Guinness Nigeria Plc V. Emmanuel Nwoke (2000)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
IBIYEYE, J.C.A.
The appeal and cross-appeal in this matter arose from the decision of Omage, J., (as he then was) erroneously reflected in the record of appeal to have been delivered on 26th February, 1996 instead of 26th February, 1998 at the High Court, Benin City.
The plaintiff now the respondent/cross-appellant filed a Writ of Summons dated 5th of July, 1996 against the defendant now appellant/cross-respondent seeking a number of reliefs. These reliefs which are reflected in paragraph 23 of the amended statement of claim dated 29th of February, 1997 reads:
“23. WHEREOF, the plaintiff claims from the defendant as follows:
(a) A declaration that the detention by the defendant of 2168 cartons of Malta Guinness and 159 crates of Satzenbrau paid for by the plaintiff is illegal and an act of recklessness.
(b) A declaration that the detention of the plaintiff’s vehicles referred to in paragraph 4 above by the defendant without releasing same to the plaintiff or paying for the use of vehicle is illegal and an act of recklessness.
(c) A declaration that the defendant has breached the contract entered into in Benin City with the plaintiff for the supply of beer and Malta Guinness, the defendant’s products.
(d) An order for the immediate supply of 2169 Cartons of Malta Guinness and 159 crates of Satzenbrau beer for which the plaintiff paid to the defendant the sum of N852,470.70 on 16/4/96.
(e) N10m (Ten Million Naira) for breach of contract for the supply of drinks, the defendant’s products.
(f) Loss of earnings for the five vehicles referred to in paragraph 4 above at the rate of N681,326.36 monthly from 1/5/96 to 31/1/97 that is, the sum of N6,472,600.3. (sic).
(g) Loss of earnings for the period 15/4/96 to 30/4/96, that is N340,663.08.
(h) N681,326.36 representing monthly loss of earnings for the five vehicles from 1/2/97 until the defendant releases the vehicles to the plaintiff.
(i) An order for the release of the vehicles referred in paragraph 4 above to the plaintiff.
(j) N390,000.00 being outstanding of the vehicles referred in paragraph 4 above to the plaintiff.
(k) N500,OOO.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) being Solicitor’s fees.
(l) N10m (Ten Million Naira) being general damages.
(m) Perpetual injunction”.
The defendant reacted to the above claim by filing a statement of defence and counter-claim which was amended two times over and was eventually titled ‘further amended statement of defence and defendant’s amended counter-claim’ dated 12th day of August, 1997. The defendant denied all the paragraphs of the amended statement of claim save paragraphs 6, 7,12,13, 14 and 15 which it elaborated upon in paragraphs 4 and 4A of its further amended statement of defence and counterclaim in paragraph 19 of the said pleading. Paragraphs 4 and 4(a) (above) read:
“4. Defendant in reaction to paragraphs 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the statement of claim contends that it has put on hold the supply of the said products paid for and the payment of freight pending the determination at the Chief Magistrate’s Court of the criminal charge of conspiracy, forgery, receiving and subsequently selling off of several thousands of stolen Guinness small stout empties and Satzenbrau empties valued at millions of naira and also the determination of the defendant’s counter-claim for conversion in this suit.
4(a) Defendant asserts further to paragraph 4 above that plaintiff, by his conduct which was a criminal breach of trust, induced frustration or renunciation of the existing freight contract and contract for the sale of goods.”
Paragraphs 19 without the detail of the fraud and 20 of the further amended statement of defence read:
“19. Defendant avers that aside from the direct loss of the empties due to plaintiff’s conversion, defendant has also suffered consequential damages by way of providing logistics for police investigation of the large scale fraud.
PARTICULARS OF DAMAGES
(i) Conversion using Ifeanyi Morka:………
…………………. N3,935,000.00
(ii) Conversion using Augustine Nwokolo:
………………….. N1,200,000.00
(iii) Conversion using Peter Ayere:
……………
…………… N400,000.00
(iv) Logistics provided to assist police
in investigation …………..
…………………… N350,000.00
TOTAL SPECIAL DAMAGES. N5,885,000.00
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES N14.115.000.00
N20,000,000.00
WHEREUPON defendant counter-claims the sum of twenty Million Naira as formulated in paragraph 19 above. Defendant shall rely all (sic) relevant documents”.
