Ime Ekong & Ors. V. Godfrey Oside (National President, Hapsssa) & Ors. (2004)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.
The following declaratory reliefs were sought by the appellant as plaintiff against the respondent as defendant at the High Court of Justice of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (the lower court) –
“1. A declaration that the purported dissolution of the Abuja Branch executive of HAPSSSA vide the 3rd defendant letter, dated 11/10/99 with reference No. HPSA/GS/AS/2885/99 is ultra vires, null and void as it negates the provisions of both the HAPSSSA Constitution and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
2. A declaration that the letter signed by the 1st and 2nd defendants dated 7/10/99 with reference No. HPSA/GS/2885/99 freezing HAPSSSA Nicon Hilton Hotel branch Account No. 0350006479-01 is unconstitutional, ultra-vires, null, void and of no effect, same having been written with malice, jealousy and contempt.
3. A declaration that there was no meeting of the National Executive Council, where the resolution for the suspension and/or dissolution of the Abuja branch HAPSSSA was passed nor the mandate, consent and authority of the NEC obtained to approve of the suspension/dissolution and freezing of the branch accounts.
4. A declaration that the 1st and 2nd defendants lack the constitutional ability without the NEC sitting, approving any dissolution/suspension/freezing of a branch account and especially Abuja Nicon HAPSSSA accounts.
5. An order of court reinstating all the branch executives of Abuja Nicon Hilton Hapsssa.
6. An order of court granting the Abuja branch executives access to operate HAPSSSA Nicon Hilton Hotel branch account No. 0350006479-01.
7. An order declaring the letters of 7th and 11th October, 1999, with reference No. HPSA/GS/ AS/2885/99, written and signed by 1st & 2nd defendants as lacking in merit and content and therefore void ab-initio.
8. N10,000.000 (ten million naira only) for defamation of character jointly and severally from 1st and 2nd defendants;
(a) N2,000,000.00 (two million naira) only for general damages;
(b) Cost of action.”
A notice of preliminary objection filed by the respondent was moved on the 15th day of March, 2000. Learned Counsel for the appellant made his reply on the preliminary objection and the learned trial Judge delivered ruling in respect thereof declining jurisdiction to try the suit. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to this court on two grounds.
In compliance with the rules of this court, parties filed and exchanged briefs of arguments. Learned Counsel for the appellant set out the following lone issue:-
“1. Whether by the provision of section 2 of Decree 47 of 1992, or any provisions, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory lacks jurisdiction to entertain suit No. CV/831/99.”
Learned Counsel for the respondents formulated one issue for our consideration. It reads as follows:-
“Was the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, right in declining jurisdiction to hear suit No. CV/831/99 based upon the grounds of the defendants’ challenge of its jurisdiction.”
I have observed that a notice of preliminary objection was filed by the respondents. Apparently, however, arguments were canvassed in the respondents’ brief in respect of the preliminary objection in a separate brief filed by the respondent. At any event, the respondents and their counsel were not in court on the date of hearing, though duly served. The notice of preliminary objection and its arguments are therefore deemed abandoned and same are hereby struck out. See Ajibade v. Pedro (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.241) 257; NHRI v. Ayoade (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt.530) 541; Jadesimi v. Okotie-Eboh No. 2 (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.16) 264; Onyekwuluje v. Animashaun (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.439) 637; (1996) SCNJ 24.
The reply brief filed by the appellants in respect of the preliminary objection is equally hereby struck out for lack of legs to stand. We have taken this appeal under the provision of our order 6 r. 9(5) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2002 as none of the parties or their respective counsel was in court to present any oral argument.
In his argument on the lone issue, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that though Decree 47 of 1992, gave the National Industrial Court jurisdiction to try trade disputes and inter/intra union disputes, that Decree is inconsistent with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution and therefore null and void. Learned Counsel cited and relied on sections 6, 257(1) and 251(1) S-Z of the 1999 Constitution, which, according to him empower the FCT High Court to exercise unlimited jurisdiction except where the Constitution ousts its jurisdiction. Decree 47 of 1992, as an existing law is inconsistent with the provision of the unlimited jurisdiction the FCT High Court, therefore null and void. Several authority were cited in support among which are:- Olu of Warri & 3 Ors. v. E. O. Kperegbehi (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt.339) 416 at 422; Anoh & 5 Ors. v. Ihirnyam (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt.486) 174 at 179. Learned Counsel urged us to “confer jurisdiction” on the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory in suit No. CV/831/99; set aside the ruling of the lower court and remit same to the High Court for trial.
Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the learned trial Judge was right in declining jurisdiction to hear the suit. He submitted further that Decree No. 47 of 1992 is not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution. Learned Counsel cited and relied on section 315( 4)(b) of the 1999 Constitution that Decree 47 of 1992 is an existing law and that the National Industrial Court is a superior court of record. Appeals from the National Industrial Court, by section 6(a) of the Decree lies as of right to the Court of Appeal on question of fundamental rights as contained in chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Reference were copiously made by learned Counsel to constitutional provisions especially section 6(1) of the Constitution. It was wrong for the appellants to contend that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is not saved by the Constitution of 1999.
