Home » Nigerian Cases » Court of Appeal » Inland Bank Nig Plc & Anor. V. Fishing & Shrimping Co. Ltd (2010) LLJR-CA

Inland Bank Nig Plc & Anor. V. Fishing & Shrimping Co. Ltd (2010) LLJR-CA

Inland Bank Nig Plc & Anor. V. Fishing & Shrimping Co. Ltd (2010)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

UZO NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.

The Respondent as Plaintiff sued the Appellants as Defendants and claimed the sum of N300 Million jointly and severally for libel.

The Respondent contended that the libel complained of was published in the prospectus issued by the 2nd Appellant on behalf of the 1st Appellant. The Respondent also claimed for an order of perpetual injunction restraining the Appellants from further publication of the words complained of.

The Appellants thereafter filed their joint statement of defence The trial proceeded and at the end of which, the trial Judge delivered his considered judgment on the 31st of January, 2001. The trial Judge entered judgment for the Respondent in the sum of N10 Million and also made an order restraining the Appellants from further publication of the offending words.

Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellants filed their notice and 4 grounds of appeal. The Appellants filed its amended brief on 10th July, 2007 vide an order for leave granted on 3rd July, 2007.

The Appellants formulated 5 issues for determination namely:

(i) Whether the words complained of are defamatory.

(ii) Whether the Respondent proved its case as required by law.

(iii) Whether the Respondent’s reply filed on 21st September, 2001 after the conclusion of final addresses was properly filed.

(iv) Whether the trial Court was right in holding that the defence of qualified privilege was not established by the Appellants.

(v) Whether the award of the sum of N10 Million as damages to the Respondent was justified taking into account the entire circumstances of the case.

The Respondent filed his amended brief of argument on 18th June, 2008 and was deemed properly filed and served on 17th June, 2009. In it, the Respondent formulated 2 issues for determination viz:

(i) In view of the pleadings and evidence before the trial court, did the Respondent/Plaintiff prove its case and thus, entitled to judgment? (Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and?).

(ii) Is the award of the sum of N10 Million as damages to the Respondent proper in this case? (Ground 1).

The Respondent’s issue one encompasses issue 1 – 4 in the Appellant’s brief and, the Respondent’s 2nd issue is the same as the appellant’s issue 5 For clarity I will adopt the 5 issues as formulated by the Appellants.

ISSUE ONE

Whether the words complained of are defamatory?

The learned counsel to the Appellants in his brief submitted that the publication complained of is not defamatory. It is not the impression of the Respondent that is relevant in determining what is defamatory but it can only be determined by the impression of a reasonable man reading the publication in the entire circumstances in which it was published. See Okolo V. Midwest Newspaper Corp. (1977) 1 SC Pg 33. Appellants contended that no reasonable man could have been shunned, ridiculed or injured by the publication complained of. Counsel contended that the only publication that can amount to defamation in the case of a Company is that which impacts negatively on the company’s business through injury to its reputation or goodwill. See D and L Caterers Ltd and Anor v. D’Ajou (1945) KB 364 at 366.

The decision in this case was followed by the Supreme Court in the following cases: Duyile V. Ogunbanio & Sons Ltd (1988) 1 NWLR Pt. 72 Pg 601, Edem V. Orpheo Nig. Ltd (2003) 13 NWLR Pt. 838 Pg. 537, Iwueke V. IBC (2005) 17 NWLR Pt. 955 Pg. 457.

Learned counsel also submitted that it is only when the publication complained of impacts negatively on the Company or its Counsel submitted further that, where the publication does not business can an action in defamation be sustained. Counsel argued that since this, was the first business of the Respondent it had no reputation that can be damaged by the publication.

Counsel submitted further that, where the publication does not result in injury to the Respondent’s pocket, it will not amount to defamation. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the words complained of are not defamatory and that the trial Court was wrong in finding for the Respondent when the Respondent did not lead evidence to show how the publication impacted negatively on its business. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the words complained of were not defamatory.

In answer to issue 1 the learned counsel to the Respondent submitted that the action being one founded in the tort of libel, to succeed the Respondent/Plaintiff had to prove the ingredients of the tort i.e-

(a) Publication of the offending words;

(b) That the words refer to the Plaintiff.

(c) That the words are defamatory of the plaintiff.

(d) Publication to third parties.

(e) Falsity or lack of accuracy of the words complained of and;

(f) That there, are no justifiable legal grounds for the publication of the words.

