Ini Okon Utuk V. The Official Liquidator (Utuks Construction and Marketing Company Ltd.) & Anor. (2008)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
JEAN OMOKRI, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the decision of G. G. Ezekwe, J., of the Federal High Court, sitting at Uyo in Suit No. FHC/CA/M 1/93 delivered on 7/5/96.
The gist of this case on appeal is that sometimes ago, the Utuks Construction and Marketing Company Ltd. ran into lean times. To keep a float it sold off three 30 tonnes Fiat Tipper bucket to the 2nd respondent, Traman Nigeria Ltd. Instead of giving the tipper buckets to the 2nd Respondent company sold the to other person. The 2nd respondent consequent sued for the return of the items in suit NO. HU/112/92. Judgment was entered in favour of the 2nd respondent. The Court in its judgment ordered the 1st respondent to return the three No. 30 tonnes fiat tipper buckets to the 2nd respondent. Unable to comply with the orders of the court, the 2nd respondent brought an application for the payment of the money equivalent of the items. The application was granted by the court and it was ordered that the sum of N1,774,400.00 be paid to the 2nd respondent.
In the interim, the appellant who was originally not a party to the proceedings brought an application praying that he be subsisted for his deceased’s father in the proceedings. That application was granted and the present appellant was subsisted by the order of the court dated 25/9/95. The court also granted a stay of execution in the judgment in Suit No. HU/112/92 until the final determination of the winding up proceedings against the judgment debtor, Utuks Construction and Marketing Co. Ltd.
After the winding up of the company, the 2nd respondent wrote to the 1st respondent to pay the judgment debt of N1.7 million. In response, the 1st respondent caused certain properties of the company to be valued and then brought an application ex parte before the court for leave to settle the judgment debt by transferring the assets of the company so valued to the 2nd respondent in full and final satisfaction of the debt of N1.7 million. The properties are:
1. 26 Oron Road, Uyo
2. 4 William Street, Uyo ,
3. 8 Barracks Road, Uyo
4. Ikot Ekpene Road, Uyo, Opposite Shopping Centre, Uyo
5. 194 ikot Ekpene Road, Uyo
6. Land at Ekpobot Street, Uyo
The Federal High Court, Calabar, presided over by Adu- Kafarati J. granted the application. Subsequently, the appellant who had obtained leave to substitute his late father, brought an application to set aside the order transferring the assets of the company to settle the judgment debt of N 1.7 million. That application was heard by G. C. Ezekwe, J., who dismissed the application on the ground that he cannot set aside the judgment of Abdu-Kafarati, J., being a court of Co-ordinate jurisdiction.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the G. C. Ezekwe, J., 1st appellant appealed to this Court on 1/7/96 filing 5 grounds of appeal in his notice and grounds of appeal.
In the appellant’s brief of argument dated on 6/6/97 and filed 9/6/97 and deemed filed on 10/6/97, the appellant distilled 3 issues from the 5 grounds of appeal. The 3 issues for determination are as follows:
“4.01 Whether the learned trial Judge misapplied the law in refusing to entertain the application to set aside the order obtained ex parte from his predecessor under the I view that he was not competent to sit in judgment over the decision unless it was a nullity ab initio.
4.02 Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the applicant should have obtained leave of the Federal High Court before bringing the application against the Liquidator by virtue of Section 417 of CAMA.
4.03 Whether the learned trial Judge was right in accepting NEMAS Associates as Chartered Surveyors and Values merely on the basis of the description on the cover of the Inspection Survey and Valuation Report, without considering the averments in the affidavits of the appellant to the contrary.”
The 1st respondent’s brief was dated on 9/3/2000 and filed the same day. It was deemed properly filed and served by this Court on 9/11/2004. The 1st respondent in its brief distilled 3 issues for determination and they are as follows:
“(i). Whether a Judge can set aside an order made by another Judge of a co-ordinate or concurrent jurisdiction where the Order was not found to be a nullity.
