Frank Norman Spencer Thirwell V Oye Oyewumi & Anor (1990)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AKANBI, J.C.A.
In the final and twentieth paragraph of their statement of claim filed in the Federal High Court Ibadan on 25th May 1981, the plaintiffs in this action averred as follows:- ‘the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the said sum of N256,000 from the defendants and the plaintiffs claim against the defendants jointly, severally or in the alternative the said sum of N 256,000.’
The 1st defendant filed a statement of defence denying liability. So also did the 3rd defendant who filed a separate and distinct statement of defence. It did not however appear that second defendant filed any statement of defence. In fact he was not represented at the trial throughout and did not take part in the proceedings.
Equally so, no defence was filed on behalf of the 4th defendant even though Counsel for the 1st defendant also announced appearance for this defendant. However no statement of defence was filed on its behalf. It thus appeared that the contest right from the outset was to be fought out between the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant. And indeed as it turned out, at the end of the trial, the judgment went against only the first defendant.
In a considered judgment of some considerable length the learned trial Judge held that there was no evidence to show that either the 2nd or 3rd defendant ‘was involved in the actions of the 1st defendant who has so very freely used other peoples name and offices to facilitate the fraud which he set out to perpetrate. ‘ He concluded that both 2nd and 3rd defendants were in the circumstances not liable.
He also found, inter alia, that the 4th defendant company only existed in the imagination of the 1st defendant and that having regard to the entire circumstances of the case and the accepted evidence, the 4th defendant, if it existed at all, could not be held liable on the claim. As regards the claim against the 1st defendant the learned trial Judge held – ‘The plaintiffs are clearly entitled to recover the money paid by them to the 1st defendant..’ . Accordingly, he entered Judgment for the plaintiffs against the 1st defendant in the sum of N 256,400 (Two hundred and fifty thousand four hundred naira) plus interest thereon at 5% per annum up to the date of judgment The 1st defendant being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court has appealed to this court on a number of grounds. All in all fourteen (14) grounds of appeal were filed and argued; and fourteen (14) issues were also A identified in the brief of argument filed on behalf of the 1st defendant. I shall only set out the identified issues not only because as it appears to me, each of them is an abridgment of the copious and lengthy grounds of appeal filed in this case but also because Counsels arguments were predicated on them. The issues read thus –
‘STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 3.1 Whether learned trial Judge was right in entertaining a claim based on a void contract. 3.2 Was the learned trial Judge right in holding that neither the 1st defendant nor the 4th defendant owned shares in Comazzi Limited and that there was no purchase consideration. 3.3 Was the learned trial Judge right in holding that the retrospective effect of the N.E.P.B. Decree took away the rights of the 4th defendant to the shares they purchased in 1976 by accepting exhibit C as conclusive. 4.4 Was the trial Judge right in holding that the representation made by the 1st defendant about the ownership of the ‘if shares was false and calculated to deceive the plaintiffs. 4.5 Whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering the 1st defendant to refund to the plaintiffs the sum of N 256,400.00 being the price paid by the defendants for the shares they bought. 4.6 Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that there was no legal relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
4.7 Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the proxy ‘Exhibit V’ was issued to the plaintiff to give appearance that the plaintiffs had taken advantage of the sale. 4.8 Was the learned trial Judge right in holding that there was no approval for the sale of the shares. 4.9 Whether the interpretation and application of S.10 Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Decree in this case by the learned trial Judge was right. 4.10 Whether the learned trial Judge was right in finding the appellant liable for fraudulent representation and deceit. 4.11 Whether the judgment is against the weight of evidence.
4.12 Whether the learned trial Judge was right in giving judgment for 5% interest; a relief not asked for by the plaintiff. 4.13 Was the trial Judge right in rejecting some admissible evidence. 4.14 Whether reliance on the pleadings by the Judge instead of adduced evidence by the parties led to miscarriage of justice.’ But before dealing with the issues raised and the arguments canvassed in support, it will be necessary for a proper understanding of the events that gave rise to the action in the first place, to give a short resume or a historical account of the case.
