Godfrey Anukam V Felix Anukam (2008)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

TABAI, J.S.C

This suit was filed at the Owerri Judicial Division of the High Court of Imo State by the plaintiff who is the respondent therein. The defendant therein is the appellant before us. The suit was filed on the 21/10/92. The following reliefs were claimed:-

“(a) Declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a statutory certificate of occupancy of the land verged GREEN in the plaintiff’s plan no. GIK/IMO/89/92 filed together with the statement of claim.

(b) N20,000 damages for trespass.

(c) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his agents or servants from further interfering howsoever with the plaintiff’s rights and interests in the land for which the declaration in (a) above is sought.

Pleadings were filed and exchanged. The statement of claim was filed along with the writ of summons on the 21/10/92. The appellant’s amended statement of defence was filed on the 9/1/97.

At the trial, both parties testified and called witnesses. At the close of evidence, learned counsel for the parties addressed the court. By its judgment on the 7/7/99, the claim was allowed in its entirety except that N500.00 damages was awarded instead of the N2,000.00 claimed. The appellant was not satisfied with the judgment and went on appeal to the court below. The appeal was dismissed. This was in the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the 8/7/2002. The appellant was still aggrieved by the judgment and has come to this court on appeal.

Briefs have been filed and exchanged. The appellant’s brief was prepared by Declan Obioma Madu and same was filed on the 30/12/02. The respondent’s brief was settled by Chief E.T.O. Njoku. It was filed on the 6/3/03. The appellant proposed four issues for determination in his brief of argument. On the 12/11/07, when the appeal was argued, on the application of learned counsel for the appellant, the third issue was withdrawn and struck out, leaving the following three issues for determination.

1. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the judgment of the court below in favour of the plaintiff/respondent when he did not plead and prove the root of his title to the land in dispute.
2. Whether the provisions of section 46 of the evidence act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 edition avails the respondent in the circumstances of this case.
3. Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the award by the learned trial Judge of reliefs not claimed by the plaintiff/respondent in his evidence before the trial court.

For the respondent the following three issues for determination were presented:

1. Whether the burden of proof of the root of title to the land in dispute did not shift to the appellant going by his amended statement of defence.
2. Whether the lower court was not right in holding that section 46 of the evidence act enured in favour of the respondent.
3. Whether the lower court’s confirmation of the grant of the reliefs sought for in the suit was wrong.

In conclusion, but for differences in phraseology, the issues formulated by the parties are in substance the same. But the appellant’s issues one and three are couched with some assumptions of facts to suit his arguments. This should not be so. I would therefore adopt the issues as formulated by the respondent. They are clearer to me.

Before I embark upon the resolution of the issues for determination, let me first dispose of the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. Chief Njoku for the respondent argued that all the four grounds of appeal are grounds of mixed law and facts and submitted, therefore, that by reason thereof the appeal can only be competent if it was filed with the leave either of the court below or this court in compliance with section 233(3) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It was his submission that since there was no leave to appeal, the appeal was incompetent. Mr. Madu for the appellant did not react to the preliminary point.

It needs to be emphasised that it is usually difficult to draw a distinction between a ground of law and a ground of fact, the distinction being always a very tiny one. The distinction becomes even more difficult when it involves a point of law and mixed law and fact. A ground of mixed law and facts or facts simpliciter does not necessarily become a ground of law simply because such an appellation has been accorded it by the appellant’s counsel. The court has the task of carefully examining the ground of appeal to ascertain this fine distinction. See Amuda v. Adelodun (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 360) 23 at 30; Ogbechie v. Onochie (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 484; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 718.