At the trial, the plaintiff/respondent adduced evidence in his own behalf while the defendant/appellant called four witnesses. Learned counsel for the parties addressed the trial Court. In a considered judgment delivered on 26th of February, 1996, the learned trial Judge allowed sub-paragraphs (a) (b), (c), (d) partly (e), (i), (j) and dismissed sub-paragraphs (f), (g), (h) and (k) of paragraph 23 of the amended statement of claim. He also dismissed the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira assessed as counter-claim by the defendant/appellant).
Both parties were aggrieved by the decision of the trial court. The defendant/appellant appealed to this court wholly on the counter-claim and the plaintiff/respondent cross-appealed on three grounds a piece.
Briefs were filed and exchanged by the parties in the appeal and cross-appeal. The appellant’s brief also contains the cross-respondent’s brief. The appellant distilled the following issues from its three grounds of appeal.
“1. Whether or not the trial Judge was right to declare the Confessional Statements earlier admitted as Exhibit 11(1-3) under Section 91(2) of the Evidence Act as now ‘irrelevant’ for the reason that “the makers of the statement were not called to testify and be cross-examined?”.
- Whether or not an aggrieved party can pursue his civil remedy against a tortfeasor whose wrong also constitutes a crime without first securing ‘a criminal charge’ or a conviction against the offender?.
- Whether or not the judgment on the counter-claim was not perverse having regard to the weight of evidence adduced?”
The respondent formulated one issue in his brief of argument and it reads:
“Whether the learned trial Judge rightly held that Exhibits EN11 (1-3) per se tendered by the Appellant can prove the fact in issue and therefore not relevant in establishing the Appellant’s counterclaim.”
As regards the cross-appeal, the respondent/cross- appellant identified the following three issues:
“1. Whether the remedy in detinue includes the payment of damages for loss of use to a successful claimant?.
- Whether the cross-appellant proved special damages resulting from the detention of the five vehicles by, the cross-respondent as required by law?.
- Whether the cross-appellant proved the claim for Solicitor’s fees as required by law? If the answer is yes, was the trial court right in dismissing the claim?”
In response, the appellant/cross-respondent framed two issues which are as follows:-
“1. Whether or not the cross-appellant’s role in the Warri fraud was not a fundamental breach of distributorship and transportation contracts which entitles (sic) the cross-respondent to repudiate both contracts as well as immediately take steps to mitigate its losses?.
- Whether or not by convention or public policy a litigant can recover his solicitor’s fees from the adverse party through the court.”
At the hearing of this appeal, P. Onegbedan, Esq, and Prince A. N. Onyebuchi, the learned counsel for the appellant and the Respondent respectively adopted and relied on their briefs. The learned counsel for the appellant urged the court to allow the appeal and dismiss the cross- appeal while the learned counsel for the respondent urged the court to dismiss the appeal and allow the cross-appeal.
On Issue No.1, the learned counsel for the appellant referred to pages 89 lines 22 to 27, 91 line 2 and lines 5 to 7 of the record of appeal on part of the finding of the learned trial Judge on the irrelevance of Exhibits EN 11 (1-3) being the statements of the three drivers who did not testify before him and submitted that it was an error in law to so hold. He argued that since the three exhibits were admitted in evidence, it was a great violence to the appellant’s case for the learned trial Judge to subsequently reject them and he relied on Section 91(2) of the Evidence Act, 1990 and the cases of Igbodim v. Obianke (1976) 9-10 SC 179, 192/ 192 and A.-G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels No.2 (1989) 5 NWLR (pt.121) 255 at 282. He submitted that those exhibits are relevant, weighty and probative as they met the requirement of Section 95(a) of the Evidence Act, 1990 but that they were wrongly rejected at judgment stage.
In response, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the appellant’s counter-claim is the basis of the appeal and that it contains allegation of crimes of conspiracy, stealing, forgery and criminal conversion by the respondent.
