Home » Nigerian Cases » Supreme Court » Guaranty Trust Bank Plc V. Est Master Construction Limited (2018) LLJR-SC

Guaranty Trust Bank Plc V. Est Master Construction Limited (2018) LLJR-SC

Guaranty Trust Bank Plc V. Est Master Construction Limited (2018)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

The Respondent commenced garnishee proceedings at the High Court of Rivers State against the Applicant and some other banks, to enforce the Judgment sum of N99, 600. 457.05 obtained against its customer, Admiralty Fleet Ltd. (Judgment Debtor). The trial Court granted the Motion ex-parte on 6/5/2013, and made a Garnishee Order Nisi against the Applicant, who was the first Gamishee, and other Garnishee Banks.

Upon being served, the Gamishee Banks filed their Affidavits to show cause as to why the said order Nisi should not be made Absolute. In the Applicant’s Affidavit deposed to by its external counsel based on information provided by one of its Legal Officers, Eddy Henshaw, it was averred that the Judgment Debtor had an Account with the Bank, and that the sum of N99, 600, 457.05 in the Account had been blocked.

However, the Applicant later filed a Further and Better Affidavit, wherein it averred that the earlier Affidavit was incorrect because the said Eddy Henshaw inadvertently lifted the Judgment sum stated on the Order Nisi and mistakenly reproduced it as available in the

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Judgment Debtor’s Account. The Affidavits were deposed to by same Deponent. On 7/1/2014, the trial Court discharged three Gamishees and ordered

In respect of the 1st Garnishee, Guaranty Trust Bank Plc., in view of the self-contradictory position taken by the said bank through its Legal Officer, Eddy Henshaw, he is hereby ordered to appear before this Court on 13/1/2014 so that he may clarify his explanation on oath for the contradictory information supplied by him to the Deponent, Joseph George, and precisely cross-examined by the Garnishor in this Application. This case is adjourned to 13/1/2014 for Eddy Henshaw to appear before this Court and for Ruling on the Garnishee Application in respect of the 1st Garnishee, GTB Plc.

On 13/1/2014, Eddy Henshaw did not appear in Court as ordered and the Applicant’s counsel informed the trial Court that he was no longer in the Applicant’s employment. Learned counsel addressed the Court, and in the Court Ruling delivered the same day -13/1/2014, the learned trial Judge, Georgewill, J. (as he then was) concluded as follows –

GTB Plc.’s Further Affidavit, which has refused to utilize the

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opportunity offered to them by the Court to clarify the contradictions is a complete afterthought and it is hereby discountenanced. I believe the Affidavit to show cause to the effect that Judgment Debtor has in its Account the Judgment sum of which has been duly blocked by the GTB Plc., in due difference (sic) to the Order Nisi duly served on it. In the circumstances, therefore, there are no justifiable logical reasons or ground instituting against the making of the Order Nisi absolute against the 1st Garnishee, GTB Plc. Consequently, the Order Nisi made on 6/5/2013 by this Court against the GTB Plc., to show cause is hereby made absolute.

The Applicant’s Appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed but the Applicant did not appeal against its decision to this Court within time, which is why it has now filed this Application praying inter alia for extension of time to seek leave to appeal against the said Judgment; leave to appeal; and extension of time to appeal against the Judgment.

It also seeks the leave of this Court to introduce and argue a fresh Ground of Appeal (Relief 4); deeming prayers in respect of its Notice of Appeal already filed and

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the Record of Appeal already compiled and transmitted to this Court (Reliefs 5 & 6); abridgment of time to file Briefs (Relief 7); and Stay of Execution (Relief 8), which it withdrew at the hearing of this Application, and the said Relief 8 was struck out.

The Application is supported by a 35-paragraph Affidavit and 12 – paragraph Further and Better Affidavit. In opposing the Application, the Respondent filed a 20-paragraph Counter-Affidavit with paragraph 8 of the Counter Affidavit having sub-paragraphs a. – z. and aa. – ff. Both Parties filed their respective Written Address, and the Applicant formulated four Issues for Determination in its own Written Address –

(i) Whether in the present circumstances, the Appellant is entitled to the exercise of the discretion of this Court granting it (I) extension of time to file his appeal, (II) leave to appeal, and (III) extension of time to file his appeal, against the judgment of the lower Court.

