Hon. Ifedayo Sunday Agbegunde V. The Ondo State House Of Assembly & 11 Ors (2015)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.

On 19th March, 2015, having found the appeal and the cross-appeal to which this judgment relates unmeritorious, I dismissed the two and promised to give my reasons today. The reasons are provided anon. The facts which brought about the two appeals are herein under stated. The appellant contested and won the Akure North/South Federal Constituency seat on the PAGE| 3 platform of the Labour Party. He abandoned the party and defected to the Action Congress of Nigeria the A.C.N. He asserts that the factionalization or division in the Ondo State Chapter of the Labour Party accounts for his defection to the Action Congress of Nigeria. By an originating summons filed on the 26th January, 2012, the appellant as plaintiff commenced Suit No. FHC/AK/CS/31/2012 at the Federal High Court, hereinafter referred to as the trial court, seeking the interpretation of Section 68(1) (a) and (g) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and a declaration thereon that by virtue of the proviso to the section he is entitled to remain the elected member for Akure North/south Federal constituency inspite of his defection from the Labour Party that sponsored him to the Action Congress of Nigeria, A.C.N. Appellant also urges that the defendants, the respondents herein, be restrained from howsoever tampering with his right to the Federal seat. He filed a six paragraph affidavit in support of his originating summons. The 1st – 3rd respondents not only contested appellant’s claim, they counter-claimed against him. They assert that by virtue of the very proviso to Section 68(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the appellant who, on the basis of the factionalization or division in the Ondo State Chapter of the Labour Party alone, defected to the Action Congress of Nigeria, automatically ceases to be the elected member for the Akure North/South Constituency. It is defendants’ prayers that the seat be declared vacant and the Independent National Electoral Commission ordered to conduct a bye election for the vacant seat. The 1st – 3rd respondents filed an eleven paragraph counter-affidavit in opposition to appellant’s originating summons. Their counter-claim is supported by an affidavit, a further and better affidavit and written address. Appellant’s claim as contained in his originating summons and the 1st – 3rd respondents’ counter-claim were taken together. The trial court in a considered judgment delivered on 30th May, 2012, while dismissing appellant’s claim granted 1st – 3rd Respondents’ counter-claim. Dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Akure Division, hereinafter referred to as the court below, on a Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 26th June, 2012 containing (10) ten grounds. The court in a well considered judgment delivered on 15th September, 2014 dismissed the appeal decision and affirmed the trial court’s decision. Still aggrieved, the appellant has appealed to this Court vide his Notice of Appeal filed on 17th September, 2014. It is significant to acknowledge the fact that the 5th and 7th Respondents have also cross-appealed against the Lower Court’s judgment by their Notice containing three grounds dated and filed on 19th September, 2014. Notwithstanding the fact that the 5th and PAGE| 4 7th respondents/cross appellants did not file any brief of argument in respect of either the main appeal or their Cross-Appeal, the court granted them leave pursuant to Order 6 rule 9 of its rules to advance oral arguments regarding the Cross-Appeal. Respondents to the Cross-Appeal were also allowed to similarly respond. Arguments for and against the Cross-Appeal are a rehash of those advanced in the main appeal. The cross appellants like the appellant in the substantive appeal, insist that the appellant is entitled to keep his seat inspite of his defection from the Labour Party that sponsored him. They argue that fragmentation in the Ondo State Chapter of the Labour Party suffices. At the hearing of the appeal, parties, except the 5th & 7th respondents in the main appeal, on identifying their respective briefs adopted and relied on same as their arguments for or against the appeal. The sole issue distilled by the appellant in his brief of argument which issue the respondents to the appeal, except the 5th and 7th, seem to adopt as having arisen for the determination of the appeal, reads:- “Whether the Lower Court’s interpretation and application of Sections 68(1) (a) (g) and 222(a) (e) and (f) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is valid, when it affirmed the trial court’s decision, that a dispute at the state level does not warrant the Appellant’s defection and consequently arrived at the conclusion that the National leadership of a political party determine the existence or proof of division in a political party.” On their sole issue, learned appellant’s counsel contends that the trial court’s interpretation of Section 68(1-) (a) and (e) of the 1999 Constitution and the Lower Court’s affirmation of same are wrong in law. The position of the two courts that it is only a dispute or crisis which consumes the national leadership of a political party that entitles the appellant who had defected from the party that sponsored him because of the crisis to retain his seat, is not what Section 68(1) (a) and (g) of the 1999 Constitution