(ii) whether the failure of the appellant to seek and obtain leave of the lower court to bring his application against the 1st respondent was not fatal to his application.
(iii) whether the trail judge was not right to have accepted valuation by NEMAS Association as Chartered Surveyors and valuers in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.”
The 2nd respondent brief dated 23/2/2004 and filled on 9/3/04 and deemed filed on 9/11/2004. The 2nd respondent distilled 4 issues for determination and they are as follows:
“(1) whether the learned trial judge was right in holding that he was not competent to have set aside the ruling of his learned brother.
(ii) whether the suit (i.e) the motion to set aside the fact No leave was obtained before commencement of the suit.
(iii) whether or not this appeal is competent in view of the fact that the appellant not being a party nor substituted for a party in suit No. HU/112/92/ in court below and being a person interested in this appeal requiring LEAVE which was not sought for nor obtained.
(iv) whether the affidavit of the appellant in support of the motion to set aside the ruling contained sufficient materials to enable the court to have exercised its jurisdiction appellant favour.”
On being served with the 1st and 2nd respondent brief, the appellant filed a reply brief dated 31/1/05 and filed on 1/2/05 and it was deemed properly filed and served on 24/2/05.
On Issue No.1, it is the contention of the appellant that every order made on a motion ex parte, any party affected by it may apply to the court by motion to vary or discharge it. The appellant also contended that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to revoke leave given ex parte, upon mere facts being brought to its notice. He relied on Becker vs. Noel (1971) 1 WLR 803. It is the contention of the appellant that the case of Akporue & Ors v. Okei & Ors (1973) 12 SC 137 is distinguishable from the instant case. The appellant concluded that it is the very court that made the order that has the power to vary or discharge same.
On Issue NO.2, the appellant’s contention is that the trial court was wrong to conclude that the appellant must apply for leave of the Court before instituting proceedings against the Liquidator, the 1st respondent, under section 417 of the CAMA. The appellant relied on section 418 of the CAMA and contended that an order for winding up of a company operates in favour of all the creditors and of all the contributors of the company as life made on a joint petition of a creditor and of a contributor, therefore the appellant does not need prior leave of the court because it is not a necessary condition precedent for bringing an action against the 1st respondent for acts done or omitted to be done by it.
On’ Issue No.3, the appellant contended that the trial, Judge was wrong in accepting NEMAS Associates as Chartered Surveyors, and Valuers on the face of the cover page of the valuation report. It was also Contended that the purported valuation of the property for the satisfaction of judgment debt was done secretly and the valuation report on the properties was tailored to the amount stated in the judgment debt.
The appellant pointed out that apart from the finding that NEMAS Associates was not a registered member of the Nigeria Institute of Estate Surveyors and Valuers either at the National or State level, the learned trial Judge neglected or refused to call for oral testimony to clarify or substantiate such an important evidence of assigning property worth over N18.7 million as against N1.7 million. The appellant was of the view that mere disparity on the figures submitted in the two reports is sufficient for the learned trial Judge to at least have caused more inquiry to be made in the interest of justice. ”
The 1st respondent, in Issue No. 1 contended that the general position of the law is that a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of another court of similar jurisdiction. See Onagoruwa vs. I. G. P. (1991) 5 NWLR (pt. 193) 593 at 638 and Koden v. Shidon (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 571) 62 at 675.
The 1st respondent contended that the appellant tried unsuccessfully to show that the order of the court made by Abdu-Kafarati, J., was obtained by fraud but he was unable to prove any fraud whatsoever. In the absence of any fraud the trial Judge was right to have refused to sit on appeal over an order given by his learned brother of co-ordinate jurisdiction. See Onwuka vs. Maduka (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 344 at 344 – 355; Akporue vs. Okei & Ors. (supra) and Aghenghen vs. Wagherogor (1974 – 75) 9 NSCC 20 at 23. Contrary to the appellant’s contention that the law does not provide room for appeals against ex parte order, and as such he has been denied justice through a misconception of the general principles of law, the 1st respondent pointed out that in fact the appellant can appeal to this court as it was decided in Guardian Newspaper Ltd. V. A-G Federation (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt. 398) 703 at 729 – 730. He concluded that the trial Judge was right in holding that he could not set aside a previous order made by his learned brother of Co-ordinate jurisdiction.