According to the plaintiffs, at a point in time, the first defendant who claimed to be a director of the 4th defendant a foreign company, represented to the plaintiffs that the 4th defendant was the owner of some 246,000 shares i.e. 50% of the equity capital in Comazzi Limited, a company incorporated in Nigeria and that in his capacity as such director, he had power to operate the business of the 4th defendant in Nigeria. Consequent upon the representation, the plaintiff entered into negotiation with the 1st defendant to buy the said 246,000 shares in Comazzi Limited. Some agreement was reached and the plaintiffs were informed that the necessary approval of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board had been obtained to transfer some of the shares in Comazzi Limited.
On the strength of this information and after some exchanges of correspondence mainly between the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant, the plaintiffs paid to the 1st defendant a total sum of N 256,400 as ‘purchase consideration’ for the 246,000 shares in Comazzi Ltd. In the course of time, it became evident to the plaintiffs that the approval of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, required for a valid, .ff transfer of the shares, had not been obtained. So they demanded a refund of the sum of N 256,400 they had turned over to the 1st defendant.
No refund was made and so, the present action was instituted. For a clear understanding of the defence put forward by the 1st defendant it will be apt to set out some of the relevant paragraphs of his statement of defence. ‘3. The 1st defendant admits paragraph 5 of the statement of claim only to the extent that he was at the material time a director of the 4th defendant resident in Ibadan. The 4th defendant was only involved in the negotiation of sale of 60% of the share capital in Comazzi Ltd., only. And that in that regard, it was made quite clear to the plaintiff that the 20% of those shares still in the hands of Miss P. Comazzi had just to be acquired.
The plaintiff knew that at all material times Miss P. Comazzi was in Italy. The 1st defendant further avers that the plaintiffs knew that the process of completion of transfer of those shares would have to await the clear approval of the Nigerian Enterprises Board. The aforesaid arrangement was clearly spelt out to the plaintiffs and they were agreeable to them. 4. The 1st defendant will therefore contend at the hearing of this suit that the 3rd plaintiff at all material times understood that the contract for the purchase by them of the 246,000 shares then held by the 4th defendant could not be finalised until the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board has issued its certificate of compliance.
6. The 1st defendant avers that in the interval and in order to fully fix the plaintiffs with full ‘ownership’ of the shares sold to them two powers of Attorney were executed in favour of the 2nd plaintiff. The first dated 17th February, 1978 expired on 31st December 1979 and the second dated 31st December which is irrevocable. The 1st defendant will tender original copies of these documents at the trial of this action. The 1st defendant will contend that the plaintiffs are estopped from denying that the shares sold to them by the 4th defendant had not been/or are being transferred to them.
7.The 1st defendant denies that an unreasonable long period had elapsed before this transfer process is completed by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board. 8. The 1st defendant states that he had since 1980 resigned his directorship in the 4th defendant and that company had since then been struck off the U.K. register of companies. 9. The 1st defendant denies any personal involvement but revealed to the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs and the said Sola Fapohunda that the shares were held in the name of the 4th defendant and that he, the 1st defendant was acting as a director of the 4th defendant. The 1st defendant will rely on and tender the letter dated 10th February, 1978 in this regard. 10. The 1st defendant admits paragraph 7 but all the parties knew that he was acting only as an agent of the 4th defendant and subject to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Boards certificate of acceptance.
12. With regard to the 14th paragraph of the statement of claim the monies received by the 1st defendant on behalf of the 4th defendant were used to pay the shares bought off the original share holders as follows:- Miss P. Comazzi N 82,000 C. Comazzi) Vide Loans. N 152,000& H. Saleh &) 1st defendant N 234,000 14. The 2nd plaintiff among others had assumed controlling shares of t the company in question, presided over its numerous decisions and are signatories to all its cheques. 18. With regard to paragraph 16 of the statement of claim, the defendants deny that no approval Was obtained as approv.al was in fact obtained to deal in the 20% shares of P. Comazzi Limited and that in any event no application could be made in respect of the balance of 40% of the share until the certificate of compliance had been obtained from the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board.