envisages. A political party, it is contended, exists at various levels, to wit, ward, local government, state and national levels. Crisis at any of these levels, not necessarily at the national level of the party alone, submits learned appellant counsel, fits the division Section 68(1) (a) (g) contemplates as justifying a defection from the political party that sponsored the defector as well as the retention by the defector of his seat. The appellant, it is further submitted, is justified to retain his seat having abandoned the Labour Party that sponsored him because the state chapter of the party is factionalized and divided. Further arguing the issue, learned counsel contends that the erroneous interpretation made by PAGE| 5 the two courts below stems from their reliance on and application of particularly Section 222(a) (e) and (f) of the Constitution in the exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction. The rules of statutory interpretation require the two courts to ascribe to the words that make up Section 68(1) (a) and (e) they are asked to interprete their ordinary literal meaning without more. Section 222(a) and (f) of the Constitution which the courts relied upon to interprete Section 68(1) (a) and (g) only outlines conditions for the eligibility of an association to operate as a political party in Nigeria. It does not, as wrongly held by the courts, in any way help in defining the type of division provided under Section 68(1) (a) and (e). By erroneously imputing the word “faction” at the national level of the political party and cross-referencing the word into Section 222 of the 1999 Constitution, the courts stand liable for reading into the Constitution what the legislature does not intend. Further relying on Imah V. Okogbe (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt.316) 159 at 173, AG Federation V. AG Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt 1380) 249 at 317 and Agwuna V. AG Federation (1995) LPELR -258 (SC), learned counsel urges that the Lower Court’s circumscribed statutory interpretation rather than the liberal one be discountenanced. Concluding, learned counsel submits that the Lower Court’s wrong resort to the decisions of this Court in Fedeco V. Goni (1983) LPELR-1256 (sc) and Abubakar V. AG Federation (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt 1041) 178 does not save its judgment. Having failed to imbibe the correct principles of statutory interpretation, the decisions of the two courts, learned counsel insists, must be set-aside. He relies inter-alia on INEC V. Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806), Awuse V. Odili (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.851) 180; AG Abia State V. AG Federation (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt.940) 452 at 503 and I.M.B. V. Tinubu (2001) 45 WRN 1 at 19 and urges that the issue be resolved in their favour and the appeal allowed. Responding, learned counsel to the 1st – 3rd respondents submits that the facts on the basis of which the appellant sought his reliefs and the 1st – 3rd respondents counter-claimed against him are not in dispute. Appellant contested and won the Akure North/South Federal Constituency seat on the platform of the Labour Party (LP) and that he defected to the Action Congress of Nigeria (A.C.N) following the purported factionalization of the party. The resolution of the dispute created by these facts, learned counsel submits, requires the communal interpretation and application of Sections 68(1)(g), 221, 222(a)(e) and (f) and 229 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The Lower Court in determining whether and how the meaning of these sections relate to these ascertained facts, learned counsel further submits, must be guided by certain rules. Basic among these rules, it is submitted, is the duty on the court to consider the Constitution from which the particular sections emanate as a whole and ascribe to the clear and unambiguous words which make up the sections their ordinary literal meaning. The rules of interpreting provisions of the Constitution, learned counsel contends, are PAGE| 6 as specially expounded in very many cases. The two courts have dutifully applied the relevant principles correctly and rightly concluded that the type of division envisaged under Section 68(1) (e) of the Constitution is one that affects the entire structure of the political party. The narrow interpretation suggested by learned appellant counsel, it is contended, is legally infeasible. Learned counsel inter-alia relies on Victor Adegoke Adewunmi Anor v. The Attorney General of Ekiti State & 6 ors (2002) 1 SCNJ 27 at 49, Mobil Oil Nig (Ltd) V. Federal Board of Internal Revenue (1977) 3535, Ogbunyiya V. Okudo (1979) 6-9 SC 32 and Nafiu Rabiu V. The State (1980) 8-11 SC 130 in emphasizing that the appellant does not come within the exception created under Section 68(1) (g) of the Constitution. The division at the State level of the Labour Party does not shield him from the consequences of abandoning the political party that sponsored him for another party. Learned counsel argues that both courts having correctly applied the applicable laws to the facts before them, this Court cannot interfere with their decisions. He accordingly urges a resolution of the sole issue on the appeal against the appellant and the dismissal of the appeal. Learned counsel to all the other respondents, except the 5th and 7th respondents/cross