Isaac Obiuweubi Vs Central Bank Of Nigeria (2011)
LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report
BODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.
The facts are rather straightforward. The Appellant was a senior employee of the Respondent Bank. On the 11th day of August 1987 he was put on suspension, and on the 30th day of October 1987 his appointment was terminated.
Aggrieved by the situation, he sued the respondent at the Lagos High Court. He sought a declaration that the decision to terminate his employment was unlawful, null, and void as it offends the Rule of Natural Justice. He also claimed his entitlements and general damages in the sum of N100,000 against the respondent bank. The Writ of Summons and statement of claim were filled in the Registry of the Lagos High Court on the 7th day of July 1988. The suit was before Fafiade J (as she then was). Pending before the learned trial judge was a Motion to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Section 3(3) of Decree No. 17 of 1984.
On the 14th of April 1989 the learned trial judge ruled that the Lagos High Court had jurisdiction to hear the case and adjourned hearing for the 25th and 26th of October, 1989. Trial never commenced before Fafiade J. Her Lordship retired and on the 22nd day of January, 1991 the case came before Olugbani J. (as he then was) for the first time. On the 15th of December, 1993 trial commenced with the appellant (as plaintiff) giving evidence. (See page 145 of the Record of Appeal). The plaintiff concluded his evidence on the 8th of October 1996. No witnesses were taken thereafter, then on the 23rd of September, 2002 the case came before Lufadeju J (as she then was) for the first time. Olugbani J. has since retired.
On the 23rd of September,2003 both Counsel adopted their written addresses on the issue of jurisdiction. Ruling was reserved by Lufadeju J for the 28th of October, 2003 but subsequently delivered on the 16th of December, 2003.
The objection to jurisdiction was for an order striking out the suit for want of jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 251 (1) (p) and (r).
In a considered Ruling delivered on the 16th of December,2003 the learned trial Judge said in the penultimate paragraph that:
“….By virtue of Section 25 1(i) (p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution, only the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in Civil Cases and matters pertaining (among other things) to the Administrative action or decision of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
And with the above reasoning the learned trial judge ruled that the Lagos High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case and struck it out. The plaintiff (as appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeal. The concluding part of the well considered judgment reads:
“…..In conclusion, I affirm the decision of the lower Court in its Ruling of 16th December, 2003 on the Respondents Motion on Notice. This appeal therefore fails. Each party to bear its costs”.
This appeal is against that judgment. In accordance with Rules of the court, the appellant filed his Brief on the 7th of December, 2006, while the respondent’s Brief filed on the 19th of March, 2007 was deemed duly filed and served on the 7th of July, 2010.
The appellant formulated four issues for determination. They are:
ISSUE I.
Whether the Court of Appeal after recanting the provisions of Section 236 (1) of the 1979 Constitution as the applicable law in this action and Section 251(i) (p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution respectively was right to hold that the provisions of section 251 (i) (p) and (r) of the 1999 constitution operated in retrospect to deprive the State High Court of the jurisdiction it competently exercised in 1988 before the amendment that ousted its jurisdiction having regard to the fact that Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution did not contain abatement provision or have retroactive effect.
ISSUE 2
Was it open to the Court of Appeal to depart from or derogate from a decision of the Supreme Court delivered in the Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board v Garba 2002 7 SC Pt.11 p. 138 at 148 even when the Court of Appeal held see page 267-268 of the Records…
“The case of OHMB v Garba (Supra) cited by the Appellant is instructive and very remarkable but I fear the Appellant is inviting the Court to misapply the Law… was in total disregard to the hallowed principle of stare-decisis.
ISSUE 3
Whether the Court of Appeal correctly interpreted the Provisions of Section 6 (i) of the Interpretation Act 1990 as to when an enactment expires, lapses or ceases to have effect or is repealed and particularly sub-section (6) (i) (e) of the aforesaid Act in relation to the pending proceedings of the Appellant in the Lagos High Court.
ISSUE 4
Whether the Court of Appeal was right to hold that Decree No. 107 of 1993 with effect from 17th November 1993 operated in retrospect to affect the Appellant’s action which was already pending in the Lagos State High Court since 1988 without any provision whatsoever for cases pending in the State High Courts to abate in the said Decree and thereby,’ importing into the Decree No.107 of 1993 abatement provisions.