On Issue NO.2, the 1st respondent relying on the provisions of sections 417 and 425(1) of the CAMA; Abekhe v. NDIC (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 406) 228 at 242 and FMB Ltd. vs. NDIC (1995) 6 NWLR (pt: 400) 226 at 243 submitted that since the appellant did not seek leave of he court to commence his action against the 1st respondent, the proceedings was a complete nullity.
On Issue NO.3, 1st respondent submitted that the appellant failed to prove the a legations made against NEMAS Associates therefore the trial Judge was right to have accepted the valuation by NEMAS Associates.
The 2nd respondent in Issue No. 1 relied on Akporue vs. Okei & Ors. (supra) and submitted that, no Judge is competent to sit in judgment over the decision or order made by another Judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction. He also submitted that a court of law can interfere with its own judgment or orders by setting it aside or correcting it. The procedure for getting a court to so interfere is by bringing application to, the ACTUAL Judge who delivered the judgment or ruling. He relied on F. B. N. Plc. v. Asubob & Co. Nig. Ltd. & Anor. (Unreported) Appeal No. CA/C/53/2001 delivered on Thursday, 20th March, 2003, Court of Appeal (Calabar Division) and Akporue vs. Okei & Ors. (-supra).
On Issue No.2, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that the appellant ought to have sought for and obtain the leave of the court before commencing the suit to set aside the ruling of the court in accordance with section 417 of the CAMA. He concluded that the appellant having not fulfilled a condition precedent before instituting the suit, the action is incompetent and the Federal High Court “lacked the jurisdiction to have entertained the suit. He referred to Rossek vs. ACB Plc. (1993) to SCNJ 20.
On Issue Nos. 4, the 2nd respondent submitted that the averments in the appellant’s ‘affidavit did not contain sufficient materials to have warranted the court to set aside the said judgment assuming: that the court had the jurisdiction to have done so.
Now, I have carefully considered and reflected upon the issues formulated by the parties in this appeal. I am of the considered view that the 3 issues formulated by the 1st respondent are more succinct, comprehensive and derivable from the grounds of appeal. I shall therefore rely on them in the determination of this appeal.
Before delving into the main issues in this appeal, there are some collateral matters that cal for closer consideration at this stage to comment upon and disposed of.
Firstly, I observed that the parties made references to the decision of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State in Suit No. HU/112/92. It is important to note that the present appeal is only against the decision of the Federal High Court” Calabar, presided over by G. C. Ezekwe, J., in Suit No. FHC/CA/M1/92 delivered on 7/5/96. There is no appeal against the decision of the High Court in Suit No. HU/112/92 before this court now.
Secondly, I observed that Issue Nos. 3 and 4 of the 2nd respondent do not flow from any of the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. Issue No. 3 formulated by the 2nd respondent bears no relationship whatsoever with any of the five grounds of appeal filed. Issue NO.4 has no nexus with any of the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant.
Now, in brief writing, issues for determination are confined to and circumscribed by the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant and any issue not related to the grounds of appeal is incompetent. See Falola v. U. B. N. Plc. (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 924).405 SC and Magit vs. University of Agric. Makurdi (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 211 SC. An issue must be distilled from a ground or grounds of appeal. Issues for determination derive their source from the ground or grounds of appeal. A respondent must frame or formulate his issue for determination from the ground or grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. He cannot frame issues not based on any ground or grounds of appeal unless he has filed a cross-appeal or a respondent’s notice from which such issues derive their source. Presently, the 2nd respondent’s Issues Nos. 3. and 4 which were not formulated or distilled from the grounds of appeal filed are incompetent and are hereby discountenanced. See State vs. Usman (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 906) 80 at 117; Oshoboja vs. Amuda (1992)8 NWLR (Pt. 250) 679; Ageimo vs. Abraham (2001) 16 NWLR’ (Pt. 738) …; C. I. F. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Sillo (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) 258; Labiyi vs. Anretiola (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 258) 137 and I. I. B. (Nig.) Ltd. . vs. Adelumaragun (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 924) 275.