Learned Counsel argued further that by section 275 of the 1999 Constitution, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory has no ‘unlimited jurisdiction,’ its jurisdiction is subject to the provisions of section 251 and any other provisions of the Constitution, in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law. Learned Counsel urged us to dismiss the appeal.
Let me say from the outset that a trade dispute is any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person (see section 47 of the Trade Dispute Act, Cap. 432, L.F.N. 1990). The learned trial Judge had already made a finding that the matter placed before him was without doubt essentially a trade dispute one. The learned trial Judge subsequently declined to assume jurisdiction on the matter. The jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is as provided by section 20(1) of the Trade Dispute Act.
The provision reads as follows:-
“20(1) The court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have jurisdiction –
(a) to make awards for the purpose of settling trade disputes; and
(b) to determine questions as to the interpretation of –
(a) any collective agreement;
(b) any award made by an arbitration tribunal or by the court under part 1 of this Act;
(iii) the terms of settlement of any trade dispute as recorded in any memorandum under section 7 of this Act.”
Further, Decree No. 47 of 1992, provides in section 1A as follows:-
“1A(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection(3) of section 20 of this Act, no person shall commence an action, the subject matter of a trade dispute or any inter or intra union dispute in a court of law and accordingly, any action which, prior to the commencement of this section is pending in any court shall abate and be null and void.”
On the strength of the provision of section 1A of Decree No. 47 of 1992, as amended, my learned brother, Tobi, JCA (as he then was), in the case of N.U.R.T.W v. Ogbodo (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt.537) 189 at page 200 paragraph A, stated inter alia:
“In my humble view, the High Court of a State has no jurisdiction to hear any inter or intra union dispute within the meaning of section 1(A)(1) of Decree No. 47 of 1992.”
In an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Udoh v. O.H.M.B. (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.304) 139 at page 149, paragraphs B-C, Karibi-Whyte, JSC, made the following comment in respect of section 1A(1) & (2) on the amendments introduced:
“It seems to me that the mischief aimed at by this amendment is to avoid the proliferation of Trade Union cases in several High Courts and ensure their litigation in the National Industrial Court only. See Savannah Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.97) 305.”
I therefore agree completely with the finding and holding of the learned trial Judge that the matter placed before him was a trade dispute matter and that he lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
On the other issue canvassed by learned Counsel for the appellant that Decree 47 of 1992 was inconsistent with the Constitution, it behoves me to say that both the appellants and the respondents are in agreement in their submissions in their respective briefs of argument that, that Decree is an existing law. An existing law has been defined by the Constitution to mean any law and includes any rule of law or any enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before the date which having been passed or made before that date comes into force after that date.
Decree 47 of 1992 (as amended) came into force on 1st day of January, 1992 and its provisions remain in force up to today as same have been saved by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 section 315 of the Constitution provides:-
“315(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, an existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution and shall be deemed to be-:
(a) an Act of the National Assembly to the extent that it is a law with respect to any matter on which the National Assembly is empowered by this Constitution to make laws.”
On the issue of the ‘unlimited’ jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory as submitted by learned Counsel for the appellants, I find it difficult to agree with him. On my part, I will prefer to regard the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory by section 257 of the Constitution as general but limited. That section is made general subject to the provisions of some sections of the same Constitution such as section 251 and any other provisions of the Constitution. Any other provision of the Constitution may, in my view, include section 315 of the Constitution, which saves the Decrees/Acts that created the National Industrial Court and conferred jurisdiction on it. It is difficult therefore, to read unconstitutionality in the statute that created the National Industrial Court and the jurisdiction it has been conferred with especially by Decree No. 47 of 1992. Thus, by Decree 47 of 1992, the only court that is conferred with jurisdiction to hear trade dispute matters is the National Industrial Court. Same Decree accorded the status of a superior court of record to the National Industrial Court, as appeals from its decisions on questions of fundamental rights contained in chapter IV of the Constitution shall lie to the Court of Appeal. (section 5 and 6(a) of the Decree under reference).
Lest I forget, let me say in passing that, I declined to reflect the arguments canvassed by learned Counsel for the respondent on the validity of the writ of summons, as there was no appeal on that issue by the appellants. The respondents themselves did not cross-appeal on that issue. Courts of law are not charitable organizations. Nor do they entertain issues to charge the mental alertness of the parties.
They make pronouncements for a purpose, i.e. giving out justice to the deserving party from the litigants.
In the final result, I find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is hereby dismissed. I affirm the decision of the lower court, which declined jurisdiction on this trade dispute matter. The respondents are entitled to N10,000.00 costs from the appellants.
Other Citations: (2004)LCN/1582(CA)