Learned counsel for the respondent formulated a sole issue for determination. It reads:
Whether the claimant’s action is caught by, the provisions of Section 251 (i) (p) (r) of the 1999 Constitution notwithstanding its commencement in 1988 before the promulgation of the 1999 Constitution.
Let me say straightway that issues formulated by the appellant are at best prolix, of an academic nature and do not address the real grievance in this appeal. The sole issue formulated by the respondent is nearer the point. An Appeal Court is at liberty, to adopt issues formulated or formulate issues that would determine the real grievance in an appeal, if not satisfied with the issues formulated as I now find myself.
The main issue arising in this appeal is:
Whether the High Court of Lagos had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit which was brought before it by, the appellant in view of the Constitution. (Suspension and Modification) Decree 107 of 1993 and the 1999 Constitution.
At the hearing of the appeal on the 16th of December 2010. Learned Counsel for the appellant, Chief J. O. Akpuduro adopted his brief filed on the 7th of December, 2006 and urged this court to allow the appeal. Likewise, K.S. Omosivwe adopted his brief filed on the 19th of March 2007, and deemed dull filed on 7th of July, 2010. He urged us to uphold the decisions of the two courts below and dismiss the appeal.
This is an area of our Law that appears difficult. In the course of this judgment I shall examine some judgments of the Supreme Court and make observations which I venture to hope will be of assistance to judges who have the task of applying the law in this difficult area. It is well settled that where the words of a statute are clear, the court should accord it its ordinary and plain meaning. See
Mobil v F. B. I. R. 1977 3SC p53
Tariola v.Williams 1982 7 SC p27
Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution was amended by, the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.107 of 1993. The Section as amended, relevant to this appeal reads thus:
“(i) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from:
(q) the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(r) subject to the provisions of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies
(s) any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or nay of its agencies; provided that; nothing in the provisions of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of this subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.
Section 251 (i) (p) (q) (r) of the 1999 Constitution is impari material with the above. The provisions vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in Civil causes and matters arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government and its agencies, the operation and interpretation of the Constitution as its agencies, the Federal Government and its agencies as well as any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government and its agencies.
For the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction under Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution or Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the following must coexist.
(a) The parties, or a party must be the Federal
Government or its agencies:
(b) Subject matter of the Litigation.
That is to say jurisdiction is the combination of parties and subject matter. The words used in this piece of legislation are plain as plain can be and have been interpreted by this court on several occasions. See:
N.E.P.A. v Edegbero 2002 18 NWLR pt 798 p79
Oloruntoba – Oju v Abdul-Raheem & 3 Ors 2009 5-6 SC (Pt.11) p.57.
In this appeal it is not in dispute that the respondent, the Central Bank of Nigeria is an agency of the Federal Government. Any lingering doubt of that fact is put to rest by the provisions of Section 39 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, Cap 47 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 which states that the Central Bank may act generally as agent for the Federal Government or of a State Government. It is thus obvious that the respondent Bank was established as an Agency of the Federal Government. On subject matter of the litigation, the matter must arise from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies, from the operation and interpretation of the Constitution and from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by’ the Federal Government, or any of its agencies.
I am firmly of the view that as from the 17th of November 1993 the Federal High Court had exclusive jurisdiction if the matter is a civil matter arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
The matter must arise from the operation and interpretation of the Constitution.
Finally the matter must arise from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decisions by the Federal Government, or any of its agencies.
This suit has to do with the administration or management and control of the Federal Government. The respondent is a Federal agency and the appellant is/was its employee. The termination of the appellant’s appointment is on administrative action by an agency of the Federal Government, the respondent.
Learned Counsel for the appellant in his brief observed that at the time the appellant’s cause of action arose in 1987, neither Decree No. 107 of 1993 or Section 251 (i) (p) (r) of the i999 Constitution was in force contending that the said Legislations do not have retroactive provisions. He argued that the two courts below were wrong to hold that the said provisions applied. Reliance was placed on:
N.E.P.A. v. B. Atukpor 2001 1 NWLR Pt.693 p.96
OHMB v. Garba 2002 7 SC Pt.11 p.138
Learned counsel observed that OHMB v. Garba (Supra) is on all fours with the appellant’s case and the courts below ought to have followed the principle of Stare decisis. Reliance was placed on:
Globa Transport Oceanic SA and Anor v. Free Enterprises Nig. Ltd.2001 2 SC p.154
Eperokun v University of Lagos 1986 4 NWLR Pt 34 p.162.