The Appellants conceded that 3 ingredients A, B and D are not in issue. However C, E and F are the issues the Appellants are contesting. The Appellants in their submission argued that the words complained of are not defamatory. That the words are true and that there were justifiable legal grounds for publishing them. Counsel submitted that the words complained of were indeed defamatory, false and not justifiable at all.

Counsel submitted that the words complained of were pleaded in paragraphs 15 and 18 of the Statement of Claim. See also Exhibit 9 which is the abridged Prospectus published by the Appellants.

In order to determine whether the words complained of were indeed defamatory counsel referred to the test in the case of Dumbo V. Idugboe (1983) 1 SCNLR Pg. 29 at 48; NEPA V. Inameti (2002) 11 NWLR Pt. 778 Pg 397 at 422.

“In determining whether the words are capable of a defamatory meaning the Judge will construe the words according to the fair and natural meaning which would be given them by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence and will not consider what persons setting themselves to word to deduce some unusual meaning might succeed in extracting from them. The test according to Lord Seaborne is whether under, the circumstances in which the writing was: published reasonable men to whom the publication was made would be likely to understand them in a libelous sense.”

Counsel submitted that in the circumstances under which the Appellants published the words complained of, every reasonable man to whom same was published would likely understand them in a libelous way. The Appellants having returned the loan of $1 Million granted the Respondent, claimed that the Respondent “misrepresented vital facts” to the loan transaction.

The counsel stressed that anyone reading the publication would warn himself against transacting any business with the Respondent or having any financial dealing with it particularly any loan or credit facility.

Counsel submitted that the statement published by the Appellants concerning the Respondent was defamatory of the Respondent was defamatory of the Respondent in that it had the effect of discrediting the Respondent, lower it in the estimation of others, injure its reputation in trade and more importantly injure its financial credit. See Edem v. Orpheo (Nig. Ltd. (supra).

The Respondent’s counsel also submitted that it is for the Appellants to plead and prove that the publication is true and legally justifiable. The learned counsel for the Respondent urged the Court to hold that the words complained of were indeed defamatory in their ordinary, fair and natural sense.

A statement is said to be defamatory if it tends “to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or to cause other persons to shun or avoid him or to discredit him in his office, trade or profession; or to injure his financial credit.”

Labati v. Badmus (2007) 1 NWLR Pt. 1014 Pg 199 Nitel v. Tugbiyele (2005) 3 NWLR Pt. 912 Pg. 334, Edem V. Orpheo (supra). Awolowo v. Kingsway Stores (Nig.) Ltd (1968) 2 All NLR Pg 230.

See also  Deacon Joshua Oyedemi Adeyemo & Anor V. Prince/prophet Ezekiel Adejumo Akintola (2003) LLJR-CA

The Plaintiff in a libel case must satisfy 5 basic ingredients in proof of its case. These ingredients are listed in the case of Buraimoh v. Bamosko (1989) 3 NWLR Pt. Pg 352 at 365 – 364.

(1) That there was a publication in writing

(2) That the publication was false.

(3) That the publication is defamatory of the Plaintiff.

(4) That the defamatory statement was published to a 3rd party.

(5) That it was the Defendant who published the defamatory words. Joseph Mayange V. Punch Nig. Ltd (1994) 7 NWLR Pt. 358 Pg. 570 at 585.

In proof of these basic ingredients, the respondent pleaded the facts of the publication in its statement of claim and by evidence elicited from PW1. The Respondent also proved to the satisfaction of the trial Court that, the publication was false. See Exhibit 8, the Ruling from the suit filed in Lagos High Court where the Court held that the failure to obtain the consent of Central Bank of Nigeria was not an illegality on the part of the Respondent nor could it be regarded as fraudulent. Even though this is contained in the Ruling in a case before the Lagos High Court, the Court cannot close its eyes to its content. Exhibit 8 is part of evidence before this Court. In sum, there is no misrepresentation of facts by the Respondent in the dealings with the Appellants.

The Respondent had claimed that the words contained in the abridged prospectus were indeed defamatory of the Respondent. The test of a reasonable man was used, in the words of the trial Judge who held:

“Going by the ordinary interpretation of the publications complained of, the Court’s impression is that the Plaintiff is deceitful and fraudulent, it falsified documents meant for the transaction (sic) involved to the 2nd Defendant; that the said falsification was intentional as its main-intention was to defraud the 2nd defendant. And NEXIM; being a fraudster, the public is warned of transacting business with it as its activities constitute a sham and the public is warned of having anything to do with it.