This is still being awaited. The 1st defendant will contend that if the plaintiffs paragraph 16 is correct (which is denied), then the whole transaction became illegal and unenforceable and would urge the court that the case of the plaintiffs are not maintainable at law. 19. Whereof the 1st defendant denies owing the plaintiffs any sums of money whatsoever or in the alternative that the demands are k premature and made mala fide and the 1st defendant prays that H the plaintiffs claim be dismissed.
These averments along with others contained in the statement of defence evidently impelled the plaintiffs to file a Reply’ In their Reply, it was, inter alia, asserted that the 1st defendant received the entire sum of N 256,400 in his personal capacity and thus constituted himself an agent ‘to hold the money and pay it over to 4th defendant only at the completion of the purchase transaction;’ and to disburse it in accordance with instructions. It was also specifically pleaded in paragraph 5 of the Reply that the 1st defendant acted fraudulently. That paragraph reads:-
‘The 1st defendant at all material times fraudulently dealt with the plaintiffs in respect of the purported sale of 246,000 shares in Comazzi Limited and has used the 4th defendant as a cloak for fraud. Particulars of Fraud (1) Using the 4th defendant as a cover for himself: (2) Representing the 4th defendant as unincumbered owner of the 246,000 shares in Comazzi Limited. (3) Pretending that the plaintiffs money has been paid to alleged debtors of the 4th defendant to whom he has only given unauthorised loan.
(4) Pretending that he has transferred money to P. Comazzi who is at all material times in Italy, without the approval of the Central Bank of Nigeria. (5) Pretending to make use of the Plaintiffs funds which he held as agent or trustees of the plaintiffs. (6) The plaintiffs will contend at the hearing of this suit that: (1) The 4th defendant is practically identical with the 1st defendant, who with other members of the family are members and directors of the 4th defendant; (2) The 4th defendant is a mere cloak or sham for the purpose of dealing irregularly in shares to defeat the purpose of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, 1977; (3) The 4th defendant is an agent, trustee or nominee of the 1st defendant; and (4) The veil of incorporation should be lifted in respect of the 4th defendant.
(7) The plaintiffs repeat all the averments contained in their statement of claim.’ The 1st defendant was obliged to file an Answer in which he denied acting as an ‘agent’ or ‘Trustee’ of the plaintiffs but maintained that the money he had received on behalf of the 4th defendant was disbursed in accordance with instructions. And in paragraphs 2,3,4,5,6, & 7 of the Answer he went on to say:.. ‘2. The 1st defendant denies paragraph 3 of the Reply and state further that the plaintiffs claim therein is misconceived. The 1st defendant will contend that once the plaintiffs had parted with their money under their agreement with the 4th defendant, they no longer had any interests in or claims thereon. (Italics supplied)
3. The 1st defendant denies paragraph 4 of the Reply and re-iterate defendant, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 1977 was only relevant to the 20% of the share capital of Comazzi Ltd., and at that material time the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board approved the sale of those 20% shares to the plaintiffs which shares are still validly held by them. 4. The 1st defendant also states that all parties to this suit under-B stood and agreed that the balance of the shares in Comazzi would be transferred to the plaintiffs when the Certificate of Compliance, with the Act was received. This is still being awaited. It had not been refused.
5. The 1st defendant denies paragraph 5 of the Reply and states that the paragraph is unfair vexatious, scandalous and should be struck out. (i) In particular the 1st defendant states that he is quite a different legal personal (sic) from the 4th defendant; (ii) Sub paragraph 2 is untrue. The purpose of the 4th defendant was legitimate business. (iii) Sub paragrapb3 is untrue. The 1st defendant states that share certificates were issued and signed by the recipients of such monies. No fraud or illegal purpose are discernible nor intended. (iv) Money was not transferred to anyone in Italy or anywhere else. Money due to P. Comazzi was paid to her authorised agent in Nigeria and in Nigerian currency. (v) The 1st defendant denies sub paragraph 5 and states that it is absurd to think that he could also have been agents of the plaintiffs in the circumstance.
6. The 1st defendant will contend that paragraph 6 of the Reply is a malicious repetition of previous spurious averments and will urge the court to discountenance them. 7. WHEREOF the 1st defendant prays that the plaintiffs claims be dismissed in their entirety as misconceived and tending to overreach.’ At the hearing, the 3rd plaintiff and two other witnesses gave evidence for the plaintiffs. None of the defendants gave evidence but one Christopher Olawoye. who said he was at one time a Secretary to the Board of Directors of Comazzi Ltd. gave evidence for the defence.