The following have been held to be some guidelines in the distinction between a ground of law on the one hand and a ground of mixed law and facts or facts on the other:-

1. Whether a ground of appeal complains of an error involving a misunderstanding or misconception of the law or a misapplication of the law to proved or admitted facts, it is a ground of law. See Amuda v. Adelodun (supra).
2. A ground of appeal which complains of the lower court’s exercise of its discretion necessarily involves the appellate court’s consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances upon which the discretion was exercised and so one of fact. But where the ground complains of the lower court’s use of wrong principles in the exercise of its discretion, the facts and circumstances in which the discretion was exercised are no longer in issue. The only issue in such a case is that of the alleged wrong principle and therefore one of law alone. See Metal Construction (WA.) Ltd. v. D.A. Migliore & Ors. (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 299 at 315.
3. A ground of appeal which complains of the lower court’s evaluation of evidence and alleges sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is one of fact or at best one of mixed law and facts. Where however the ground of appeal does not complain about the evaluation but only about the inference to be drawn from the established or admitted facts, its one of law. Similarly, where the ground of appeal alleges that there is no evidence upon which the lower court could reach its decision, it is a ground of law. See Anambra State Housing Development Corporation v. J.C.O. Emekwue (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 426) 505 at 527-528; Ifediorah v. Ume (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 74) 5; U.B.A. v. Stahlbau G.M.B.H. (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 374.

In this case, the four grounds of appeal without their particulars are as follows:

(a) The Court of Appeal erred in law when it held that the appellant did not prove his root of title to the land and this occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

(b) The lower court erred in law when it upheld the decision of the trial court declaring title by traditional history to the land in dispute in favour of the respondent who did not establish the root of title of his grantor Aneme Anukan.

(c) The lower court erred in law in holding that the provision of section 46 of the evidence act availed the respondent.

(d) The lower court erred in law when it held that the respondent led evidence in support of the reliefs claimed in the statement of claim and therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

It is clear from the above that grounds (a), (b) and (d) are grounds of mixed law and facts. The totality of the aforesaid three grounds is an invitation to this court to review the evidence to see if it supports the decision of the two lower courts. Ground (c) of the grounds of appeal is however distinguishable from the other three grounds. It questions whether, given the evidence established or admitted, section 46 of the Evidence Act was rightly invoked in favour of the respondent which, in my consideration, is a ground of law. It involves no question of evaluation of the evidence before the court. I hold therefore that ground (c) of the grounds of appeal being a ground of law, the appellant can appeal to this court as of right by virtue of the provisions of section 233(2)(a) of the 1999 constitution.

In view of the above consideration, it is my respectful view that the appeal is competent. The preliminary objection fails and is accordingly overruled.

I shall now proceed to consider the issues raised. With respect to the 1st issue, learned counsel for the appellant referred to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the statement of claim and submitted that the respondent whose claim is founded on evidence of tradition was bound to plead and establish such facts as; the person who founded the land and exercised original acts of possession, how he founded the land and the particulars of the intervening owners through whom he claims. For this submission, he relied on Onwugbufor v. Okoye (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 424) 252 at 280-281; Piaro v. Tenalo (1976) 12 SC 31; Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393. Having failed to plead and prove these crucial facts, counsel submitted, the respondent failed to prove that his father, Anukam Aneme, had title to the land in dispute, contending that he (Anukam Aneme) could not therefore have given to him what he did not have nemo dat quod non habet. He relied on Macaulay v. Omilaye (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 497) 94 at 102; Odubeko v. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 208) 637.

On the second issue of whether in the light of the evidence before the court, section 46 of the evidence act was rightly invoked in favour of the respondent, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that there was overwhelming evidence of the appellant’s numerous acts of possession of the land in dispute, and that the evidence was essentially unchallenged under cross-examination and should be taken as established. It was his submission therefore that section 46 of the evidence act ought to be invoked in favour of the appellant and not the respondent. For this submission he relied on Omoregbe v. Lawal (1980) 3-4 SC 108; Osakwe v. Governor of Imo State (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 191) 318 at 339. He referred, in particular, to the evidence that the appellant’s father, John Anukam built a photographic studio on the land in dispute as far back as 1932 which he gave to one Anuruo Ibekanwa who lived there from 1946 – 1952.