(ii) Whether the Applicant has appropriately sought leave to raise fresh issue not argued at the lower Court and which issue nullifies the Garnishee Order Absolute.

(iii) Whether in the present

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circumstances, the grant of departure to compile transmit record of appeal and directions on briefs of arguments will serve the interest of justice.

(iv) Whether in the present circumstances, it is in the interest of justice to stay the execution of the Judgment of the lower Court pending the determination of the Appeal filed before this Court.

The Respondent adopted the four Issues for Determination formulated by the Applicant in its Written Address. I will also do same in dealing with this Application. The Applicant’s contention under the first Issue is that it is entitled to the exercise of this Court’s discretion in granting Reliefs 1, 2 and 3; it referred the Court to the position of the law on –

– Requirement of leave to appeal on grounds other than of law alone: Section 233 (2) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Akeredolu V. Akinremi (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 25) 710 cited.

– Onus on Party seeking leave to appeal out of time: Order 2 Rule 31 (2) of the Supreme Court Rules, Re-Adewunmi (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 83) 483; Lamai V. Orbih (1980) 12 NSCC 188, Co-operative and Commercial Bank Ltd. V. Ogwuru (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt.284) 630;

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Ibodo V. Enarofia (1980) 5-7 SC 42; and Ukwu V. Bunge (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 518) 527 at 541 cited.

– Need to refrain from deciding upon the merits of the grounds of appeal when considering an application for leave to appeal Observation of Udoma, JSC, in Holman Bros. (Nig.) Ltd. V. Kigo (Nig. Ltd. & Anor. (1980) 8-11 SC 43 at 62, and the statement of Ejiwunmi, JSC, in CBN V. Ahmed (2001) 28 WRN 38; (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 724) 368 cited and quoted at pages 15-16.

It submitted that this Court has the power to extend the statutory period for giving notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal – Section 27(2) and (4) of the Supreme Court Act, Cap. S15, LFN 2004; and that this Court’s discretion must, however, be exercised judicially and judiciously after a consideration of the affidavit evidence, citingHolman Bros. (Nigeria) Limited V. Kigo (Nigeria) Limited (supra).

As to its reasons for failing to appeal within time, it referred to paragraphs 13 – 21 of its Affidavit where the Deponent averred that –

  1. The Appeal was subsequently heard and Judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal on 16/06/15. In the Judgment dismissing the

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Appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of the High Court and further held that the Appellant/Applicant allegedly withheld evidence for failure to produce Eddy Henshaw, despite evidence before the Court that he was no longer in the Appellant/Applicant’s employment.

  1. In affirming the ruling of the High Court, the Court of Appeal failed to consider that (it) relied on its Further and Better Affidavit to which was attached the Judgment Debtor’s Statement of Account, despite the two conflicting Affidavits emanating from it on whether or not the Judgment Debtor had sufficient funds in its account to satisfy the Judgment Debt. (Copy of the Judgment attached as Exhibit OA2)
  2. Upon perusal of the Court of Appeal Judgment, the Applicant and its officials were dissatisfied with the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeal in affirming the Judgment of the High Court, and intend to challenge the Judgment before this Honourable Court. (Copy of the said proposed Notice of Appeal attached thereto as Exhibit OA3)
  3. On 14/9/15, being dissatisfied with the Judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Applicant filed its Notice of Appeal to
See also  Adebowale Ajao V. The State (1984) LLJR-SC

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this Honourable Court against the said Judgment within time. (Copy of the Notice of Appeal dated 11/9/15 attached as Exhibit OA4)

  1. I know as a fact by virtue of my legal training and practice that the Grounds of Appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal involve questions of facts and/or mixed law and fact. The Applicant requires the leave of this Court to properly file the appeal, hence the instant application.
  2. The Applicant had earlier filed an Application for leave to appeal and stay of execution before this Court on 19/10/15. The Application was fixed for hearing on 23/1/17 but could not be taken as the Respondent just filed its Reply Brief and same was not available in the Court file. The Application was accordingly adjourned till 27/6/17 for hearing.
  3. On 19/1/17, in the course of preparing for the hearing of the said Application, the Applicant’s counsel discovered that he had filed the Application after the mandatory statutory period of 3 months from the date of the Court of Appeal Judgment without a prayer for an order for extension of time to seek leave in the Application (the Application for leave and stay dated 19/10/15

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attached thereto as Exhibit OA5)

  1. I know for a fact that the omission to include the prayer for extension of time to seek leave to appeal in Exhibit OA5 is due to the mistake of the Applicant’s counsel, who had thought that the Application for leave was filed within time, like the Notice of Appeal.
  2. The Applicant has now filed the instant Application before this Court for extension of time to seek leave to appeal, and extension of time to file its Appeal, and to deem the Notice of Appeal as properly filed.

