Federal Ministry of Works and Housing & Anor V. Monier Construction Co. (Nig) Ltd & Anor (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AYOBODE O. LOKULO-SODIPE, JCA.
This is an appeal against the Ruling of the Federal High Court presided over by Honourable Justice A.I. Chikere (hereinafter referred to as “the court below”) delivered on the 28th of January, 2005 in the Originating Application dated 17th December, 2001, brought by the Appellants as Applicants. The said application, in which the present Respondents were equally the Respondents, was brought pursuant to Sections 14, 29(2) and 30 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act Cap 19 LFN 1990; and Order 20 Rule 15 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000, The orders sought in the originating application are as follows: –
“1. AN ORDER setting aside the interlocutory award/ruling dated 13th December, 2001 by the Honourable Justice AA. Kolajo (Sole Arbitrator), in the matter of the arbitration between Monier Construction Company (Nigeria) limited v. Federal Ministry of Works and Housing the Federal Government of Nigeria in relation to Federal Ministry of Works and Housing Contract No. 2930.
2. AN ORDER removing the Honourable Justice A.A. Kolajo (Sole Arbitrator) from the arbitral panel on the ground that he has prejudiced or predetermined at an interlocutory stage issues to be determined at the end of the arbitration proceedings and thereby disqualified himself from further arbitrating on the dispute subject matter of the arbitration proceedings.
3. AN ORDER setting aside the whole of the arbitration proceedings in respect of disputes arising out of or in connection with the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing Contract No. 2930 before the Honourable Justice AA Kolajo sitting as Sole Arbitrator.”
The application was brought upon nine grounds. The nine grounds shorn of their particulars are as follows: –
“1. The Sole Arbitrator misconducted himself when he failed to give the applicants a full opportunity of presenting their case on the ground that “proceedings in the arbitral case had been closed” thereby occasioning miscarriage of justice to the applicants.
2. The Sole Arbitrator mis-conducted himself and the proceedings; and acted unfairly and prejudicially against the applicants when he refused to re-open the hearings by holding as follows: –
“Moreover the plaintiffs counsel in Apena’s case (supra) did not oppose the filing of a new statement of defence. This application was vehemently opposed by the Claimant’s learned SAN, Another point of difference is that the defendant’s counsel in Apena’s case (supra) sought an amendment of the statement of defence, not a re-opening of the case. In the cited case, the defendants’ dispensed with the services of their counsel and retained another, In the present application there is no dispensation of the former counsel. The two former counsel, Mrs, A.M. Bakare and Mr. Pius Oteh (both legal officers with the 1st Respondent) are still in the team of lawyers being led by Chief Ale Babalola, SAN” thereby occasioning miscarriage of justice to the applicants.”
3. The Sole Arbitrator misconducted himself and the proceedings and thereby occasioned grave miscarriage of justice to the applicants when he held as follows: –
“In any case on the facts already before the Tribunal, the respondents cannot counter claim for the difference in the old and new contract since the respondents were responsible for the delay by their failure to finance the contract adequately and even to pay for work done”.
4. The Sole Arbitrator misconducted himself and the proceedings and occasioned grave miscarriage of justice to the applicants when he refused to grant the applicants’ application dated 19th November, 2001.
5. The Sole Arbitrator misconducted himself and the proceedings and thereby occasioned to the applicants grave miscarriage of justice when he held that: “No new issues are stated by the respondents’ counsel”.
6. The Sole Arbitrator misconducted himself and thereby occasioned grave miscarriage of justice to the applicants when he decided at the Interlocutory stage matters for determination in the final award by holding thus: –
‘The respondents asked their two former counsel not to go into negotiation as to the quantum of money due to the claimant on matters on which both parties agreed in principle. In fact they instructed their former counsel to withdraw from further negotiations with the claimant. The respondents caused the existing situation”.
7. The Sole Arbitrator misconducted himself and thereby occasioned grave miscarriage of Justice to the applicants when he held that by the applicants Counsel filing a written address to the existing case, they were precluded by the doctrine of waiver from their right to bring an application to re-open the proceedings.