appellants, proffer arguments similar to the foregoing arguments of the 1st – 3rd respondents. Here and there in their respective briefs, reliance have also been placed on the decisions of this Court in Federal V Goni (supra) and Attorney General of the Federation V. Abubakar (2007) (supra) in aid of the principle that the division in the Labour Party, being restricted to Ondo State, does not justify appellant’s defection to another party. Again, it is argued in some of these briefs that the findings of the two courts below being concurrent cannot easily be tempered with by this Court. Counsel support this submission with the cases of Idufueko V. Pfizer Products Ltd (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt.1420) 96 at 113 and Fedeco v. Goni (supra). As a whole, they urge that the lone issue be resolved in their favour and the appeal be dismissed. The question the appeal raises is a very narrow one: whether the Lower Court is right in its affirmation of the trial court’s interpretation and application of Section 68(1) (a) and (g) and 222(a) (e) and (f) of the 1999 Constitution as amended to the facts of the instant case. Also, the facts in relation to which the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the law have been made are not in dispute: appellant has defected from the Labour Party on which platform he contested and won his election for the Akure North/South Federal Constituency seat because of the division in the party at the State level. The appellant, from the affidavit in support of his originating summons as well as the counter affidavit in opposition to 1st – 3rd respondents’ counter-claim, does admit that the division he claims entitles him to PAGE| 7 defect to the A.C.N. does not affect the national body and structures of the Labour Party. The narrow issue to determine in the appeal, therefore, is whether or not the two courts below are right in holding that, by virtue of Section 68(1) (a) and (g) and 222(a) (e) and (f) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the division at the State level the appellant relies upon indeed entitles him to abandon the party that sponsored him, the Labour Party, for another, the Action Congress of Nigeria, A.C.N. and retain his seat inspite of the defection. Both courts have answered this overriding question in the negative. They are said to be concurrent in their findings. Given the facts available to the two courts and the law applicable to these facts, it is their decision that appellant’s defection to the Action Congress of Nigeria does not come within the purview of the law. Learned counsel to the respondents are correct that this Court remains hesitant to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact and does so only if same are shown, notwithstanding their being concurrent, to be perverse. In UBN Plc V. Chimaeze (2014) LPELR-SC 204/2006 this Court defined what a perverse decision is and how same is treated on appeal thus:- “…[A] decision of a court is perverse when it ignores the facts or evidence before it which lapse when considered as a whole constitutes a miscarriage of justice. In such a case an appellate court is bound to interfere with such a decision… In the case at hand, therefore, the appellant succeeds only if establishes that in its findings in respect of the special, and general damages the Lower Court has ignored the evidence on record and/or wrongly applied a principle to the evidence. The appellant/cross respondent must establish, too, that the lapse has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” See also Atolagbe V. Shorun (1985) LPELR-SC.14/1984. It draws from the foregoing principle that the appellant herein succeeds only if he demonstrates that the two courts below have, in arriving at their concurrent decisions, either ignored facts, incorrectly applied any principle to correctly ascertained facts, took into consideration irrelevant matters or excluded such other matters which are relevant to their findings and, in addition, the injustice the concurrent decisions in the circumstance occasion. In the exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction, both courts have had to apply the relevant provisions of the Constitution to the undisputed facts that ground appellant’s claim against the respondents and the 1st – 3rd respondents counter-claim. I agree with counsel on both sides that in interpreting and applying the relevant constitutional provisions the courts must be guided by certain principles. In the case at hand the 1st – 3rd respondents’ counter-claim draws from the complaint that Section 68(1) of the 1999 Constitution has not been complied with by the appellant thereby making the interpretation of the provision an issue. The duty of the two courts in that regard is to examine the conduct of the appellant complained of within the purview of the provision and determine whether the provision in question has indeed been breached or otherwise. Being a PAGE| 8 constitutional provision, the courts do not discharge their duty by limiting their scrutiny of the conduct of the appellant by reference only to the particular section of the Constitution. Effective exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction requires examining the Constitution as a whole. See The Governor of Kwara State & 2 Ors V. Jerome Oladele Dada (2011) 6-7 SC (Pt.1) 41 and Bernard Amasike V. The Registrar General Corporate Affairs Commission & anor (2010) 5-7 SC (Pt.1). The trial court, see