From what can be distilled from the pleadings and the welter of evidence adduced at the trial, it appears to me that it can be safely said that it is common ground that the 1st defendant received from the plaintiffs a total sum of N 256,400 being the purchase consideration for the 240,000 shares in Comazzi Ltd. There appears however to be some confusion and divergence of views H as to whether approval for the sale of the shares was obtained and whether those shares have been duly transferred to and taken up by the plaintiffs. However that may be, it is noteworthy that the 1st defendant in paragraph 4 of his ANSWER to the REPLY filed on behalf of the plaintiffs averred thus:-
‘The 1st defendant also states that all parties to this suit understood and agreed that the balance of shares in Comazzi would be transferred to the plaintiffs when the Certificate of Compliance with the Act was received. This is being awaited. It had not been refused. (Italics supplied) Similar averments are contained in paragraphs 3&4 of the statement of defence. The 1st defendant would appear to say that due approval was given for the transfer. In this regard, reference was made to Exhibits E -E1. The plaintiffs contended that Exhibits E & El did not carry the necessary approval. At best, it was a conditional or qualified approval which in reality did not satisfy the requirement of the law. Furthermore, attention was drawn to a passage in Exhibits F –F1 dated 6th May 1980 written by the Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Board (herein after called the Board).
The letter was addressed to the Managing Director of Comazzi Company. The passage under reference reads:- ‘After careful examination of the records available to the Board, your company i.e. Comazzi Ltd. has been declared a defaulter under Section 13 of Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Decree No.3 of 1977 and appropriate measure under the provision of the decree are being taken.’
It is also significant to note that before Exhibits E -E 1 referred to above was received, two separate letters each dated 9th January 1979 -Exhibits G E -Gland H & H1 had been sent to the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs apparently by the firm of accountants known as Aderemi Thirwell Aneni & Co. The letters conveyed to the two plaintiffs the information that approval for the transfer of some 36,000 shares in Comazzi Ltd. to them, has been granted. On the same 9th January 1979, two other letters again addressed to the plaintiffs emanated from the Ibadan Office of ‘Ibadan Nominee Ltd.’ The letters which were written in Ibadan, were also signed by a Mr. P. Thirwell.
These letters were addressed to the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs and conveyed the impression that the Board has given an unqualified or unconditional approval for the transfer of some of the shares of Ibadan Nominees Ltd to lst & 2nd plaintiffs. But significantly in paragraph 18 of the statement of defence, the 1st defendant has also stated that application could not be made ‘in respect of the balance 40% of the shares until the Certificate of compliance had been obtained from the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board.’
In any case outside the documentary exhibits to which I had referred earlier on, there as not exhibited before the trial court, any document conveying the’ unqualified approval of the Board authorising the sale of the shares in question. Whatever is the case. it must be pointed out that the learned trial Judge inter alia found:
(a) there was nothing in the statement of defence of the first defendant to indicate clearly that the 4th defendant owned or ever acquired, if at all, validly, any shares in Comazzi Ltd. (b) that the evidence on record did not support the case of the first defendant that Ibadan Nominee bought 246,000 shares (i.e. A 60%) of the total shares in Comazzi Limited. Reference in this regard was made to paragraphs 3 & 12 of the statement of defence; and to Exh. M, a letter dated 18th August 1980 addressed to the Solicitor to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant. (c) that the shares were not acquired by the 4th defendant if at all before the negotiations for the shares in Comazzi Ltd. between B 1st defendant and the plaintiffs. . (d) that neither the 1st defendant nor the fourth defendant Company, held or had any right in or title to, any such shares in Comazzi Ltd.