The words complained of are not and cannot at all be said to be complimentary of the Plaintiff as a company which is involved in criminal activities by concealing vital information about its operations and thereby lowering it in the estimation of right thinking man of the society as per the evidence of PW1 which was unchallenged, discredited or shaken under cross-examination and it is the law that when the evidence of a witness has not been challenged, contradicted or shaken under cross- examination and his evidence is not inadmissible in law and is in line with the facts pleaded, the evidence must as the correct version of what the witness says. ADEJUMO V. AYANOEGBE (1989) 3 (PT.110)417.”

A Company or Corporation in law is a person that can sue and be sued. Thus, a Corporation or Company can maintain an action for libel in respect of any words which are calculated to injure its reputation in the way of its trade or business Consequently, where a statement is made with regard to the mode in which a trading, Corporation or Company conducts its business such as to convey to right thinking members of society generally that it conducts its business in a dishonest, improper or inefficient manner. The Corporation or company can maintain an action for defamation without Proof of special damages as if it were a natural person. On the other hand, where the statement does not reflect on the trading or business reputation of a Corporation or Company, no action for defamation will lie. See Edem V. Orpheo (supra). Duyile V. Ogunbaye & Sons Ltd (1988)1 NWLR Pt. 72 Pg 62.

A Company cannot sue for libel unless it is defamed in the way of its business. Edem V. Orpheo (supra). A company can only sue for loss of profit, shortfall in turnover; anticipatory loss or goodwill but not for natural grief and distress and definitely not for social disadvantage.

In this case the words complained of were indeed defamatory of the Respondent. The words showed to the reasonable man that the respondent carries on with its business in a fraudulent or dishonest way.

It is true that the Appellants had to make a disclosure in its prospectus of the law suit against the 1st Appellant. The Respondent Company sued the 1st Appellant for “breach of contract and negligence” in the way it handled the loan granted it by ADB/NEXIM. The Appellants could just have disclosed that they had been sued by the Respondent for a sum of N200 Miliion. What is mandatory is for the Appellants to disclose that N200 Million of the 1st Appellant is endangered because of the law suit. The reason for the lawsuit is an “unnecessary communication” and should not have come within the scope of information to be disclosed.

The Appellants went beyond their legal duty of disclosure for the N200 Million law suit and dabbled into “uncharted sea” to publish the offending words complained of. The words complained of were indeed defamatory of the Respondent and I so hold. The 1st issue is therefore resolved against the Appellants.

ISSUE TWO

Whether the Respondent proved its case as required by law?

The Appellants’ counsel submitted that to succeed in an action for defamation, the Plaintiff must prove the following:

(a) Publication of the offending words.

(b) That the words refer to the plaintiff.

(c) That the words are defamatory of the plaintiff.

(d) Publication to third parties.

(e) Falsity or lack of accuracy of the words complained of;

(f) That there are no justifiable legal grounds for the publication of the words;-

Counsel noted further that all the above listed ingredients must co-exist for a plaintiff to succeed. See Concord Press Nig Ltd V. Olutola (1999) 9 NWLR Pt. 620 at 582.

Counsel concedes that ingredients A, Band D are not in issue. The only ones in issue are C, E and F.

Counsel adopted his arguments on issue one and stated further that the words cannot be defamatory of the Respondents in the way of business because the Respondent has not commenced business. Also that PW1 admitted that the publication can only be faulted after the conclusion of the suit pending in Lagos against the 1st Appellant.

Counsel submitted that the Respondent did not prove the falsity of the publication. Counsel argued that the grounds for the disclosure were justifiable, and that PW1 admitted that the Appellants had to disclose the law suit with a claim of N200 Million against the 1st Appellant. Counsel stated that fact admitted needed no further proof. See the case Din v. African Newspapers Ltd (1990) 3 NWLR Pt. 129 Pg 409.

Appellants’ counsel, finally submitted that the Respondent failed to prove all the ingredients which must co-exist for its case to succeed in libel and urged the Court to resolve this, issue for the Appellants.

The counsel to the Respondent in his argument submitted that the Respondent proved its case against the Appellants as it pleaded and led credible evidence in support of its pleadings.

The Respondent proved that the words were defamatory as they gave the impression that the Respondent was not a Company to be trusted with transactions especially financial ones.

