J. Uzor & Ors V. Nigerian Stores Workers Union & Ors. (1973)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

UDO UDOMA, J.S.C. 

This appeal raises two issues for decision which, although fundamental in nature in view of their effect on the whole case, fall within a narrow compass as will emerge in the course of this judgment.

The appeal arose from Suit No. LD/600/1970, instituted in the High Court of Lagos by the Plaintiffs, herein respondents, against the defendants, herein appellants, the particulars of claim whereof, as endorsed on the writ of summons, would appear in the judgment.

Subsequent to the filing of the writ, and in obedience to an order of court made in that behalf, the respondents filed and delivered their statement of claim dated 11th January, 1971.

For the better appreciation of the importance of the issues raised and argued before us, it is necessary, we think, that the whole of the statement of claim be set out hereunder. It reads:-

“The Plaintiffs through their representatives aver as follows:-

1. That at the last Annual Convention of the Nigerian Workers Council otherwise (N.W.C.) held at Ibadan on the 30th and 31st August, 1969 Mr. Chukwura the General Secretary delivered a report on behalf of the Central Working Committee.
2. That the report was well received and debated and adopted for discussion.
3. That there was an election of officers and Mr. N. Chukwura and J. O. Enigbokan were returned unopposed as Secretary and Treasurer respectively.
4. That at the same annual Convention Mr. J. Uzor was elected President.
5. That certain individuals formed themselves into an un-constitutional body known as the Revolutionary Reform Committee and purported to hold what was styled as a representative meeting of affiliates of the Nigerian Workers Council on the 15th December, 1969 and purported to pass certain unconstitutional resolutions.
6. That there is no power under the Constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council for the formation of any group or body under the name of Revolutionary Reform Committee.
7. That Mr. J. Uzor wrote a letter dated 16th December, 1969 to Messrs. N. Chukwura and J. O. Enigbokan purporting to suspend the said gentlemen from their offices as Secretary and Treasurer respectively of the Nigerian Workers Council.
8. That by letter dated 16th December, 1969 signed by J. Uzor as Chairman of the Revolutionary Reform Committee and J. U. Akpan as Secretary of the same committee, all officers of the Nigerian Workers Council were declared suspended contrary to the Constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council.
9. That pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 above the defendants drove the plaintiffs from the Nigerian Workers Council Secretariat at 7, Montgomery Road, Yaba broke the lockers belonging to the Secretary and Treasurer of the Nigerian Workers Council planted thugs and hooligans in the office to prevent the Plaintiffs from carrying out their lawful duties.
10. That pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 above, Mr. J. U. Akpan in the company of a number of hooligans came to the house of the Secretary Mr. N. Chukwura and seized the Secretary’s Official Car No. LK. 6042-A Volkswagen 1500 Car and have since prevented the said Secretary N. Chukwura from using the said vehicle.
11. That on the 24th and 25th January, 1970 without notifying the Plaintiffs’ representatives who are the Lawful Secretary and Treasurer respectively of the Nigerian Workers Council, the Defendants purported to hold an emergency Convention and elected themselves unlawfully into offices of President-Mr. Uzor and Secretary-Mr. Akpan and the other defendants as Committee Members of the Nigerian Workers Council contrary to the Constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council.
12. That by the provisions of the Constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council an emergency Convention can be called either:-

(1) By the Central Working Committee or

(2) At the request of at least one third of the affiliated Unions of the Nigerian Workers Council.

(3) The request for such an emergency convention must be channelled through the Central Working Committee.

(4) The Central Working Committee must be summoned by the Secretary acting on the advice of the President.

13. That none of the steps made obligatory by the constitution as itemised in paragraph 12 above was complied with.
14. That at the said unlawful emergency Convention held on the 24th and 25th January, 1970 the defendants and others were elected as President and Secretary and officers of the Nigerian Workers Council and have held themselves out as such officers of the Nigerian Workers Council contrary to the Constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council.
15. That by Constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council it is only the Bi-annual Convention that can amend the constitution and there is no provision for the suspension of the Constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council except under the powers of amendment of the Biannual Convention.
16. That by reason of the defendants said action the plaintiffs and their representatives had been unable to carry out their duties and have suffered loss and damage.
17. That the defendants have published false information about the plaintiffs representatives as follows:-

(1) A letter was written to the Rent Control Tribunal under the Solicitor General and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice Lagos State that Mr. Chukwura should be removed from that Tribunal because he was no longer with the organisation of the Nigerian Workers Council.

(2) A letter was written to the I.C.I. Management to the general effect that Mr. J. O. Enigbokan was no longer an officer of the Nigerian Workers Council.