pages 279-281 of Vol. 1 of the record of Appeal, in determining the status of the appellant, having ascertained the facts on which his claim and 1st – 3rd respondents counter-claim rest, considered, beyond Section 68(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended that is directly in issue, Sections 69, 153, 221, 222, 226 and 229 of the same Constitution and Section 80 of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended and at page 286 of Vol. 1 of the record concluded its decision thus:- “Having held that the interpretation of Section 68(1) (a) and (g) of the Constitution by the plaintiff was myopic in nature and said that the section connotes a national outlook, the originating summons of the plaintiff therefore failed. I so hold and I also hold that all counter-claims herein succeeds (sic).” In the discharge of its appellate jurisdiction regarding the trial court’s foregoing decision the Lower Court, per Mshelia JCA who read the lead judgment, at page 619 of Vol.2 of the record of Appeal rightly identified not only the task before the court but also how it would accomplish same thus:- “The crux or failcrum of this appeal is the interpretation of section 68(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, read along with Section 222 of the same Constitution and other relevant provisions of the Constitution referred to by the parties for ease of reference, I will reproduce the said Sections hereinunder….. The guidelines to be observed in the interpretation of statutes most especially our Constitution are stated by Obaseki JSC in the case of AG of Bendel State V. AG of the Federation and ors (1981) 10 SC 1 at 132, 134……” The court also availed itself with the further principle of interpretation of the provisions of the Constitutions restated by this Court per Iguh JSC in I.M.B. V. Tinubu (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.740) 690 thus:- “In this regard, it will be necessary to recall the general principle of law governing the interpretation of our Constitution. This is that such interpretation as would serve the interest of the Constitution and best carry out its object and purpose should be preferred. Its relevant provisions must be read together and not disjoint and where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous- they must be given their ordinary meaning, unless this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution.” (Underlining mine for emphasis). Concluding, the Lower Court in its judgment at pages 631 of Vol II of the record of Appeal held PAGE| 9 as follows:- “A community reading of Sections 221, 222, 229 of the Constitution as well as Section 80 the Electoral Act, clearly shows that, the division envisaged by Section 68(1) of the Constitution refers to division in the party at the top or centre not a division at the State or Local Government level as contended by the appellant…..The intention of the law makers is to punish defectors. If the provision of Section 68(1) (g) of the Constitution is interpreted as proffered by the appellant then the purpose for which the section was introduced would be defeated. There will be no end to defection by members… The case of case of Federal Electoral Commission V. Goni (1983) LPELR-1266 (SC) is a classical example of the division envisaged by Section 68(1) (g) of the Constitution……. I find this case very relevant and instructive… Appellant cannot therefore take advantage of the proviso to Section 68(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution….. Appellant has violated the provisions of Section 68(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution. The consequence is that appellant has to mandatorily vacate his seat in the House of Representatives….” (Underlining mine for emphasis). It is the foregoing decision of the Lower Court the appellant herein asserts is not only incorrect but such that entitles this Court to interfere with. The question to answer here is whether the decision is perverse having either not drawn from the evidence on record or consequent upon wrong application of the law to correctly ascertained facts by the court. Or still, whether the decision is bedeviled by the court’s consideration of irrelevant facts or the exclusion of relevant facts which lapse results in miscarriage of justice see Ramonu Atolagbe v. Kerede O. Shorun (supra), Akwai Lagga v. Audu Yusuf Sarhuma (2008) 6-7 SC (Pt.1) 101 and Gabriel Iwuoha & Anor v. Nigerian Postal Services Ltd & Anor (2003) 5 SCM 104. I am unable to agree with learned counsel to the appellant that on the facts and the law as concurrently applied by the two courts below their decisions can be interfered with. One is left in no doubt that the determination of the dispute the trial court is approached to resolve turns decisively on the meaning of the word “division” as used by the framers of the proviso to Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. Whereas learned appellant’s counsel contends that “any division,” in the political party would entitle a person who contested and won an election on the platform of that party to defect to another party and inspite of the defection to retain his seat, learned counsel to the respondents’, except the 5th & 7tn, on the other hand, argue that the “division” in the State structure of the Labour Party only does not entitle the appellant to abandone the Labour Party for the A.C.N. Not being the kind of “division” that affects the national structures and