He referred to Section 138(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 1990 and the case of Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1 on the standard of proof and submitted that that standard beyond reasonable doubt has not been met by the appellant who placed reliance on Exhibits EN11 (1) to (3). He referred to Section 91(1) and (2) of Evidence Act and said that it did not avail the appellant as it relates to purely civil proceedings because the counter- claim has “the colouration of a criminal proceeding.” In almost the same breath, he contended that the appellant has not satisfied the proviso to section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1990.
I do not sustain the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent for saying that since the counter- claim of the Appellant has the colouration of a criminal proceeding, Section 91(1) of the Evidence Act, 1990 which relates to civil proceedings does not apply to it. Counter-claim proceeding is through and through a civil matter and cannot assume any criminal status just because it is tainted with allegation of crimes.
The appellant relied so much on Exhibits EN11(1) to (3) to sustain its counter-claim. The three statements which make up Exhibits EN 11(1) to (3) were admitted in evidence by virtue of Section 91(1) of the Evidence Act as they contain items of information which tend to establish the fact of criminality against the respondent. The resume of Section 91(1) of the Evidence Act is that in any civil proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible any statement made by a person in a document tending to establish that fact, subject to certain conditions being fulfilled, will be admissible. Such a document will equally be admitted in evidence by virtue of Section 91(2) of the Evidence Act, 1990 notwithstanding the fact that its maker is available but not called as a witness. See also Igbodim v. Obianke (1976) 9-10 SC 179 and A.-G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels (No.2) (supra) 282. The foregoing have shown that Exhibits EN 11 (1) to (3) were properly admitted. The crucial question is; What is the evidential value of Exhibits EN11 (1) to (3)? Section 92(1) of the Evidence Act, 1990 appears to provide the answer. It prescribes as follows:
“92(1) In estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to a statement rendered admissible as evidence by this Act, regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which any inference can reasonable be drawn as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement, and in particular to the question whether or not the statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the facts stated, and to the question whether or not the maker of the statement had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent facts.”
(italics for emphasis).
It will be recalled that Exhibits EN11 (1) to (3) are statements of three drivers tendered through the DW2 (a police investigator) and were admitted in evidence by virtue of Section 91 (1) of the Evidence Act, 1990. In effect, those exhibits were not tendered through their makers. It is settled law that documents may be admitted by the consent of the court in the absence of their makers under Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1990, the court still has a duty to consider the weight to be attached to such documentary evidence before coming to the conclusion as to whether or not it establishes the facts stated therein. See A.-G., Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels (No.2) (supra) 283. Factors to be taken into consideration are set out in section 92(1) (supra). I have perused the factors taken into consideration by the learned trial Judge as the bases for rendering the said exhibits ‘irrelevant’ and I am of the view that they are to a large extent valid. I will, however, supplement these bases by saying that the makers of the exhibits in point made confessional statements in which they did not only implicate themselves but they also implicated the Respondent. This is implicit evidence that after making the statement, they (the three drivers) realised that they might be prosecuted. In a clear attempt to save themselves from possible trial and conviction, they became light-footed and rendered themselves incommunicado. This, in my view, shows that the three makers of Exhibits EN11(1) to (3) had exhibited an incentive to conceal or misrepresent facts contained therein (that is to say the exhibits). This negative attitude of the makers of those exhibits has adversely affected the credibility, cogency and the weight of their statements. In these circumstances, the facts stated in Exhibits EN11(1) to (3) are tainted with inaccuracy borne out of the desire of their makers to mis-represent them. They are accordingly devoid of any probative value. This court will also not act on them. See Section 227 of the Evidence Act, 1990, Ajayi v. Oly Fisher (1956) 1 FSC 90 at 97; Esso West Africa Incorporated v. Alli (1968) NMLR 414 at 423 and 424; Kenneth Clarke & Anor. v. The State (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.35) 381 at 388 and 399. I therefore resolve Issue No.1 in the affirmative.
In view of the resolution of Issue No.1 which appears to be the pivot of the instant appeal, I am of the strong view that it will be a purely academic exercise considering Issues 2 and 3.
