Industrial Training Fund Governing Council & Anor V. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2016)

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MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A. 

This application is pursuant to Section 241 and 242 of the 1999 Constitution, Section 15 and 24 of the Court of Appeal Act, Orders 4 Rule 6, 7 Rules 1, 7 and 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

The application is for:
1. An order extending time within which to seek leave to appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court, Abuja Division Coram E. S. Chukwu, of the 26th of June 2015, in FHC/ABJ/CS/316/2015, between Industrial Training Fund Governing Council; & Anor v. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria.
2. An order granting leave to the applicants to appeal against the decision.
3. An order extending time within which the applicants may appeal against the decision.
4. An order granting leave to the applicant to raise a fresh issue on appeal, to wit, the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain labour related matter.
5. Such orders as the Court may deem fit to make in circumstances.
The grounds for the application are:
1. The claim of the plaintiff relates to or is connected with the employment, salaries,

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condition of service and welfare of the defendants’ employees and Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain cases relating to or connected with employment.
2. The service of originating processes is invalid as same was not done in accordance with requirement of the law.
3. The cause of action was founded on Public Officer Protection Act and was not commenced within three months of accrual and therefore statute barred.
4. The learned trial judge has delved into substantive issues based on his personal opinion without any evidence at this stage of proceeding.

The application is supported by a 22 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by Muhammad Doko Idris, with the ruling of the trial Court and the notice and grounds of appeal attached as exhibits.

M.D. Idris Esq. of counsel to the appellants/applicants urged the Court to grant the application in the interest of justice; in opposition a five paragraphed counter affidavit deposed to by Joy Odoh was filed on behalf of the respondent; P. Olise Esq., of counsel urged this Court not to grant the application.

This Court has carefully gone through the affidavit in support of the

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application and the counter affidavit, paying no less attention to submissions of learned counsel before arriving at the conclusion that in an application of this nature it is not enough to merely contend that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, see Paragraph 5 of the applicant’s affidavit in support of the application; because jurisdiction being what it is can be raised at any stage, even on appeal, and that therefore allows for the trial Court to hear the substance of the suit, and the applicant can conveniently bring his grievances, inclusive the issue of jurisdiction a in a basket on appeal rather than piecemeal.

Generally speaking this Court sees very little sense in interlocutory appeals, especially for the reason that more often than not they are time wasting, to both the Court and the parties, needlessly:
“In Amadi v. N.N.P.C. (2000) FWLR (pt.9) 1522, (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 66 at 02, the Supreme Court observed the dilatory effect of interlocutory appeal to the substantive suit and directed that the point on jurisdiction should be taken in the course of proceedings in the substantive claim, and any aggrieved party can

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appeal on both the issue of jurisdiction and the judgment on merit in the proceedings. The reasoning of the Supreme Court being that interlocutory appeals cause unnecessary delay. Indeed, they are a waste of resources and precious judicial time. The Supreme Court had cause to frown at such appeals. SEE TUKUR. V. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT.63) 39; GLOBE FISHING INDUSTRIES LTD. V. COKER (1990) 11 SCNJ 56”; PDP V. ABUBAKAR (NO.1) (2007) ALL FWLR part 386 697 at 709, Per Rhodes-Vivour JCA, as he then was.
Again in RIBADU V. DALHATU (2012) LPELR-192729, this Court held “… it is improper to grant an extension of time within which to appeal against an interlocutory Ruling since the issues which the Applicant sought to appeal against could be taken after the Judgment on the merit, see Abubakar vs. Chuks (2007) 18 NWLR Part 1066 Page 386 at 411…”
The dilatory nature of interlocutory appeal came to fore again in this case, see Paragraph 3 (a) (c) (e) (f) and (g) of the counter affidavit of the respondents.
Even though the applicant stated the failure to appeal before now was not deliberate, this Court fails to see any convincing reason from the

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affidavit of the applicant, OKERE V. NLEM (1992) 4 NWLR (PT 234) PG.132 SC. C.C.B (NIG.) LTD. V. OGURU (1993) 3 NWLR (PT.284) PG 630 and UKPE IBODO & ORS V. ENOROFIA (1981) 5-7 SC 41 AT PG. 51.

Discretion is never exercised in favour of an applicant just for the asking, “Judicial discretion must be exercised according to the relevant rules of law and practice and according to the rules of reason and justice. The guiding principle is that discretion, being judicial, must at all times be exercised not only judicially but also judiciously based on sufficient materials placed before the Court.” ONI V. FAYEMI (2008) 8 NWLR part 1089 pg. 400 at 440, per Sankey, JCA.

This Court does not believe that sufficient reasons exist for the exercise of its discretion in favour of the applicant, and for the reasons stated above I find no merit in the application, it is accordingly dismissed.

Parties to bear their respective costs.

Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8947(CA)