The Respondent also proved that the publication was false by leading evidence and tendering, the Ruling in the Lagos High court where the trial court held that there was no truth in the allegation that the Respondent misrepresented facts in its dealing with the Appellants. The Respondent also proved that infact the Appellants were the ones that misplaced documents to the transaction which was proved by the letter of the Appellants to the Respondent Exhibit 11. It should be noted that PW1 did not admit that the Respondent’s case is dependent on the suit filed in the High Court of Lagos State for breach of contract and negligence.

See also  Edicomsa International Inc. And Associates V. Citec International Estates Ltd. (2005) LLJR-CA

These two cases are independent of one another and each can succeed on its own, Exhibits 3 and 4 are the Statement of Claim and Statement of Defence for the suit in the High Court of Lagos State. The suit in Lagos High Court is for breach of contract and negligence whereas this present case is for libel.

The Appellants contended that the publication complained of was legally justifable. PW1 in his testimony stated:

“I agree that the Bank ought to make material disclosures. We have sued the bank in Lagos for N200 Million it is a material sum and it ought to be disclosed.”

All parties agree that the suit instituted in the Lagos High Court in the sum of N200 Million is a material sum and ought to be disclosed. The quarrel is not the amount or whether it ought to be disclosed. The quarrel is the words used and the information disclosed. What was necessary to disclose was the law suit and the sum involved. The words complained of were defamatory of the Respondent and not in anyway justifiable in the circumstances of this case. The information that the Respondent “misrepresented vital information” was “an unnecessary communication” in the circumstances of this case.

I also hold that the Respondent proved its case against the Appellants and thus this issue is resolved against the Appellants.

ISSUE THREE

Whether the Respondent’s reply filed on 21st September, 2001 after the conclusion of final addresses was properly filed.

The Appellants’ counsel submitted that the Appellants filed their joint statement of defence on 19th of June, 2000 and that the time started to run on the 20th of June, 2000. Again by a motion on notice dated 10th July, 2000 the Appellant prayed for an order to amend their joint statement of defence. This was granted and time was supposed to start running when the amended joint statement of defence was served on the Respondent.

The Appellants’ counsel is of the view that time to compute should be when the statement of defence was served on the Respondent and not 17th of July, 2000 when the amended joint statement of defence was served on the Respondent.

The trial Judge in his judgment held that the time to compute the 30 days allowed by Order 25 Rule 4 of the High court Rules Plateau State is when the amended joint statement was served on the Respondent which is 17th of July, 2600. The trial Court also held that time does not run during the Court’s vacation vide Order 48 Rule 6 High Court Rules Plateau State. Therefore computing the time from 17th of July, 2000 excluding time for vacation, the Respondent had until 3rd October, 2000 to file its reply; the Court having not directed otherwise.

It therefore follows that the reply to the Appellants amended joint statement of defence filed on 21st September, 2000 was filed within time.

It is intriguing that Appellants’ counsel would be arguing on when time is supposed to start running. An Appellant who amends his statement of defence ought to know that the Respondent is entitled to a reply to his amended joint statement of defence if he so wishes. The amended joint statement of defence is the last joint statement of defence filed and as such that is the one the Respondent ought to reply to. Time would start running as soon as the Respondent is served with it, which was on 17th July, 2000 by a joint reading of Order 25 Rule 4;

“A Reply to any defence shall be served by the Plaintiff before the expiration of 30 days after the service on him of that defence, and a defence to a Counter Claim shall be served by the Plaintiff before the expiration of 30 days after the service on him of the Counter Claim to which it relates.”

and Order 48 Rule 6:

“The time of filing and. service of pleadings shall not run during the annual vacation unless otherwise directed by the Court or Judge in chambers”

The Respondent had uptil 3rd October, 2000 to file his reply excluding the time of vacation.

The trial judge held that the Respondent’s reply to the joint amended statement of defence was filed within time and I so hold. The 3rd issue is also resolved against the Appellants.

ISSUE FOUR

Whether the trial Court was right in holding that the defence of qualified privilege was not established by the Appellants?

Learned counsel to the Appellants conceded that to succeed in a defence of qualified privilege, a Defendant in an action for defamation must supply facts and particulars upon which he relies for his defence. Where the Defendent is duty bound by law to make certain disclosures, he must disclose the nature of the duty. Atoyebi V. Odudu (1996) 6 NWLR Pt. 157 Pg 384, NTA Vs; Babatope (1996) 4 NWLR Pt. 440 Pg 75. Iloabachie V. Iloabachie (2005) 13 NWLR Pt. 943 Pg 695 at 702.

