Independent National Electoral Commission & Others V. Chief T.A. Orji & Ors (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal holding in Umuahia, Abia State (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”) and delivered on 25 February, 2008 in Petition No. ABS/GOV/EPT/4/2007.
The tribunal in its judgment nullified the election of the 1st and 2nd Respondents as the Governor and Deputy Governor respectively of Abia State. It declared and returned Onyema Ugochukwu and his running mate, Hon Chinwendu Nwanganga (the 4th and 5th Respondents in the Appeal hereof) as the duly elected Governor and Deputy Governor of Abia State. Being dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Appellants have appealed against it on 14 Original Grounds and one Additional Ground of Appeal.
At the trial tribunal Onyema Ugochukwu and Hon. Chinwendu Nwanganga filed petition No.ABS/GOV/EPT/4/07 challenging the return of the 1st and 2nd Respondents hereof. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) filed Petition No. ABS/GOV/EPT/9/07 also challenging the return of the 1st and 2nd Respondents hereof.
The two Petitions were later consolidated. The Petitioners in ABS/GPV/EPT/4/07 were designated as “1st set of Petitioners” in the Tribunal. The Petitioners in ABS/GOV/EPT/9/07 WAS ALSO DESIGNATED as “2nd set of Petitioners”.
The judgment of the Tribunal was predicated on three issues and they are as follows:
(i) Whether the 1st and 2nd Petitioners in petition No. ABS/GOV/EPT/4/07 scored the majority of the lawful votes cast at the questioned election and not less than one quarter of all the votes cast in each of at least two thirds of all the Local Government Areas in Abia State?
(ii) Whether the election of the 1st Respondent is voided by substantial malpractices?
(iii) Whether the 1st and 2nd Respondents were qualified to contest the questioned election?
The tribunal resolved ISSUES (i) AND (ii) against the Petitioners and in favour of the Appellants and the 1st – 3rd Respondents hereof.
The Tribunal equally resolved ISSUE (iii) against the Appellants and the 1st -3rd Respondents hereof and in favour of the Petitioners.
This appeal challenges the resolution of the aforesaid issue in favour of the Petitioners.
The tribunal made a finding that the 1st Respondent is a member of an alleged secret society. It equally found that the 1st and 2nd Respondents were “public Servants” and that they did not resign their appointments within “30 days” of the questioned election.
In so doing the tribunal relied on the evidence of PW1 and PW5.
Dissatisfied with the judgment the appellants filed 14 grounds of appeal in their amended notice of appeal vide a Motion on Notice dated 23rd day of April, 2008 and filed on the 9th of May, 2008. See Amended Notice of Appeal. The Appellant distilled 4 issues from the 14 grounds of appeal I quote hereunder –
The issues which call for determination in this appeal are as follows:
(i) Whether the tribunal did not breach the Appellants’ constitutional right to fair hearing when it disallowed the Appellants from cross examining the witnesses called on behalf of the 1st-3rd Respondents (Ground 1 of Appeal).
(ii) Whether the tribunal was right in holding that the 1st and 2nd Respondents were disqualified from contesting the questioned election? (Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of Appeal).
(iii) Whether the tribunal had the jurisdiction to grant the Petitioners a relief they did not claim? (Ground 9 of Appeal).
(iv) whether the tribunal was right in not delivering distinct and separate judgments in Petitions Nos ABS/GOV/EPT/4/07 and ABS/GOV/EPT/9/07 (Ground 13 and 14 of Appeal).
The Respondents in their reply brief raised preliminary objection to the competence of the Appellants to file this appeal on the following grounds-
(a)The Appellant on record have no locus standi to appeal.
(b) The trial tribunal never decided any point against INEC or the Appellants on record to cloth them with any right of Appeal.
On 25/11/08 D.D. Dodo SAN learned leading counsel to the 4th & 5th Respondents referred to his Preliminary Objection contained on pages 5-10 of the 4th-5th Respondents brief of argument dated 23/10/08 filed on 27/10/98. The preliminary objection is argued on pages 5-10 of the said 4th and 5th Respondents brief of argument. He adopted the argument at paged 5-10 of the said brief and relied on it in urging this court to sustain the objection.