On Issue No. 1 of the cross-appeal, the learned counsel for the cross-appellant referred to pages 92 and 93 of the record of appeal on the judgment of the learned trial Judge where it held that the detention of the five vehicles by the defendant/appellant was wrongful and that the remedy for such wrongful act was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Ordia v. Piedmont (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 2 NWLR (pt.379) 516. He was utterly dismayed when the learned trial Judge said that the remedy open to the plaintiffs/respondent/cross-appellant was only the value of the chattel. This line of reasoning, he argued, was used by the learned trial Judge to refuse claims in paragraph 23(f)(g) and (h) of the amended statement of claim. He argued instead that the remedy in detinue includes the payment of the loss of use of chattel to the successful plaintiff.
In reply, the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant/cross-respondent instead of addressing the issue of remedies open to a successful litigant whose action is in detinue, went extensively into the propriety of the cross-respondent’s action for repudiating the two existing contracts between it and the cross-appellant.
Thus, he argued that the fraud in Warri, without being specific, was fundamental breach of those contracts and thereby occasioned their repudiation. He further argued that the cross-respondent repudiated the existing contracts as a salutory step towards mitigating its huge loss occasioned by the cross-appellant’s criminal breach of trust. He submitted that the position in ‘our law’ is that a contract may be discharged by breach as in this case where the cross-appellant commits a criminal act and he relied on the cases of Udom v. E. Micheletti & Sons Ltd. (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt.516) 187; (1997) 7 SCNJ 451. He eventually argued that the cross-appellant is not entitled to the remedy in detinue which includes damages for loss of use.
The contention of the learned counsel for the cross-respondent is largely anchored on the criminal breach of trust allegedly committed by the cross-appellant. I am of the strong view that the cross-respondent has no basis from available record that the cross-appellant committed breach of trust or any crime at all. This is so because there is neither evidence at the trial Court that he (the cross-appellant) has been convicted of a crime at the prompting of the cross-respondent nor is there such evidence that there is a subsisting criminal proceeding against him (the cross-appellant). The commission of any crime by the cross-appellant in any contractual transaction with the cross-respondent in the circumstances of this case is purely imaginative. There was therefore no basis for mitigation of loss embarked upon by the cross-respondent.
Apart from the cross-respondent’s inability to establish the allegation or commission of a crime against the cross- appellant, I am of strong opinion that unless the commission of a crime by either party to a contract is made one of the conditions for the repudiation of such contract, no contract is discharged by the mere commission of a crime which was not in the contemplation of the parties to it. I have read particularly the case of Udom v. E. Micheletti (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the cross-respondent, I could not find the legal proposition that criminal breach of trust automatically discharges a contract. It instead dealt with, inter alia, waiver of breach of contract.
The issue in point deals with the tort of detinue and its attendant remedies. Detinue is only an action in tort whereby the plaintiff on demand seeks specific restitution of his chattel. It entails claim for the return of the chattel or its value and damages for its detention.The crucial question in relation to the instant issue is: Do the remedies for detinue include damages for loss of use? It appears a careful consideration of the case of Ordia v. Piedmont (Nig.) Ltd. (supra) relied upon by both learned Counsel will provide the answer. The remedies open to the plaintiff as per Belgore, J.S.C. at page 526 of that case are threefold and it is up to the plaintiff to decide the course of option to take from the following:
“1. value of chattel and damages for its detention. The value of the chattel is as proved at the time of judgment in trial court and the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the value. He is also to show by evidence the damage suffered by the detention.
- the return of the chattel and damages. In this case, the judgment on proof of the detention is for the return of the chattel and damages for its retention.
- for the return of the chattel or its value as assessed and damages for its detention. This seems to be the best form of action for if the chattel has otherwise been removed from jurisdiction or hidden away and out of sight of the Sheriff there is no alternative other than a distraint for the value of the chattel as assessed plus of course damages for its detention”.
The foregoing propositions do not appear to cover the issue of loss of use by the successful claimant, Bello, C.J.N. (as he then was) has the following to say at pages 531 of the same case:
“It is pertinent to emphasise that in an action in detinue, the court may order the return of the chattel and damages for its detention. In the alternative, the court may order as damages, payment of the value of the chattel and also damages for the loss of issue use. The measure of damages for the chattel is its value or the cost of its replacement at the time of its recovery while the measure of damages for the loss of its use is the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff for its detention which depends on the circumstances of each case. See Odumosu v. A.C.B. (1976) SC 55 and Stitch v. A.-G., Federation and Ors. (1986) 2 NSCC 1389, (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.46) 1007”
(Italics for emphasis)
It is apparent from the principles enunciated and reproduced above that one of the remedies available to a successful claimant in the tort of detinue is damages for the loss of the use of the distrained chattel or chattels. In the instant case, I agree with the learned counsel for the cross-appellant that the claim of damages for loss of the use of the five vehicles in point was regularly made by the cross-appellant.