therefore the corporate existence of the party, learned counsel insist, appellant’s defection does not come within the proviso to Section 68(1) (g) to entitle him to retain his seat in the House of Representatives inspite of his defection to the A.C.N. from the Labour Party on which platform he contested and won the seat. This position of the respondents is unassailable. PAGE| 10 In Fedeco V. Goni (supra) this Court, while interpreting Section 64(1) (g) of the 1979 Constitution which is pari materia, that is on all fours, with Section 68(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, held at pages 21-22 of the report thus:- “Under Section 64(1) (g) of the Constitution where a person whose election to the legislative house was sponsored by a political party, becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that house was elected, he would have to lose his seat in that house. But under the proviso to the said Section 64(1)(g), if his membership of the new political party occurred because – (1) THERE WAS A DIVISION in the political party which sponsored him and as a result he joined the new political party…. he does not lose his seat.” (Underlining mine for emphasis). The court at pages 22-23 of the report further held:- “A split or division could arise without any fault of the members of a political party resulting in a member rightly or wrongly, finding himself in a minority group which may not be big enough, or strong enough to satisfy the recognition, as a separate political party, of the Federal Electoral Commission. For such a member not to be allowed to join another political party with his faction may be to place him in a position where his right to contest for political office will be lost. Such a situation is entirely different from the fraudulent and malevolent practice of cross-carpeting politicians of yester years who, for financial consideration or otherwise, crossed from one political party to another, without qualms and without conscience. Such a practice had to be discouraged by the framers of our Constitution if political public morality of our country was to be preserved.” (Underlining mine for emphasis). In AG Federation V. Abubakar (supra) which the Lower Court further imbibed, this Court per Aderemi JSC at page 178 of the report held thus:- “It is manifest from the above quoted constitutional provisions that the lawmakers intended to and indeed made punishable the defection of an elected member, from the political party that sponsored him, to another political party before the expiration of the period for which the House was elected by declaring his seat vacant. No similar provision was made for the Vice-President or even for the President.” The principles enunciated by this Court in the two cases, Fedeco v. Goni supra and Ag Federation V. Abubakar supra, is to the effect that only such factionalisation, fragmentation, splintering or “division” that makes it impossible or impracticable for a political party to function as such will, by virtue of the proviso to Section 68(1) (g), justify a person’s defection to another party and the retention of his seat for the unexpired term in the house inspite of the defection. Otherwise, as rightly held by the courts below, the defector automatically looses his seat. In the instant case, the two courts are right that the Labour Party that has continued to function as a political party by meeting the conditions associations by virtue of Section 221 and 222 of PAGE| 11 the Constitutions must necessarily meet, cannot be said to have been so factionalised, fragmented, split or divided to justify the defection of the appellant to another party and retention of his seat inspite of the defection. This remains the position of this Court on the issue. The interpretation of Section 68(1) (a) and (g) of the 1999 Constitution in relation to sections 221 and 222 of the same constitution to arrive at the same conclusion does not derogate from the position. After all, it is a trite principle of interpretation of the Constitution that its entire provisions be read together as a whole in ensuring the enthronement of the real intention of its framers. Isolated consideration of a particular section is disallowed. The Lower Court must be commended for its consideration of several clauses of the same Constitution and coming out with the harmonious conclusion it has and by so doing enthroning the real intention of the framers of the Constitution. See Odubeko V. Fowler (1993) 9 SCNJ 185, Unilife Dev Co. Ltd v. K. Adeshigbin & ors (2007) 3 SCM 151 and Alegbe V. Oloyo (1983) NSCC 315. Finally and most importantly, by the doctrine of stare decisis or precedent, the two decisions of this Court in Fedeco V. Goni (supra) and AG of the Federation V. Abubakar (supra) on the same facts and legislation as those canvassed in the instant matter bind the Lower Court and this Court as well. The concurrent resort to and correct application of the principles enunciated in the two cases by the two courts must persist. I so hold. See Adetoun Oladeji (Nig) Ltd V. Nigeria Breweries Plc [2007] 1 SCNJ 375 and Cyril O. Osakue v. Federal College of Education (Technical) Asaba & 2 Ors (2010) 2-3 SC (Pt III) 158. It is for all the foregoing reasons that I found the Appeal and the Cross Appeal unmeritorious on the 19th March, 2015 and dismissed same. The consequential orders I made while dismissing both appeals remain extant. MAHMUD MOHAMMED, C.J.N.: On Thursday the 19th Day