8, The Sole Arbitrator mis-conducted himself and thereby occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice to the applicants by holding that if the applicants were allowed to re-open the hearings, it will amount to giving the applicants “an opportunity to have a second bite at the cherry and to patch the flaws in their case”,
9. The interlocutory award/ruling dated 13th December, 2001 and published/made by the Sole Arbitrator was improperly procured as the respondent was under some defect as to capacity and therefore did not have any locus standi to continue to maintain the arbitral proceedings arising out of or in connection with Contract No.2930.”
The court below in its considered Ruling refused the originating application and remitted the arbitral proceedings to the Sole Arbitrator for completion.
The Applicants (now Appellants) being dissatisfied with the Ruling of the court below refusing their application appealed against it by filing on 3/2/2005, a Notice of Appeal of the same date. The Notice of Appeal contains six grounds of appeal. The grounds of appeal shorn of their particulars are as follows: –
“1. The learned Trial Judge erred in law when he failed to consider the unchallenged affidavit evidence before him in refusing the Appellants’ application.
2. The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the Sole Arbitrator exercised his discretion judicially and judiciously by refusing the Appellants the opportunity to re-open their case.
3. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the Sole Arbitrator did not breach the rule of natural justice in his interlocutory award dated 13th December, 2001.
4. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the Sole Arbitrator did not misconduct himself despite established cases from the Records of clear breaches of the rule of Natural Justice. 5. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the Sole Arbitrator was right to have applied the doctrine of waiver against the Appellants.
6. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the 1st Respondent who was in Receivership had capacity to have continued with the Arbitral proceedings.”
The reliefs sought from this Court as set out in the Notice of Appeal are:
“(1) An order setting aside in totality the ruling of the lower court delivered on 28th January, 2005 and (2) An order granting the Appellants (sic) application dated 17th of December, 2001 which was refused by the lower court.”
The originating application dated 17th December, 2001 was filed consequent to the refusal by the Sole Arbitrator of the Appellants’ application to re-open their case to enable them place all materials relevant to their case before the Arbitral Tribunal.
In compliance with the Rules of this Court, parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. The appeal was heard on 25/3/2009. Oluwole Aladedoye, learned lead counsel for the Appellants, in urging the Court to allow the appeal, relied on and adopted Appellants’ brief of argument dated 14/7/2005 and filed on 15/7/2005, as well as Appellants’ Reply brief dated 24/7/2006 and filed on the same date, but deemed as properly filed on 4/10/2006.
Learned counsel for the Respondents, Mrs, Hannatu Abdurrahman in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal relied on and adopted Respondents’ brief of argument dated 14/06/2006 and filed on the same date. Learned counsel also brought it to the attention of the Court that the Respondents argued its preliminary objection in respect of the appeal in its brief of argument. The Court was urged to dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the court below.
The Appellants formulated four Issues for the determination of the appeal from the six grounds of appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal.
The Issues are: –
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge ought to have disregarded the unchallenged affidavit evidence before him in deciding the Appellants’ Originating Application? (Ground 1)
2. Whether the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that the Sole Arbitrator exercised his discretion judicially and judiciously by refusing the Appellants the opportunity to re-open their case was not wrong having regard to the evidence before the Court?
(Ground 2)
3. Whether the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that the Sole Arbitrator did not misconduct himself and breach the rule of natural justice in his interlocutory award was not wrong having regard to the evidence and materials before the Court? (Grounds 3 & 4)
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was not wrong to have justified the invocation of the doctrine of waiver by the Sole Arbitrator?
(Ground 5)”
The Respondents in their brief of argument, gave Notice of Preliminary Objection. By the objection raised in the said Notice, the Respondents seek for an Order of this Court striking out or dismissing this appeal.
Aside from the Notice of Preliminary Objection contained in the Respondents’ brief of argument the Respondents distilled a sole issue for the determination of the appeal from the six grounds of appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal. The sole Issue reads:-
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right in refusing to set aside the proceedings of the Sole Arbitrator from the facts and circumstances of the case. (Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5)”
I will first deal with the Notice of Preliminary Objection set out in the Respondents’ brief of argument. It is hereby re-produced verbatim: –
Take Notice that at the hearing of this appeal the 1st Respondent shall move this Honourable Court to strike out dismiss this appeal on the following grounds:
“(I) This appeal revolves round the Judgment of the learned trial Judge refusing to set aside the arbitral proceedings of the Sole Arbitrator Han. Justice AA Kolajo (RTD.) on ground of misconduct and injunction restraining him from publishing the final Award.
