its agencies” under Section 251(1)(r) of the Constitution is meant to cover all organs established by law through which the Federal Government carries out its duties. See University of Abuja v. Ologe (1996) 4 NWLR Pt. 445 page 706; Abdulraheem v. Oduleye (2005) 8 NWLR Pt. 926 page 144 at 165.

I had earlier said in this Judgment that learned Counsel for the Respondents in his brief of argument conceded that the 1st to 4th Appellants are agencies of the Federal Government, On the question whether it is only the federal High Court that has jurisdiction to entertain disputes concerning agencies of the Federal Government, the learned trial Judge said in his judgment as follows:

“It was the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Defendants that flowing from the provisions of Section 251(1) (q) and (r), the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit to the exclusion of this Court. Having had a cursory and second look at the writ and the motion on notice with the supporting affidavit and all the annexure thereto presently before the Court from the eagle lens of Section 74 (l)(m) of the Evidence Act 1990, it is my firm belief that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit. The Plaintiffs are not challenging the administrative or the management and control of the 1st- 4th Defendants but rather they are challenging the wrongful termination of their employment by the 1st – 2nd Defendants. By the proviso in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit and whatever applications that may be brought in the course of proceedings. The Plaintiff, even conceding that the 1st – 4th Defendants are Federal Agencies seeking redress against the 1st- 4th Defendants for injunction and damages for wrongful termination of their appointments. Their action against the 1st – 4th Defendants are based on existing condition of service exhibited in part which is a law in existence and binding on both the 1st-4th Defendants and the Plaintiffs. When Section 272(1) is read together with the proviso to Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, it leaves no one in doubt that this Court jurisdiction to heal and determinant this suit. ”

It has been held by the Supreme Court in NEPA v. Edegbero & ors (2002) .SCNJ 173 that actions which relate to breach of contract of employment will come within the terms ‘”administration” and “management” as defined by Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Niki Tobi, JSC, said at page 189 thus:

“I do not agree however with him that the claim which relates to breach of contract of employment has nothing to do with the administration and control of the Appellant.

Entering into a contract of employment with an employee is a business relationship which clearly comes within Section 230 (1) (q) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993”

Similarly, in Ayeni v. University of Ilorin (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 644) 290 at 304, Obadina, JCA said:

“I am also of the view that the action instituted by the Appellant arose from that administrative and executive decision of the Respondent to terminate the appointments of the Appellants by the letter dated 18’h July, 1994.”

It is therefore clear that a decision to terminate the appointment of an employee is an executive and administrative decision. It falls within the provisions of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and therefore robs the State High Court of jurisdiction.

In the present case, the learned trial Judge relied on the proviso to Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution to hold that he had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The proviso to Section 251 does not operate to confer jurisdiction on State High Courts in matters covered by that Section. I am fortified in my opinion by the case of NEPA v. Edegbero (supra) where Ogundare, JSC said at pages 183-184 as follows:

“I have myself read the proviso to paragraphs (g), (r) and (s) of subsection (1) of Section 230 all over again. I can find no such exception in it that would lead me to find to the contrary. A careful reading a/paragraphs (q). (r) and (s) reveal that the intention of the law makers was to take away from the jurisdiction of State High Court and confer same on the Federal High Court in respect of actions in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. While paragraph (s) talked of actions for declaration or injunction the proviso extended this to actions for damages, injunction or specific performance. It did not say as the learned trial Judge, with profound respect, appear to read into it that action for damages, injunction or specific performance against the Federal Government or any of its agencies could still come before a State High Court. I am of the view that the learned trial Judge was in error in his interpretation of the purport of the proviso. ”

In Nwude v. Chairman. EFCC (2005) 36 WRN 141 at 163, Odili, JCA said:-

“By virtue of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to a suit, it is no longer necessary to examine the nature of the reliefs or claims sought in the case in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court. It is sufficient that once one of the parties be it the plaintiff or the Defendant is the Federal Government of any of its agencies, only the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to determine the matter”

I am of the opinion that there will be no need to consider the other issues raised for determination of the Appeal as to do so will amount to an academic exercise and a wasteful venture of serving no useful benefit.

This Appeal succeeds; the decision of the High Court of Kogi State sitting at Obangede delivered on the 28th day of February, 2005 and the consequential orders made including the award of special damages are hereby set aside. I award the sum of N5, 000 as cost in favour of the Appellants against the Respondents.


Other Citations: (2007)LCN/2423(CA)

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