The Applicant argued that by the above averments in the said Affidavit, it provided good and substantial reasons for granting this Application since the failure to file the application for leave to appeal within time was due to the omission of its counsel and not the fault of the Applicant – Lamai V. Orbih (1980) 12 NSCC 188, Elobisi V. Onyeonwu (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 120) 224. It then urged this Court to grant the Application in the interest of justice as it “indeed took steps to appeal within time, though wrongly taken by error (and) has now taken the proper steps to regularize the Appeal already filed”, especially as its affidavit

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evidence has amply demonstrated the reasons for failure to appeal and seek leave within time – Ifebuzor V. Nwabueze (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 560) 148.

It also submitted that its Grounds of Appeal prima facie show good cause why the Appeal should be heard. It analyzed the Grounds of Appeal 1 and 2, and argued that the holding of the Court of Appeal that evidence of “Eddy Henshaw” would have been unfavourable to it, is mere speculation, which has no place in the adjudicatory process – Olufeagba V. Abdul-Raheem (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 384 at 439 and Archibong V. Ita (2004) All FWLR (Pt 197) 930 at 955 cited.

Furthermore, that its contention under Grounds 3 and 4 is that the Court below was wrong to affirm the trial Court’s Ruling when it failed to give reasons for believing facts in the Affidavit as opposed to facts in the Further and Better Affidavit, which is critical, and this Court has emphasized that a Court must give reasons for exercising its discretion, Ekwunife V. Wayne (WA) Ltd. (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 422 at 447 and Olowolaramo V. Umechukwu (2003) FWLR. (Pt. 183) 109 cited.

It is, therefore, its contention that the said Grounds 1 to 4 of

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the Grounds of Appeal show that the Court of Appeal failed to review the decision of the trial Court; and failed to properly evaluate the evidence and the findings of the trial Court. It submitted that the Grounds are not frivolous but raise substantial issues of fact or law for the consideration of this Court; that they raise arguable points of law on the propriety of the decision of the lower Court affirming the Ruling of the trial Court, and it has shown good cause on why the Appeal should be heard – Obikoya V. Wema Bank (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.96) 157 at 178 cited; and that a refusal of this Application will have grave consequences on the Applicant who has shown its readiness to diligently pursue the Appeal.

The Respondent also referred the Court to the position of the law, citing Minister, PMRV. E.L. (Nig.) Ltd. (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1208) 261 at 294, CPC V. Nyako (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1277) 451 at 471/2. It contends that the said four Grounds of Appeal do not raise any issue of general importance or novel points of law and neither do they show a prima facie arguable Appeal. It also analyzed the Grounds of Appeal vis-a-vis the Judgment of the Court of Appeal

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and argued that contrary to the Application’s contention, the Court of Appeal had considered all the facts and circumstances of the case before arriving at its decision.

As to Grounds 3 and 4, it cited Iloabachie V. Iloabachie (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 178 and Order 2 Rule 32 of the Rules ,of this Court, and submitted that where the Court of Appeal affirmed a finding of fact of the trial Court, this Court can only grant leave to appeal against same in exceptional circumstances, which is non-existent in the instant case.

The Applicant countered in its Reply on Points of Law that the Respondent’s submissions are entirely misconceived in that it suggests that a ground of appeal must disclose a likelihood of success as opposed to an arguable point before a relief sought can be granted, which is not the position of the law as ordained by this Court in its decided cases; and that it is settled that a Party, who seeks leave to appeal, must advance good reasons for failure to appeal within time, and the ground of appeal must show prima facie good cause why it should be heard – Chime V. Onwuegbu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 723)1874, 1884, Lamai V. Orbih (supra),

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Co-operative and Commercial Bank V. Ogwuru (supra), Ibodo V. Enarofia (supra) and Ukwu V. Bunge (supra) cited.

It further submitted that contrary to the Respondent’s submission, it has, by its Affidavit, shown satisfactory reasons why the Application should be granted by the Court; that the inadvertence of its counsel was honest and sincere and sufficient to entitle it to this Court’s discretion.