(ii) On 28th January, 2005, the Appellants’ Originating Summons (sic) was dismissed by the trial Judge thereby paving way for the Sole Arbitrator to proceed with the reference.
(iii) On 1st February, 2005, the Sole Arbitrator published the final Award to both parties.
(Iv) By virtue of sections 29 and 30 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, upon the publication of the award on 1st February, 2005, the Appellant (sic) should have filed a fresh action for setting aside the award as this present appeal do (sic) not relate to the final award at all and there is no relief sought by the Appellant (sic) that the final award be set aside.
(v) Any judgment by the Honourable Court that will upturn the final Award when that is not an issue or matter before this Honourable Court and will be against fair hearing, as that is not the fulcrum of this appeal.
(vi) This appeal is therefore merely academic and will serve no useful purpose as allowing the appeal for instance leaves the final Award still intact.
(vii) The Notice of Appeal on this matter complained against the whole decision of the learned trial Judge and if this appeal is allowed and the final Award set aside, and proceeding of the Sole Arbitrator set aside, it will include the partial award (agreed Award) by both parties delivered on 18th September, 2001 which has not be (sic) appealed against or set aside by either aggrieved party.
(viii) Again the ruling of the learned trial Judge delivered on 13th May, 2005 dismissing Appellants’ Motion for setting aside the publication of the final Award which have (sic) not been appealed against makes this whole appeal mere academic.
On the premises above this Honourable Court is humbly urged to strike/dismiss this appeal.”
The Appellants reacted to the preliminary objection of the Respondents in their Appellants’ Reply brief, Therein the Appellants drew the attention of the Court to a motion dated 19th August, 2005 filed on 25th August, 2005 which the Respondents had earlier brought. It was stated that the orders which the Respondents sought in the said motion, is one striking out and/or dismissing this appeal on the ground that it relates to pre-publication award while the final award had been published before the present appeal. The Appellants disclosed that this Court in a considered and unanimous Ruling delivered on 13/4/2006 dismissed the said motion as lacking in merit. They further said that the Respondents have not appealed against the said Ruling. It is the stance of the Appellants that all the issues raised by the Respondents by the preliminary objection are premised on, connected with or have originated from the purported publication of the final award, That the Respondents by the preliminary objection raised in their brief of argument have wrongfully opted to renew the motion that had been decided on 13/4/2006.
The Appellants submitted that the Respondents cannot do this and that the only option open to them was to have appealed against the Ruling of 13/4/2006, It was further submitted that for this Court to now entertain the issues raised by the preliminary objection will be tantamount to its sitting on appeal over it own decision which the Court has no competence to do, In the circumstances this Court was urged to strike out the preliminary objection as lacking in merit and the case of Oyekola v. Ajibade (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 902) 356 was cited in aid. Also citing the case of Okukuje v. Akwido (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 700) 261 at 316 on the proprietary of re-litigating issues that had been decided by a competent court twice, the Appellants submitted that the issues being sought to be re-argued by the Respondents had been determined against them with certainty and solemnity.
Dwelling on the aspect of the preliminary objection that they (i.e. Appellants) did not appeal against the Ruling of the lower court refusing to set aside the final award of the Sole Arbitrator, the Appellants having said that the Respondents’ submission on the issue might seem ingenious, further said to the effect that the Respondents had lost sight of the fact that the application which resulted in the said Ruling was an interlocutory application premised on the existence of a valid appeal. Furthermore, the Appellants contended to the effect that by the said application, they sought for orders of both the trial court and this Court to protect the res of the appeal and by extension their right of appeal which every court of record possess the inherent jurisdiction to protect. This being so, the Appellants submitted that both the lower court and this Court have the jurisdiction to entertain their application. That in the circumstances they have the option of appealing against the decision of the lower court in respect of their application to set aside the publication of the final award or to renew the same application before this Court pursuant to the provisions of Order 3 Rules 3(1), (3) and (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002. The case of UBN v. Fajebe Foods [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 325 at 399-340 (sic) was cited in aid of the interpretation of the provisions of the rule of court in question. The Appellants said that it is on record that upon the delivery by the court below of its Ruling on 13/5/2005, they being dissatisfied repeated their application on the same day, seeking for the order of this Court to preserve the subject matter of the appeal. This they did by filing on 13/5/2005 a motion of the same date in which they sought for the order of this Court to set aside the publication of the final award made by the Sole Arbitrator on the ground that the Arbitrator published the award to frustrate their right of appeal and render whatever decision this court may reach in this appeal otiose amongst others. This motion the Appellants stated is yet to be heard and determined. It was further said that the complaint of the Respondents in the circumstances tantamount to putting the cart before the horse.