Counsel submitted that the Appellants who had offered their shares for subscription was under a duty to disclose sufficient material information that will affect the judgment of a prudent investor. Also that PW1 in his evidence admitted that the claim against the Appellants in the High Court of Lagos State of N200 Million was a huge sum and ought to be disclosed. With this, admission the Appellants need not prove that which has been admitted; See Din V. African Newspapers (supra).

Counsel further submitted that the trial Judge was wrong when he held that since the Appellants did not call evidence, their defence of qualified privilege must fail. Learned counsel, urged the court to hold that the learned trial Judge was wrong when he held that the defence must fail because no evidence was adduced by the appellants, Counsel submitted that the admission of the Respondent successfully established the, defence of qualified privilege and urged the Court to so hold.

In reply the learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that there is no justifiable legal ground to make the publication complained of to be entitled to the protection that the defence affords. The Appellants had a duty and legal burden to prove all the facts and circumstances necessary to bring the words complained of within the purview of qualified privilege. Offorboche V. Ogoja Local Government & Anor (2001) 16 NWLR Pt 739 Pg 458 at 486. The Appellants who raised the defences of justification, fair comment and privilege in paragraphs 14 and 15 of their defence, did not call any evidence in support of their defence. This is fatal to their defence of qualified privilege. See Mammon V. Kamalu (2005)18 NWLR Pt. 958 Pg 478 at 510. Newbreed Organisation Ltd V. Erhomosele (supra).

If the Appellants did not lead evidence in support of their defence of privilege then the Respondent had no burden of proving malice even though that has been pleaded and proved. The Respondent in paragraph 20 of their statement of claim adequately pleaded malice and led credible and unchallenged evidence in proof thereof. See Kankia V. Maigemu (2003) 6 NWLR Pt. 817 Pg 496 at 520, Ogbonnaya V. Mbakwe (2005) 1 NWLR Pt. 907 Pg 252 at 275, Egesimba V. Onuzulike (2002) 15 NWLR Pt. 791 Pg 468 at 518.

Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent.

A Plaintiff in an action for defamation has the onus of proving the six co-terminus ingredients which I have already enumerated in the course of this judgment.

Iloabachie V. Iloabachie (supra) Guardian Newspaper Ltd V. Ajeh (2005) 12 NWLR Pt. 938 Pg 205, NACB Ltd V. Adeagbo (2004) 13 NWLR Pt. 894 Pg 551, Concord Press (Nig) Ltd V. Olutola (1999) 9 NWLR Pt. 620Pg 578.

See also  Silas Bounwe V. Resident Electoral Commissioner Delta State & Ors (2005) LLJR-CA

The onus of proof of a defamatory statement is on the Defendant to prove the truth of a defamatory statement rather than for the Claimant to prove its untruth.

Akomolafe V. Guardian. Press Ltd (2004) 1 NWLR Pt. 853 Pg. 1

Justification is a defence in an action for libel. If the statement made about the claimant is true, there can be no action for defamation. The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that the statement made is true, rather than on the claimant to prove that it was false.”

Irving V. Penguin Books (2000) WLR 362 pg. 478.

In Iloabachie V. Iloabachie (supra), the Supreme Court held that “In order to destroy or neutralize the defence of qualified privilege, it is incumbent on the claimant to prove malice: A reply to a defence of qualified privilege should resonate with facts and particulars that show the malicious intention of the publisher of the statement.”

The Respondent in its Statement of claim paragraph 20 pleaded that the Appellants published these defamatory words out of malice. Yes the Appellants are under a legal duty to disclose that the bank had been sued for a total sum of N200 Million.

The malice in the disclosure of the Appellants is going further to state that- “in the course of investigation and analysis the Bank found, out that the Company misrepresented very vital facts to the transaction.”

These offending words have been found to be false and an “unnecessary communication” on the part of the appellants concerning the Law suit instituted by the Respondent see Exhibit 8 of the Ruling from the High Court of Lagos State.

The Appellants were not able to sustain their defence of privilege as they led no evidence in proof of their defence that the statement was true. The burden of proof is on the Defendants/Appellants to prove that the statement made is true. Irving V. Penguin Books (supra). The Defendants/Appellants having failed to prove the defence of privilege, the trial Court was right in holding that their defence of privilege failed, Issue 4 is therefore also resolved against the Appellants.