of March, 2015, I delivered my Judgment in this appeal agreeing with my learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad JSC. in his lead Judgment dismissing the appeal and the Cross-Appeal. I stated on that day that I shall give my reasons for the Judgment today which I now proceed to do. I have had the advantage before today of reading in draft the reasons given by my learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC for dismissing this appeal and the Cross-Appeal on 19/3/2015 and I entirely agree with them. This appeal is against the Judgment of the Court of Appeal Akure Division, delivered on 15/9/2014, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Judgment of the Federal High Court Akure of 30/5/2013 refusing the reliefs sought by the Appellant in his Originating Summons while granting the reliefs sought by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents in their Counter-Claim PAGE| 12 declaring the seat of the Appellant as a member representing Akure North/South Federal Constituency of Ondo State in the House of Representatives vacant. The Court of Appeal in affirming the Judgment of the trial Court was of the view that the division envisaged by Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), must be a division that affects the entire structure on the National leadership of a political party at the centre and not at State or local Government level. The only issue arising for determination in this appeal as identified in the Appellant’s brief of argument and virtually adopted in slightly different wordings by all the Respondents in their respective briefs of argument reads:- “Whether the Lower Court’s interpretation and application of Sections 68(1)(a)(g) and 222 (a)(e) and (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is valid, when it affirmed the trial court’s decision, that a dispute at the state level does not warrant the Appellant’s defection and consequently arrived at the conclusion that the National leadership of a political party determines the existence or proof of division in a political party?” The circumstances giving rise to the dispute between the parties in this appeal, are quite simple. The Appellant was elected to the House of Representatives on the platform of the Labour Party in the April, 2011 general elections in Nigeria as a member representing Akure North/South Federal Constituency in Ondo State. The Appellant after serving in the House of Representatives for brief period, decided to decamp from the Labour Party under which he was elected, to the Action Congress of Nigeria, ACN (now All Progressives Congress APC). He then approached the Federal High Court, Akure and sought for declaratory and injunctive reliefs against the Defendants/Respondents to justify his action in defecting to another political party other than the one on which he rode to the House of Representatives. The learned Counsel to the Appellant in the Appellant’s brief of argument and the Appellant’s Reply briefs filed and adopted by him in support of his arguments in this appeal, explained that the appeal is on the question of defection which, according to him must be supported by a division of a political party. Counsel emphasized that the defection of the Appellant was supported by the provision of the proviso in Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) and therefore urged this Court to allow the appeal and uphold the defection of the Appellant by allowing him to remain on his seat in the House of Representatives. However, learned Senior Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents, who is also the Attorney-General of Ondo State, has urged this Court, relying on the arguments contained in the joint Respondents brief of argument filed on behalf of his clients, to dismiss this appeal, which he described as against concurrent decisions of the two Lower Courts and not being PAGE| 13 perverse, he urged this court not to disturb the decisions. Leaned Senior Counsel stressed that the appeal centered on the construction of Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution on the effect of defection and that the Appellant having failed to bring himself within the provision of the proviso to Section 68(1)(g) of the Constitution, he must be prepared to face the effect of his action by immediately vacating his seat. Learned Counsel to the 4th, 9th and 12th Respondents in the joint brief of argument filed on behalf of his clients and oral submission, also urged this Court to dismiss the appeal and order the Appellant to vacate his seat. Learned Counsel pointed out that there was no division in the Labour Party nationwide to justify the defection of the Appellant under Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution whose provisions are in pari-materia with Section 69 of the 1963 Constitution and Section 64(1)(g) of the 1979 Constitution. Relying on the case of FEDECO VS GONI Reported in 1983 NSCC Vol. 14 page 481 at 485, learned Counsel urged this Court to dismiss the appeal. Learned Counsel to the 5th and 7th Respondents/Cross-Appellants who filed no Respondents/Cross-Appellants’ brief of argument was granted leave by this Court under Rule 9 of Order 6 of the Rules of this Court to present oral argument in support of the case of the 5th and 7th Respondents/Cross-Appellants. Learned Counsel relying on the Notice of the Cross-Appeal of his clients, urged this Court to allow the Cross-Appeal so as to enable the Appellant to