Dwelling on the prayer that this Court should strike out the name of the 2nd Respondent on the ground that the issues relating to the joinder of the said Respondent was raised and resolved in its favour in the court below; the Appellants submitted to the effect that this finds no support in the Ruling of the said court. That there was nowhere in the Ruling of the court below that the learned trial Judge commented on, talk less of delivering any Ruling on the issue of the joinder of the said Respondent. This Court was urged to discountenance and hold the submission of the Respondents on the joinder of the 2nd Respondent as incompetent. The cases of Joe v. Dom [1999] 9 NWLR (Pt. 620) 538 at 547 and Oshatoba v. Olujitan [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt.655) 158 at 170 amongst others were cited in aid.
Dwelling on the Respondents’ prayer that the words “in receivership” lied to the name of the 1st Respondent be struck out, the Appellants submitted that the matter did not arise from the Ruling of the court below. That it is on Record that the Respondents never applied for the said words to be struck out from the name of the 1st Respondent or that the 2nd Respondent be struck out as a party. The Appellants submitted that in the absence of any prayer for leave to argue the issue concerning the striking out of the said words and an order granting the same, the Respondents cannot raise the same, being a new issue as it was not decided by the court below.
It is indeed correct that the Respondents as Applicants by a motion dated 19/8/2005 filed on 25/8/2005 sought for an order of this Court “dismissing/striking out this appeal in its entirety for being incompetent”. The grounds for the application as set out therein are: –
“1. The entire appeal relates to pre-publication award whereas the Final Award has been published before the filing of the said appeal.
2, The nature of this appeal is consequently unknown under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act Cap A18 2004.
3. The procedure for the challenge of an Arbitral Award that has been published under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act Cap A18 2004 has not been followed.
4. The relief sought by the Respondents/Applicants touches on the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain this appeal,”
This motion was dismissed by this Court in the Ruling delivered on 13/4/2006. The motion filed on 13/5/2005 by the Appellants for the setting aside of the publication of the final award was on the same day adjourned till 21/6/2006.
This appeal is in respect of the Ruling of the court below delivered on 28/1/2005. As earlier stated the Notice of Appeal against the said Ruling was filed on 3/2/2005, The final Award made by the Sole Arbitrator was published on 1/2/2006, This was sequel to the order of the court below in its Ruling of 28/1/2005 remitting the matter back to the Sole Arbitrator for completion after it dismissed the Appellants’ motion dated 17/12/2001. The orders sought in the Appellants’ motion dated 17/12/2001 have earlier been reproduced verbatim. Simply stated they are for: (1) an order setting aside the interlocutory award/ruling dated 13th December, 2001 by the Sole Arbitrator;
(2) an order removing the Sole Arbitrator from the arbitral panel on the ground that he has prejudiced or predetermined at an interlocutory stage issues to be determined at the end of the arbitration proceedings and thereby disqualified himself from further arbitrating on the dispute subject matter of the arbitration proceedings; and (3) an order setting aside the whole of the arbitration proceedings in respect of disputes before the Sole Arbitrator.
I have given due consideration to the order sought in the Respondents’ motion dated 19/8/2005 and the grounds for the same vis-a-vis the grounds for the said Respondents’ preliminary objection as set out in their brief of argument. I am of the humble view that, as submitted by the Appellants’, the Respondents cannot properly urge for the dismissal of the instant appeal on the very same ground that it relates to pre-publication award given the fact that a final Award has been published before the said appeal was filed. It is however worthy of note that not all the grounds for the preliminary objection raise this issue, Ground (viii) stands out in this regard. The ground raises the Issue as to whether or not the instant appeal has not been rendered academic in the light of the fact that the Ruling of the court below delivered on 13/5/2005 dismissing the Appellants’ motion for the setting aside of the publication of the final award has not been appealed against.