Finally he observed that Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and Decree No 107 have no abatement regarding pending cases and also have no retrospective effect. Reliance was placed on Section 6(i) of the Interpretation Act Cap 192.
He urged us to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal.
In response, learned counsel for the respondent argued that for the Federal High Court not to have jurisdiction under Decree 107 OR Section 251 (p) (q) (s) of the 1999 Constitution, the cause of action must arise before 17/11/93, the date the amendments come into force, and the trial must be concluded before that date. Reliance was placed on:
Egypt Air v. Abdullahi 1997 11 NWLR Pt.528 p.182
SPDC v. Isaiah 2001 FWLR Pt56 p608
Learned Counsel submitted that the appeal lacks merit. Jurisdiction is a threshold matter. It is very fundamental as it goes to the competence of the Court to hear and determine a suit. Where a court does not have jurisdiction to hear a matter, the entire proceedings no matter how well conducted and decided would amount to a nullity. It is thus mandatory that courts decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to consider any other matter. See:
Bronik Motors Ltd and another v Wema Bank Ltd. 1983 1 SCNLR p.296
Okova v. Santilli 1990 2 NWLR Pt.131 p. 172
Madukolu v Nkerndilim 1962 1 ANLR Pt.1 p.587
Jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the High Court, on appeal and even in the Supreme Court for the first time. See:
Usman Danfodio University v. Krans Thompson Organisation Ltd 2001 15 NWLR Pt.736 p.305
It can be raised by any of the parties or by the court, and once raised the judge would do well to examine it and render a considered Ruling on it. In the task of determining if the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a case the following principles must be considered diligently by the Judge.
(a) Whether the subject matter of the case is within the court’s jurisdiction;
(b) Whether there is any feature in the case which Prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction, and
(c) Whether the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction;
see:
Madukolu v Nkemdilim 1962 2 SCNLR p.342
Ajao v Popoola 1986 5 NWLR Pt.15 pt.802
Furthermore when there is an appeal on the substantive matter to the Court of Appeal and issue of jurisdiction is raised, the Court of Appeal should make a finding on jurisdiction and if finds that it has no jurisdiction it should go ahead and say so and give a considered judgment on the substantive matter. This is so because as the penultimate court it must make its decision on the substantive appeal known to the Supreme Court, since its Ruling on jurisdiction may very well be wrong. See:
Ebba v Eeodo and Anor 1984 1.S.C.N.L.R. p372
Jamgbadi v. Jamgbadi 1963 2 SCNLR p.311.
The Law in force, or existing at the time the cause of action arose is the law applicable for determining the case. This law does not necessarily determine the jurisdiction of the court at the time that jurisdiction is invoked. That is to say the law in force at the time cause of action arose governs determination of the Suit, while the law in force at the time of trial based on cause of action determines the court vested with jurisdiction to try the case. For example, Decree 107 of 1993 came into force on 17/11/93. A litigant who had a cause of action in 1990 would have his case governed by the law at the time (i.e. 1990) if trial commences before 1993 the court to try, the case would be the State High Court but if after 17/11/93 the case would be tried in the Federal High Court.
Decree 107 of 1993 denied the State High Court jurisdiction as from 17/11/93 and transferred jurisdiction on the matters in Section 251 of the Constitution to the Federal High Court. As from 17/11/93 the State High Court no longer had jurisdiction. See:
Uwaifo v A-G Bendel State 1982 7 SC p.124
Adah v. NYSC 2004 13 NWLR Pt.891 p.639
Jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an action is determined examining the law conferring Jurisdiction at the time the suit instituted and trial commences.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the Constitutional provision in the past. I shall now examine a few cases particularly. OHMB v Garba (Supra) which learned counsel for the appellant says is on all fours with this case:
In Olutola v Unilorin 2004 18 NWLR Pt 905 p.116
The appellant, a Professor of Education at the University of Ilorin was removed front office in 1989. He sue the University. His action was filed on 13/1/93. Trial commenced on 31/3/94.