(3) False publications were made in the newspapers that Messrs Chukwura and Enigbokan were no longer officers of the Nigerian Workers Council.

18. That the plaintiffs therefore seek the remedies as stated on the Writ of Summons.
19. That the plaintiffs have made repeated demands for these remedies but the defendants have refused and neglected to comply.”

Then, without delivering any defence, the appellants applied by motion dated 29th January, 1971, to the court for an order in the terms to the following effect:-

(1) That the plaintiffs claim be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to maintain the action and would not therefore be entitled to any decree against the defendants, jointly or severally;

(2) That judgment be entered for the defendants or the action be struck out on the ground that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action for the relief sought, the action being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court, particularly as the plaintiffs have not alleged any grounds (such as right of property, contract or right to work) which would justify the intervention of the court in the internal affairs of the Nigerian Workers Council.

On 25th February, 1971, the motion came up before Kassim, J. for hearing.

It was elaborately argued in the course of which a number of authorities were cited and relied upon by counsel for both parties.

In a reserved ruling, delivered on 28th May, 1971 the learned trial judge over-ruled the objections and dismissed the application with costs to the respondents, on the ground, inter alia, that,

“This is a case in which certain members of the council complained that the council acted in breach of the rules by which the council and every member of it are bound, and that the council has invaded the individual rights of the complaining members.”

The learned trial judge held further that with regard to the complaint of the respondents as contained in paragraph 11-15 of the statement of claim, the provisions of the constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council constitute a contract between members of the Council, which, like any other contract, is subject to the jurisdiction of the court; and “that the act complained of is prima facie wholly ultra vires the council.”

The appellants have now appealed to this court against the order dismissing their application. They have complained against the ruling of the learned trial judge on a number of grounds. As argued before us by Mr. Ajose Adeogun, their counsel, their complaint may be summarised under three main heads for the purpose of this judgment.

Firstly, they have complained that the learned trial judge failed to consider adequately or at all and also failed properly to direct his mind to the statement of claim filed by the respondents herein and consequently failed to hold that the said statement of claim does not disclose a proper cause of action against the appellants, who are sued jointly and severally and not as representatives of the organisation described by the respondents as the Revolutionary Reform Committee of the Nigerian Workers Council, nor as the representatives of the Nigerian Workers Council as the burden of the complaint by the respondent as manifested in the statement of claim is against the Revolutionary Reform Committee. In support of this submission learned counsel cited and relied upon Order 28, Rule (1) of the High Court of Lagos Rules and pointed out that the application to the High Court was made under the said rule.

Secondly, it was the contention of the appellant that the learned trial judge failed to give consideration to the issue properly raised and argued before him as to whether or not the respondents have any locus standi to institute the action at all against the appellants, jointly and severally and also failed to make any pronouncement as to whether or not the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 HARE 461 [67 ER 189] has any, and if so, what application to the issue raised and argued before him, since the matters pleaded in the statement of claim are purely the internal affairs of the Nigerian Workers Council-an organisation, the composition whereof is nowhere set out in the statement of claim, nor is it anywhere therein alleged that members thereof have separate and individual interests.

Finally, it was the appellants’ complaint that the learned trial judge erred in law in holding that an action sounding in damages for trespass to the property of the Nigerian Workers Council, allegedly wrongfully seized by the appellants, would lie at the instance of respondents, who, as affiliates of the said council were not in possession of the said property in their own individual rights, they not being sued as representatives of the Nigerian Workers Council.

For the respondents, Mr. Atilade, learned counsel submitted that the learned trial judge was right in holding that the statement of claim disclosed a cause of action and that the complaint of the respondents in terms of the statement of claim were directed against the Nigerian Workers Council; and that although the Nigerian Workers Council was not a party to the proceedings, it was still open to the respondents to apply to the court to have the council joined as a party thereto. Learned counsel pointed out that the gravamen of the respondents’ complaint was that something which ought to have been done by a special majority of the Nigerian Workers Council was not so done; and that the majority of the members of the Nigerian Workers Council had not the power to do what they did without the requisite majority as provided by the constitution.

It was conceded, however, by learned counsel that the Nigerian Workers Council was not a party to the action; that the property alleged to have been seized by the appellants belong to the Nigerian Workers Council; and that the respondents represented only three unions out of a total union membership of 103 affiliated to, and which constitute the Nigerian Workers Council. The respondents were therefore in a minority.

We now consider these submissions, and, for the purpose, we think it necessary to examine both the particulars endorsed on the writ of summons and the averments contained in the statement of claim filed and delivered.