The 2nd respondent’s Issue Nos. 3 and 4 and the arguments proffered under it are incompetent and are hereby struck out.
On Issue NO.1, the appellant contended that the trial court ought to have discharged or varied the order of Abdu-Kafarati, J. It is important to note that the order the appellant sought to set aside was an order made by Abdu-Kafarati, J., of the Federal High Court. Hon. G. C. Ezekwe, J., also a Judge of the Federal High Court, refused to set aside the order which was lawful and proper on the ground that it was the decision of his brother Judge with co-ordinate jurisdiction. The simple issue is, whether Hon. G. C. Ezekwe, J., was right or wrong. To begin with there is a general proposition that in the absence of any legislation a Judge cannot sit on appeal or the judgment of another judge of concurrent or co-ordinate jurisdiction. There are a plethora of cases dealing with the issue. In the case of Onwuka vs. Maduka (supra) at page 354 – 355, this Court held that:
“Where it is intended that a particular act of one Judge or Court could be set aside by himself or another Judge of concurrent jurisdiction such rules ordinarily expressly provide for them. Therefore, in the absence of express provision granting power to the Court of Judge or another Court of concurrent jurisdiction to set aside or vary its own orders, the remedy open to the appellant in the instant case was to go on appeal to the Court of Appeal against the exercise of discretion by Ikeazor, in his ruling adding the 2nd, 8th respondents to the suit.”
In Akporue & Ors VS. Okei & Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court per Dan Ibekwe, JSC, held thus:
“The trial Judge has no power to set aside the order or representation made by another Judge of the High Court and the defendants, if dissatisfied with the order as indeed they were, should have appealed against the order of representation, …”
See also Orewere & Ors. vs. Abiegbe & Ors. (1973) 8 NSCC 479 per Elias, CJN.
In Agbenghen vs.Wagheroghor (supra) at page 120 at 23, Elias, CJN., held this:
“We have had occasion in recent months to warn High Court Judges against the practice of sitting on appeal, as it here upon the judgments of the High Court Judges and to review and pass upon such judgments.”
It is crystal clear from the above decided cases that a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction does not have the jurisdiction to set aside the judgment or ruling or order of another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. See further Amannuba vs. Okafor (1966) 1 All NLR 205 at 207 and Uku & Ors. vs. Okumagba (1974) All NLR (Pt. 1) 475. It is important that I mention that the position of the law stated above is not sacrosanct. It admits of a very important exception and that is where a judgment or ruling or any decision of a concurrent or co-ordinate jurisdiction is a nullity. It could be varied or even set aside by another Court or Judge of co-ordinate or concurrent jurisdiction. See Skenconsult vs. Sekondy Ukey, (1981) 1 SC 6 and Olu Onagoruwa vs. L G. P. (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 193) 638 at 639. Thus a Judge of co-ordinate or concurrent jurisdiction can set aside the decision of his brother Judge where:
(a) the said judgment is ab initio void.
(b) when the order is a nullity it can be set aside ex debito justicie.
See Koden vs. Shido (supra), and Onagoruwa V. I. G. P. (supra). None of this situations is manifested in the instant case on appeal. So I see no merit whatsoever in the arguments of the appellant that the trial Judge should have discharged the order of his brother Judge. The appellant contended that orders obtained ex parte are by their very nature obtained not on the merits and that the proper court to vary discharge or set it aside is the very court which made the order and that the law does not provide any room for appeals against ex parte orders.