On the second condition, it submitted that it set out its complaint against the Judgment appealed against in this Notice of Appeal; and at Paragraphs 22 to 25 of its supporting Affidavit, it demonstrated the fact that the proposed Grounds of Appeal are arguable, so it has effectively and effectually satisfied the two conditions for the grant of the reliefs.

Furthermore, that by its submissions, the Respondent is inviting this Court to consider the merits of the Appeal at this preliminary stage, which is wrong in law, because all that is required of it is to show that there are arguable grounds of appeal not necessarily grounds that may eventfully succeed – CBN V. Ahmed (2001) 11 NWLR (pt. 724) 368.

As the Applicant said, there are two conditions

See also  Chief T. F. Oruwari V. Mrs. Ine Osler (2012) LLJR-SC

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spelt out by the law that must be satisfied before an Application of this nature is granted – see Order 2 Rule 31 of the Rules of this Court, which provides –

(1) The Court may enlarge the time provided by these Rules for the doing of anything to which these Rules apply, or may direct a departure – – in any other way when this is required in the interest of justice.

(2) Every application for an enlargement of time in which to apply for leave to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for the failure to appeal and to apply for leave to appeal within the prescribed period. There shall be exhibited or annexed to such affidavit –

(a) A copy of the Judgment from which it is intended to appeal;

(b) A copy of other proceedings necessary to support the complaints against the Judgment; and

(c) Grounds of Appeal which prima facie show good cause why the Appeal should be heard.

So, where time within which to appeal has expired, the Appellant may apply for extension of time to seek leave to appeal; and it is crucial that he files what are generally referred to as “the Three-Legged Prayers”, ” Tripod

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Prayers ” or ” Trinity Prayers ” for (a) extension of time to seek leave to appeal; (b) leave to appeal; and (c) extension of time to appeal. For there to be a valid appeal, the three reliefs must be granted by the Court – see Odofin V. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 350 at 375 SC.

To this end, an Applicant has to convince this Court that the delay in bringing such an Application is neither willful nor inordinate and that there are good and substantial reasons for the failure to appeal within the prescribed period; and what is more, their grounds of appeal must prima facie show good cause why the Appeal should be heard at all. The two conditions are conjunctive and not disjunctive, therefore, they must co-exist – Nwora V. Nwabueze (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1271) 467.

In this case, the essence of the Applicant’s Application is that the delay in filing the said Application was due to inadvertence of counsel because after he filed the Notice of Appeal on 14/9/2015 within three months as provided for by Section 27 (2) of the Supreme Court Act and the initial Application for leave to appeal and stay filed on 19/10/2015 its counsel, while preparing for hearing of

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the application on 19/1/2017, found he omitted a prayer for extension of time to seek leave to appeal.

Inadvertence of counsel is a familiar refrain heard by this Court in Applications of this nature. It is true that inadvertence of counsel or counsel’s error in judgment, if reasonable, is an acceptable explanation for delay in applying for leave to appeal. As this Court pointed out in Shanu V. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt 684) 392/403

In Akinyede V. The Appraiser (1971) A All NLR 162 counsel’s carelessness was held by this Court to be good reason for failure to appeal within time, provided such carelessness is pardonable. In Doherty v. Doherty (1964) 1 All NLR 299 and Bowaje v. Adediwura (1976) 6 SC 143 pardonable inadvertence of counsel was accepted as good and substantial reason for the delay. In Alagbe v. His Highness S. Abimbola & Ors (1978) NSCC 84; (1978) 2 SC 39 where delay was partly due to counsel and his clerk, the delay was held to be satisfactorily explained.

However, it is not yet uhuru, so to speak, because Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, warned counsel in Iroegbu v. Okwordu (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) 643 that

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notwithstanding the decisions of this Court on the said subject in Akinyede V. The Appraiser (supra), Doherty V. Doherty (supra), and the case of Ahmadu V. Salawu (1971) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 318 –

The Courts will not regard this as universal talisman, the waiver of which will act as panacea in all cases. The Courts must be satisfied that the allegation of the fault of counsel is true and genuine, but also that it is availing having regard to the circumstances of the particular case.