Livy Uzoukwu SAN leading counsel to the Appellants adopted his argument at pages 2-7 of the appellants reply brief dated 8/11/08 filed on 10/11/08. He relied on same as reply to the Preliminary objection and therefore urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection. The argument of the 4th and 5th Respondents is that an appeal is a complaint against a decision which attack the right or interest of the appellant. No decision of the tribunal was made against any of the appellants on records in the final decision of the tribunal. As such there is no basis at all for the appeal. He cited many authorities on this point amongst the authorities cited are OKONKWO V. NGIGE (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt 981) 119 at 135 C-E; ADELEKE V. OYO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (2006) 10 NWLR (pt.987) 51 at 77-78 F-F; PADAWA v. JATAU (2003) 5 NWLR (pt 813) 247 at 268 G-H and 269-270 C-E. The learned silk argued that from the plethora of decided cases on this point the entire brief filed by the Appellants on record is purely academic and therefore the appeal should be dismissed in limine and he urged this court to sustain the Preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal. In his reply to the Preliminary objection the learned leading SAN argued in his paragraph (d)-(e) (f) on page 2 of the reply brief that in setting aside the said return, the Tribunal made findings against the Appellants on record and that the Appellants had a responsibility to defend the results declared by it a fortiori the return based on these results. That a right of appeal is a constitutional right and any denial of that right must find justification in the constitution. The Appellant referred to pages (3671-3672) of the Record where the Tribunal held as follows I quote –
“We refer to the testimony of PW5 which was highlighted earlier in this issue, it is in support of the Petitioner’s assertion hence the burden has now shifted to the two sets of Respondents. We have noted that apart from denial, the two sets of Respondents did nothing to disprove such allegation”.
It further found at (page 3679 of the Record) as follows:
“We are of the candid view that the two sets of Respondents did not succeed in controverting the evidence adduced by the two sets of Petitioners especially the sworn deposition of PW5 which the second set of Petitioners referred to on page 16 paragraph 25.11 of their written address”.
The Appellants hereof were the 2nd set of Respondents in the Tribunal, against whom, with the 1st set of Respondents (1st-3rd Respondents hereof), the findings above were made by the Tribunal.
Consequently, the 4th and 5th Respondents claim that no point was ever decided against INEC or the Appellants hereof to clothe them with a right of appeal is not borne out of the record”.
He made references to the case of EKECHI V. OKAH (1993) 1 NWLR Pt. 257) 34 at 45 A-C. The Appellants then urged it on the court to dismiss the Preliminary objection.
Amongst other authorities relied upon by both counsel to this appeal is MOBIL PROD. NIG UNLIMITED V. MONOKPO (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt 852) 346 at 399 A-C, where it was held that a party to a proceedings cannot appeal a decision arrived thereof which does not wrongfully deprive him of entitlement or something which he had a right to demand. Unless there is such a grievance, he can not appeal against a judgment which has not affected him since the whole exercise may turn out to be academic. Under no circumstance can it be argued that a party to proceedings who has not been affected by a decision may nevertheless appeal against it merely as a party. This is because a person entitled to appeal is a person aggrieved by a decision i.e. a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which deprived him of some right see also NGIGE v. OBI (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt 999) 1 at 102-103 E-D 103 D-G and 220 E-F.
Section 246(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides as follows:
“An appeal to the Court of Appeal shall be as of right from
(a) decisions of the code of conduct Tribunal established in the fifth schedule to this constitution.
(b) decisions of the National Assembly Election Tribunal and Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunals on any question as to whether.
(i) any person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly or of a House of Assembly of a State under this constitution,
(ii) Any person had been validly elected to the office of Governor or Deputy Governor of a State
(iii) the term of office of any person has ceased or the seat of any such person has become vacant.
In KHALIL V. YA’ADUA (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt 847) 446 at 488 Paragraph D my learned brother Thomas JCA said inter alia-
“There is no doubt that the right to appeal from the decision of the National Assembly/Governorship and Legislative House Election Tribunal to the Court of Appeal is a constitutional right”.