remain on his seat in the House of Representatives. The Counsel to the 6th, 8th and 10th Respondents in the Respondents joint brief and oral submission on behalf of his clients had urged the Court to dismiss the appeal because the defection of the Appellant was in contravention of Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution. He pointed out that as the Appellant had failed to bring his conduct in defection within the provision of the proviso to Section 68(1)(g) of the Constitution, the case of the Appellant was rightly dismissed by the trial court as subsequently affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeal. Taking into consideration of the sole issue for determination in this appeal earlier quoted in my reasons for Judgment, it is quite plain that the determination of this appeal merely requires the application of the provisions of Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the undisputed facts and circumstances that led to the defection of the Appellant from Labour Party that brought him to the House of Representatives, to the Action Congress of Nigeria ACN (now All Progressives Congress APC). There is no dispute that this Appellant contested the April 2011 election under the platform of the Labour Party and won the election to occupy the seat of the House of Representatives Constituency of Akure North/South of Ondo State in that House. It is also on record that the Appellant defected to PAGE| 14 another political party, Action Congress of Nigeria ACN, before the expiration of the period of four years for which the House was elected. It is also not in doubt from the Appellant’s case placed before the trial Federal High Court for determination, that the Appellant had put very heavy reliance on the provisions of Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) which states – “68(1) A member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in the House of which he is a member if – (a) …………………. (b) …………………. (c) …………………. (d) …………………. (e) ………………… (f) …………………. (f) being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected: Provided that his membership of the latter Political party is not as a result of a division in the political party of which he was previously a member or a merger of two or more political Parties or factions by one of which he was previously sponsored;” The law is trite that in the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, the entire provision must be construed together as a whole and not in parts as stated by this Court in several cases including NAFIU RABIU VS THE STATE (1980) 8-11 SC.130. The general rule of interpretation of statutes has also been laid by this Court in several decisions and the rule is that where the words of a statute are plain, clear and unambiguous, the Court shall give effect to their literal meaning. It is only when the literal meaning may result in ambiguity or injustice that the Court may seek internal aid within the body of the statute itself or external aid from statutes in pari-materia in order to resolve the ambiguity or avoid doing injustice. See OGBUNYIYA VS OKUDO (1976) 6-9 SC.32 AND OGUNMADE VS FADAYIRO (1972) 8-9 SC. 1. The provisions of Section 68(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which are in contention in this appeal, are quite plain, clear and unambiguous and therefore must be given their ordinary or literal meaning. In fact, what is really in issue in this case is not the interpretation of the affected provisions of the Constitution but the application of the provisions to the undisputed facts in the case. These undisputed facts are that the appellant PAGE| 15 who was elected under the platform of the Labour Party to the House of Representatives representing Akure North/South Federal Constituency in Ondo State, defected to another Political party other than the one that brought him to the House before the expiration of the tenure of the House. The question for resolution is whether or not he could retain his seat inspite of his defection. From the evidence contained in the record of appeal, both the trial Court and the Court of Appeal answered this question in the negative. I entirely agree with the two Courts below. The provisions of Section 68(1)(g) of the Constitution are very clear that the Appellant being a member of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in that House when being a person whose election to the House was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected. To escape the hammer of this Section of the Constitution hitting the Appellant on the head, the Appellant must lead credible and cogent evidence to show that his conduct in defecting from his Labour Party to another party, was covered by the proviso to the Section. Did the Appellant succeed in doing that at the trial court? I am afraid, the Appellant had woefully failed to lead evidence showing that there was a division within the Labour Party nationwide to support his defection to another political party as rightly found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court below. It is for the above reasons and fuller reasons given by the learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC, that I also on Thursday 19th Day of March, 2015, dismissed the Appeal and the Cross-Appeal and affirmed the order of the trial Federal High Court as affirmed by the Court below that the Appellant must vacate his seat with immediate effect, with no order on costs.

SC. 643/2014