Fugah & Ors. V. Tamakloe & Anor (1939)

LawGlobal Hub Judgment Report – West African Court of Appeal

Personal Bend not binding against tribe—Application for amendment and re-execution of Bond during trial. The appellants were ordered to execute a Bond binding against the Klevie tribe, the sufficiency of such Bond to be determined by a Judge of the West African Court of Appeal. The Bond was executed by the appellants personally, and Barton J. adjourned the question of the sufficiency of this Bond for the consideration of the Court.

Held : Bond executed in personal capacity and not binding on tribe.

Permission to amend and re-execute the Bond refused as Respondent had had no opportunity to consider the effect or validity of alleged authority given to appellants by tribe.

Final leave to appeal refused.

Frans Dove for the Appellants.

R. E. Phipps for the Respondent.

The following joint judgment was delivered :—

PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST, WEBB, C.J., SIERRA
LEONE, AND BUTLER LLOYD, AG. C.J., NIGERIA.

Application for final leave to appeal is refused. On 29th November, 1938, the named appellants were given up to 28th February to execute a Bond that would be binding as against the Klevie Tribe, the sufficiency of the Bond to be determined by a Judge of this Court.

On 27th February they executed a Bond. The matter came before Barton J. on the 15th March when he, being of opinion that bond had been executed by appellants in their personal capacity, adjourned the matter for consideration of this Court. In our opinion the new bond is executed by Fugah and Akoglo in their personal capacity. They do not purport to sign as representatives of the Aribe. Their Counsel suggests that the Court should now allow them to amend and re-execute the Bond saying that they have at all events written authority to institute these proceedings.

In our opinion it would be unreasonable to adopt this course because the Respondent had no opportunity of considering the effect or validity of the alleged authority. The appellants were represented by Counsel last November and if they failed to take his advice in the preparation of the new Bond they have only themselves to blame.

We grant the respondent £7 7s. costs.
As we have refused final leave the other motion is dismissed, Mr. Dove stating he knows nothing about it.