This court ruled that the court that had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit was the Federal High Court
This was so because Decree 107 of 1993 came into force on 17/11/93. It divested the State High Court of jurisdiction to hear the case. Since trial in the case commenced on 31/3/94 a date after 17/11/93, correct court to hear the case was the Federal High Court.
In Osakue v F.C.E. (Technical) Asaba and 2 ors 2010 2-3 Pt.111 p.158
The cause of action arose in 1990 when the appointment of the appellant was terminated. The appellant sought redress at the at the High Court in Asaba in 1992. The court commenced trial in the action 1994. Decree 107 of 1993 became operative on 17/11/93. The law applicable to determine jurisdiction is Decree 107 of 1993. At the time the case was heard in 1994, the State High Court had been divested of jurisdiction. The correct court to hear the case once again was the Federal High Court.
Olutola v. Unilorin Supra and Osakue v F.C.E Supra are similar in that in both cases cause of action arose before 17/11/93. At the time cause of action arose it was the State High Court that had jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, but when the cases were eventually heard after 17/11/93 jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the action had changed. Jurisdiction to hear the action was conferred on the Federal High Court exclusively as at 17/11/93. Trial commenced in both suits in 1994.
The next case is:
O.H.NI.B. v Garba and 2 ors 2002 7 SC Pt.11 p.138
Learned Counsel for the appellant relied heavily on it, and asked that use follow it. In the case (Supra) the respondents were employees of the appellant’s Board. They, with other employees were put on indefinite suspension in 1992. They brought action in the High Court against the appellant’s Board for declarations, and arrears of salaries. The cause of action arose before 17/11/93 and trial also commenced before that date.
Infact the respondents closed their case on 17/1/93. As at 17/11/93 when the State High Court was divested of jurisdiction to hear the matter was part heard. This court held that it was the High that had jurisdiction to hear and determine the case and not the Federal High Court. The reasoning of this Court runs as follows:
Decree 107 of 1993 cannot affect pending proceedings to deprive the State High Court of jurisdiction to conclude such proceedings.
Reliance was placed on Section 6(i) of the Interpretation Act. Cap. 192 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. The provision runs thus:
“6(i) The repeal of an enactment shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment;
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the enactment;
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under the enactment;
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment.
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced,
and such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the enactment had not repealed.
Decree 107 of 1993 is substantive law and it does not have retrospective operation. That explains the reasoning in:
O.H.M.B. v. Garba (Supra)
whether O.H.M.B. v. Garba (supra) can be followed in this case.
The Supreme Court is the final Court of Appeal in Nigeria. Its decisions are binding on every, court in this country. By the doctrine of Stare Decisis all courts are bound to follow the decisions of this Court. The reason is simple. Following previous decisions of this court ensures certainty and order in the judicial system. It ensures stability and removes surprises. Counsel is assured that justice would be done, and it reduces stress and makes the task of dispensing justice easier and less onerous.
Before following Precedent, facts must be examined. This is so because judgments can only be understood in the light of the facts on which they were decided. Afterall facts have no views.
In this case the cause of action arose on the 30th of October 1987 when his (appellant’s) appointment was terminated. He sued the respondent on the 7th of July, 1988. The 1st judge to hear the case was Fafiade J. No witnesses were taken before her Lordship retried. The case then came before Olugbani J for the first time on 22nd of January 1991. Trial commenced before Olugbani J. with evidence of the appellant on the 15th of December, 1993. The appellant concluded his evidence on the 8th of October 1996. No witness was taken thereafter. Olugbani J. retried, and so the case came before Lufadeju J. It is clear that the facts in O.H.M.B. v. Garba Supra are different from the facts in this case. The important thing to note is the date, 17/11/93 when the State High Court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the case. In O.H.M.B. v Garber Supra, the cause of action and trial commenced before 17/11/93. In this case the cause of action arose before 17/11/93 but trial commenced before Olugbami J after 17/11/93, ie on 15/12/93. Furthermore the proceedings before Olugbarni J are of no effect, since the case went before Lufadeju J to start “de novo”. De novo means a new. That is, to start all over again.