The submission or contention of the appellant does not represent the correct position of the law and it is misconceived. Firstly, Order 9 Rule 11 of the Federal High Court, 2000, provides that:
“Where an order is made in a motion ex parte any party affected by it may within seven days after service of it, or within such further think, as the court shall allow, apply to the court by motion to vary or discharge it; and the court may, on notice to the party obtaining the order, either refuse to vary or discharge it or may vary or discharge it with or without imposing terms as to costs or otherwise, as seems just.”
Obviously, the appellant failed to take advantage of the above provision. He was aware of the order of the trial court but he did not bring any application within 7 days as provided by Order 9 Rule 11 of the Federal High Court. More importantly, such application must be brought before the same Judge, in this case, Abdu-Kafarati, J.
Secondly, there is no law preventing the appellant from appealing against the order made by Abdu-Kafarati, J. In fact, an appeal was the correct option open to the appellant in the circumstance. See Akporue vs. Okei & Ors. (supra); Onwuka vs. Maduka (supra) and Guardian Newspaper Ltd. vs. Attorney-General of the Federation (supra) and First Bank of Nig. Plc. v. Asubob & Co. Nig. Ltd. & Anor. (Unreported) Appeal (supra). I therefore resolve Issue No. 1 against the appellant.
I shall now consider Issue No.2, which is:
“Whether the failure of the appellant to seek and obtain leave of the lower court to bring his application against the 1st respondent was not fatal to his application.”
This issue readily brings to mind the provisions of section 417 of the CAMA, which provides thus:
“If a winding up order is made or a provisional Liquidator is appointed no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the court given on such terms as the Court may impose.”
It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent was appointed Liquidator for the Utuks Construction and Marketing Company Ltd. on 26/6/95.
The wordings of section 417 of the CAMA are so clear, unambiguous and plain, therefore the court must give it its literal, plain and ordinary meaning. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and Unambigous the courts are precluded from resorting to any aid or any other cannon of interpretation. See Ibori vs. Ogboru (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 102; Ibi vs. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 565; Elobanjo vs, Damodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76 and F. R. N. vs. O. Shon (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 973) 361. See also Maxwel in Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, page 28, where it was stated thus:
“The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in there ordinary meaning and the second is that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. “The length and detail of modern legislation” wrote Lord Evershed M. R. has, undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words themselves and sentence. The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without in the first instance, reference to cases.”
It is not is dispute that the 1st respondent was Appointed Liquidator of Utuks Construction and Marketing Co. Ltd. on 26/6/95. Therefore with effect from 26/6/95 no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the court given on such terms as the court may impose. The appellant argued in his brief that leave of the lower court was not necessary as a condition precedent to bring an action against the Liquidator for acts done or omitted to be done by the Liquidator. The submission of the appellant is misconceived. The provisions of section 417 of the CAMA are clear and unambiguous and it provides that such leave is a condition precedent. See Abeke vs. NDIC, (supra); FMB Ltd. VS. NDIC (supra) and Klifco Ltd. vs. Philip Holzmann A. G. (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 436) 276 at 282.
In Nnonye vs. Anyichie (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 639) 66 at 75, this Court held thus:
“Where a plaintiff commences an action which requires the fulfillment of a condition precedent or pre-condition for the commencement of the action that condition must be fulfilled before the action can be validly commenced. And where there is non-compliance with a stipulated pre-condition for setting the legal process in motion, any suit instituted in contravention on that condition is incompetent and that court is equally incompetent to entertain the suit.”
Where there is a non-compliance with a simulated pre-condition for setting the legal process in motion any suit institute in contravention of the condition is incompetent and the court is equally incompetent to entertain the suit. See Rossek VS. A. C. B. Plc. (1993) 10 SCNJ 20; and Madukolu & Ors. vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 581 at 383, where the Court held thus:
“A Court is competent when:
(1) It is properly constituted with respect to the number and qualification of its members;
(2) the subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction;
(3) the action is initiated by due process of law;
(4) and any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction has been fulfilled.