I have earlier on referred to and quoted pages 3671-3672 of the Record of Appeal. When one looks at the above quoted one can not fault the right of the Appellants to appeal in this matter.
“I am not unmindful of the fact that INEC by its statutory existence is an independent body with constitutional powers to conduct election in Nigeria. The function of INEC by statutory provisions is one of an umpire in the conduct of an election. The body should never place itself in a position where imputations may be concluded that it supports one party or the other in an election. Unproved and unsubstantial allegations will be made against it. INEC should remain fair and focused no matter the provocation Omage JCA in BONI HARUNA ORS V. ADAMU MODIBO & ANOR (2004) 16 NWLR Pt 900 487 at 573.
I will however add that though the right of appeal is a constitutional right of the Appellants but this right by INEC should be sparingly exercised. This is in the interest of our electoral process that INEC and its officials should remain as neutral as possible in election cases as their primary responsibility is to conduct free and fair election regardless of who wins. See HARUNA V. MODIBO Supra. Having said much I see no reasons why INEC in view of the pronouncement of the Tribunal should not appeal.
The preliminary objection therefore fails and it is dismissed.
In the main appeal the learned leading counsel to the Appellants adopted his Brief of argument dated 13/10/08 and filed on 20/10/08 and urged the court to allow the appeal. He further stressed on the importance of complying with the provisions of the Practice Direction especially paragraph 1(1)(b) thereof referring to the case of OKEREKE V. YAR’ADUA (2008) 12 NWLR Pt. 110 Page 95 at 140-141 H-C He urged the court to allow the appeal.
Dodo SAN of learned leading counsel to the 4th & 5th Respondents adopted his brief of argument dated 23/10/08 filed on 27/10/08. He relied on same in urging this court to dismiss the appeal and uphold the decision of the lower tribunal. Chief Wole Olanipekun SAN leading counsel for the 1st & 2nd Respondents admitted that no brief was filed by the 1st & 2nd Respondents.
Prince L.O. Fagbemi SAN leading counsel for the 3rd Respondent did not also file any brief on behalf of the 3rd Respondent. They are deemed to have admitted the truth of everything stated in the Appellants brief. The 4th & 5th Respondents in their brief of argument adopted the issues formulated by the Appellants.
On a perusal of the grounds of appeal, and issue formulated therefrom – I am of the view that a determination of issue 2 which reads I quote –
“Whether the Tribunal was right in Holding that the 1st and 2nd Respondent were disqualified from contesting the election (Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12” will determine the merit of the appeal.
This issue covers 10 grounds out of the 14 grounds filed. In fact a court can re formulate issues in an appeal as same is to narrow the issue(s) in controversy in the interest of accuracy and brevity. As long as the issues(s) are anchored on the grounds of appeal the opposite party can not complain. See UNITY BANK PLC V. BOUARI (2008) Supreme Court Monthly 193 at 210. In arguing this issue the Appellant stated that the 1st & 2nd Respondents were not public officers. He argued that it is not in controversy that the 1st Respondent was Chief of Staff to the Abia State Governor while the 2nd Respondent was a “Civil Commissioner”. It was on that basis that the Petitioner now Respondent came a conclusion that they were in the public service of Abia State. It is the argument of the Appellants that for the 1st & 2nd Respondents to be said to be in the “Public service of a state” the offices they occupied must come within the scope and definition of public service of a state under section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. He said if the 1st and 2nd Respondents were not in the public service of a state (Abia State) the tribunal lacked the jurisdiction and competence to invoke the provisions of S.182 (1) (g) against them citing the case of ASOGWA V. CHUKWU (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt 811) 540 at 576; MOMOH OKEWALE 1977 6 SC 81, 1977 11 NSCC 365 Where the Supreme Court held that a driver who was employed by the Lagos City Council was not a public officer as there was no evidence that he was appointed by the public service commission either of the Federation or of Lagos State.