Anyway one looks at it the facts in O.H.M.B. v. Garba supra are different from the facts in this case, and so O.H.M.B. v Garba cannot be followed. If I may add this case was filed in the Lagos High Court on the 7th of July 1988. This year makes it twenty-three years (23 years) since it was filed in court. It was sent to the court of Lufadeju J in 2002 to start De novo. Luladeju J has since retired. That is to say for twenty-three years not a single witness has been taken. This is a classic case where interlocutory appeals should be discouraged. Counsel ought to have proceeded with the trial before the State High Court and at the end of trial appeal on the substantive case (if the need arises) and include jurisdiction.
Twenty three years waiting for his entitlements is clearly too long a time to wait. It must be highly traumatic and at great cost to the appellant, and waste of precious judicial time. Unnecessary interlocutory appeals such as this have been frowned upon by this court. See:
Tukur v Government of Gongola State 1989 4 NWLR pt.117 p.317
Globe Fishing Industries Ltd. v Coker 1990 11 SCNJ p.56.
I now, go back to consider decisions in:
Egypt Air v Abdullahi 1997 1 NWLR Pt.528 p.182, and
SDPC v. Isaiah 2001 11 NWLR Pt 723 p.168
In the former it was held that if the trial in the State High Court is not concluded before the amendments came into force, proceedings after the amendment are a nullity. The case ought to be transferred to the Federal High Court. This case is clearly in conflict with O.H.M.B. V. Garba (Supra).
I must observe, first, that it is a decision of the court of Appeal. To my mind it is wrong, for the simple reason that had their Lordships adverted their minds to Section 6(i) of the Interpretation Act Cap 192 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 they would nor have decided in the manner they did. Section 6(i) Supra provides:
“6(i) the repeal of an enactment shall not:
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the enactment;
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under, the enactment;
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment;
And any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed., as if, the enactment had not been repealed,
Decree No.107 of 1993 is substantive law. It has no retrospective operation, and so would not affect proceedings that are ongoing before 17/11/93.
Cases that were on going before 17/11/93 were to be concluded by the State High Court, while cases that commenced after 17/11/93 are to be heard by the Federal High Court. It is thus clear that Egypt Air v. Abdullahi (Supra) was wrongly decided.
The SDPC case is a decision of this court. This court observed that;
“while it is correct that the cause of action arose before the promulgation of the Decrees mentioned above, the trial of the action was in progress when Decree 107 of 1993 was signed into law…”
This court concluded….” From that moment when the Decree was signed into Law the jurisdiction of the State High Court to determine any matter connected with or pertaining to mining and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas has been ousted. Once the jurisdiction of a court to determine a matter has been ousted any further hearing in the matter is indeed null and void because any decision it makes amounts to nothing”.
I must at this stage, for the purpose of emphasis state clearly what this court decided on proceedings in High Courts in the light of Decree 107 of 1993. Decree 107 of 1993 became operative on 17th November 1993. On that date the State High Courts seized to have jurisdiction for the causes of action in Section 230(i) of the 1979 Constitution. As from that day the Federal High Court was conferred with exclusive jurisdiction on the said causes of action.
In Osakue v F.C.E. (supra) and
Olutola v Unilorin (Supra)
It was held that where the cause of action arises before the amendments came into force by Decree 107 of 1993 but trial commenced after the date the amendments came into force, then the Federal High Court would have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the case.
In O.H.M.B. v. Garba supra
It was held that if as in the two cases referred to above the cause of action arose before amendments by Decree 107 of 1993 came into force and trial commenced before that date, and so trial was part heard before the said date, trial should continue in the State High Court., because Decree 107 of 1993 has no retrospective provision. To my mind there is no conflict in these cases. In:
Osakue v F.C.E. (supra) and
Olutilola v. Unilorin (supra)
Trial commenced for the first time in 1994, i.e. after 17/11/93 when Decree 107 of 1993 came into force. The Federal High Court had exclusive jurisdiction as at 17/11/93. Consequently proceedings before the State High Court in 1994 are clearly a nullity.