(e) that the representation made to the plaintiffs by the 1st defendant, as to the ownerships of shares in Comazzi Limited, either C by himself or by the 4th defendant was false and calculated to deceive. The learned trial Judge in his further consideration not only disbelieved the evidence of the only witness called by the defendants but also viewed with suspicion the documents tendered by him as they appeared to have been tampered with. But more importantly. the Court also noted that-
(i) There was not before it any evidence to show that any positive steps were taken by Comazzi Limited to comply with the stipulated conditions given by the Board before the shares were traded in. (ii) That approval for the sale not having been given by the Board for the sale of the shares, neither 1st defendant nor 4th defendant had authority to deal in or sell those shares; and that in any case the 4th defendant could not hold more than 20% shares in Comazzi Ltd.
(iii) That on the evidence before the court the Plaintiffs paid person-. ally to the 1st defendant the sum of N 256,400 for the purchase of the shares and as that amount was not paid to the 4th defendant, F and the condition precedent to the transfer of the shares not having been satisfied, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full sum from the 1st defendant.
These various findings and conclusions made by the learned trial Judge gave the leverage for the attack launched by Mrs. Ajayi-Obe, S.A.N., against the judgment of the learned trial Judge. I have already set out early in this judgment the issues as identified by appellants counsel. The defendants counsel Mr. Bamidele Aiku has in his own brief identified only three issues for consideration and with the two others arising from the grounds of appeal which I propose to consider, I am of the view that a resolution of the three issues along with the two others will meet the justice of f the case. The three issues identified in the respondents brief read as follows:-
‘1. Whether the plaintiffs who paid money to the 1st defendant upon a contract declared void by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, 19n is entitled to a refund of the money. 2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering the appellant to refund the amount paid upon a contract declared void by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, 1977.
3. Whether the learned trial Judge Was right in ordering the appellant to refund the amount paid on it contract founded on misrepresentation upon recision by the representee.’ The two additional issues which I have identified are – (4) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in making a further award of 5% interest per annum on the amount claimed by the plaintiffs. (5) Whether the trial Judge was right in rejecting the following documents- (a) Power of Attorney sought to be put in evidence by the 1st defendant. (b) Letter written by Mr. Price to Nova Joint Service dated 18th June. 1979.
(c) Minutes of extraordinary meeting on sale of shares and whether the rejection of these documents has caused a miscarriage of justice. Learned Senior Counsel Mrs. Ajayi-Obe for the appellant both in her brief of argument and oral submissions made the following points:- (i) That having held that the contract between the parties was void, the learned trial Judge ought to have proceeded to find that any money paid thereunder was unrecoverable; for according to her, a void contract is an illegal contract and is not therefore enforceable in law vide Fibrosa v. Fairbairn (1943) A.C. 32; Abimbola George & Ors. v. Dominion Flour Mills (1963) All N.L.R. 71 at 73.
(ii) That it was wrong for the trial Judge to say that the shares in Comazzi Ltd. were not transferred to Ibadan Nominees Ltd. or that there was no consideration for the sale of the shares. What is more, Counsel argued, that the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 1977 did not in any way affect the sale of the shares made by Cletto Comazzi and Hussein Salih in 1976 to Ibadan Nominees Ltd. To support her contention she drew attention to the various documentary exhibits tendered at the trial.
I propose to examine them very briefly. First, both Exhibits Q and R, the so-called ‘Share Transfers’ said to have been executed by Cletto Comazzi and Hussein Salih in favour of Ibadan Nominees Ltd were not dated and as such if any transfer or shares was made at all, it is not possible to say on the face of these exhibits, that they were indeed made on a date anterior to the coming into effect of the decree. And Exhibits Sand S1 which at best were no more than notifications of an intention to sell, did not support the contention that the shares were sold earlier than 29th June 1976 the operative date of the relevant Act. True they were both dated 11th March 1976 but that is no proof that the sale took place on the dates stated on them, or before 29th June 1976.
I have also examined Exhibit T and T1 both of which have been dated 10th July 1976 to see if they support the contention that the alleged sale of the shares by Cleto Comazzi and Hussein Salih were made to Ibadan Nominees Ltd. before the Act of 1977 came into effect and regret to say that those two exhibits have not in any way succeeded in resolving the problem created by the failure to spell out the date when the ‘Shares Transfers’ were actually made. If anything, the information conveyed in the two exhibits was that both Cleto Comazzi and Hussein Salih have resigned as directors of Comazzi Ltd. after selling their shares in the company.