I accordingly resolve the cross-appellant’s Issue No.1 in the affirmative. With regard to the cross-appellant’s Issue No.2 on whether or not special damages resulting from the detention were proved, the learned counsel for the cross- appellant referred to the settled law that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved and cited the case of Okubre v. Ibanga (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.154) 1 at 6. He referred to particularly paragraphs 14, 16, 17 and 23(f) and (h) of the amended statement of claim where the special damages were specifically pleaded as well as pages 49 to 55 of the record of appeal where the cross-appellant testified on those claims and specially quantified the loss of earnings. He also referred to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the further amended statement of defence where the cross-respondent clearly admitted that the cross-appellant is entitled to the payment of freight and supply of products already paid for but that “he put them on hold pending the determination of the cross-respondent’ s counter claim’s”. He argued that from the record of appeal, there is no evidence that any criminal charge is pending against the cross appellant. He submitted that the cross-appellant discharged the burden of specifically pleading and strictly proving the special damages for loss of earning on the five vehicles from 1/5/96 to 31/1/97 and from 1/2/97 to 20/3/98 when the cross-respondent released them. He further submitted that the evidence of the cross-appellant on those heads of claim including the quantified damages was not challenged and relied on the cases of Osuji v. Isiocha (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) 623 at 638 and Odulaja v. Haddad (1973) 11 SC 357; (1973) All NLR 836 at 839.
The cross-respondent was silent on this issue. It therefore holds that he has nothing to urge on the court on it. Despite this apparent silence, the court has a bounden duty to consider if the cross-appellant has made out a probative case. It is trite law that proof of special damage is not radically different from the general method of proof in civil cases. It is equally proved on a balance of probability. Where the plaintiff pleads the special damages with particularity and gives some evidence of it and the defendant does not challenge or contradict the evidence given, he has discharged the onus of proof and unless the evidence is of such a quality that no reasonable tribunal can accept it, it ought to be accepted. This is because where evidence called by the plaintiff in a civil case is neither challenged nor contradicted, his onus of proof is discharged on a minimal of proof. See Kosile v. Folarin (1989) 3 NWLR (pt.107) 1 at 12; Oshinjinrin & Ors. v. Elias & Ors. (1970) 1 All NLR 153 at 156; Nwabuoku v. Ottih (1961) 1 All NLR 487; Boshali v. Allied Commercial Exporters (1961) 1 All NLR 917 at 921 and Ukoha v. Okoronkwo (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt.2) 100 at 105.
I have carefully considered the state of pleadings and the testimonies thereon and I am of the strong view that since the cross-respondent neither challenged nor contradicted the evidence of the cross-appellant on the heads of claim in subparagraphs (g) and (h) of paragraph 23 of the amended statement of claim, the aforementioned heads of claim have been established and should be allowed. See Osuji v. Isiocha (supra) at 12. They are accordingly allowed. Issue No.2 is therefore resolved in the affirmative.
Issue No.3 is proof of claim of the solicitor’s fees. Learned counsel for the cross-appellant submitted that based on the finding of the trial court at pages 93 and 94 of the record of appeal, the fees for the cross-appellant’s Solicitor were in the nature of special damages. He added that the rule of any claim for special damages is that it must be pleaded and strictly proved and relied on the case of Okubre v. Ibanga (supra) 6. He pointed out that the cross-appellant pleaded this item of claim in paragraphs 20 and 23 (k) of the amended statement of claim and testified on them and backed up his testimony by receipts (Exhibits EN 6(A) – (C). The cross-appellant reacted to this in its paragraph 7 of the further amended statement of defence by challenging the beneficiary to show credible proof from Edo State Tax Authority. Learned counsel for the cross-appellant further submitted that such proof was not a legal requirement in a claim for special damages. He added that, the learned counsel for the cross-respondent had the opportunity to dislodge this claim under cross-examination but he failed to do so. He pointed out that the cross-respondent and its counsel were fully aware that the cross-appellant would make special claim for his Solicitor’s fees. He argued on this score that the cross respondent has the right to engage the services of any counsel of his choice and it is not the business of the court to question the fees charged by such counsel. He submitted that being a claim for special damages what is essential is that the claim should be specifically pleaded and strictly proved.