It is very clear that the Appellants’ appeal against the Ruling of the court below delivered on 28/1/2005 in respect of their motion dated 17/12/2001 is an interlocutory appeal. It is worthy to note in this regard that the precursor of the motion dated 17/12/2001 that resulted in the Ruling of 28/1/2005 was the refusal by the Sole Arbitrator of the Appellants’ application for (i) an order of the Sole Arbitrator to re-open the hearings of the arbitral reference proceedings: (2) an order granting leave to the Respondents (now Appellants) to file and SCNJ further written statement in amplification of the case. See pages 152-159 of the Records. As earlier stated the Sole Arbitrator published his final award on 1/2/2005. The Appellants by a motion on notice dated 7/2/2005 brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court below sought for: (1) an order setting aside the publication of the Final Award by the Sole Arbitrator pending the determination of the appeal filed against the judgment of the lower court delivered on 28/1/2005; (2) an order setting aside the Final Award dated 1/2/2005 pending the determination of the appeal against the judgment of the lower court delivered on 28/1/2005; and (3) an order of interlocutory injunction appeal restraining the Respondents their agents, privies, etc, from taking any step to enforce the Final Award dated 1/2/2005 pending the determination of the appeal filed against the judgment of the lower court delivered on 28/1/2005. See pages 242-244 of the Records. The Respondents herein raised a preliminary objection in respect of the said motion and the court below in Its Ruling delivered on 13/5/2005in respect of the Appellants’ motion of 7/2/2005 upheld the preliminary objection. The court below in upholding the said preliminary objection, said at page 347 of the Records thus:-
“Parties are agreed that the said award had already been published.
Order 20 Rule 15(g) of the rules of court provides that such application shall be made by originating motion. The word shall there is mandatory. It means that no other way of filing suit to set aside an award is allowed except by way of originating motions, See AMADI VS NNPC [2000] 10 NWLR part 674 ratios 5 and 6 at page 85. On the whole the objection is allowed.”
The Respondents in the ground of the preliminary objection under consideration have argued that the non-appeal by the Appellants against the Ruling of the court below delivered on 13/5/2005 makes this appeal academic, The answer of the Appellants to the submission of the Respondents is that they have a choice of filing an appeal against the Ruling of 13/5/2005 in question, or filing another one before this Court pursuant to the provisions of its Rules. And that they have made their election by filing another motion on notice in this Court on the same 13/5/2005. The submissions of the Appellants would appear to require the consideration of the appropriateness of the process they filed before this Court on 13/5/2005.
It is indeed true that the Rules of this Court provides to the effect that whenever an application can be made under its Rules to the court below or to it, such an application in the first instance shall be made to the court below except where there are special circumstances which make it impossible or impracticable to first apply to the court below.
I am of the humble view that the Appellants’ submission that they have the choice of appealing against the Ruling of the court below of 13/5/2005 shows a misapprehension on their part of the said Ruling as well as the fact that an originating motion and a motion on notice or application are not the same.
The court below in its ruling of 13/5/2005 never pronounced on the merit of the Appellants’ motion of 7/2/2005. The court below found the motion as being inappropriate for the orders sought by the Appellants and therefore not worthy of consideration on the merit. The question of refusing or granting of the orders sought in the said motion therefore has no basis.
The options available to the Appellants given the Ruling of the court below delivered on 13/5/2005 in respect of their motion of 7/2/2005, was either to have filed an originating motion before the court below and thereby showing that they agree with the court’s decision; or to have appealed against the decision upholding the preliminary objection and asking for appropriate reliefs in the Court of Appeal. In short the Appellants having regard to the Ruling of the court below delivered on 13/5/2005 in respect of their motion had not made any motion that was capable of being refused; the election to make a similar motion to this Court on the basis of the one made to the lower court having been refused therefore is a non-issue.