For more acts of possession, counsel referred further to the evidence of the PW 1 under cross-examination that the appellant started building a house on the land in dispute in 1967, erected temporary stores thereon after the civil war and that during the lifetime of the respondent’s father the appellant’s father had the DW1 as a tenant on the land in dispute. Counsel argued that there was no such evidence of the respondent’s possession of the land to avail him of the provisions of section 46 of the evidence act. On the prerequisites for the invocation of section 46 of the evidence act, learned counsel relied on Abibu v. Binutu (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 57; Ndiribe v. Ogbodu (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 599.

As regards the third issue, the substance of the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant is that whereas the relief for declaration of the respondent’s entitlement to a certificate of occupancy and injunction as pleaded in paragraph 26 of the statement of claim is in respect of the area verged GREEN the area verged RED is the area in dispute and that it is this area in respect of which the declaration and injunction ought to be granted. It was his submission therefore that there is no evidence in support of the green area for which the declaration and injunction were sought and granted. In this regard, counsel submitted that the concurrent findings of the two courts below are not supported by the evidence and therefore perverse.

Learned counsel for the appellant finally urged that all the issues be re-solved in favour of the appellant and the appeal is allowed with a dismissal of the respondent’s claim.

On the 1st issue for determination, learned counsel for the respondent made the following submissions. He referred to the pleadings in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim which were admitted by the appellant in paragraph 3(a)

of the amended statement of defence and submitted that by virtue of the provisions of section 75 of the evidence act they need no further proof. It was his further submission that the different and additional aspect of the appellant’s case pleaded in paragraph 3 – 6 of the amended statement of defence is that which burden of proof was squarely on appellant in accordance with the provisions of section 137 of the evidence act. On the specific issue, learned counsel referred to the concurrent findings of the two courts below about the appellant’s failure to prove as alleged and submitted that the findings are not perverse and ought not to be disturbed. Reliance was placed in Ude v. Nwangwu (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 416) 644 at 652; Chinwendu v. Mbamali (1980) 3-4 SC 31.

With respect to the 2nd issue for determination, learned counsel for the respondent referred to the pleadings in paragraph 7(c) of the amended statement of defence that the appellant’s father John Anuka allotted land to the respondent and argued that section 46 of the evidence act was rightly invoked particularly having regard to the established fact that the respondent’s house is adjacent to the land in dispute.

For the 3rd issue the substance of the submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that since the entire land of the respondent is verged GREEN including the area verged RED which is the area in dispute, the trial court was in order in granting the relief as claimed.

The above represents the substance of the submissions of counsel in their respective briefs of argument. I shall now endeavour to resolve the issues starting with the first issue. It poses the question of where lies the burden of proof having regard to the pleadings and evidence. It is the contention of the appellant that the respondents, having failed to plead and prove his root of title by evidence of tradition, failed to discharge the onus of proof on him. The argument of the respondent on the other hand is that it is the appellant who failed to prove the root of his title to the land in dispute.

In the first place, had the plaintiff/respondent any duty, going by his case as set out in the statement of claim, to plead and prove the original founder of the land in dispute, how he founded it and the intervening persons through whom it devolved down to his father Anukam Aneme from whom he inherited it I shall answer this question in the negative. It is true that in Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 SC (Reprint) 140 at 154-155 this court has laid down the five modes of proof of title to land. The first of these is that ownership of land may be proved by traditional evidence. The burden and standard of proof of each case depends on the nature of the case as pleaded. Where, as in this case, the plaintiff alleges that he got the land from his father and the defendant does not deny or challenge this allegation, then plaintiff has no duty to prove the father’s own source of his title. To drive this point home, it is necessary to reproduce paragraphs 3-12 of the statement of claim.