Any defect in the competence of court renders the proceedings before it a nullity; a defect of competence being extrinsic to the adjudication.”
Not having fulfilled a condition precedent before instituting this action, it is incompetent and court below lacked the jurisdiction to have entertained the suit. See also Provisional Council OSU vs. Makinde (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 613 at 618.
I conclude therefore that the appellant’s failure to obtain leave of the court before filing his suit against the 1st respondent is fatal and the trial Judge was right in dismissing the applicant’s application. I, therefore, I resolve Issue No. 2 against the appellant and in favour of the respondents.
On Issue No.3, it is my view that having regard of the facts and circumstances of the instant case on appeal and having regard to my earlier findings in Issue Nos, 1 and 2, it is superfluous to consider Issue NO.3. However, out of abundance of caution, ex abundanti cautela, I shall deal with the issue presently. The import of Issue No 3 is whether the learned trial Judge was right in accepting the valuation of properties of Utuks Construction and Marketing Company Ltd. made by NEMAS Associaties. My answer to the above is contained in the ruling, of the trial Judge at page 75 of the record of appeal where he said:
“…I cannot challenge the value of the properties that is to say N1,774,700.90 as given by NEMAS Associates since they are Chartered Surveyors and Valuers until the contrary is proved.
The applicant contradicted themselves as to the value of the properties they averred in their affidavit that the values of the properties Were N92 million while the report of their Estate Valuers stated the value to be N18,755,010.00. I cannot choose and pick. I do not accept either of them.
I have gone through the affidavits of the applicant, and I do not see any element of fraud averred to have been committed by the respondents in the whole transaction. Fraud being a criminal offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
It is abundantly clear that the trial Judge had no basis to challenge or to reject the valuation report made by NEMAS Associates on the value of the properties until the contrary is proved.
As could be seen, the appellant who was the applicant before the trial court contradicted himself as to the correct value of the said properties while in the supporting affidavit the value of the properties were assessed as N92 million. in the appellant’s Estate Valuers estimate Court the value of the properties were assessed as N18.755.010.00. Obviously, there is a material contradiction in the case presented by the appellant before the trial court which was not resolved. The sum of N92 million is a far cry from N18,755,010.00. Both sums are mutually repugnant and mutually exclusive and therefore irreconcilable.
The learned trial Judge was quite correct when he held that he cannot pick and choose which valuation to accept. He was therefore correct when he rejected either of the valuation prescribed for the Appellant. See Momah vs. Vab Petroleum Inc. (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 654) 534 SC; Ogunbiyi vs. Ogundipe (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 263) 24 at 29 and Areaja vs.. State (1982) 4 SC 78 at 88 – 89. I have carefully and scrupulously had and examined the supporting affidavit filed by the appellant at the trial court and I cannot find any averment relating to any fraud or fraudulent act committed by the respondents in the whole transaction. Fraud is a criminal offence therefore it behoves the appellant to prove it beyond reasonably doubt. Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act. See Ejinkonye vs. State (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 648) 262; Olatunji VS. State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 680) 18; Joshua vs. State (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 658) 591 and Karim vs. Nigerian Army (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 758) 716. Thus. the appellant failed dismally to establish any case of fraud which would have persuaded the court below to set aside the judgment on the ground of fraud. He was quite unable to impugn the findings of the trial Judge in the Ruling appealed against. I agree with the findings of the trial Judge and his ruling is impeccable and unassailable. I therefore, resolve this ground against the appellant.
Having resolved Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 against the appellant, there is no merit in this appeal and it richly deserves to be dismissed.
Accordingly, this appeal is hereby dismissed. The decision of G. C. Ezekwe, J., delivered in Suit No. FHC/CAlM1/93 01/7/5/95 is hereby affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
Other Citations: (2008)LCN/2845(CA)