On the factors determining a public officer he called in aid the case of REGISTERED TRUSTEES PPFN V. SHOGHOLA (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt 883) 1 at 20 para C-E. The Appellants argued that a Chief of Staff and Civil Commissioner are the appointees of the Governor of Abia State and held their offices at his pleasure. They are political office holders.
The Appellants also proffered argument on the incompetence of the claim that the 1st & 2nd Respondents were in the public service of Abia State within a period of one month preceding the date of election. I do not need to venture into this argument without first of all deciding whether the 1st & 2nd Respondents are public officers which will then necessitate the consideration of resignation. On the pleadings of the allegation that the 1st Respondent is a member of a secret society the Appellants argued that there are no facts upon which to anchor any evidence that there is a body known as Okija secret society. The learned SAN cited the case of REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH V. OLOWOLENI (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt 158) 514 at 534 paragraph E-F where it was held thus –
A party’s case is defined circumscribed and limited by its pleadings. This is why such a pleading demands so much care and skill to draft for where a plaintiff’s pleading is defective or bereft essential averments it could constitute a definite guarantee for his failure.
The Appellant argued that Okija shrine has never been published at least legally as a secret society. He argued that the admission of the evidence of PW5 offended not only the Practice Directions but also the hallowed doctrine of fair hearing. The evidence of the PW5 formed the bedrock of the case of the Petitioner in relation to the allegation of the 1st Respondent belonging to a secret society. The tribunal should have ensured that PW5 was competent to testify in the first place. The Appellants argued that it was not proved by the petitioners that Okija shrine is a secret society citing S.318 (1) of the Constitution.
There is nothing in the evidence of the PW5 excluding the Okija shrine as place of worship for traditional religion. There was no proof of –
(a) The secret signs used by members
(b) The rites and rituals performed
(c) The symbol members used
(d) The activities of member that are detrimental to non-members and
(e) How – its membership is incompatible with the function or dignity of a public office.
The Appellants further submitted that it is not established that the 1st Respondent is a member of the Okija shrine. On the merit the evidence of the PW5 did not establish that Okija shrine is a secret society and that the 1st Respondent is a member. On the conclusion of his argument the learned SAN urged this court to allow the appeal and dismiss the petition. On Issue 2 the 4th & 5th Respondents in their joint brief argued that the 4th & 5th Respondents pleaded material fact to the effect that the 1st & 2nd Respondents were still in the public service of Abia State at all material times. They pleaded that the 2nd Respondent on record is a Civil Commissioner in the Executive Council of Abia State while the 1st Respondent is Chief of Staff. He argued that once there is evidence on record to justify a conclusion reached by a trial court the Court of Appeal will sustain the conclusion. He said none of the Appellants nor/1st & 2nd Respondents gave any contrary evidence on this point. The sworn deposition of the 2nd Respondent completely avoided this fact. They sought to rely on the letters which were tendered as Exhibits “LC1” “LC2” and “LC3”.
On the question of the 1st Respondent being a member of a secret cult the 4th & 5th Respondents relied heavily on –
(1) The sworn deposition of PW5 page 2711 of the Record
(2) His answer to cross examination Pages 2720-2726
(3) The oral evidence of PW5 and
(4) The video Cassette Exhibit HS
He submitted that section 182 (1) (h) is not enacted with criminal connotation and the court will not read any criminal con into it. It is enacted as a self executing ground of disqualification which stands out on his own. He further argued that the Supreme Court never decided in ONYENGE V. EBERE (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.889) 20 at 37 part G-H that Ogwugwuakpu Okija is not a secret society. The Supreme Court was never invited in that case to decide whether or not the shrine is a secret society. He concluded that the tribunal duly considered all the points in issue. No miscarriage of justice was occasioned and therefore urged this court to resolve all the issues against the Appellants and therefore dismiss the appeal.
The 1999 Constitution provides for the qualification of person seeking election to the offices of the President, Vice President and member of the National Assembly, Governor, Deputy Governor and Member of the State of House of Assembly. Sections 177 and 182 stipulate the qualification and the disqualification of the offices of the Governor and the Deputy Governor.