On the writ of summons, the appellants are stated to be sued jointly and severally. The claims endorsed on the said writ of summons fall under four separate and distinct heads. They comprise two declarations, an injunction and damages. The first item of claim seeks a declaration that the appellants’ (defendants’) action in forming a Revolutionary Reform Committee of an organisation known as the Nigerian Workers Council is unlawful and against the constitution of the said Nigerian Workers Council. The second declaration sought that the election of certain persons, including some only of the appellants, as officials of the Nigerian Workers Council is illegal. There then follows a claim for an injunction to restrain the appellants from preventing the respondents’ representatives from carrying on their functions as Secretary and Treasurer respectively of the Nigerian Workers council. The last item is a claim for 10,000pounds damages for unlawful obstruction of the respondents’ representatives and for unlawful seizure of the property of the Nigerian Workers Council. Thus, the claims as endorsed on the writ of summons would appear to be somewhat confusing. As under the first head of claim, the appellants are alleged to have formed an unlawful Revolutionary Reform Committee, the question which naturally arises is, against whose interests was this Revolutionary Reform Committee Surely, the answer must be that such a committee must be against the interest of the Nigerian Workers Council. And yet the Nigerian Workers Council is not a party to the action.

The second head of claim, which alleges that the election of certain individuals as officials of the Nigerian Workers Council is illegal, does not state how this illegality affects the interest of the respondents. There appears to be a confusion of thought in connection with the claims put forward by the respondents on the writ of summons.

One naturally would have thought that the statement of claim which follows would do something to bridge the gap, create a link and clarify the position as regards the various items of claim endorsed on the writ of summons. This does not appear to have been successfully achieved by the statement of claim.

Analytically, it seems possible to divide the statement of claim, apart from paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, which are merely introductory, into three main parts. The first part comprises paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 which contain allegations that certain unnamed and unidentified individuals, contrary to the constitution of the Nigerian Workers Council, had formed themselves into a Revolutionary Reform Committee; purported to hold a representative meeting of affiliates of the said council; and passed unparticularised resolutions. It is nowhere pleaded in the statement of claim that the individuals, who had formed the alleged Revolutionary Reform Committee, are the appellants. There is apparently no link between the endorsement on the writ of summons and the allegations contained in the statement of claim in this respect. It seems, therefore, difficult to see how the appellants, who are not sued in their capacity as members or representatives of the Revolutionary Reform Committee of the Workers Council, can be called upon to answer for the acts of such a committee in their individual capacity.

On the pleadings, there appears to be no nexus between the individual appellants and the body known as the Revolutionary Reform Committee. It is still more incomprehensible that the three unions, represented by the respondents, not stated in the statement of claim to be members or agents of the Nigerian Workers Council, can be heard to complain about any injury done to the property of the said council.

The second part of the statement of claim consists of paragraphs 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 which contain allegations concerning the regulation and management of the Nigerian Workers Council; breaches of its constitution; and trespass upon its goods. Then there is paragraph 17 which constitutes the third part of the statement of claim. It introduces an entirely new element into the case, namely, a claim in respect of falsehood. The allegation is that certain letters containing falsehood and certain false publications were made in some unnamed newspapers about certain individuals alleged to be members of the Nigerian Workers Council. This item of claim nowhere features in the particulars endorsed on the writ of summons and appears inconsistent therewith just as the averments contained in paragraph 5 of the statement of claims are irreconcilable with the endorsement on the writ of summons seeking a declaration that the formation of a Revolutionary Reform Committee is illegal.

The statement of claim is a remarkable document. For instance, there is therein no averment as to the composition of the Nigerian Workers Council, that is to say, its membership and the qualification for such membership. It is even more astonishing from the point of view of their case that the respondents failed to plead directly that they are members of the said council. They also failed to plead their right in the said council. There is no allegation by the respondents that they have the authority of the council as its agent to institute the proceedings, and, indeed, to claim damages for the wrongful seizure of its properties. We think this is a very serious omission as it raises at once, the question of the locus standi of the respondents in instituting the action, as well as the question of the competency of the action itself; or as to whether the statement of claim as framed discloses any cause of action against the appellants; and as to how the respondents as unions, nowhere identified as members of the Nigerian Workers Council can be damnified by the unconstitutional activities alleged in the statement of claim. These are some of the matters which the statement of claim ought to have disclosed and which it failed to do.