“3. The land the subject matter of this suit (hereinafter called the land in dispute) is situate at No.2 Ekeonunwa street, Owerri, and forms part of a family land traditionally known as and called “ISHI ONUEKU ONE” where the father of the plaintiff, ANUKAM ANEME, lived with his wife and children;

4. The land in dispute verged RED in the plaintiff’s plan is part of the plaintiff’s land verged GREEN. The entire plaintiff’s land is bounded by the houses of Dick Anukam, Sunday John Anukam, Patrick and Hezekiah Ibejiako and by Ekeonunwa street;
5. Many years ago when the plaintiff was a minor the plaintiff’s father made a gift inter vivos of the land verged GREEN in the survey plan no.GIKS/IMD/89/92 drawn by G. I. Ikeh, a registered surveyor and filed together with this statement of claim to the plaintiff;
6. The gift was made in the presence of John Anukam (the father of the defendant), William Anukam (also called Wilfred Anukam), Dick Anukam and Godwin Anukam all being brothers of the plaintiff and sons of the plaintiff’s father.
7. Also in the presence of the sons, the plaintiff’s father entrusted the said land to the plaintiff’s aunt, Beatrice Okenwa to look after for the plaintiff.
8. The plaintiff’s father had hitherto made gifts of various portions of land in the compound to his sons who built and lived in the houses as shown in the survey plan.
9. The plaintiff’s aunt built a mud house on a portion of the plaintiff’s land and lived therein while erecting another mud house on the portion verged RED in the plan and let same out on rent. The plaintiff’s aunt used the proceeds from the rent in paying plaintiff’s school fees.
10. When the plaintiff became a major, the aunt handed over the two buildings to the plaintiff. Plaintiff lived in the house formerly occupied by his aunt while allowing the one on rent to continue to be on rent.
11. During the Nigerian civil war, the two buildings were destroyed. At the end of hostilities the plaintiff rebuilt the house he lived in, using concrete blocks for the walls and corrugated iron sheets for the roof. He did not rebuild the house that was let out on rent but let it out to tenants who used it as open stalls. That portion of the plaintiff’s land overlooks the Owerri main market and is separated from the market by Ekeonunwa street. This portion is verged RED and is the land in dispute.
12. In 1977, the defendant, without the consent of the plaintiff broke and entered the land in dispute and started the construction of a building.

In paragraph 3(a) of the amended statement of defence, the appellant pleaded:

“Paragraph 3 of the statement of claim is also admitted. Furthermore, the defendant avers that the great grandfather of the defendant and grandfather of the plaintiff lived on the land with their relations Uwaleke Eshika, Eke Onugha on the land in dispute. Both begat children on this land.”

It is clear from the above that the appellant admitted paragraph 3 of the statement of claim in his own paragraph 3(a) of the statement of defence without any qualification. It is surprising therefore that he proceeds to plead in the same paragraph 3(a) and other paragraphs of the amended statement of defence a different source of his root of title. The respondent maintained his source of title to be his father, Anukam Aneme, and at the trial was at pains to prove just that. And in view of the appellant’s admission of his assertion in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim, he had no duty to prove the person who founded the land, how he founded it and the person through whom the land devolved on his father. For the purpose and proof of his title, the respondent had no duty to plead and prove more facts than he did. In my view, it was sufficient if he established that the land belong to his father, Anukam Aneme, who gave same to him and that is what he did.

On this question of whether the land in dispute belonged to the respondent’s father, Anukam Aneme as claimed by the respondent or Onugha Uwaleke as claimed by the appellant, the testimony of the DW4 supported the case of the respondent. At page 61 of the record of proceedings the DW2 Obodi Akuebionwu said:

“I know the land in dispute. I know that the land belongs to Anukam since I was a boy. The Anukam I am talking about is the father of John. I know late John Anukam. The late John Anukam was a steward. Apart from being a steward, he was also a photographer.”

This was the testimony of the DW4 in chief. It supports the case of the respondent that the land belonged to Anukam Aneme and not Onugha Uwaleke who is the appellant’s source of title. The well settled principle of law is that in a claim for declaration of title to land, the plaintiff has to succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence. Where however, evidence from the defendant supports the case of the plaintiff he is entitled to rely on it. This was the principle in Akinola v. Oluwo (1962) 1 SCNLR 352; Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336; Omoni v. Tom (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 195) 93; Obiaso v. Okoye (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 119) 80.

In this case, having regard to the strong evidence of the respondent supported by the evidence of the DW4 highlighted above, it is futile for the appellant to contend that the burden of proof still remained with the respondent. I have no doubt in my mind that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the claim of the respondent.