Under S. 182(1) No person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if:-
(a) …
(b) …
(c) …
(g) being a person employed in the public service of the Federation or of any State, he has not resigned, withdrawn or retired from the employment at least thirty days to the date of election
(h) he is a member of any secret society.
The Constitution disqualifies a person employed in the Civil or public service of the Federation or State who has not resigned withdrawn or retired at least thirty days before the date of election.
Resignation from employment is by giving of the required length of notice or payment in lieu of notice. Therefore a petitioner can validly challenge the election of a Respondent on the ground that the person on whose election is questioned was at the time of the election not qualified to be elected. This was exactly what the Petitioner/4th & 5th Respondents in this case did.
Section 145(1) of the Electoral Act 2006 states-
“An election may be questioned on any of the following grounds: (a)That a person whose election is questioned was at the time of the election not qualified to con the election.
The quarrel of the 4th & 5th Respondents as Petitioners which the lower tribunal upheld was that the 1st Respondent was the Chief of Staff and the 2nd Respondent a Civil Commissioner in the Abia State Government and they never resigned their position before the date of election. The question is who is a Chief of Staff or a Civil Commissioner? Do they qualify as Civil or Public officers?
In ASOGWA V. CHUKWU (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt 811) 540 at 576 A-F Pats – Acholonu JSC said as follows
“I have carefully read the definition of the “Public service of the State” as stated in section 318 (1) of the Constitution. I have already set down to whom it refers. It therefore goes without saying that neither the Speaker nor the non statutory officer described as “majority Leader”. (Which term or office is unknown in our statutory law) nor any member of the House is a public officer for the purpose of section 318 (1) aforesaid. So, section 318 does not include any member of the House at all.
In Interpretation Act Cap. (192) 1990, Law of the Federation of Nigeria, the term public officer is defined as follows: “Public Officer means a member of the public service of the Federation within the meaning of Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria and Public service of the State.”
It seems to me that somehow the two interpretations as contained in the two statutes are saying the same thing. In other words, the term Public officer should only relate to the holders of the offices as reflected only in section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. That is to say, the public officer referred to in the Interpretation Act can only be described to be referable to those enjoying employments with statutory flavour as reflected in section 318 (1).
In DAVA V. ADEYEYE (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.920) 1 at 19 para D-E it was held that:
The question then is when is a person in the public service of a State? The answer can be found in the definition of the words ‘public service of a State”. Section 318(1) of the Constitution defines the words as:
“Public service of a State” means the service of the State in any capacity in respect of the Government of the State and includes service as”.
The provision goes on to enumerate non – political offices in the Government of the State.
It was further held at pages 19-20 para H-A that:
From the above definition therefore, it is clear that the Governor of a State is not in the Public Service of that state within the meaning of S.318 (1). The Deputy Governor, the Speaker and all other political office holders are not in the public service of the State.
It was also held at page 22 para E that:
In the first instance, having admitted that the office occupied by the 1st respondent prior to the election is not a creation of the 1999 Constitution it follows that its occupant cannot be subject to the provisions of section 66(1) (f) of the said 1999 Constitution.
The said section 66(1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution considered in the judgment above has identical provision with section 182 (1) (g) of the same Constitution. The only difference between the two is that the former relates to qualification to Senate or House of Representatives; while the latter is in respect of the office of the Governor.
In MOMOH V. OKEWALE (1977) 6 S.C. 81, (1977) 11 NSCC 365, the Supreme Court held that a driver who was employed by the Lagos City Council was not a public officer. The court decided that there was no evidence that he was appointed by the Public service Commission either of the Federal or of Lagos State.
On the factors for determining a public officer the Court of Appeal in the case of REGISTERED TRUSTEE PPFN V. SHOGHOLA (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt.883) 1 at 20 para C-E Per Chukwuma – Eneh JCA (as he then was) stated thus:
The respondent in his brief had been described as a public officer in a Statutory body… this connotes that the respondent was holding a public office, this added to the confusion in the matter … none of the three factors that must co-exist to constitute a public office namely that the office was created by the constitution, statute or other enabling legislation, secondly that its function, duties and powers are as defined by law and other regulation; thirdly that the position must show some permanency: appear to be present here.