The 1990 warning of Nnaemeka, JSC, in Iroegbu V. Okwordu (supra) remained unheeded and because of the frequency of attributing almost all non-compliance with the Law and Rules of Court on the “mistake” or “inadvertence” of counsel, the current trend in judicial practice is to distinguish inadvertence of counsel from the ineptitude of counsel – see a recent Judgment of this Court in Appeal No. SC. 113/2013 – Malari & Ors V. Leigh (unreported) delivered on 12/1/2018, where a similar Application was refused; I. T. Muhammad, JSC, stated as follows –

This, I believe is one of the few instances where a Party must take a quick, effective and spontaneous decision in

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relation to the way and manner/bear the consequence of the ineptitude, negligence of counsel handling his case – – Mistake, inadvertence and sickness of counsel can always be distinguished from ineptitude, complete ignorance or malfeasance exhibited by counsel.

Thus, the rule that a litigant should not be punished for the mistake or inadvertence of counsel does not extend to a situation where his counsel has exhibited tardiness and incompetence. The question in this case is whether inadvertence of counsel is within limits or has crossed the line to sheer ineptitude on the part of the Applicant’s counsel in this matter.

In paragraphs 18 & 19 of its supporting Affidavit, it was averred that –

18.The Applicant had earlier filed an Application for leave to appeal and stay of execution before this Court on 19/10/15. The Application was fixed for hearing on 23/1/17 but could not be taken as the Respondent just filed its Reply Brief and same was not available in the Court file. The Application was accordingly adjourned till 27/6/17 for hearing.

  1. On 19/1/17, in the course of preparing for the hearing of the said Application, the

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Applicant’s counsel discovered that he had filed the Application after the mandatory statutory period of 3 months from the date of the Court of Appeal Judgment without a prayer for an order for extension of time to seek leave in the Application.

The way I see it, this first condition is not a drawback to the Application as the Applicant had filed an initial Application within time before the error in not including the first prayer to extend the time was discovered. Its counsel ought to have been more diligent, but in such circumstances, I do not think that the said error suggests ineptitude on counsel’s part.

But it is not over yet, for an application of this nature to succeed, the Applicant must also show that there are grounds which prima facie show good cause why the Appeal should be heard. The two conditions go hand in hand – see Nwora V. Nwabueze (supra) where it was held-

For an application for extension of time to appeal to succeed, the Applicant must show to the Court that the delay in bringing the application is neither willful nor inordinate; that there are good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the

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prescribed period; and there are ground’s which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. The two conditions are held to co-exist. If one is non-existent the Application must fail – the two conditions are conjunctive not disjunctive.

However, as this Court also stated in Nwora V. Nwabueze (supra), this is not the time to enquire into the merit or otherwise of the case because that would surely amount to deciding the substantive matter in an interlocutory application, which the law absolutely frowns upon.

See also  Standard (Nigeria) Engineering Company Ltd & Anor. V. Nigerian Bank For Commerce And Industry (2006) LLJR-SC

In this case, I agree with the Applicant that the Respondent’s submissions, and even the averments in its Counter-Affidavit, dwelt on the substantive issue for determination in the Appeal, which is wrong, because as Ejiwunmi, JSC, also observed in CBN V. Ahmed (supra) –

The duty of the Court in the consideration of grounds of appeal proposed by an application for leave to appeal is limited to whether the grounds of appeal are substantial und reveal arguable grounds. It is not the business of the Court at this stage to decide the merits of such grounds as are filed in support of the application.

See also Obikoya V. Wema

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Bank Ltd. (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 157 at 178, wherein this Court per Obaseki, JSC, explained as follows –

The grounds of appeal required to be exhibited are only to show why the appeal should be heard. The Rule does not require the grounds to show why the appeal should be allowed. Although in both cases, the grounds of appeal should be substantial, the certainty required in the latter case does not necessarily need to be present in the former case. A ground showing good cause why an appeal should be heard is a ground, which raises substantial issues of fact or law for the consideration of the Court. It is a ground, which cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand or totally lacking in substance. It is a ground, which evokes a serious debate as to the correctness of the decision of the Court below. It is a ground, which taxes the intellect and reasoning faculties of the appeal Judges. It is a ground, which is not frivolous.

In this case, Oladipupo Abimbola, legal practitioner in the Applicant’s counsel’s law firm, averred in paragraph 22 of Applicant’s Affidavit

I was informed by Mr. Folabi Kuti of counsel in our firm on 20/1/17 at

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about 11a.m. in our office of Duplex D3, Jima Plaza, Plot 1267, Ahmadu Bello Way, Garki, Abuja and I verily believe him (being one of the counsel directly involved in the handling of this appeal) as follows:

(i) That the Applicant has a good and arguable appeal in which the Judgment of the Supreme Court maybe decreed in its favour.