ISSUE FIVE

Whether the award of the sum of N10 Million as damages to the Respondent was justified taking into account the entire circumstances of the case. The learned counsel to the Appellants submitted that the trial Judge in assessing damages for libel is expected to take into account, the entire circumstances of the case, especially the reputation of the plaintiff and the conduct of the Defendant from the time of the publication to the verdict of the Court.

The Court of Appeal will generally not interfere with the award of damages unless where it is manifestly too high or too low or were awarded using the wrong principles. See Harold Shodipe V. Daily Time (1972), Benue Printing and Publishing Co V. Gwagwada (1989) 4 NWLR Pt. 116 Pg 439.

Counsel submitted that the trial Judge applied wrong principles in the award of damages of N10 Million namely;

(1) That the trial Judge did not take into consideration that the Respondent was an artificial person and can only be injured in its trade or business.

(2) The Respondent did not lead evidence to show what injury it suffered due to the publication.

(3) That PW1 admitted that was the first business the Respondent undertook.

(4) That there was no evidence of injury to the Respondent as a result of the publication and as such only nominal damages can be awarded. Edem V. Orpheo (supra).

Counsel submitted that the Court should follow the decision in Iwueke V. Imo Broadcasting Corporation (2005) 17 NWLR Pt. 955 Pg.457. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Respondent did not lead evidence on damages and as such the trial Judge should have awarded nominal damages of N50, 000.00.

In reply the learned counsel to the Respondent submitted that the Appellants did not lead any evidence in mitigation of damages rather it rested its case on the Respondents’ case. Okolie V. Marinho (2006)15 NWLR Pt. 1002 P9316 at 340. The learned Respondent’s counsel submitted that the Respondent had attracted a credit facility of U.S $1,000,000.00 which showed its business standing. The Respondent had proved that the publication which was in writing was circulated to the public portraying the Respondent as a Company which conducts its business in a dishonest and improper manner. The Appellants never retracted nor apologized for the publication rather set up a defence of justification. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue against the Appellants.

It is trite that –

“if a Plaintiff can prove that a libel has been published of him without justification, his cause of action is complete and he need not prove that he has suffered any resulting actual damage or injury to his reputation for such damage is presumed.” CRSN Corp. V. Oni (1995) 1 NWLR pt; 371 Pg.270

Everyone is entitled to his reputation and good name. It therefore follows that if someone destroys another’s reputation without justification, he is entitled to be compensated.

Damages for label is discretionary and therefore no set rules or criteria for determining the quantum. Each case is decided upon is peculiar facts and circumstances.

The purpose of awarding damages is to compensate the plaintiff for any loss or injury he has suffered or sustained as a result of the false publication. Ukachukwu V. Uzodinma (Supra).

The Court in assessing damages in a libel action should take into consideration the following factors, namely;

(1) The conduct of the plaintiff

(2) His position and standing.

(3) The nature of the libel.

(4) The mode and extent of the publication.

(5) The whole conduct of the defendant from the time when the libel was published down to the very moment of the Courts verdict. NEPA Vs Inameti supra) Alawiye V. Ogunsanya (2004) 4 NWLR Pt 864 Pg 486.

Thus, the assessment of damages in a successful libel action is not dependent on any established legal rules. It always depends on the peculiar circumstances of the case Ukachukwu V. Uzoduma (supra).

In the present case, the trial Court considered the position and standing of the Respondent being a limited liability Company. The nature of the libel was considered. The trial Judge also considered the extent of the publication. The prospectus was published and circulated in the Guardian Newspaper which had a very wide reach in the country. The Appellants neither apologized no retracted the offending publication. The whole conduct of the Appellants did not show any remorse for the offending publication. The Appellants failed to take the option of settlementout of Court inspite of Exhibits 5, 6 and 7.

The test whether damages are excessive is whether the award exceeds the highest sum that any reasonable Court might have considered appropriate. A Court’s award should not be overturned unless it was out of all proportion. The trial Judge carefully considered all the parameters in the award of damages taken into consideration the peculiar nature of this case and this cannot be faulted.

In the circumstances of this case, I believe that the award of N10 Million was not excessive and I so hold. Issue 5 is also resolved against the Appellants.

The 5 issues formulated by the Appellants are all resolved against him. This appeal therefore fails and it is hereby dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the trial Judge and the damages of N10 Million awarded against the Appellants.

N30, 000.00 costs is also awarded the Respondent against the Appellants.


Other Citations: (2010)LCN/3536(CA)

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