I can not but agree with the Appellants that from the authorities the following material ingredients of a public officer within the intendment of S.318 (1) of the Constitution are as follows –
(a) The term “Public officer or servant relate only to the holders of the offices as reflected only in section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
(b) Refers to those officers whose employment enjoy statutory flavour as reflected in 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
(c) The office must be a creation of the Constitution statute or enabling legislation.
(d) The functions, duties and powers are as defined by law and other regulation.
(e) The office must have some permanency.
(f) A person employed by the Public Service commission of the Federation or state is a public officer.
(g) Political office holders can not qualify as being in the public service of a state.
The 1st & 2nd Respondents herein are to my mind as Chief of Staff and civil commissioner appointees of the Governor of Abia State and hold their offices at the mercy of the Governor. The appointments and dismissal are sometimes made in the media – electronic or prints.
Except in employment governed by statute where the procedure for employment and discipline (including dismissal of an employee are clearly spelt out, any other employment outside the statute is an employment of Master and Servant, IBAMA V. S.P.D.C OF NIGERIA (2006) 7 WRN 160, at 196-197.
From the forgoing the only conclusion I can reach is to hold that the 1st & 2nd Respondents in this appeal are not public officers and therefore qualified to contest as Governor and Deputy Governor of Abia State. The decision of the lower tribunal on the point is set aside. The question of resignation 30 days to the election will therefore not apply.
The next question is whether the 1st Respondent is a member of a secret cult/society referred to as Okija secret society or Okija shrine.
In paragraph 6 C (1) (i) (ii) of their petition the 4th & 5th Respondent as petitioner pleaded thus –
(i) The 1st Respondent is a member of a secret society. The Petitioners shall call oral and documentary evidence of his initiation into the Okija secret society.
(ii) Initiation into the said secret society involved the stripping of the 1st Respondent up to only his pants and his submitting himself to the chief priest of the secret society bound in chains while a life cockrel was wielded over his head and around him.
What is “secret society”? The definition of what a secret society is contained in S. 318 the interpretation section of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It provides I quote “secret society” includes any society, association, group or body of persons (whether registered or not) –
(a) that uses secret signs, oaths, rites or symbols and which is formed to promote a cause, the purpose or part of the purpose of which is to foster the interest of its members and to aid one another under any circumstances without due regard to merit, fair play or justice, to the detriment of the legitimate interest of those who are not members;
(b) the membership of which is incompatible with the function or dignity of any public office under this Constitution and whose members are sworn to observe oaths of secrecy; or
(c) the activities of which are not known to the public at large, the names of whose members are kept secret and whose meeting and other activities are held in secret;
The lower tribunal based its judgment on the Evidence of PW5 whose competence to give evidence was seriously challenged. The PW5 had been declared to be an incompetent witness in the mother case i.e. CA/PH/EPT/197/08 I also declare him as an incompetent witness having regard to the Practice Directions.
To say the least evidence of PW5 is worthless, so also is Exhibit HS.
If the Supreme Court in ONYENGE V. EBERE (2004) 14 NWLR Pt 889, 21 did not declare Okija shrine as a secret cult or society it is clearly outside the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal to declare Okija/Society/Shrine as a secret cult. The said Okija/Shrine/Society has not at any time been proscribed by law.
It is a well settled principle of the administration of justice that a party who sets out to assert the existence of a claim bears the burden of establishing the claim and must fail if he does not succeed in establishing what he has undertaken to do. See CARDOSO V. DANIELS & ORS Appellate Courts Land Mark Cases Vol. 4 Page 52 at 96 D -E
This issue is resolved in favour of the Appellant. Since the tribunal had held that the election was conducted in substantial compliance with the law and that the 1st & 2nd Respondents scored the majority of lawful votes cast, the return of the 1st Respondent which was a product of that election could not have been legally set aside by the tribunal.
The decision of the lower tribunal is hereby set aside and in its place I declare the 1st & 2nd Respondent in this appeal as validly elected as Governor and Deputy Governor of Abia State. No order as to cost.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3116(CA)