The learned Counsel for the cross-respondent, in response, submitted that the learned trial Judge was right when he dismissed the said claim for N500,00.00 on the grounds of remoteness and enforceability. He further submitted that the mere issuance of receipts – Exhibits EN 6(A-C) covering the sum of N450,000.00 is not credible proof but that he should have called for proof from the tax office to establish the credibility of the receipt.
I agree with the observation of the learned trial Judge who held, inter alia, that the cross-appellant’s claim of his Solicitor’s fees of N500,000.00 is in the nature of ‘special damages’. The rule that special damages must be strictly proved applies to cases of tort. The rule requires anyone asking for special damages to prove strictly that he did suffer such special damages as he claimed. This, however, does not mean that the law requires a minimum measure of evidence or that the law lays down a special category of evidence required to establish entitlement to special damages. What is required of proof of special damages is that the person claiming should establish his entitlement to that type of special damages by credible evidence that would convince the Judge that he is entitled to an award under that head. In other words, the evidence must be of such a quality that a reasonable tribunal would accept. See Oshinjinrin & Ors. v. Alhaji Elias & Ors. (1970) 1 All NLR 153 at 161; Odunlaja v. Haddad (supra) 839; Osuji v. Isiocha (supra) 638 and Kosile v. Folarin (supra) 12 and 13.
The antecedent of this head of claim is that it arose as fees payable to the cross-appellant’s Solicitor. In other words, the fees in point are sequel to the damages suffered by the cross-appellant for which the said Solicitor was briefed. It is not in doubt that the head of claim was pleaded with some particularity and was strictly proved. The crucial question is; Did this head of claim arise as a result of damage suffered by the cross-appellant in the course of any transaction between him and the cross-appellant? This is the question that ought to preoccupy the mind of any reasonable tribunal dealing with the circumstances of the instant head of claim. A reasonable tribunal, such as this court, will definitely opine that the quality of evidence adduced by the cross-appellant on this score fell below the standard of acceptability because the circumstances making up the so-called ‘special damages’ occurred after the cause of action in this case had arisen. The seemingly financial inconvenience of the Solicitor’s fees of staggering N500,000.00 to the cross-appellant did not form part of the basis of the tort of detinue on which the cross-appellant pivoted his cause of action. It is also unethical and an affront to public policy to pass on the burden of Solicitor’s fees to the other party, in this case the cross-respondent.
In addition, the character of the act forming the said Solicitor’s fees of N500,000.00 made as a head of claim by the cross-appellant is obviously not cumulative to the tort of detinue committed by the cross-respondent. It is outside it. I am of the strong view that this type of claim is outlandish to the operation of the principle of special damages and it should not be allowed. It is absolutely improper to allow the cross-appellant to pass his financial responsibility couched as ‘special damages’ to the cross-respondent. I accordingly resolve issue No.3 in favor of the cross-respondent.
In the final analysis, the appeal is devoid of merit and it is dismissed. The cross-appeal substantially succeeds. The judgment of the trial court is upheld as it relates to paragraph 23 (k) of the amended statement of claim but it is set aside with regard to sub-paragraphs(f), (g) and (h) of the amended statement of claim. In effect, the various sums of N6,472,600.30, N340,663.08 and N681,326.36 which are respectively claimed by the respondent/cross-appellant in sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) as well as the payment of the sum of N681,326.36 monthly from 1/2/97 to 20/3/98 when the five vehicles were released as claimed in sub-paragraph (h) of paragraph 23 of the amended statement of claim shall be paid to the respondent/cross-appellant by the appellant/cross-respondent. The appellant/cross- respondent shall pay costs of N3,000.00 on the appeal and N2,000.00 on the cross-appeal to the respondent/cross-appellant.
Other Citations:(2000)LCN/0759(CA)