As earlier stated there is a difference between an originating motion and a motion on notice. This much is clear from the provision of Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000 which shows that an originating motion is one of the ways by which an action is commenced; while Order 9 shows that motions on notice are for interlocutory proceedings. In the circumstance if the Appellants had adhered to the procedure stipulated by the Rules of the court below for the setting aside of the final award made on 1/2/2005, then the only option they have is to appeal against any decision refusing this and not the filing of a motion on notice before this Court. The submission of the Respondents that there is no appeal against the dismissal of the Appellants’ motion for the setting aside of the final award is therefore unassailable.
Now, even if the Appellants have by the filing of a motion on notice before this Court taken the right step (which is not conceded), the question still remains as to whether this appeal can be a fruitful exercise in the light of all that the Records disclose. The orders sought in the motion which the court below dismissed have been earlier reproduced verbatim in this judgment.
They are (1) an order setting aside the interlocutory award/ruling dated 13th December, 2001 by the Sole Arbitrator; (2) an order removing the Sole Arbitrator from the arbitral panel on the ground that he has prejudiced or predetermined at an interlocutory stage issues to be determined at the end of the arbitration proceedings and thereby disqualified himself from further arbitrating on the dispute subject matter of the arbitration proceedings; and (3) an order setting aside the whole of the arbitration proceedings in respect of disputes before the Sole Arbitrator.
It is to be noted that as at the date the application was made the Sole Arbitrator was yet to fully discharge his duty/function. Parties are definitely not disputing that the Sole Arbitrator completed his duty/function with the publication of the final award on 1/2/2005. The reliefs which the Appellants are seeking in the instant appeal are (i) an order setting aside in totality the ruling of the lower court delivered on 28/1/2005; and (ii) an order granting the Appellants application dated 17/12/2001 which was refused by the lower court The question that needs to be asked even if the appeal is considered on the merits and found to be meritorious are: (i) of what use is the setting aside of an interlocutory award when a final award has been published; (ii) from which arbitral panel can Han. Justice A. A. Kolajo be now removed; and (iii) can the Appellants set aside the whole of the arbitration proceedings (which comfortably includes the final award) by an interlocutory appeal. The Appellants put the motion dated 13/5/2005 by which they are seeking for the setting aside of the final award by this Court in issue themselves in their brief of argument. Without prejudice to all that I had said in respect of the said motion, the germane question to now ask is as to whether the instant appeal can be considered on the merit without first setting aside the final award? The clear answer in my humble view is that it cannot. The Appellants themselves filed the motion dated 13/5/2005 seeking for the setting aside of the final award, and knew that the said motion was still pending before this Court at all material times before this appeal was heard. Yet they chose to, and indeed argued the instant appeal first. This they did having full benefit of the preliminary objection of the Respondents particularly ground (viii) thereof under consideration. It would appear that the Appellants do not realise that the instant interlocutory appeal and their motion dated 13/5/2005 for the setting aside of the final award are antithetical. One would have thought that the Appellants would have pressed for the healing of their motion dated 13/5/2005 first. The said motion If successful, would have reverted the proceedings of the Sole Arbitrator to one that was yet to be completed and thereby creating the enabling circumstances to warrant the granting of the prayers sought In the motion dated 17/12/2001 and which are the relief sought in the instant appeal if it should succeed.
Given all that has been said above, I am of the firm view that the instant appeal is indeed nothing more than a mere academic or hypothetical exercise, as submitted by the Respondents for as long as the final award remains intact. This is against the backdrop that given the existing situation this Court would clearly be engaging in the making of futile or vain orders if the instant appeal were to be determined on the merits and found meritorious. Courts are not to indulge in the consideration of issues which are no longer necessary for proper adjudication of cases. Courts are not to embark on what will eventually amount to a waste of precious judicial time, energy and resources. See the cases of OKULATE V. AWOSANYA (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530 at 550 and AG FEDERATION V. ANPP (2004) 5 WRN 1 at 21.22. There is every power in a court of record to strike out a case in such circumstances in order to protect its integrity.
Accordingly, I uphold the preliminary objection of the Respondents on the basis of ground (viii) of the grounds of objection. Consequently, the instant appeal must be and is hereby struck out as it cannot be sustained for as long as the final award remains intact.
I make no order as to costs.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3347(CA)