On the other hand, it was not unreasonable to expect that the appellant who is a grandson of Anukam Aneme would also trace his title to him. He did not do that. Rather he traced it to Onugha Uwaleke. I am persuaded by the argument of the respondent that it was the appellant who had the duty to plead and prove the person through whom Uwaleke derived his title. On this issue of burden of proof, the learned trial Judge at page 95 of the record said:

“It is settled law that once a party pleads and traces the root of title to a particular person or family, he must establish how that person came to have title vested in him. He cannot ignore the proof of his overlord’s title and rely on long possession Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig) Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 393 at 395. Did the defendant who pleaded traditional evidence fulfil this requirement of the law. In my view he had not. The defendant merely pleaded and traced the persons upon whom he alleged the land in dispute devolved upon and finally came to Onugha without any trace of how Onugha became the owner. Again, the introduction of Onugha into the lineage of Anukam seems to portray a doubtful nexus.”

The above represents the correct position of the legal burden of proof on the appellant going by the state of the pleadings. And I have no conceivable reason to fault the above finding by the trial court that the appellant failed to discharge this burden. It is not surprising therefore that the court below adopted the above reasoning and conclusion of the trial court in its entirety and concluded thus: ” From all what I have said, suffice it therefore to say that the appellant failed to prove his title to the land in dispute.” (See pages 157-158 of the record.)

I agree with the concurrent findings of the two courts below that the appellant failed to establish his alleged title to the land in dispute through the traditional evidence on which he relied.

Still on this question of proof of the respective cases of the parties, it is necessary to examine other aspects of the case contained in the pleadings and evidence. The case of the respondent is substantially as pleaded in paragraphs 3-12 which I have reproduced above. The evidence in support thereof came from two witnesses only, the PW1 and the respondent himself PW2. They are both sons of Anukam Aneme. The only discrepancy identified by the trial court was as to the year the appellant started erecting a building on the land in dispute. While the PWI said it was in 1967 the respondent said it was in 1977. The trial court reasoned that it was a mere discrepancy not fatal to the case of the respondent. I agree with that assessment. Besides, this discrepancy the evidence from the two witnesses is consistent with the case of the respondent as pleaded. The PW1 besides being a son of Anukam Aneme was one of those in whose presence Anukam Aneme made the gift of the land verged GREEN in plaintiff’s plan including the land in dispute. The learned trial Judge accorded credence to his evidence and I have no doubt that he had good cause so to do.

With respect to the case of the appellant, apart from the finding that he failed to establish the traditional history pleaded, the trial court identified some material contradictions. In paragraph 8 of the amended statement of defence the appellant pleaded as follows:

“8. Anukam Aneme died in 1955. He never shared land to anybody in the family and never encroached on John Onuegbu Anukam property which he inherited from Onugha. The plaintiff had all along been in Owerri and all through the lifetime of John Anukam he never disputed this land in dispute. The purported gift is a mere ruse. No gift was ever made to the plaintiff.”

Yet in his evidence under cross-examination at page 58 of the record, the appellant said:

“Anukam Aneme gave the plaintiff and the mother where they were living in the compound. Anukam Aneme was my grandfather.”

No explanation was offered for this contradiction between the pleading in paragraph 8 of the amended statement of defence and the evidence of the appellant himself. Again, the learned trial Judge pointed out another contradiction in the evidence of the appellant himself and the DW4. At page 97 of the record the trial Judge said:

“Again it has to be noted, and I agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that of the four witnesses called by the defendant only the DW3 and DW4 gave evidence as to the ownership of the land. While the DW4 testified that the land belonged to the grandfather of the defendant, i.e. Anukam Aneme, the DW3 i.e. the defendant said that the land in dispute was his father’s inheritance from Onugha. This again is a material contradiction in the evidence of the two witnesses.”