They did not go as far as stating when the shares were actually sold. The learned Senior Advocate in her oral submissions however said that notwithstanding the retrospective character of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, it has no application in so far as the transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants is concerned. Asked by the court when exactly was the sale effected, she was candid to concede that all the documents tendered in the course of the proceedings did not mention any specific date or dates. She however added that since the intention to sell was given on 11/3/ 76, it must be assumed that all the sale took effect before the operative date of the Decree. I am unable to make any such assumption.
For to do so, would tantamount to filling in the missing gap in the 1st defendants case and/or re-construct this case for him. It was the defendants case that certain shares were sold to Ibadan Nominees Ltd. by both Cleto Comazzi and Hussein Salih, and it was his duty to prove the sale or the proper acquisition of the shares by the 1st defendant-the Ibadan Nominees Ltd.
Significantly the 1st defendant either in his personal capacity or as a director of the 4th defendant did not give evidence regarding the alleged sale of shares. Nor did Cleto Comazzi or Hussein Salih whose shares were said to have been purchased by 4th defendant. I have already shown that Exhibits Q -Q1. R -R 1, S -S1 or T -T1 on which so much store was set, did not establish what the 1st defendant had averred in his statement of defence. The evidence of the only witness for the defence was also not conclusive on the vital points raised above. In my view there is no justifiable reason for the criticism of the learned Judge. Exhibit C’ is very explicit. It means what it says and that is in so far as F the Board is concerned as at 29th May 1981, 40% of the share capital in Comazzi Ltd. was still in the hands of Cleto Comazzi and Salih.
Similarly, the reference to Exhibit M by the trial Judge was to emphasise the point that even the 1st defendant who wrote that letter recognised that in so far as the Board was concemed, Ibadan Nominees Ltd. (4th defendant) had no legal right to deal in the shares of Comazzi Ltd and that there was the need to refund the money paid in respect of the shares purported to have been transferred. Indeed the observations of the learned trial Judge appear to me to be well justified having regard to the pleadings of the 1st defendant and the evidence on record.
It must also be borne in mind that the learned trial Judge did not believe the only witness called by the 1st defendant. Not only did he say that the evidence of the witness was unreliable but also took the view that the documents tendered by him were drawn up for the purpose of the action and that they were tampered with in order to give a wrong picture to the Court. It is sufficient to note that there was no appeal against that finding. There is no doubt that approval of the Board was necessary for any valid transfer of shares. The Judge found that no such approval was obtained in this case.
It was the 1st defendants duty to secure such approval. Mrs. Ajayi-Obe however submitted that the responsibility for obtaining approval for the sale fell on either the plaintiffs or Comazzi Ltd. The short answer in that regard is that, that was not the case of the first defendant on the pleadings. The totality of the evidence also did not support that contention. But perhaps the more serious submission is the. one made with regard to the application of section 10 of the Act. In the written, brief, learned counsel argued that the section has no application in this case, her contention once again being that a conditional approval was obtained and as such there was no basis for holding that the transaction was void.
According to her, non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed will only result in a certificate of non-compliance being issued. It does not however appear to me that learned counsel fully appreciated the effect of that submission. To my mind, where a certificate of non-compliance has been issued the resultant effect will be that there has been no approval given and any transfer made or purported to have been made will be invalid.
But as has been noted before the clear finding in this case and with which I agree is that no approval for the transfer of the shares in question was obtained. I am not unmindful of the fact that in her oral submission, learned counsel did not on this issue confine herself to the arguments contained in her brief. She asked us to read Section 10 along with Sections 4,5 and 6 thereof in order to appreciate fully the potency of the submission. But Counsel to the plaintiffs said we should do nothing of the sort.
His objection was predicated on the fact that none of those sections was referred to in the brief of argument. We indicated that our ruling on the objection would be embodied in this judgment.
For my part, I see nothing wrong or which will preclude the court, in an appropriate case, from referring to other provisions of the Act if that will help to correctly interpret the section or to bring out the mischief which the section under consideration is designed to cure -moreso as in this case where Section 10 is made subject to the provision of Section 9 of the
Other Citation: (1990) LCN/2434(SC)