The statement of claim appears to us to contain a number of inconsistencies and to be incurably defective. The learned trial judge, in his ruling would appear not to have been unaware of some of those defects. He was faced with the dilemma of his own making and which he never attempted to resolve. This principally accounts for his failure to relate the authorities reviewed by him to the issues properly raised and argued before him. He expressed very clearly this dilemma in the course of his ruling by the number of questions which he posed himself in the underquoted passage of his ruling. He said:

“Now it is apparent on the statement of claim that the plaintiffs are unincorporated associations of workers, although it is stated that they sue by their representatives, Mr. N. Chukwura for the first plaintiffs and Mr. J. O. Enigbokan for the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs. Are we to understand that in paragraph 9 of the statement of claim the plaintiffs are saying that the defendants drove all the members of three plaintiffs/workers unions from the Secretariat of the Nigerian Workers Council at 7, Montgomery Road, Yaba And are they complaining about the breaking of the lockers belonging to the secretary and treasurer of the council on behalf of themselves or on behalf of the Council Are we being asked to take it that preventing the secretary and treasurer from carrying out their lawful duties to the Council tantamounts to preventing the three unincorporated plaintiffs/unions from performing their duties to it And, assuming that the answer to the last question is in the affirmative, what were the duties which the plaintiffs were performing for the Council”

It is evident from the above passage of the ruling that the learned trial judge found himself in some difficulty and was unable to determine the nature of the respondents’ case, on the statement of claim against the appellants, which would entitle them to the several relief which they seek. It is clear that the lockers allegedly broken were the property of the Nigerian Workers Council; so too was the office referred to in the statement of claim.

In paragraph 3 of the statement of claim, it is alleged that N. Chukwura and J. O. Enigbokan, who now purport to represent the respondents in the present suit, were at the annual convention of the Nigerian Workers Council returned unopposed as Secretary and Treasurer respectively of the said council; and since it is not therein alleged that they were so returned by virtue of their being officials of the respondents or as nominees of the respondents, it must be presumed that they were so returned in their own right as individuals. If that be so, and since it is alleged in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the statement of claim that they were subsequently suspended and thereby prevented from performing their official duties, it seems to us that they and they alone in their own right or as officials of the Nigerian Workers Council are the only persons entitled to complain against those who had so unlawfully, according to them, prevented them from discharging their functions therthereby depriving them of their offices. The respondents therefore would appear to have no locus standi to institute the present proceedings, particularly as it is nowhere, in the statement of claim, alleged that they themselves have in any way been deprived of their right still to continue as members of the Nigerian Workers Council, if ever they were.

The learned trial judge, having found that the act complained of was “prima facie ultra vires the council,” that the case was one “in which certain members of the council acted in breach of the rules by which the council and every member of it are bound, and that the council have invaded the individual rights of the complainant members” erred in law not to have held that the proper defendant, that is, the Nigerian Workers Council was not before the court; and that if even the alleged contraventions were proven, the respondents, having sued the appellants in their individual capacity, would not be entitled to the relief claimed.

In our view, it is also possible to hold that, having regard to the allegations contained in the statement of claim, the respondents’ complaints were partly directed against the Revolutionary Reform Committee and partly against the Nigerian Workers Council, neither of which was a party to the action. The whole matter might well have been treated as the internal affairs of the Nigerian Workers Council on the authority of Foss v. Harbottle (supra) which the members could easily have resolved internally among themselves.

In his ruling, the learned trial judge appeared to have drawn heavily from Edward and another v. Halliwell and others (1950) 2 ALL. E.R. 1064 in which it was held that as the matter in question in that case was not a mere irregularity in the internal management of the unions concerned, but a matter of substance, tinctured with oppression, the court would grant the plaintiffs therein relief, if it was proper to do so, as distinct from the decision in Foss v. Harbottle (supra). But in relying on this authority, the learned trial judge overlooked the fact that in that case, to start with, the proper parties were before the court. That is not the case in the appeal under consideration.

In Edward and another v. Halliwell and others (supra) two members of a union sued on behalf of themselves and all other members of a registered trade union. The defendants therein were sued on behalf of themselves and all other members of the executive committee of their union, and the union itself was joined as defendant. Pleadings were duly filed and delivered and the case tried.

Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs therein. The position in the present case on appeal is different and distinguishable from the circumstances set out above. The appellants as defendants in the case under consideration are not sued on behalf of themselves and all other members of the executive committee of the Nigereian Workers Council.

For the reasons given above; this appeal succeeds. It is allowed. We make the following order: Suit No. LD/600/1970 in the High Court of Lagos State is hereby dismissed as incompetent. And this shall be the judgment of the court. Costs to the appellants both in this, and in the High Court are assessed and fixed at N92 and N30 respectively.

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Other Citation: (1973) LCN/1678(SC)