In view of the foregoing contradictions highlighted, the learned trial Judge accorded no credibility to the traditional evidence of the appellant. At page 98 of the record, the trial court also pointed out inconsistencies in the evidence of DW2 and rejected his evidence as being unreliable. The court below reproduced the reasoning and findings of the trial court which it wholly endorsed. I have no reason to disturb the concurrent findings of the two courts below. They are amply supported by the evidence on record. The result is that I resolve the 1st issue for determination against the appellant.

The 2nd issue pertains to the propriety or otherwise in the invocation of section 46 of the evidence act in favour of the respondent. It was the contention of the appellant that there was evidence of his numerous acts of possession and ownership on and around the land in dispute to warrant the inference that he has title to it. It was his submission therefrom that section 46 of the evidence act was wrongly invoked in favour of the respondent.

The case of the respondent and accepted by the court below is that the land verged GREEN in exhibit “B” and which includes the land verged RED was given to him by his father and grandfather of the appellant, Anukam Aneme in the presence of his other children namely John Anukam (appellant’s father), William Anukam, Godwin Anukam and Dick Anukam and his maternal aunt Beatrice Okenwa that he gave it on trust to Beatrice Okenwa for him. Beatrice Okenwa split the land into two and built thatched houses on them. She lived in one and rented out the other to tenants which proceeds she used in paying his school fees. When the land was surrendered to him, he continued to live on the part where she lived and collected rents on the other part. During the civil war they fled. On their return after the civil war, the buildings had been damaged. He rebuilt the part where he now lives and rented out the empty portion to traders who paid him rent. It is this empty portion on which the appellant encroached and which is the land in dispute. The appellant does not deny the respondent’s title to the area verged GREEN except the portion verged RED which is the land in dispute. The land in dispute is contiguous to the area not in dispute. And in view of the respondent’s acts of ownership cover the undisputed portion, the learned trial Judge at page 103 of the record found:

“It seems to me that these and all the other acts of the plaintiff in asserting his right over the land in dispute coupled with the contiguous nature of the land in dispute to the undisputed property of the plaintiff are sufficient to raise the probability that the plaintiff is in addition to his house the owner of the land in dispute. See the case of Okechukwu v. Okafor (supra) and section 46 of the evidence act, 1990.”

The above clearly shows that the respondent’s user of the undisputed portion of the land verged GREEN and its contiguity to the land in dispute. These facts are uncontroverted and therefore established. The fact of contiguity is even clearly borne out in exhibit “B”. In the face of these established facts, I do not fancy any error in the trial court’s invocation of section 46 of the evidence act. It is not surprising therefore that the court below also fully endorsed the conclusion of the trial at page 162 of the record. The result is that I also resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.

The third and last issue is whether the lower court was right in affirming the reliefs granted by the trial court. I have earlier in this judgment reproduced the reliefs claimed by the respondent. Relief one thereof seeks a declaration that the respondent is entitled to statutory certificate of occupancy to the land verged GREEN in the respondent’s plan exhibit “B”. With respect to the relief claimed, the respondent testifying as PW2 said:

“I want the court to declare that I am entitled to the statutory certificate of occupancy of the land in dispute.”

The substance of the argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that the land in dispute is the area verged RED in plaintiff’s plan exhibit “B” which is not the same thing as the land verged GREEN. It was his submission therefore that the court granted a relief not claimed by the respondent. Technically, the argument sounds reasonable. In practical terms however, the argument is neither here nor there. The area verged RED which is the land in dispute forms part of the same parcel of land verged GREEN. The area to which the appellant made adverse claim was restricted to the area verged RED within the larger area verged GREEN. Although the judgment has given title of the land verged GREEN to the respondent, the appellant’s loss is nevertheless confined to the area verged RED since he made no claim to any area outside the area verged RED. Therefore, the declaration in respect of the GREEN area notwithstanding, the appellant has suffered no greater loss than the area verged RED and cannot be heard to complain. The result is that this issue is also resolved in favour of the respondent.

On the whole, I am satisfied that the appeal is without substance and is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. I assess the costs of this appeal at N10,000.00 in favour of the respondent.

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SC.257/2002