(ii) The grounds of appeal show good cause why the Appeal should be heard as they contain substantial issues of facts and law for the consideration of this Court on the propriety of the decision of the Court of Appeal.

(iii) A refusal of the instant Application for leave to appeal will have grave consequences on the Applicant who has shown its readiness to diligently pursue the Appeal, as it will be denied for all time to have the appeal heard on the merits.

(iv) There are exceptional circumstances to justify the grant of leave to appeal sought herein, particularly that the Applicant stands in an unfair position to pay a debt it does not owe.

(v) That the Applicant is not the Judgment Debtor, but one who through an error of judgment has been made to be answerable for the Judgment Debt and the analogy

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of not depriving the Judgment Creditor of the fruits of its Judgment will not readily describe the Applicant’s unwillingness to meet the Judgment Debt.

He further averred as follows in paragraph 23 of the said Affidavit –

The Applicant is desirous of challenging the Judgment of the Court of Appeal before this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeal ought to consider the failure of the High Court to provide reasons for choosing to believe the ‘affidavit to show cause’ as opposed to the further and better ‘affidavit to show cause’, though the said issue was not taken before the Court of Appeal.

The proposed Grounds of Appeal, without particulars, are as follows-

GROUND 1:

The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they held at page 16 of the Judgment as follows: “The learned counsel to the respondent was right in his submission that the Appellant deliberately withheld the evidence of Eddy Henshaw because had they produced him, the evidence would be unfavoarable to the Appellant”, and subsequently proceeded to affirm the finding of the trial Court in this regard.

GROUND 2:

The learned Justices of the

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Court of Appeal misdirected themselves when they equated the failure to produce Eddy Henshaw, the bank’s officer, with the failure to produce the deponent of the Affidavit and Further Affidavit to show cause.

GROUND 3:

The Court of Appeal erred in affirming the trial Court’s finding/position on the ‘Affidavit to show cause’ as opposed to the ‘Further and Better to show cause’.

GROUND 4:

The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they made an Order dismissing the Appeal with APPEAL NO: CA/PH/314/2014-GTB v. MASTER CONSTRUCTION LIMITED on 16/6/2015 and made an order as to cost against the Appellant in the sum of N100,000.00 only.

As the Respondent rightly submitted, leave to appeal in this case where the Court of Appeal affirmed the findings of fact of the trial Court can only be granted in exceptional circumstances. This is clearly spelt out in Order 2 Rule 32 of the Rules of this Court, which provides that –

Where, in an appeal to the Court from the Court below, the Court below has affirmed the findings of fact of the Court of first instance, any application to the Court in pursuance of its jurisdiction under

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Section 233(3) of the Constitution for leave to appeal shall be granted only in exceptional circumstances.

The definition of the word “exceptional” ‘is “much greater than usual” – see Cambridge English Dictionary. In other words, in this case where the Court of Appeal has affirmed the findings of fact of the trial Court, the Applicant has to jump through an extra hoop to convince this Court to grant this Application; how has it fared Not very good, I must say.

There is nothing exceptional about the circumstances of this case to sway this Court to grant this Application in favour of the Applicant. The Rules of this Court speak of grounds of appeal, which prima facie, show good cause why the Appeal should be heard. Prima facie means “on the face of it; on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information” – see Black’s Law Dictionary. 9th Ed. The Applicant’s four Grounds of Appeal must show, on the face of it, “good cause” why the Appeal should be heard before this Application can be granted. As I. T. Muhammad, JSC, aptly put it in Malari V. Leigh (supra) –

Even the ordinary man on the street knows what is good. In ordinary usage, it

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connotes a high standard or quality, which is opposite to bad or poor. Anything good in law is something, which is valid, sufficient, effectual, unobjectionable, sound and/or responsible. Thus, an Application for extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal is not granted. as a matter of cause.

In this case, I do not see any redeeming features to warrant this Court indulging the Applicant by granting this Application in its favour. Thus, the Application lacks merit, and it is hereby dismissed. The Applicant is ordered to pay the Respondent costs assessed at N100, 000.00.


SC.744/2015(R)

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