In: O.H.M.B. v. Garba (supra)
as at 17/11/93 the case was part heard in the State High Court. The State High Court could continue since Decree 107 of 1993 has no retrospective provision.
To my mind there is no conflict whatsoever in the following cases.
Osakue v. F.C.E. 2010 2-3 SC (Pt.111) p.158
Olutola v. Unilorin 2004 18 NWLR Pt.905 p.416
O.H.M.B. v Garba 2002 7SC (Pt 11) p.138
It is SDPC v. Isaiah 2001 FWLR Pt56 p.608
that is in conflict with O.H.M.B. v Garba (Supra)
In SDPC v Isaiah (Supra) the reasoning of this court is that proceedings before the State High Court terminates when Decree 107 of 1993 comes into force not withstanding whether proceedings commenced before the Decree came into force, while O.H.M.B. v Garba (supra) is of the view that proceedings commenced in the State High Court continue after the Decree came into force in the state High Court.
SDPC v Isaiah (supra) was decided in 2001 while O.H.M.B. V. Garba (supra)
Olutola v Unilorin (supra)
Osakue v. F.C.E (supra) were decided in 2002, 2004 and 2010.
The position of Stare Decisis is not for counsel to follow the decision he likes but to follow the decision that is more recent.
O.H.M.B. v Garba (supra).
Olutola v Unilorin (supra) and
Osakue v F.C.E. (supra)
are sound law and represent the correct interpretation of the Legislation under consideration.
For the State High Court to have jurisdiction under Decree 107 of 1993 the cause of action must arise before the 17th of November, 1993 and the trial must also be in progress before the said date. That is to say all part heard cases in the State High Court before 17/11/93 can continue after 17/11/93 in the State High Court because Decree 107 of 1993 does not have retrospective operation, and in view of Section 6(i) of the interpretation Act Cap 192 Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria, 1990. See:
O.H.M.B. v Garba 2002 7 SC (Pt.11) p.138
For the Federal High Court to have jurisdiction the suit must be filed on or after 17/11/93. All cases filed in the State High Court filed before 17/11/93 but in which trial had not commenced as at 17/11/93 shall be heard by the Federal High Court. See:
Olutola v. Unilorin 2004 18 NWLR Pt.905 p.416
Osakue v. F.C.E.2010 2-3 SC (Pt.111) p.158.
In this case, the appellant’s cause of action arose on the 30th of October 1987 when his appointment was terminated by the respondent. The appellant sued the respondent at the Lagos High Court in 1988. As at today’, twenty three years thereafter trial has not commenced in the State High Court. Legislation applicable to the cause of action and that applicable to the jurisdiction of the Court in this case are so obviously different. When this case would eventually be heard the State High Court would have been divested of jurisdiction.
For the purpose of clarity I must restate that this suit is against the Central Bank, a Federal Government Agency. The Central Bank terminated the appellant’s employment. That act is an administrative action by the Central Bank. The Appellant’s action is for declaration affecting the validity of an administrative decision of the Central Bank. It falls within the warm embrace of Section 251 (i) (r). provisions in pari materia with Section 230 of the 1979 Constitution as amended by the constitution (suspension and modification) Decree No.107 of 1993.
Now., the appellant’s cause of action arose in 1987. If trial commenced before 17/11/93 the State High Court would have jurisdiction if even trial continued after 17/11/93. On the other hand since trial has not yet commenced, since trial is to start de novo, it is the Federal High cor-u1 that has jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore since the case would commence after the 1999 Constitution came into force it is the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit, in view of the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution.
Finally I must observe that both courts below found that the proper court vested with jurisdiction to hear and determine the appellant’s case is the Federal High Court. Both courts below are correct. Trial in the State High Court had not commenced before Decree 107 of 1993 came into force in 1993. Infact twenty three years thereafter (i.e.2011) trial has still not commenced in any court.
Learned counsel for the appellant would do well to pursue the claims of his client in the substantive suit- his entitlements, instead of putting his client through the harrowing experience for twenty-three years to decide which court as between the State High Court and the Federal High Court is the correct court to hear his case.
This appeal has no redeeming features. It is hereby dismissed.
No order on costs.
SC.266/2006
